Uttarakhand High Court
State Of Uttarakhand vs Ajam on 12 June, 2017
Author: Rajiv Sharma
Bench: Rajiv Sharma, Sharad Sharma
Reserved Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Government Appeal No. 12 of 2011
State of Uttarakhand ....Appellant
Versus
Ajam .... Respondent
Mr. Amit Bhatt, A.G.A for the State/appellant.
Mr. Mohd. Umar, Advocate for the respondent.
Reserved on : 05.06.2017
Decided on: 12.06.2017
Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma,J.
Hon'ble Sharad Sharma, J.
Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma,J.
The State has preferred this appeal against the judgment and order dated 05.08.2010, rendered by learned Sessions Judge, Roorkee, District Haridwar in Sessions Trial No. 72 of 2010, whereby the respondent- accused, who was tried with and charged for the offence punishable under Section 307 of I.P.C., was acquitted.
2. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that PW1 Kunwar Singh submitted a written report to the Police Station, Roorkee on 18.12.2009, mentioning therein, that his daughter Km. Kavita was coming back to her house on 18.12.2009 at 2.30 P.M. after taking tuitions. When she reached near the house of Shehnawaz, Advocate, she noticed that the accused/respondent was chasing her. He was carrying a mug in his hand, which contained acid. The accused ran behind the daughter of the complainant by proclaiming that he will kill her and while saying so, he threw acid on PW2 Kavita. The face of Kavita was burned. Thereafter, the accused ran away from the spot. The victim was taken to the Joint Hospital, Roorkee for treatment. The matter was investigated and challan was put up after completing all the codal formalities.
23. The prosecution has examined as many as seven witnesses in support of its case. The statement of the accused was also recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. He denied the case of the prosecution. The trial court acquitted the accused vide the impugned judgment dated 05.08.2010. Hence, the State has come up in appeal before this Court.
4. Mr. Amit Bhatt, learned A.G.A. for the State /appellant has vehemently argued that the prosecution has proved its case against the accused.
5. Mr. Mohd. Umar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, has supported the judgment dated 05.08.2010.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the judgment very carefully.
7. PW1 Kunwar Singh, father of victim, has testified that he works as a Fitter in the Laboratory. He was present in his office on 18.12.2009. His daughter informed him telephonically that somebody has poured acid on her. He reached his home. He noticed burn injuries on the body of his daughter. He inquired from his daughter about the manner in which the incident took place. She told that the accused started chasing her and he was insisting her to stop, however, she did not stop. The accused was carrying a box (container) in his hand. When his daughter reached near the house of Shehnawaz, Advocate, accused proclaimed that since she is not interested in listening him, he would ruin her life. Thereafter, he poured acid on her body. She received severe burn injuries. The accused left the spot after hurling abuses on her. He (PW-1) father of the victim, reported the matter to the S.H.O., Police Station Roorkee.
3The accused was acquainted with the family members of the victim. The Police has taken into possession the burnt hair, sweater, jeans and shirt of the victim.
8. PW1 Kunwar Singh, in his cross examination, has admitted that he was not the eyewitness of the incident. He received the information from his daughter on telephone between 2.30 P.M. to 3.00 P.M. He reached his house with his colleagues. He took his daughter to the hospital. His daughter was admitted for a night in the hospital. Thereafter, the matter was reported to the Police. The complaint was lodged by his friend.
9. PW2 Kavita, the victim, has categorically testified in her examination-in-chief that when she was coming back from the tuitions on 18.12.2009, at about 2.30 P.M., the accused, whom she recognized in the Court, was standing in the street. He was carrying a box (container) in his hand. He started chasing her. The accused, at an isolated place, near the house of Shahnawaz, Advocate poured acid on her. She tried to save herself. The acid had fallen on her body. She felt burning sensation. Her clothes were also burnt. The accused was shouting that if she did not belong to him, he would ruin her life. She shouted. Thereafter, the accused ran away. She further deposed that the accused used to stalk her. His brother had warned the accused to mend his ways but to no avail.
10. She has also admitted in her cross examination that she was taken to the hospital by her father on the motorcycle.
11. The statement of P.W.2 has been corroborated by her brother P.W.3 Pankaj. According to him, the accused used to harass his sister. He requested him not to 4 do so. Thereafter, the accused stopped coming to their house. His sister has told him the manner, in which, the accused has thrown acid on her. She received burn injuries. She was taken to hospital. He also went to the hospital and the FIR was registered.
12. PW4 Dr. Swati Murari is the material witness of the case. She medically examined the victim PW2 and has found burn injuries on the person of the victim. The same are being reproduced below:-
"1. Blister present over right side of hand.
2. Blister present over right side face
3. Blister present over right side neck
4. Blister present over left side face near neck.
5. Blister present over left side neck.
6. Blister present over both side of chest.
7. Blister present over dorsum of right foot.
8. Hair present singeing over right occipital region.
9. Blister present over dorsum of right hand and left hand.
Opinion- all injuries are superficial, fresh caused by burn. Opinion- reserved."
13. PW4 Dr. Swati Murari has proved the medical report. According to her statement, PW2 has received burn injuries due to acid. Burn injuries were fresh, superficial and not fatal.
14. PW5 Constable, Gambhir Singh, in his cross examination has deposed that the box (container), which was taken in possession, was not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination.
15. P.W. 6 & 7 namely Vijay Pal Singh and Dinesh Singh Bhandari are formal witnesses.
16. What emerges from the facts enumerated hereinabove is that the accused used to stalk the victim PW2 Kavita. When PW2 Kavita was coming back to her house from tuitions, she was chased by the accused. The 5 accused threatened her to kill and poured acid on her body. PW2 Kavita received burn injuries. Her clothes were also burnt. Her sister informed PW1 Kunwar Singh about the incident. PW1 Kunwar Singh took PW2 Kavita to the hospital. She was examined by PW4 Dr. Swati Murari. The incident was also narrated by PW2 to her father PW1 Kunwar Singh as well as her brother PW3 Pankaj.
17. It has come on the record that the accused used to visit the house of the victim. He used to harass her. PW2 apprised his brother about his misbehavior. PW3 Pankaj told the accused not to harass his sister. He stopped coming to their house. The accused poured acid on the body of PW2. PW2 received the burn injuries.
18. According to PW4, Dr. Swati Murari, she noticed a number of burn injuries on the body of PW2. According to her testimony, these injuries were caused by acid.
19. The prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had thrown acid on P.W.2 Kavita Devi, which led to burn injuries.
20. PW2 Kavita Devi has deposed that the accused was forcing her to stop but she did not stop and thereafter accused proclaimed that he would ruin her life. The Police has taken in possession the burnt clothes of the victim, which were duly proved in the court. The Trial Court has acquitted the accused, primarily on the ground that the box (container), which was recovered from the spot, was not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. The statement of P.W.2, Kavita Devi has been duly corroborated by her father PW1 Kunwar Singh and brother PW3 Pankaj. Merely, that the container was not sent for forensic examination, it could not result in the acquittal of the accused. The case of the prosecution 6 cannot be thrown out on the basis of defective investigation.
21. Learned Trial Court has also taken a very hyper-technical view that there was some overwriting in the FIR and the person, who has written the complaint i.e. Shri Yadav, was not examined. Shri Yadav is not the material witness. Learned Trial Court was required to read the statement of Doctor as a whole. The observation of learned Trial Court that the petitioner could be carrying hot water is perverse, in view of the overwhelming evidence led by the prosecution that the accused was carrying acid in the container and threw the same on the victim.
22. The accused had preplanned to throw acid on PW2, knowing fully well that acid would cause serious injuries to her which could also be life threatening. In the case under Section 307 I.P.C., it is not the injuries, which matters but it is the intention/knowledge to kill. It has come, as noticed hereinabove that the accused was shouting at the time of throwing acid on the body of PW2 that he would ruin her life. PW4. Dr. Swati Murari has duly testified that the burn injuries were received by the victim.
23. After a judgment was rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the State Government has framed the Rules called "The Uttarakhand Poisons (Possession and Sale) Rules, 2015". Rule 14 lays down that a licence holder shall not sell any poison to any single person, unless accompanied by minimum one companion as witness to disclose the purpose of purchase. Rules 14, 16, 17, 18 & 19 of the Rules read as under:-
Person to whom 14. (1) A licence holder shall not sell any poison to poisons may be any single person, unless accompanied by sold- minimum one companion as witness to disclose the purpose of purchase.7
(2) The buyer must be personally known to the licence holder, or identified to his satisfaction by producing a Photo Identity Card which has his address or substantiate it with a document giving his address.
(3) The licence holder shall also ascertain, before selling any poison, the name, telephone number and address of the buyer and the witness and the purpose for which the poison is purchased.
(4) The licence holder shall not sell any poison to any person who appears to him to be under the age of eighteen years, or to any person who does not appear to him to him to be in full possession of his faculties.
Stock Register 16. (1) The licence holder shall maintain in respect of of Poisons each poison, a stock register which shall contain the following details, namely:-
(a) Serial No;
(b) Date;
(c) Quantity received;
(d) Name and address of person from
whom received;
(e) Quantity sold;
(f) Balance in stock; and
(g) Remarks.
(2) The licence holder, at the end of each month, shall intimate the following to the local Police Station, namely:-
(a) Balance of different poison at the
beginning of the month;
(b) Details of the Quantity sold
purchserwise with purpose during the
month;
(c) Name of the purchaser and witnesses
with address; and
(d) Balance stock at the end of the month
for different poisons.
(3) Poison issued from stock to the dispensary on any day for retails sale and for dispensing of prescriptions shall be entered as one item in the issue said of the register with a note to that effect.
(4) Where poisons issued to different institutions for its use in the laboratory or Industry, the head of the institution shall ensure of its proper use and no quantity of poison shall be pilfered.
(5) The daily balance of stock must be entered in the register.
Custody of 17. (1) All poisons kept for sale under these rules by poison kept for any licence holder shall be kept securely in a sale and box, almirah, room or building (according to labeling of the quantity maintained) which shall be receptacles in secured by lock and key and in which no which they are substance shall be placed other than poisons kept. possessed in accordance with a licence granted under the Act, and each poison shall be kept securely within such box, almirah, room or building in a separate closed receptacle of glass, plastic metal or 8 earthenware.
(2) Every such box, almirah, room or building and every such receptacle shall be marked with the word "POISON" in red letters, both in English and in the local language and in the case of receptacles containing separate poisons, with the name of such poisons.
Poison sold to 18. When any poison is sold, it shall be the securely securely packed in a closed receptacle or packed and container (according to the quantity); and labeled- every such receptacle or packet shall be labeled by the licensee with a red label bearing in English and in local language giving the name of the poison and the name and address of the licensee.
The following universal warning symbols shall also be displayed on the receptacle.
Security, 19. A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Storage And outlining the measures undertaken for security, Incident storage and incident management of acids/corrosive Management Of substances shall be prepared and displayed Acids/Corrosive prominently in the premises of the user. Substances By (1) Security of acid/corrosive substances. Users (Except (a) A person shall be made accountable for Individuals):- possession and safe keeping of acid in the premises.
(b) The storage of acid/corrosive shall be under the supervision of this person.
(c) The storage of acid/corrosive shall be under double lock system to ensure more security.
(d) A register of usage of acid shall be maintained and the same shall be filed with the concerned SDM (or Tehsildar wherever the office of SDM does not exist) every quarter.
(e) There shall be compulsory checking of the students/personnel leaving the laboratories /place of storage where acid/corrosive is used/stored.
(2) Storage of acids/corrosive substances.
(a) The chemicals should be stored in plastic or other suitable containers.
(b) All storage containers should be labeled to indicate the identity of the chemicals and the hazards involved and the precautions to be taken.
(c) Incompatible chemicals should not be stored together.
(d) The inventory of corrosive chemicals should be kept to a minimum.
(e) Protective glove, aprons, safety glasses and face shields should be worn where appropriate.
(3) Incident Management
(a) Skin contact: Quickly take off contaminated clothing, and gently leather goods (e.g. watchbands, belts).
Quickly and gently blot or brush away excess chemical. Immediately flush with lukewarm, gently flowing water for at least 30 minutes. Do not interrupt flushing, if it can be done safely;
9continue flushing during transport to hospital. Immediately call a Poison Centre or doctor treatment is urgently required, or call transport to a hospital.
(b) Eye contact: Avoid direct contact.
Wear chemical protective gloves if necessary. Quickly and gently blot or brush chemical off the face. Immediately flush the contaminated eye (s) with lukewarm, gently flowing water for at least 30 minutes, while holding the eyelid(s) open. If a contact lens is present, do not delay flushing or attempt to remove the lens. Neutral saline solution may be used as soon as it is available. Do not interrupt flushing. If necessary, continue flushing during transport to hospital.
(c) Ingestion: Have victim rinse mouth with water. If vomiting occurs naturally, have victim lean forward to reduce risk of aspiration. Have victim rinse mouth with water again.
Immediately call a Poison Centre or doctor. If treatment is urgently required, transport victim to a hospital.
(d) Inhalation: Take precautions to ensure your own safety before attempting rescue (e.g. wear appropriate protective equipment), Move victim to fresh air.
Keep at rest in a position comfortable for breathing. If breathing is difficult, trained personnel should administer emergency oxygen. Do not allow victim to move about unnecessarily.
Symptoms of pulmonary edema may be delayed. Immediately call a Poison Centre or doctor. Treatment is urgently required. Transport to a hospital."
24. The State Government under its ancillary powers conferred by Section 357-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has framed Scheme called "The Uttarakhand Victim from Crime Assistance Scheme, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "Scheme") notified on 16.07.2013. According to Schedule 1 defines particulars of loss or injury caused to victim and maximum limit of assistance in the cases injury is caused by the acid attack.
(a) if face/head injured- Rs. 1,50,000/-
(b) if other organs injured - R. 30,000/-
1025. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2016) 3 SCC 669, in the case of Laxmi vs. Union of India and others and other analogous matters has directed to the States to constitute a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board specially for the acid attack victims. Thus State is required to constitute a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board separately for the acid attack victims. Normally, under the scheme, a lump sump payment is made. But taking into consideration the trauma and uncertainities of life faced by the acid attack victims, it would be better that scheme be framed by the State to pay monthly payment to help them in leading a normal life.
26. In McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology, 10th Edition, the burns has been explained alongwith treatment as under:-
"Burn:- The reaction that occurs when tissue (usually skin) receives more energy (heat, chemical energy, electrical energy, or radiation) than it can absorb without injury. Factors such as the duration of contact, temperature, volume of chemical, and voltage influence the severity of the injury. The notable influence the severity of the injury. The notable pathologic changes are denaturation of protein and coagulation of blood vessel. Local destruction of tissue leads to bacterial invasion and infection, loss of fluid, electrolytes, and protein; loss of temperature control: and pain. Systemic reactions include altered blood flow and temperature regulation, fluid catabolism. Associated problems-other illnesses (particularly cardiopulmonary), trauma, and injuries caused by inhaling carbon monoxide, smoke, and occasionally heat- may be lethal or contribute significantly to mortality and morbidity from burn injuries.
Classification. Burns are classified according to location, percentage of total body surface involved, and depth of injury First -degree burns, for example, sunburn, are superficial burns that result in some redness, pain, and swelling. Blister formation and necrosis (tissue death) do not extend beyond the epidermis (outer layer of skin).11
Healing is competed in a few days, and there is no scarring.
Second-degree burns, for example, scalds, are burns that show destruction of the entire epidermis and variable portions of the dermis (inner layer of skin); blistering and swelling occur and pain is severe. The degree of scarring depends on the depth of injury to the dermis. Skin grafting may be necessary if burns are deep or if trauma or secondary infection ensues and deepens the necrosis.
Third-degree burns, for example, flame burns, are characterized by necrosis of the epidermis and dermis, including the dermal appendages (hair follicles and sweat glands). A pearly white, tan, or brownish-black eschar ("scab") with coagulated dermal blood vessels results. After 14 to 21 days, the eschar sloughs, leaving a raw surface. Skin grafting is usually necessary.
Fourth-degree burns, for example, severe electrical injuries, involve all layers of skin, as well as the underlying fat, muscle, nerves, or bone. These injuries may require both amputation and skin grafting to heal."
27. There is a disfigurement to the body of acid attacks victim. It reduces the chances of their marriage and to get public employment. According to the news items, which appeared in the daily Edition of Indian Express of 10.04.2015, there were 83, 85, 66, 309 acid attack cases in the years 2011, 2012, 2013 & 2014 respectively. There were 6266 cases of stalking, registered under Section 354B of I.P.C. As per, Crime India, 2015 published by National Crime Records Bureau (MH), there were 838 cases were registered of Voyeurism.
28. We are required to address this issue seriously.
29. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 746 in the case of Francis Coralie Mullin Vs. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others, have held that the right to live enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more that just physical survival. The 12 right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely, moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Their Lordships have held as under :-
"5. We must therefore proceed to consider whether any of the fundamental rights of the detenu are violated by sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause 3(b) so as to result in their invalidation wholly or in part. We will first take up for consideration the fundamental right of the detenu under Article 21 because that is a fundamental right which has, after the decision in Maneka Gandhi case1 a highly activist magnitude and it embodies a constitutional value of supreme importance in a democratic society. It provides that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law and such procedure shall be reasonable, fair and just. Now what is the true scope and ambit of the right to life guaranteed under this article? While arriving at the proper meaning and content of the right to life, we must remember that it is a constitutional provision which we are expounding and moreover it is a provision enacting a fundamental right and the attempt of the court should always be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental right rather than to attenuate its meaning and content. The luminous guideline in the interpretation of a constitutional provision is provided by the Supreme Court of United States in Weems v.U.S.13 "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had, therefore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of Constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it'. The future is their care, and provisions for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a Constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a Constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in the words might be lost in reality.13
And this has been recognised. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction."
This principle of interpretation which requires that a constitutional provision must be construed, not in a narrow and constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that the constitutional provision does not get atrophied or fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challenges, applies with greater force in relation to a fundamental right enacted by the Constitution. The fundamental right to life which is the most precious human right and which forms the ark of all other rights must therefore be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person.
6. Now obviously, the right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical survival. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.14 Subba Rao, J. quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois15 to emphasize the quality of life covered by Article 21 : 16 "By the term "life" as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world" and this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the first Sunil Batra case4. Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected by Article 21 and a fortiorari, this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Article 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and, furthermore, deprivation is not an act which is complete once and for all: it is a continuing act and so long as it lasts, it must be in accordance with procedure established by law. It is therefore clear that any act which damages or injures or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of a person, either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21.
7. But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about 14 and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights. Now obviously, any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and it would, on this view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, but no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. It would thus be seen that there is implicit in Article 21 the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right to live which is comprehended within the broad connotation of the right to life can concededly be abridged according to procedure established by law and therefore when a person is lawfully imprisoned, this right to live is bound to suffer attenuation to the extent to which it is incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. The prisoner or detenu obviously cannot move about freely by going outside the prison walls nor can he socialise at his free- will with persons outside the jail. But, as part of the right to live with human dignity and therefore as a necessary component of the right to life, he would be entitled to have interviews with the members of his family and friends and no prison regulation or procedure laid down by prison regulation regulating the right to have interviews with the members of the family and friends can be upheld as constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 21, unless it is reasonable, fair and just."
30. In the present case, accused had been stalking the victim and forcibly asked her to stop when she refused, he poured acid upon her, causing severe burn injuries. Scars shall remain on her body and mind forever, reminding her of that fateful day.
1531. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1995 SC 922 in the case of Consumer Education and Research Centre and others Vs. Union of India and others, have held that social justice means to ensure life to be meaningful and liveable with human dignity. Their Lordships have further held that life includes right to livelihood, better standard of life, hygienic conditions in work place and leisure.
"20. The preamble and Article 38 of the Constitution of India - the supreme law, envisions social justice as its arch to ensure life to be meaningful and livable with human dignity. Jurisprudence is the eye of law giving an insight into the environment of which it is the expression. It relates the law to the spirit of the time and makes it richer. Law is the ultimate aim of every civilised society as a key system in a given era, to meet the needs and demands of its time. Justice, according to law, comprehends social urge and commitment. The Constitution commands justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as supreme values to usher in the egalitarian social, economic and political democracy. Social justice, equality and dignity of person are corner stones of social democracy. The concept 'social justice' which the Constitution of India engrafted, consists of diverse principles essential for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. "Social justice"
is thus an integral part of "justice" in generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic device to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, Dalits, Tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. Social justice is not a simple or single idea of a society but is an essential part of complex social change to relieve the poor etc. from handicaps, penury to ward off distress, and to make their life livable, for greater good of the society at large. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectations. Social security, just and humane conditions of work and leisure to workman are part of his meaningful right to life and to achieve self- expression of his personality and to enjoy the life with dignity, the State should provide facilities and opportunities to enable them to reach at least minimum standard of health, economic security and civilised living while sharing according to the capacity, social and cultural heritage.
24. The expression 'life' assured in Article 21 of the Constitution does not connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a much wider meaning which includes right to livelihood, better standard of living, hygienic conditions in work place and leisure. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 16 AIR1986SC180 , this Court held that no person can live without the means of living i.e. means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content of meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live, leave aside what makes life livable. The right to life with human dignity encompasses within its fold, some of the finer facets of human civilisation which makes life worth living. The expanded connotation of life would mean the tradition and cultural heritage of the persons concerned. In State of H.P. v. Umed Ram Shanna [1986]1SCR251 , this Court held that the right to life includes the quality of life as understood in its richness and fullness by the ambit of the constitution. Access to road was held to be an access to life itself in that state."
32. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in AIR 1997 SC 645 in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation etc. vs. United Labour Union and others etc. have held that the preamble and Article 38 of the Constitution envision social justice as the arch to ensure life to be meaningful and livable with human dignity. "Social Justice" is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Their lordships have held as under:-
"41A. The Preamble and Article 38 of the Constitution envision social justice as the arch to ensure life to be meaningful and liveable with human dignity. Jurisprudence is the eye of law giving an insight into the environment of which it is the expression. It relates the law to the spirit of the time and makes it richer. Law is the ultimate aim of every civilised society, as a key system in a given era, to meet the needs and demands of its time. Justice, according to law, comprehends social urge and commitment. The Constitution commands justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as supreme values to usher in the egalitarian social, economic and political democracy. Social justice, equality and dignity of person are cornerstones of social democracy. The concept of "social justice" which the Constitution of India engrafted, consists of diverse principles essential for the orderly growth and development of personality of every citizen. "Social justice" is thus an integral part of justice in the generic sense. Justice is the genus, of which social justice is one of its species. Social justice is a dynamic device to mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. Social justice is not a simple or single idea of a society 17 but is an essential part of complex social change to relieve the poor etc. from handicaps, penury to ward off distress and to make their life liveable, for greater good of the society at large. In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain substantial degree of social, economic and political equality, which is the legitimate expectation and constitutional goal. Social security, just and humane conditions of work and leisure to workman are part of his meaningful right to life and to achieve self-expression of his personality and to enjoy the life with dignity. The State should provide facility and opportunities to enable them to reach at least minimum standard of health, economic security and civilised living while sharing according to their capacity, social and cultural heritage.
42. In a developing society like ours, steeped with unbridgeable and ever-widening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a catalyst, rubicon to the poor etc. to reach the ladder of social justice. What is due cannot be ascertained by an absolute standard which keeps changing, depending upon the time, place and circumstance. The constitutional concern of social justice as an elastic continuous process is to accord justice to all sections of the society by providing facilities and opportunities to remove handicaps and disabilities with which the poor, the workmen etc. are languishing and to secure dignity of their person. The Constitution, therefore, mandates the State to accord justice to all members of the society in all facets of human activity. The concept of social justice embeds equality to flavour and enliven the practical content of life. Social justice and equality are complementary to each other so that both should maintain their vitality. Rule of law, therefore, is a potent instrument of social justice to bring about equality in results. It was accordingly held that right to social justice and right to health are Fundamental Rights. The management was directed to provide health insurance during service and at least 15 years after retirement and periodical tests for protecting the health of the workmen.
33. Ours is a welfare State. Thus, as and when cases of acid throwing occur, immediate steps are required to be taken to arrest the accused/culprits and to take steps to reduce suffering of the acid victims.
34. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 1983 (1) SCC 124 in the case of Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others, have held that the expression "life" in Article 21 does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life but has a much wider meaning. Their Lordships have held as under:-
18"13. We would reach the same conclusion for a different reason altogether. The 1st respondent while submitting a reply to the charge-sheet dated April 14, 1975 requested the Chairman of the appellant to permit him assistance of an advocate at the enquiry. This request was refused and the decision was conveyed by the Dock Manager as per his letter dated March (sic) 1975. The enquiry opened on April 13, 1976. By May 8, 1976 evidence of only one out of 25 witnesses of the employer was offered and the second witness was under
examination. On that date Bombay Port Trust Employees Regulations, 1976 admittedly came into force. The relevant Regulation 12(8) is extracted herein before. The latter portion of the regulation practically borrows the language of sub-rule (5) of Rule 15 referred to herein before, in that it provides that the delinquent officer may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority is the legal practitioner or the Disciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. Now the 1st respondent had already submitted his request for appearing through a legal practitioner at the enquiry. This eminently just request was turned down on untenable grounds, and to make matters worse for the delinquent employee two Law Officers of the appellant were appointed Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officers. Assuming that in the absence of rules the Chairman has a discretion which was required to be exercised wisely yet taking shelter behind legal facade it was exercised against the 1st respondent because he was not under any statutory obligation to grant this request. However, when Regulation 12(8) came into force, the situation materially altered and the large number of witnesses almost all except one were examined after the regulation came into force and which made it obligatory to grant the request of the 1st respondent because the regulation provided granting of permission to appear and defend by a legal practitioner once the department was represented by legally trained minds. A very feeble submission was made by Mr Nariman that after the Regulation 12(8) came into force, the request was not renewed. In our opinion, that is hardly relevant. The unjustly refused request was already there and obligation under the regulation coupled with fair play in action demanded that the employer should have suo motu reviewed his order refusing the request. In fact one can go so far as to say that the Enquiry Officer in order to be fair and just, whenever he finds the employer appointing legally trained persons as Presenting-cum- Prosecuting Officers must enquire from the delinquent employee before commencement of enquiry whether he would like to take assistance of a legal practitioner. The option then is with the delinquent employee. In this connection, we would like to refer to a weighty observation on this point where despite constitutional inhibition this Court conceded such a right. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India6 at P. 334 (Para 93) [1982 SCC (Cri) p. 208], the learned Chief Justice while rejecting the contention that a detenu should be entitled to appear through a legal adviser before the Advisory Board 19 observed that Article 22(3)(b) makes it clear that the legal practitioner should not be permitted to appear before an Advisory Board for any party. While noting this constitutional mandate, the learned Chief Justice proceeded to examine, what would be the effect if the department is represented before the Advisory Board by a legally trained person. It was held that in such a situation despite the inhibition of Article 22(3)(b) the fair procedure as contemplated by Article 21 requires that a detenu be permitted to appear by a legal practitioner. Thus spoke the learned Chief Justice:
"We must therefore make it clear that if the detaining authority or the government takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner. We are informed that officers of the Government in the concerned departments often appear before the Board and assist it with a view to justifying the detention orders. If that be so, we must clarify that the Boards should not permit the authorities to do indirectly what they cannot do directly; and no one should be enabled to take shelter behind the excuse that such officers are not 'legal practitioners' or legal advisers."
And this view was taken as flowing from Article 21 which mandates that no one shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. The expression "life" does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life. The expression "life" has a much wider meaning. Where therefore the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely to adversely affect reputation or livelihood of a person, some of the finer graces of human civilization which make life worth living would be jeopardised and the same can be put in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair procedures. In this context one can recall the famous words of Chapter II of Bhagwad-Gita:
"Sambhavitasya Cha Kirti Marnadati Richyate"
Therefore in this case, there can be no doubt that for the additional reason that after the Regulation 12(8) came into force, the 1st respondent should have been given a reasonable opportunity to appear through legal practitioner and failure on their part had vitiated the enquiry. For these reasons, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs 2000."
35. It is the responsibility of the State to take protective as well as remedial measures to ensure that lives of citizens are protected.
36. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1983) 2 SCC 28 in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Balram Bama Patil and others have held that it is 20 not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. The Court has to ensure the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge as per the plain language of Section 307 of I.P.C. Their lordships have held as under:
"9. Shri Rana appearing for the State strenuously contended that the High Court has committed a grave error in holding that the offence under Section 307 IPC was not made out merely because the injuries inflicted on the witnesses were in the nature of a simple hurt and in these circumstances it is not possible to hold any of the accused persons guilty in respect of that offence. We find considerable force in this contention. A bare perusal of Section 307 IPC would show that the reasons given by the High Court for acquitting the accused of the offence under Section 307 were not tenable. Section 307 IPC reads:
"Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."
To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof."
2137. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in 1989 (4) SCC 286 in the case of Pt. Parmanand Katara Vs. Union of India and others, have held that private doctors are also obliged to give immediate medical relief in all injury cases under the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships have also held as under:-
"7. There can be no second opinion that preservation of human life is of paramount importance. That is so on account of the fact that once life is lost, the status quo ante cannot be restored as resurrection is beyond the capacity of man. The patient whether he be an innocent person or be a criminal liable to punishment under the laws of the society, it is the obligation of those who are in-charge of the health of the community to preserve life so that the innocent may be protected land the guilty may be punished. Social laws do not contemplate death by negligence to tantamount to legal punishment.
8. Article 21 of the Constitution casts the obligation on the State to preserve life. The provision as explained by this Court in scores of decisions has emphasised and reiterated with gradually increasing emphasis that position. A doctor at the Government hospital positioned to meet this State obligation is, therefore, duty-bound to extend medical assistance for preserving life. Every doctor whether at a Government hospital or otherwise has the professional obligation to extend his services with due expertise for protecting life. No law or State action can intervene to avoid/delay the discharge of the paramount obligation cast upon members of the medical profession. The obligation being total, absolute and paramount, laws of procedure whether in statutes or otherwise which would interfere with the discharge of this obligation cannot be sustained and must, therefore, give way. On this basis, we have not issued, notices to the States and Union Territories for affording them an opportunity of being heard before we accepted the statement made in the affidavit of the Union of India that there is no impediment in the law. The matter is extremely urgent and in our view, brooks no delay to remind every doctor of his total obligation and assure him of the position that he does not contravene the law of the land by proceeding to treat the injured victim on his appearance before Him • either by himself or being carried by others. We must make it clear that zonal regulations and classifications cannot also operate as fetters in the process of discharge of the obligation and irrespective of the fact whether under instructions or rules, the victim has to be sent elsewhere or how the police shall be contacted, the guideline indicated in the 1985 decision of the Committee, as extracted above, is to become operative. We order accordingly.
10. In case the State Governments a and the Union Territories which have not been heard file any 22 representation against the direction, they shall have liberty to appear before this Court and ask for appropriate direction within three months from now. Applications filed after that date shall not be entertained by the Registry of this Court. Until altered, this judgment shall be followed.
14. It could not be forgotten that seeing an injured man in a miserable condition the human instinct of every citizen moves him to rush for help and do all that can be done to save the life. It could not be disputed that in spite of development economical, political and cultural still citizens are human beings and all the more when a man in such a miserable state hanging between life and death reaches the medical practitioner either in a hospital (run or managed by the State) public authority or a private person or a medical professional doing only private practice he is always called upon to rush to help such an injured person and to do all that is within his power to save life. So far as this duty of a medical professional is concerned its duty coupled with human instinct, it needs no decision nor any code of ethics nor any rule or law. Still in the Code of Medical Ethics framed by the Medical Council of India Item 13 specifically provides for it Item 13 reads as under:
13. The Patient must not be neglected.
A physician is free to choose whom he will serve. He should, however, respond to any request for his assistance in an emergency or whenever temperate public opinion expects the service. Once having undertaken a case, the physician should not neglect the patient, nor should he withdraw from the case without giving notice to the patient, his relatives or his responsible friends sufficiently long in advance of his withdrawal to allow them to secure another medical attendant. No provisionally or fully registered medical practitioner shall wilfully commit an act of negligence that may deprive his patient or patients from necessary medical care.
16. Some apprehensions were expressed because of some misunderstanding about the law of procedure and the police regulations and the priorities in such situations. On the basis of the affidavit filed by the Union of India and considering the matter it is clear that there is no legal impediment for a medical professional when he is called upon or requested to attend to an injured person needing his medical assistance immediately. There is also no doubt that the effort to save the person should be the top priority not only of the medical professional but even of the police or any other citizen who happens to be connected with the matter or who happens to notice such an incident or a situation. But on behalf of the medical profession there is one more apprehension which sometimes prevents a medical professional in spite of his desire to help the person, as he apprehends that he will be a witness and may have to face the police interrogation which sometimes may need going to the police station repeatedly and waiting and also to be a witness in a court of law where also he apprehends that he may have to go on number of days and may have to wait for a long time and may have to face sometimes long unnecessary cross-
23examination which sometimes may even be humiliating for a man in the medical profession and in our opinion it is this apprehension which prevents a medical professional who is not entrusted with the duty of handling medico-legal cases to do the needful, he always tries to avoid and even if approached directs the person concerned to go to a State hospital and particularly to the person who is in-charge of the medico-legal cases. We therefore have no hesitation in assuring the persons in the medical profession that these apprehensions, even if have some foundation, should not prevent them from discharging their duty as a medical professional to save a human life and to do all that is necessary but at the same time we hope and trust that with this expectation from the members of the medical profession, the police, the members of the legal profession, our law courts and everyone concerned will also keep in mind that a man in the medical profession should not be unnecessarily harassed for purposes of interrogation or for any other formalities and should not be dragged during investigations at the police station and it should be avoided as far as possible. We also hope and trust that our law courts will not summon a medical professional to give evidence unless the evidence is necessary and even if he is summoned, attempt should be made to see that the men in this profession are not made to wait and waste time unnecessarily and it is known that our law courts always have respect for the men in the medical profession and they are called to give evidence when necessary and attempts are made so that they may not have to wait for long. We have no hesitation in saying that it is expected of the members of the legal profession which is the other honourable profession to honour the persons in the medical profession and see that they are not called to give evidence so long as it is not necessary. It is also expected that where the facts are so clear it is expected that unnecessary harassment of the members of the medical profession either by way of request for adjournments or by cross-examination should be avoided so that the apprehension that the men in the medical profession have which prevents them from discharging their duty to a suffering person who needs their assistance utmost, is removed and a citizen needing the assistance of a man in the medical profession receives it.
17. We would also like to mention that whenever on such occasions a man of the medical profession is approached and if he finds that whatever assistance he could give is not sufficient really to save the life of the person but some better assistance is necessary it is also the duty of the man in the medical profession so approached to render all the help which he could and also see that the person reaches the proper expert as early as possible."
38. Thus, in all cases of bride burning & acid throwing, it is the responsibility of the Government hospitals as well as Private Hospitals to provide immediate medical aid to the victim.
2439. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in (1996) 2 SCC 549 in the case of Chameli Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. and another, have held that right to life is right to food, water, decent environment, education, medical care and shelter. Right to shelter does not mean a mere right to a roof over one's head. It is something more than a mere protection of one's life and limb. Their Lordships have also held as under:-
"8. In any organised society, right to live as a human being is not ensured by meeting only the animal needs of man. It is secured only when he is assured of all facilities to develop himself and is freed from restrictions which inhibit his growth. All human rights are designed to achieve this object. Right to live guaranteed in any Civilised society implies the right to food, water, decent environment education, medical care and shelter. These are basic human rights known to any civilised society. All civil, political, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention or under the Constitution of India cannot be exercised without these basic human rights. Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter, therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one's head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to live, should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right. As is enjoined in the Directive Principles, the State should be deemed to be under an obligation to secure it for its citizens, of course subject to its economic budgeting. In a democratic society as a member of the organised civic community one should have permanent shelter so as to physically, mentally and intellectually equip to improve his excellence as a useful citizen as enjoined in the Fundamental Duties and to be useful citizen and equal participant in democracy. The ultimate object of making a man equipped with a right to dignity of person and equality of status is to enable him to develop himself into a cultured being. Want of decent residence, therefore, frustrates the very object of the Constitutional animation of right to equality, economic justice, fundamental right to residence, dignity of person and right to live itself. To bring the Dalits and Tribes into the mainstream of national life providing these facilities and opportunities to them is the duty of the State as 25 fundamental to their basic human and constitutional rights."
40. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in (1997) 1 SCC 301 in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) vs. Union of India and another, have held that right to transmit telephone message forms part of right to privacy protected by Article 21 as well as by Article 17 of International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. Their Lordships have also held as under:-
"18. The right to privacy -- by itself -- has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as "right to privacy".
Conversations on the telephone are often of an intimate and confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man's life. It is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man's private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.
20. India is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Article 17 of the said covenant is as under:
"Article 17
1. No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, human or correspondence, nor to lawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 is almost in similar terms.
26. Article 17 of the International Covenant -- quoted above -- does not go contrary to any part of our municipal law. Article 21 of the Constitution has, therefore, been interpreted in conformity with the international law."
41. The increasing menace of bride burning and acid attacks etc. violates the basic human rights of the victims. Victims have absolute right to live their lives with enjoyment of dignity and honour. No person has a right to 26 violate the enjoyment of human rights by other fellow citizens. Every person has a right to live his/her life on his own terms.
42. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2004) 3 SCC 793, in the case of Girija Shankar vs. State of U.P. have explained the applicability of Section 34 as under:-
"9. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true concept of the section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab1 the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.
10. The section does not say "the common intentions of all", nor does it say "an intention common to all". Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As 27 was observed in Chinta Pulla Reddy v. State of A.P.2 Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused."
43. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2008) 3 SCC 390, in the case of Sachin Jana and another Vs. State of West Bengal have held that as per the evidence on record, Section 307 read with Section 34 I.P.C. was created, more particularly, when acid attack have caused disfigurement. Their lordships have ordered the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/-
44. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in (2010) 3 SCC 571 in the case of State of West Bengal and others Vs. Committee for protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and others, have held that the words "life" and "personal liberty" are used in Article as compendious terms to include within themselves all the varieties of life which go to make up the personal liberties of a man and not merely the right to the continuance of a person's animal existence. Their Lordships have also held as under:-
"60. Article 21, one of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution declares that no person shall be deprived of his "life" or "personal liberty"
except according to the procedure established by law. It is trite that the words "life" and "personal liberty" are used in the article as compendious terms to include within themselves all the varieties of life which go to make up the personal liberties of a man and not merely the right to the continuance of a person's animal existence. (See Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.27)
61. The paramountcy of the right to "life" and "personal liberty" was highlighted by the Constitution Bench in Kehar Singh20. It was observed thus: (SCC pp. 210-11, para 7) "7. ... To any civilised society, there can be no attributes more important than the life and personal liberty of its members. That is evident from the paramount position given by the courts to Article 21 of the Constitution. These twin attributes enjoy a 28 fundamental ascendancy over all other attributes of the political and social order, and consequently, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary are more sensitive to them than to the other attributes of daily existence. The deprivation of personal liberty and the threat of the deprivation of life by the action of the State is in most civilised societies regarded seriously and, recourse, either under express constitutional provision or through legislative enactment is provided to the judicial organ."
62. In Minerva Mills10 Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the majority observed that: (SCC p. 656, para 61) "61. Articles 14 and 19 do not confer any fanciful rights. They confer rights which are elementary for the proper and effective functioning of a democracy. They are universally so regarded ... [by] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
If Articles 14 and 19 are put out of operation, Article 32 will be drained of its life blood. Emphasising the significance of Articles 14, 19 and 21, the learned Chief Justice remarked: (Minerva Mills case10, SCC p. 660, para 74) "74. Three articles of our Constitution, and only three, stand between the heaven of freedom into which Tagore wanted his country to awake and the abyss of unrestrained power. They are Articles 14, 19 and 21. Article 31-C has removed two sides of that golden triangle which affords to the people of this country an assurance that the promise held forth by the Preamble will be performed by ushering an egalitarian era through the discipline of fundamental rights, that is, without emasculation of the rights to liberty and equality which alone can help preserve the dignity of the individual."
64. Thus, the opinion of this Court in A.K. Gopalan29 to the effect that a person could be deprived of his liberty by "any" procedure established by law and it was not for the court to go into the fairness of that procedure was perceived in Maneka Gandhi30 as a serious curtailment of liberty of an individual and it was held that the law which restricted an individual's freedom must also be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. This judgment was a significant step towards the development of law with respect to Article 21 of the Constitution, followed in a series of subsequent decisions. This Court went on to explore the true meaning of the word "life" in Article 21 and finally opined that all those aspects of life, which make a person live with human dignity are included within the meaning of the word "life".
45. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2010) 9 SCC 567, in the case of C. Muniappan and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another and connected appeal, have held that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal.
29Investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omission etc. which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. Their lordships have held as under:-
"55. There may be highly defective investigation in a case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse by the IO and whether due to such lapse any benefit should be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed to depend solely on the probity of investigation. (Vide Chandrakant Luxman v. State of Maharashtra31, Karnel Singh v. State of M.P.32, Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar33, Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar34, State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy35, Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh36, Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat37 and Ram Bali v. State of U.P.38)."
46. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in (2011) 1 SCC 694 in the case of Siddharam Satilingappa Mhetre vs. State of Maharashtra and others, have held that all human beings are born with some unalienable rights like life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Life bereft of liberty would be without honour and dignity. Their Lordships have also held as under:-
3036. All human beings are born with some unalienable rights like life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The importance of these natural rights can be found in the fact that these are fundamental for their proper existence and no other right can be enjoyed without the presence of right to life and liberty.
39. It is very difficult to define the term "liberty". It has many facets and meanings. The philosophers and moralists have praised freedom and liberty but this term is difficult to define because it does not resist any interpretation. The term "liberty" may be defined as the affirmation by an individual or group of his or its own essence. It needs the presence of three factors, firstly, harmonious balance of personality, secondly, the absence of restraint upon the exercise of that affirmation and thirdly, organisation of opportunities for the exercise of a continuous initiative.
40. "Liberty" may be defined as a power of acting according to the determinations of the will. According to Harold Laski, "liberty" was essentially an absence of restraints and John Stuart Mill viewed that "all restraint, qua restraint is an evil". In the words of Jonathon Edwards, the meaning of "liberty" and "freedom" is:
"Power, opportunity or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases, or, in other words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he wills."
41. It can be found that "liberty" generally means the prevention of restraints and providing such opportunities, the denial of which would result in frustration and ultimately disorder. Restraints on man's liberty are laid down by power used through absolute discretion, which when used in this manner brings an end to "liberty" and freedom is lost. At the same time "liberty" without restraints would mean liberty won by one and lost by another. So "liberty" means doing of anything one desires but subject to the desire of others.
68. Life and personal liberty has been given prime importance in the United Kingdom. It was in 1215 that the people of England revolted against King John and enforced their rights; first time the King had acknowledged that there were certain rights of the subject which could be called Magna Carta, in 1215. In 1628 the Petition of Rights was presented to King Charles I which was the first step in the transfer of sovereignty from the King to Parliament. It was passed as the Bill of Rights in 1689.
69. In the Magna Carta, it is stated "no free man shall be taken, or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or banished or any ways destroyed, nor will the King pass upon him or commit him to prison, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land".
70. Right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights and any decision affecting human right or which may put an individual's life at risk must call for the most anxious scrutiny. (See R. v. Secy. of State for the Home 31 Deptt., ex p Bugdaycay23.) The sanctity of human life is probably the most fundamental of the human social values. It is recognised in all civilised societies and their legal systems and by the internationally recognised statements of human rights. [See R. (Pretty) v. Director of Public Prosecutions24.] USA
71. The importance of personal liberty is reflected in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of USA (1791) which declares as under:
"No person shall be ... deprived of his life, liberty or property, without due process of law. [The 'due process' clause was adopted in Section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights Act, 1960. In the Canada Act, 1982, this expression has been substituted by 'the principles of fundamental justice' (Section 7).]"
72. The Fourteenth Amendment imposes similar limitation on the State authorities. These two provisions are conveniently referred to as the "due process clauses". Under the above clauses the American judiciary claims to declare a law as bad, if it is not in accordance with "due process", even though the legislation may be within the competence of the legislature concerned. Due process conveniently understood means procedural regularity and fairness. (Constitutional Interpretation by Craig R. Ducat, 8th Edn. 2002, p. 475.) West Germany
73. Article 2(2) of the West German Constitution (1948) declares:
"2.(2) Everyone shall have the right to life and physical inviolability. The freedom of the individual shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only on the basis of the legal order."
Though the freedom of life and liberty guaranteed by the above article may be restricted, such restriction will be valid only if it is in conformity with the "legal order" (or pursuant to a law, according to official translation). Being a basic right, the freedom guaranteed by Article 2(2) is binding on the legislative, administrative and judicial organs of the State [Article 1(3)]. This gives the individual the right to challenge the validity of a law or an executive act violative of the freedom of the person by a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court, under Article 93. Procedural guarantee is given by Articles 103(1) and 104. Articles 104(1)-(2) provides:
"104. (1) The freedom of the individual may be restricted only on the basis of a formal law and only with due regard to the forms prescribed therein.... (2) Only the Judge shall decide on the admissibility and continued deprivation of liberty."
74. These provisions correspond to Article 21 of our Constitution and the court is empowered to set a man to liberty if it appears that he has been imprisoned without the authority of a formal law or in contravention of the procedure prescribed there.
Japan 32
75. Article 31 of the Japanese Constitution of 1946 says:
"No person shall be deprived of life or liberty nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law."
This article is similar to Article 21 of our Constitution save that it includes other criminal penalties, such as fine or forfeiture within its ambit.
Canada
76. Section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights Act, 1960 adopted the "due process" clause from the American Constitution. But the difference in the Canadian set-up was due to the fact that this Act was not a constitutional instrument to impose a direct limitation on the legislature but only a statute for interpretation of Canadian statutes, which, again, could be excluded from the purview of the Act of 1960, in particular cases, by an express declaration made by the Canadian Parliament itself (Section 2). The result was obvious: The Canadian Supreme Court in Curr v. R.25 held that the Canadian Court would not import "substantive reasonableness" into Section 1(a), because of the unsalutary experience of substantive due process in USA; and that as to "procedural reasonableness", Section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights Act only referred to "the legal processes recognised by Parliament and the courts in Canada". The result was that in Canada, the "due process clause" lost its utility as an instrument of judicial review of legislation and it came to mean practically the same thing as whatever the legislature prescribes, -- much the same as "procedure established by law" in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as interpreted in A.K. Gopalan13.
Bangladesh
77. Article 32 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972 (3 SCW 385) reads as under:
"32. Protection of right to life and personal liberty.--No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save in accordance with law."
This provision is similar to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Consequently, unless controlled by some other provision, it should be interpreted as in India. Pakistan
78. Article 9 Right to Life and Liberty:
"9. Security of person.--No person shall be deprived of life and liberty save in accordance with law."
Nepal
79. In the 1962 Constitution of Nepal, there is Article 11(1) which deals with right to life and liberty which is identical with Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. International Charters Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
80. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration says:
"3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."
Article 9 provides:
33"9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."
Article 10 says:
"10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him." [As to its legal effect, see M. v. United Nations & Belgium26 (Inter LR at pp. 447, 451.)] Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
81. Article 9(1) says:
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law."
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950
82. This Convention contains a most elaborate and detailed codification of the rights and safeguards for the protection of life and personal liberty against arbitrary invasion.
47. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in (2012) 8 SCC 1 in the case of Mehmood Nayyar Azam vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, have held that any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution, whether it occurs during investigation, interrogation or otherwise. The term "harassment" in its connotative expanse includes torment and vexation. Their Lordships have also held as under:-
"19. We have referred to the aforesaid paragraphs of D.K. Basu case2 to highlight that this Court has emphasised on the concept of mental agony when a person is confined within the four walls of police station or lock-up. Mental agony stands in contradistinction to infliction of physical pain. In the said case, the two-Judge Bench referred to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 which provides that: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Thereafter, the Bench adverted to Article 21 and proceeded to state that the expression "life or personal liberty" has been held to include the right to live with human dignity and thus, it would also include within itself a guarantee against torture and assault by the State or its functionaries. Reference was made to Article 20(3) of the Constitution which postulates that a person accused of an offence shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself.34
21. After referring to Joginder Kumar3, A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was), dealing with the various facets of Article 21 in D.K. Basu case2, stated that any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution, whether it occurs during investigation, interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the Government become law-breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to anarchy. No civilised nation can permit that to happen, for a citizen does not shed off his fundamental right to life, the moment a policeman arrests him. The right to life of a citizen cannot be put in abeyance on his arrest. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, under trials, detenus and other prisoners in custody, except according to the procedure established by law by placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law."
48. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in (2012) 5 SCC 321 in the case of Avishek Goenka vs. Union of India and another, have held that Article 21 stipulates right to safety against crime. Their Lordships have further held that Article 21 also explains general public safety vis- à-vis individual privacy. Their Lordships have held as under:-
"8. Whatever are the rights of an individual, they are regulated and controlled by the statutory provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The citizens at large have a right to life i.e. to live with dignity, freedom and safety. This right emerges from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. As opposed to this constitutional mandate, a trivial individual protection or inconvenience, if any, must yield in favour of the larger public interest.
32. In the present case as well, even if some individual interests are likely to suffer, such individual or private interests must give in to the larger public interest. It is the duty of all citizens to comply with the law. The Rules are mandatory and nobody has the authority in law to mould these Rules for the purposes of convenience or luxury and certainly not for crime."
49. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in (2013) 2 SCC 398 in the case of Kishore Samrite vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, have held that right to enjoyment of a good reputation, is protected equally with 35 the right to enjoyment of life, liberty and property. Their Lordships have held as under :-
"58. The term "person" includes not only the physical body and members but also every bodily sense and personal attribute among which is the reputation a man has acquired. Reputation can also be defined to be good name, the credit, honour or character which is derived from a favourable public opinion or esteem, and character by report. The right to enjoyment of a good reputation is a valuable privilege of ancient origin and necessary to human society. "Reputation" is an element of personal security and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to enjoyment of life, liberty and property. Although "character" and "reputation" are often used synonymously, but these terms are distinguishable. "Character" is what a man is and "reputation" is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is. "Character"
depends on attributes possessed and "reputation" on attributes which others believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present. (Ref. Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry33 and Nilgiris Bar Assn. v. T.K. Mahalingam34.) The methodology adopted by the next friends in the writ petitions before the High Court was opposed to political values and administration of justice. In Kushum Lata v. Union of India35, this Court observed that (SCC p. 182, para 5) when there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition should be dismissed by the Court. If such petitions are not properly regulated and abuse averted, it becomes a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance as well.
59. In light of these legal principles, the appellant and, in fact, to a great extent even Respondent 8 have made an attempt to hurt the reputation and image of Respondent 6 by stating incorrect facts, that too, by abusing the process of court."
50. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2014) 4 SCC 427, in the case of Laxmi Vs. Union of India and others have held that uniform compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs should be paid by all States/Union Territories to the victims of acid attack. Rs. 1 lakh should be paid immediately within 15 days. Remaining Rs. 2 lakhs should be paid within 2 months as expeditiously as possible. The authorities were directed to give wide publicity to said directions. Their lordships have held as under:-
36"12. Section 357-A came to be inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by Act 5 of 2009 w.e.f. 31- 12-2009. Inter alia, this section provides for preparation of a scheme for providing funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his dependants who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation.
13. We are informed that pursuant to this provision, 17 States and 7 Union Territories have prepared "Victim Compensation Scheme" (for short "the Scheme"). As regards the victims of acid attacks, the compensation mentioned in the Scheme framed by these States and Union Territories is un-uniform. While the State of Bihar has provided for compensation of Rs 25,000 in such Scheme, the State of Rajasthan has provided for Rs 2 lakhs of compensation. In our view, the compensation provided in the Scheme by most of the States/Union Territories is inadequate. It cannot be overlooked that acid attack victims need to undergo a series of plastic surgeries and other corrective treatments. Having regard to this problem, the learned Solicitor General suggested to us that the compensation by the States/Union Territories for acid attack victims must be enhanced to at least Rs 3 lakhs as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. The suggestion of the learned Solicitor General is very fair.
14. We, accordingly, direct that the acid attack victims shall be paid compensation of at least Rs 3 lakhs by the State Government/Union Territory concerned as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. Of this amount, a sum of Rs 1 lakh shall be paid to such victim within 15 days of occurrence of such incident (or being brought to the notice of the State Government/Union Territory) to facilitate immediate medical attention and expenses in this regard. The balance sum of Rs 2 lakhs shall be paid as expeditiously as may be possible and positively within two months thereafter. The Chief Secretaries of the States and the Administrators of the Union Territories shall ensure compliance with the above direction.
15. The Chief Secretaries of the States and the Administrators of the Union Territories shall take necessary steps in getting this order translated into vernacular and publicise the same appropriately for the information of public at large. List the matter on 3-12- 2013."
51. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in (2014) 5 SCC 417 in the case of Om Prakash Chautala Vs. Kanwar Bhan and others vs. Kanwar Bhan and others, have held that right to reputation is an inseparable facet of Article 21.
1. Leave granted. Reputation is fundamentally a glorious amalgam and unification of virtues which makes a man feel proud of his ancestry and satisfies him 37 to bequeath it as a part of inheritance on the posterity. It is a nobility in itself for which a conscientious man would never barter it with all the tea of China or for that matter all the pearls of the sea. The said virtue has both horizontal and vertical qualities. When reputation is hurt, a man is half-dead. It is an honour which deserves to be equally preserved by the down trodden and the privileged. The aroma of reputation is an excellence which cannot be allowed to be sullied with the passage of time. The memory of nobility no one would like to lose; none would conceive of it being atrophied. It is dear to life and on some occasions it is dearer than life. And that is why it has become an inseparable facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. No one would like to have his reputation dented. One would like to perceive it as an honour rather than popularity. When a court deals with a matter that has something likely to affect a person's reputation, the normative principles of law are to be cautiously and carefully adhered to. The advertence has to be sans emotion and sans populist perception, and absolutely in accord with the doctrine of audi alteram partem before anything adverse is said.
52. We must have a deep rooted sensitivity for life. There should be respect for the private and family life of every individual.
53. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2016) 3 SCC 571, in the case of Parivartan Kendra Vs. Union of India and others have held that compensation to the acid attack victims should be awarded not only in terms of physical injury, but note of victim's inability to lead a full life and to enjoy those amenities which are being robbed of her as a result of acid attack, should also be taken. The State shall upon itself take full responsibility for the treatment and rehabilitation of the victims of acid attack as per the guidelines issued by 38 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2014) 4 SCC 427. Their lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case have awarded a compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs. Their lordships have held as under:-
"9. In the States/Union Territories, where rules to regulate sale of acid and other corrosive substances are not operational, until such rules are framed and made operational, the Chief Secretaries of the States concerned/Administrators of the Union Territories shall ensure compliance with the following directions with immediate effect:
9.1. Over the counter sale of acid is completely prohibited unless the seller maintains a log/register recording the sale of acid which will contain the details of the person(s) to whom acid(s) is/are sold and the quantity sold. The log/register shall contain the address of the person to whom it is sold.
9.2. All sellers shall sell acid only after the buyer has shown:
(a) a photo ID issued by the Government which also has the address of the person;
(b) specifies the reason/purpose for procuring acid.
9.3. All stocks of acid must be declared by the seller with the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) concerned within 15 days.
9.4. No acid shall be sold to any person who is below 18 years of age.
9.5. In case of undeclared stock of acid, it will be open to the SDM concerned to confiscate the stock and suitably impose fine on such seller up to Rs 50,000. 9.6. The SDM concerned may impose fine up to Rs 50,000 on any person who commits breach of any of the above directions.
10. Educational institutions, research laboratories, hospitals, government departments and the departments of public sector undertakings, who are required to keep and store acid, shall follow the following guidelines:
10.1. A register of usage of acid shall be maintained and the same shall be filed with the SDM concerned. 10.2. A person shall be made accountable for possession and safe keeping of acid in their premises. 10.3. The acid shall be stored under the supervision of this person and there shall be compulsory checking of the students/personnel leaving the laboratories/place of storage where acid is used.
11. The SDM concerned shall be vested with the responsibility of taking appropriate action for the breach/default/violation of the above directions.
12. Section 357-A came to be inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by Act 5 of 2009 w.e.f. 31-12-
2009. Inter alia, this section provides for preparation of a scheme for providing funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his dependants who have suffered loss or 39 injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation.
13. We are informed that pursuant to this provision, 17 States and 7 Union Territories have prepared 'Victim Compensation Scheme' (for short 'the Scheme'). As regards the victims of acid attacks, the compensation mentioned in the Scheme framed by these States and Union Territories is un-uniform. While the State of Bihar has provided for compensation of Rs 25,000 in such Scheme, the State of Rajasthan has provided for Rs 2 lakhs of compensation. In our view, the compensation provided in the Scheme by most of the States/Union Territories is inadequate. It cannot be overlooked that acid attack victims need to undergo a series of plastic surgeries and other corrective treatments. Having regard to this problem, the learned Solicitor General suggested to us that the compensation by the States/Union Territories for acid attack victims must be enhanced to at least Rs 3 lakhs as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. The suggestion of the learned Solicitor General is very fair.
14. We, accordingly, direct that the acid attack victims shall be paid compensation of at least Rs 3 lakhs by the State Government/Union Territory concerned as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. Of this amount, a sum of Rs 1 lakh shall be paid to such victim within 15 days of occurrence of such incident (or being brought to the notice of the State Government/Union Territory) to facilitate immediate medical attention and expenses in this regard. The balance sum of Rs 2 lakhs shall be paid as expeditiously as may be possible and positively within two months thereafter. The Chief Secretaries of the States and the Administrators of the Union Territories shall ensure compliance with the above direction."
10. On 3-12-2013, in Laxmi case2, when the affidavit of the State of Haryana was placed before the Bench, in which it stated that the Government of Haryana is in the process of framing a scheme for full medical treatment, short term as well as long term, for specialised plastic surgery, corrective surgeries, providing specialised psychological treatment to the acid attack victims to help them to come out of the horror and trauma of the acid attack and their rehabilitation, this Court directed the Chief Secretaries of the States (other than Haryana) and the administrators of the Union Territories to file affidavit and indicate to this Court, the State's view in bearing 100% cost of treatment of the acid attack victims in line with the decision taken by the Government of Haryana and also with regard to framing of scheme on the lines of the Haryana Government for medical treatment at specialised hospitals having facility for plastic surgery, corrective surgery and psychological as well as other treatment to the acid attack victims. This Court further directed the Chief Secretaries of the States and Administrators of the Union Territories to issue necessary instructions to the police stations within their respective State/Union Territory that as and when an FIR is lodged with the police relating to acid attack, the police station concerned will send a communication to the jurisdictional SDM about receipt of such information. Upon receipt of such information, the jurisdictional SDM shall then make an 40 inquiry into the procurement of acid by the wrongdoer and take appropriate action in the matter.
11. While disposing of the writ petition in Laxmi v. Union of India3, this Court inter alia held, thus:
"10. We have gone through the chart annexed along with the affidavit filed by the Ministry of Home Affairs and we find that despite the directions given by this Court in Laxmi v. Union of India1, the minimum compensation of Rs 3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs only) per acid attack victim has not been fixed in some of the States/Union Territories. In our opinion, it will be appropriate if the Member Secretary of the State Legal Services Authority takes up the issue with the State Government so that the orders passed by this Court are complied with and a minimum of Rs 3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs only) is made available to each victim of acid attack.
11. From the figures given above, we find that the amount will not be burdensome so far as the State Governments/Union Territories are concerned and, therefore, we do not see any reason why the directions given by this Court should not be accepted by the State Governments/Union Territories since they do not involve any serious financial implication.
** *
13. Insofar as the proper treatment, aftercare and rehabilitation of the victims of acid attack is concerned, the meeting convened on 14-3-2015 notes unanimously that full medical assistance should be provided to the victims of acid attack and that private hospitals should also provide free medical treatment to such victims. It is noted that there may perhaps be some reluctance on the part of some private hospitals to provide free medical treatment and, therefore, the officers concerned in the State Governments should take up the matter with the private hospitals so that they are also required to provide free medical treatment to the victims of acid attack.
14. The decisions taken in the meeting read as follows:
The private hospitals will also be brought on board for compliance and the States/UTs will use necessary means in this regard.
No hospital/clinic should refuse treatment citing lack of specialised facilities.
First aid must be administered to the victim and after stabilisation, the victim/patient could be shifted to a specialised facility for further treatment, wherever required. Action may be taken against hospital/clinic for refusal to treat victims of acid attacks and other crimes in contravention of the provisions of Section 357-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
17. We, therefore, issue a direction that the State Governments/Union Territories should seriously discuss and take up the matter with all the private hospitals in their respective State/Union Territory to the effect that the private hospitals should not refuse treatment to victims of acid attack and that full treatment should be provided to such victims including medicines, food, bedding and reconstructive surgeries.41
18. We also issue a direction that the hospital, where the victim of an acid attack is first treated, should give a certificate that the individual is a victim of an acid attack.
This certificate may be utilised by the victim for treatment and reconstructive surgeries or any other scheme that the victim may be entitled to with the State Government or the Union Territory, as the case may be.
19. In the event of any specific complaint against any private hospital or government hospital, the acid attack victim will, of course, be at liberty to take further action.
20. With regard to the banning of sale of acid across the counter, we direct the Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs and Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to take up the matter with the State Governments/Union Territories to ensure that an appropriate notification to this effect is issued within a period of three months from today. It appears that some States/Union Territories have already issued such a notification, but, in our opinion, all States and Union Territories must issue such a notification at the earliest.
21. The final issue is with regard to the setting up of a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. In the meeting held on 14-3-2015, the unanimous view was that since the District Legal Services Authority is already constituted in every district and is involved in providing appropriate assistance relating to acid attack victims, perhaps it may not be necessary to set up a separate Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. In other words, a multiplicity of authorities need not be created.
22. In our opinion, this view is quite reasonable. Therefore, in case of any compensation claim made by any acid attack victim, the matter will be taken up by the District Legal Services Authority, which will include the District Judge and such other co-opted persons who the District Judge feels will be of assistance, particularly the District Magistrate, the Superintendent of Police and the Civil Surgeon or the Chief Medical Officer of that district or their nominee. This body will function as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for all purposes."
12. The abovementioned direction given by this Court in Laxmi case3 is a general mandate to the States and Union Territories and is the minimum amount which the State shall make available to each victim of acid attack. The State and Union Territory concerned can give even more amount of compensation than Rs 3,00,000 as directed by this Court. It is pertinent to mention here that the mandate given by this Court in Laxmi case3 nowhere restricts the Court from giving more compensation to the victim of acid attack, especially when the victim has suffered serious injuries on her body which is required to be taken into consideration by this Court. In peculiar facts, this Court can grant even more compensation to the victim than Rs 3,00,000.
13. We have come across many instances of acid attacks across the country. These attacks have been rampant for the simple reason that there has been no proper implementation of the regulations or control for the supply and distribution of acid. There have been many cases where the victims of acid attack are made to sit at home owing to their difficulty 42 to work. These instances unveil that the State has failed to check the distribution of acid falling into the wrong hands even after giving many directions by this Court in this regard. Henceforth, stringent action be taken against those erring persons supplying acid without proper authorisation and also the authorities concerned be made responsible for failure to keep a check on the distribution of the acid.
14. When we consider the instant case of the victims, the very sight of the victim is traumatising for us. If we could be traumatised by the mere sight of injuries caused to the victim by the inhumane acid attack on her, what would the situation of the victim be, perhaps, we cannot judge. Nonetheless we cannot be oblivious of the fact of her trauma.
15. From perusal of the record of the case, it is found that the elder sister suffered 28% burns on her body and 90% on her face, owing to the alleged brutal attack on her. Due to the acid attack, the victim had undergone several surgeries, and has to undergo many more corrective and curative surgeries for her treatment.
16. Admittedly, three skin grafting surgeries were conducted by PMCH but they were all improperly conducted as testified at Safdarjung Hospital. The victim, was brought to Delhi by the petitioner and in Delhi some skin grafting surgeries were again conducted at Safdarjung Hospital for neck, lips, eyes, nose, arm, forehead and ear. Further skin grafting surgeries were also conducted at Fortis Hospital for neck, lips, nose, eye and arm. In the opinion of the victim's doctor also, she would be required to undergo multiple corrective and curative operations and medical support for the rest of her life. The victim would be required to have corrective and curative surgeries for neck, lips, eyes, nose, arm, forehead, ears, breasts and elbow. Apart from the above medical conditions/treatment, which she is required to undergo, there are many other consequences, which an acid attack brings out in the life of the victim.
17. Considering the plight of the victim we can sum up that:
(i) The likeliness of the victim getting a job which involves physical exertion of energy is very low.
(ii) The social stigma and the pain that she has to go through for not being accepted by the society cannot be neglected. Furthermore, the general reaction of loathing which she would have to encounter and the humiliation that she would have to face throughout her life cannot be compensated in terms of money.
(iii) As a result of the physical injury, the victim will not be able to lead a normal life and cannot dream of marriage prospects.
(iv) Since her skin is fragile due to the acid attack she would have to take care of it for the rest of her life. Therefore, the aftercare and rehabilitation cost that has to be incurred will have huge financial implications on her and her family.
18. On perusal of various contentions and evidence, we find it imperative to mention that even after this Court having passed an order dated 6-2-2013 directing the Union of India and the States to implement compensation payable to acid attack victims by creation of a separate fund, only 17 States have been notified of the Victim Compensation 43 Schemes (VCS). Out of which 7 States and 4 Union Territories have not initiated VCS. Even in those States where the Scheme has been implemented, a meagre compensation ranging between Rs 25,000 to Rs 2 lakhs is provided for medical care. And many States have not provided any compensation for rehabilitation at all. In the present case, the Government of Bihar has fixed a pitiable amount of Rs 25,000 for the victims of acid attack.
19. The guidelines issued by orders in Laxmi case1,2,3 are proper, except with respect to the compensation amount. We just need to ensure that these guidelines are implemented properly. Keeping in view the impact of acid attack on the victim's social, economical and personal life, we need to enhance the amount of compensation. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that the victim of acid attack requires permanent treatment for the damaged skin. The mere amount of Rs 3 lakhs will not be of any help to such a victim. We are conscious of the fact that enhancement of the compensation amount will be an additional burden on the State. But prevention of such a crime is the responsibility of the State and the liability to pay the enhanced compensation will be of the State. The enhancement of the compensation will act in two ways:
(i) It will help the victim in rehabilitation;
(ii) It will also make the State to implement the guidelines properly as the State will try to comply with it in its true spirit so that the crime of acid attack can be prevented in future.
20. Having regard to the problems faced by the victims, this Court in Laxmi v. Union of India1 by an order dated 18- 7-2013, enhanced the compensation, stating that, "at least Rs 3 lakhs must be paid to the victims of acid attacks by the Government concerned". Therefore, a minimum of Rs 3 lakhs is to be awarded by the Government to each victim of the acid attack. In the present case, a minimum amount of Rs 6 lakhs has to be awarded to the sisters.
21. In peculiar facts of the case, we are of the view that victim Chanchal deserves to be awarded a compensation more than what has been prescribed by this Court in Laxmi case1. Though in this case we are not issuing any guidelines different from the guidelines issued in Laxmi case1, we should not forget that the younger sister was also injured by the acid attack. Although her degree of sufferance is not as that of the elder one, but she also requires treatment and rehabilitation. It is to be noted that this Court in Laxmi case3 does not put a bar on the Government to award compensation limited to Rs 3 lakhs. The State has the discretion to provide more compensation to the victim in the case of acid attack as per Laxmi case3 guidelines. It is also to be noticed that this Court has not put any condition in Laxmi case3 as to the degree of injuries which a victim has suffered due to acid attack. In the instant case, the victim's father has already spent more than Rs 5 lakhs for the treatment of the victim. In consideration of the severity of the victim's injury, expenditure with regard to grafting and reconstruction surgery, physical and mental pain, etc., we are of the opinion that the victim (Chanchal) should be compensated to a tune of at least Rs 10 lakhs. Suffice it to 44 say that the compensation must not only be awarded in terms of the physical injury, we have also to take note of the victim's inability to lead a full life and to enjoy those amenities which is being robbed of her as a result of the acid attack. Therefore, this Court deems it proper to award a compensation of Rs 10 lakhs and accordingly, we direct the Government concerned to compensate the victim Chanchal to the tune of Rs 10 lakhs, and in light of the judgment given in Laxmi case3 we direct the State Government of Bihar concerned to compensate the main victim's sister, Sonam to a tune of Rs 3 lakhs. Of the total amount of Rs 13 lakhs, a sum of Rs 5 lakhs shall be paid to the victim and her family within a period of one month and the remaining sum of Rs 8 lakhs shall be paid to the victims within a period of three months from the date of this order. Furthermore, the State shall upon itself take full responsibility for the treatment and rehabilitation of the victims of acid attack as per the guidelines provided in Laxmi case3, vide order dated 10-4- 2015."
54. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2016) 3 SCC 669, in the case of Laxmi vs. Union of India and others and other analogous matters have issued directions to regulate sale of acid and other corrosive substances. Their Lordships have also highlighted setting up of a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for acid attack victims and generally. Their lordships have held as under:-
"33. Insofar as the proper treatment, aftercare and rehabilitation of the victims of acid attack is concerned, the meeting convened on 14-3-2015 notes unanimously that full medical assistance should be provided to the victims of acid attack and that private hospitals should also provide free medical treatment to such victims. It is noted that there may perhaps be some reluctance on the part of some private hospitals to provide free medical treatment and, therefore, the officers concerned in the State Governments should take up the matter with the private hospitals so that they are also required to provide free medical treatment to the victims of acid attack.
34. The decisions taken in the meeting read as follows:
34.1. The States/UTs will take a serious note of the directions of the Supreme Court with regard to treatment and payment of compensation to acid attack victims and to implement these directions through the issue of requisite orders/notifications.
34.2. The private hospitals will also be brought on board for compliance and the States/UTs will use necessary means in this regard.
34.3. No hospital/clinic should refuse treatment citing lack of specialised facilities.45
34.4. First aid must be administered to the victim and after stabilisation, the victim/patient could be shifted to a specialised facility for further treatment, wherever required. 34.5. Action may be taken against hospital/clinic for refusal to treat victims of acid attacks and other crimes in contravention of the provisions of Section 357-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
34.6. We expect the authorities to comply with these decisions.
35. Although it is not made clear in the meeting held on 14-3-2015, what we understand by free medical treatment is not only provision of physical treatment to the victim of acid attack but also availability of medicines, bed and food in the hospital concerned.
36. We, therefore, issue a direction that the State Governments/Union Territories should seriously discuss and take up the matter with all the private hospitals in their respective State/Union Territory to the effect that the private hospitals should not refuse treatment to victims of acid attack and that full treatment should be provided to such victims including medicines, food, bedding and reconstructive surgeries.
37. We also issue a direction that the hospital, where the victim of an acid attack is first treated, should give a certificate that the individual is a victim of an acid attack.
This certificate may be utilised by the victim for treatment and reconstructive surgeries or any other scheme that the victim may be entitled to with the State Government or the Union Territory, as the case may be.
38. In the event of any specific complaint against any private hospital or government hospital, the acid attack victim will, of course, be at liberty to take further action.
39. With regard to the banning of sale of acid across the country, we direct the Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to take up the matter with the State Governments/Union Territories to ensure that an appropriate notification to this effect is issued within a period of three months from today. It appears that some States/ Union Territories have already issued such a notification, but, in our opinion, all the States and Union Territories must issue such a notification at the earliest.
40. The final issue is with regard to the setting up of a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. In the meeting held on 14-3-2015, the unanimous view was that since the District Legal Services Authority is already constituted in every district and is involved in providing appropriate assistance relating to acid attack victims, perhaps it may not be necessary to set up a separate Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. In other words, a multiplicity of authorities need not be created.
41. In our opinion, this view is quite reasonable. Therefore, in case of any compensation claim made by any acid attack victim, the matter will be taken up by the District Legal Services Authority, which will include the District Judge and such other co-opted persons who the District Judge feels will be of assistance, particularly the District Magistrate, the Superintendent of Police and the Civil 46 Surgeon or the Chief Medical Officer of that district or their nominee. This body will function as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for all purposes."
55. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2017) 4 SCC 546, in the case of Ravada Sasikala Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another have held that the case of the acid attack is an example of uncivilized and heartless crime. Such like crime does not deserve any kind of clemency. When there is medical evidence that there was an acid attack on the young girl and circumstances having brought home by cogent evidence and conviction is given stamp of approval, there was no justification to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. In the present case, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have ordered the accused to pay a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- and the state to pay a compensation of Rs. 3 Lakhs. Their lordships have held as under:-
22. The case at hand is an example of uncivilised and heartless crime committed by Respondent 2. It is completely unacceptable that concept of leniency can be conceived of in such a crime. A crime of this nature does not deserve any kind of clemency. It is individually as well as collectively intolerable. Respondent 2 might have felt that his ego had been hurt by such a denial to the proposal or he might have suffered a sense of hollowness to his exaggerated sense of honour or might have been guided by the idea that revenge is the sweetest thing that one can be wedded to when there is no response to the unrequited love but, whatever may be the situation, the criminal act, by no stretch of imagination, deserves any leniency or mercy. Respondent 2 might have suffered emotional distress by the denial, yet the said feeling could not to be converted into vengeance to have the licence to act in a manner like he has done.
23. In view of what we have stated, the approach of the High Court shocks us and we have no hesitation in saying so. When there is medical evidence that there was an acid attack on the young girl and the circumstances having brought home by cogent evidence and the conviction is given the stamp of approval, there was no justification to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. We are at a loss to understand whether the learned Judge has been guided by some unknown notion of mercy or remaining oblivious of the precedents relating to sentence or for that 47 matter, not careful about the expectation of the collective from the court, for the society at large eagerly waits for justice to be done in accordance with law, has reduced the sentence. When a substantive sentence of thirty days is imposed, in the crime of present nature, that is, acid attack on a young girl, the sense of justice, if we allow ourselves to say so, is not only ostracised, but also is unceremoniously sent to "Vânaprastha". It is wholly impermissible.
24. In view of our analysis, we are compelled to set aside the sentence imposed by the High Court and restore that of the trial court. In addition to the aforesaid, we are disposed to address on victim compensation. We are of the considered opinion that the appellant is entitled to compensation that is awardable to a victim under CrPC. In Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra19, the two-Judge Bench referred to the amended provision, 154th Law Commission Report that has devoted entire chapter to victimology, wherein the growing emphasis was on the victim.
25. In Laxmi v. Union of India20, this Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 430-31, paras 12-13) "12. Section 357-A came to be inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by Act 5 of 2009 w.e.f. 31-12-
2009. Inter alia, this section provides for preparation of a scheme for providing funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his dependants who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation.
13. We are informed that pursuant to this provision, 17 States and 7 Union Territories have prepared "Victim Compensation Scheme" (for short "the Scheme"). As regards the victims of acid attacks, the compensation mentioned in the Scheme framed by these States and Union Territories is un-uniform. While the State of Bihar has provided for compensation of Rs 25,000 in such Scheme, the State of Rajasthan has provided for Rs 2 lakhs of compensation. In our view, the compensation provided in the Scheme by most of the States/Union Territories is inadequate. It cannot be overlooked that acid attack victims need to undergo a series of plastic surgeries and other corrective treatments. Having regard to this problem, the learned Solicitor General suggested to us that the compensation by the States/Union Territories for acid attack victims must be enhanced to at least Rs 3 lakhs as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. The suggestion of the learned Solicitor General is very fair."
26. The Court further directed that the acid attack victims shall be paid compensation of at least Rs 3 lakhs by the State Government/Union Territory concerned as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. Of this amount, a sum of Rs 1 lakh was directed to be paid to such victim within 15 days of occurrence of such incident (or being brought to the notice of the State Government/Union Territory) to facilitate immediate medical attention and expenses in this regard. The balance sum of Rs 2 lakhs was directed to be paid as expeditiously as possible and positively within two months thereafter and compliance thereof was directed to be ensured by the Chief Secretaries of the States and the Administrators of the Union Territories.
4827. In State of M.P. v. Mehtaab21 (SCC p. 200, para 10), the Court directed compensation of Rs 2 lakhs to be fixed regard being had to the limited financial resources of the accused despite the fact that the occurrence took place in 1997. It observed that the said compensation was not adequate and accordingly, in addition to the said compensation to be paid by the accused, held that the State was required to pay compensation under Section 357-A CrPC. For the said purpose, reliance was placed on the decision in Suresh v. State of Haryana22.
28. In State of H.P. v. Ram Pal23, the Court opined (SCC pp. 586-87, para 11) that compensation of Rs 40,000 was inadequate regard being had to the fact that life of a young girl aged 20 years was lost. Bestowing anxious consideration the Court, placing reliance on Suresh22, Manohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan24 and Mehtaab21, directed that ends of justice shall be best subserved if the accused is required to pay a total sum of Rs 1 lakh and the State to pay a sum of Rs 3 lakhs as compensation.
29. Regard being had to the aforesaid decisions, we direct Respondent 2-accused to pay a compensation of Rs 50,000 and the State to pay a compensation of Rs 3 lakhs. If the accused does not pay the compensation amount within six months, he shall suffer further rigorous imprisonment of six months, in addition to what has been imposed by the trial court. The State shall deposit the amount before the trial court within three months and the learned trial Judge on proper identification of the victim, shall disburse it in her favour.
56. The U.S. Supreme Court in 94 U.S. 113 (1876) in the case of Munn v. Illinois, has declared that by the term "life," as here used, something more it meant than mere animal existence. The deprivation not only of life, but of whatever God has given to everyone with life for its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question of if its efficacy be not frittered away by judicial decision. The relevant paragraphs are as under :-
"Except by due process of law, no State can deprive any person of either. The provision has been supposed to secure to every individual the essential conditions for the pursuit of happiness, and, for that reason, has not been heretofore, and should never be, construed in any narrow or restricted sense.
No State "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, "says the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. By the term "life," as here used, something more it meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting out of an 49 eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world. The deprivation not only of life, but of whatever God has given to everyone with life for its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question of if its efficacy be not frittered away by judicial decision. By the term "liberty", as used in the provision, something more it meant than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bunds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose, and to act in such manner, not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness--that is, to pursue such callings and avocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities and give to them their highest enjoyment.
57. The U.S. Supreme Court in 165 U.S. 578 (1897) in the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, has held that the "liberty" mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restrain of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts. The relevant paragraphs are as under:-
"We think the statute is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution in that it deprives the defendants of their liberty without due process of law. The statute which forbids such act does not become due process of law, because it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of the Union. The "liberty" mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restrain of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and 50 essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
It was said by Mr. Justice Bardley in Butchers' Union Company v. Crescent City Company, 111, U.S. 746, 111 U.S. 762, in the course of his concurring opinion in that case, that "the right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right. It was formulated as such under the pharse 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence, which commenced with the fundamental proposition that 'all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.' This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen."
Right to life will also include article 21 to pursuit to happiness.
58. The incidents of acid burning/throwing cause physical, mental and psychological torture. Every citizen must remember that something which has happened to acid attack victim may also happen with his family members.
59. Every person has a right to life including the right to live free from any kind of mental, physical and psychological torture, be it stalking, sexual harassment, burning etc. The victim of acid burns is stigmatized and traumatized.
60. Accordingly, in view of the observations made hereinabove, the Government Appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 05.08.2010 is set aside. The accused is convicted under Section 307 of I.P.C. Registry is directed to prepare the production warrant for the production of respondent returnable on 22.06.2017. However, before parting with the judgment, in order to 51 curb and control the ever increasing cases of acid attacks, we issue the following mandatory directions: -
A. The State Government is directed to constitute a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for the acid attack victims, within a period of four weeks from today as ordered by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2016) 3 SCC 669, Laxmi vs. Union of India and others and other analogous matters.
B. All the private hospitals throughout the State of Uttarakhand are directed to provide medical assistance to the acid attack victims as per the dicta of Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2016) 3 SCC 669, Laxmi vs. Union of India and others and other analogous matters.
C. There shall not be any sale of acid over the counter to any individual throughout the State of Uttarakhand except from one licensed dealer to another or by a licensed dealer to any school or college or to any research or medical institution or hospital or dispensary under a registered medical practitioner or any recognized public institution or industrial firm. It is also made clear that if any person is found unauthorizedly selling the acid, an FIR shall also be registered against him.
D. Since the existing provisions have failed to prevent acid throwing/acid attacks on helpless women, the Senior Superintendents of Police, throughout the State of Uttarakhand, are directed to ensure prompt registration of FIR in the offences pertaining to Sections 326A, 326B, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D of I.P.C. In all such matters, the investigation shall be completed within seven days, under the supervision of the Gazetted Officer, and thereafter, the Challan shall be put up in the competent criminal court within seven days. The Gazetted Officer 52 shall be personally held liable in case of defective investigation.
E. The cases pertaining to sexual harassment, stalking, voyeurism and acid burning are required to be fast tracked. The Trial Courts throughout the State of Uttarakhand are directed to hear the cases registered under Sections 326A, 326B, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D of I.P.C. on day to day basis and conclude the trial within three months and in case, it is not possible to conclude the trial within three months, cogent and sufficient reasons shall be recorded by the Trial Court. The Trial Court shall show due sensitivity in the matters pertaining to the acid attacks.
F. The State Government is also directed to provide protection to the eye-witnesses during the pendency of the trial in the matters registered under Sections 326A, 326B 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D of I.P.C. till the conclusion of trial.
G. The State Government is also directed to include the victims of acid attacks in the category of physically challenged persons for the purpose of reservation in public employment and also to make separate scheme for their rehabilitation.
H. The State Government is directed to ensure that in every district hospital and joint hospital, specialized ward is provided in the cases pertaining to burn injuries to avoid infection within three months from today.
I. The State Government is further directed to provide free medical aid to the victims of acid attacks till their full recovery.53
J. The State Government is directed to grant ex- gratia payment of Rs.1 lakh to acid attack victims immediately after the registration of FIR and also to pay a sum of Rs.7,000 per month to the victims who have received third/fourth degree burns injuries. The State is also directed to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- per month, in those cases, where the burns injuries are of first degree and second degree. The victims are also entitled to a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- (rupees three lakh) as ordered by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
(Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.) (Rajiv Sharma, J.) Jitendra