Gujarat High Court
Special Land Acquisition Officer vs Lilavatiben Kodar Ranchhod And Ors. on 19 July, 2001
Equivalent citations: (2002)3GLR26
JUDGMENT J.N. Bhatt, J.
1. In this group of 20 applications a common question of condonation of delay on the common ground is involved, therefore, upon request they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The condonation of delay in filing First Appeals against the common award of the Reference Court, Ahmedabad, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act), is sought to be condoned inter alia pleading that there is a delay of 146 days on the part of the applicant - Special Land Acquisition Officer, on the grounds stated, elaborately, in Para. 2, which is supported by an affidavit of the officer of the Legal Department of the State of Gujarat. The delay, is therefore, sought to be condoned on the ground of inter and intra departmental procedural delay, since the decision, making process for challenging the common award of the Reference Court was to be crystallized, after having consultation and discussions with various departments inter alia mainly, General Administration, Roads and Building, Finance and Legal Department after the certified copies having been received from the concerned law officers, who conducted the cases at the District level, in view of the provisions of Law Officers Rules 132 and 133.
3. It has been evidently and unambiguously articulated in Para 2 of the appliciations that the process which the file had to undergo for maturing the decision of questioning the awards. It is in this context, the delay of 146 days in filing a group of 22 appeals has been sought to be condoned by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The grounds stated in this group of applications are supported by an affidavit of responsible officer of the Legal Department of the State of Gujarat.
4. In course of the hearing the learned Advocate for the opponents has, also, raised objection not only against the condonation of delay of 146 days in presenting the appeals late, but also on the ground that there is a delay of 177 days after the presentation of the appeals as required Court fees stamps had not been affixed, and therefore, until the Court fees stamps were affixed, the period of limitation would not stop and it is in this context it has been submitted that there is as such total delay of 323 days in filing the appeals. It is, also, further submitted that there is no justification, worth the name, on record as to why, there was delay of 177 days. So, in the entire group of applications seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeals against the common award of the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act is seriously questioned.
5. The learned Government Pleader (G.P.) appearing for the applicants has relied on the grounds stated in the applications and has reiterated them before us. It would not be necessary nor expedient to repeat the same grounds, nonetheless a factual profile which has emerged in the grounds stated in the group of applications may be highlighted, as follows :-
I. That in order to challenge or question the decision of the Reference Court, the certified true copies are required to be obtained by the Advocates of the Government, at the district level, in such a groups. It will be interesting to note that the decision rendered by the Reference Court in a group of references came to be finalised and crystalised in the common judgment, on 27-5-1999. There is no dispute about the fact that the day on which the common judgment in respect of references under the Act came to be decided by a common judgment by the District Court under Section 18 of the Act, the certified copy came to be applied for immediately on the same day. This shows that the department concerned and also the law officer in-charge of the group of references had a clear animus to challenge the verdict recorded by the Reference Court by passing common judgment in reference cases under Section 18 of the Act. Of course making an application within the period of limitation is one of the considerations and is not only decisive and we may also make it clear that non-making of such an application within limitation does not mean that it is fatal. It is one of the aspects to be screened, scanned and scrutinised by the Court for proper exercise of discretionary powers. Needless to mention that a procedure is prescribed under Rules 132 and 133 of the Law Officers' Rules applicable to the State of Gujarat under which the certified copies are required to be applied for and upon receipt thereof, with the remarks of the local Government Officer and Advocates they are required to be submitted along with such documents before the competent authority, and thereafter, they pass through various channels, stages and tables depending upon the facts of a given case for making a decision to challenge the Judgment, Order or Award.
II. In the present case, after having taken the decision to challenge the common award recorded by the Reference Court, the entire file had to be processed and had to undergo extensive exercise through various departments including General Administration, Finance, Roads and Building and Department of Law and Justice. It is noticed from the grounds stated that in view of this intra and inter departmental procedure and process, the delay has occasioned. We have no hesitation in finding in the light of the peculiar facts and special circumstances that the delay occurred is satisfactorily accounted for, by the State of Gujarat.
III. Insofar as, the second contention about the condonation of delay of 177 days after the presentation of the appeal and till the affixation of the Court fees as required aspect is also explained by the learned G.P. in course of his submissions. It is a well known fact in such a process that the payment of Court fees, though the State is ultimate liable person because of rules of business and because of internal processual mechanism, which department should arrange for Court fees fund is always required to be considered in view of separate budgetary allocation to the departments. It is in this context, the submission of the learned G.P. that the process of collection of funds for affixation of Court fees has also to be passed through various channels and process through departments due to which delay has occasioned. Needless to mention that at times though Government has always been a party, the liability for payment of Court fees or other expenditure is required to be borne by the acquiring authority or concerned Department, etc. It is in this context, the explanation that the acquiring body, namely the other department which had entered into correspondence with the officers of the different departments, has also caused the delay. It is in this context, the delay even if it is presumed to be delay even after the presentation of filing of the appeals, has been satisfactorily explained and accounted for. The question whether the delay after presentation of the appeals on account of insufficient Court fees could be considered as such as delay as required under the law. is not gone into at this stage, since the delay if at all it is to be treated as delay of 177 days after presentation of the memo of appeals, affixation of Court fees is considered to be delay as such, then also it is satisfactorily accounted for by the applicants. Otherwise also, that part of delay falls in the realm of simply procedural and technical as it is assumed to be a period of delay. It is, therefore, the aforesaid period would constitute delay or not legally, is not required to be gone into and is kept open for consideration in appropriate case.
In our opinion, therefore, the delay of 146 days in presentation of the appeals and subsequent period of 177 days after presentation of the appeals till affixation of the Court fees is required to be condoned in the peculiar facts and special circumstances, as we are satisfied that there was sufficient cause and genuine ground. Therefore, factually it is successfully, spelt out from the record of the present case that there was sufficient cause and ground for condonation of delay, and therefore, delay as prayed for, in all the matters in this group is required to be condoned.
6. Apart from that, the legal proposition insofar as the delay condonation jurisprudence is concerned, has been extensively explored and very well enunciated by catena of judicial pronouncements. Obviously, willful indifferent person cannot be helped by the Court of law when he seeks the justice for condonation of delay. Nevertheless, if the record discloses that the parties in a given case, though delay has occasioned, had not abandoned animus to question the impugned order, decision or judgment, is an important factor which should be taken into consideration for determining the genuineness and sufficiency of the ground for condonation of delay. As noticed hereinabove in this group of matters, the certified copies came to be applied for, on the same day, when the impugned common award came to be recorded by the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act. It speaks volumes about the animus of not to accept the common award of the Reference Court. On the contrary, it is reported and spelt out from record that animus and manifestation on the part of the department to carry it further and challenge in the higher forum. This aspect is itself weighty in the process of decision making when a question is raised under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
7. Apart from that the ultimate anxiety of the Court while dealing with an application of condonation of delay has been, to see that ordinarily no meritorious matter is thrown overboard on the technical grounds of delay, The purpose and design incorporating the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to see that ordinarily a substantial justice is required to be given and ordinarily, unless there are circumstances running counter to the spirit of the provision of Section 5, the meritorious matters are required to be dealt with and adjudicated upon on merits. It is rightly said that no party or person would stand benefited by filing appeal or application late without any reason ordinarily when he has made up his mind to challenge the impugned order, award, judgment or decision, as the case may be. There cannot be such presumption also. This proposition of law is also very well settled since long. Therefore, while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, one cannot start with presumption that party did not intend to question it. On the contrary, the presumption may be other way round. Whereas in the present case it is manifested in the application that the certified copy of the impugned common award was applied for on the same day when the Reference Court finalized the matters. Therefore, the contention that delay cannot be condoned in this group of matters is unsustainable and unacceptable.
8. Insofar as the proposition of law on this point is concerned, there are host of decisions. However, we would like to refer some of the important decisions wherein the principles and the basic ideas and the underlying design and deciderum of the provisions of Section 5 or such other provision in any other enactment have been succinctly highlighted :
I. In the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, reported in JT 2000 (5) SC 389 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that technicalities of law cannot prevent the Courts to do substantial justice and undo illegalities.
After considering the principles enunciated in following decisions in :
(1) New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, 1975 (2) SCC 840, (2) Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156, (3) Shankuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, 1969 (1) SCR 1006, (4) Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, 1979 (4) SCC 365, (5) Lata Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, 1969 (2) SCC 770, (6) State of Kerala v. E. K. Kuriyipe, 1981 Supp. SCC 366, (7) O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh, 1984 (4) SCC 66, (8) Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, JT 1987 (1) SC 537 : 1987 (2) SCC 107, (9) Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra, 1987 Supp. SCC 339, (10) G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, JT 1988 (1) SC 524 : 1988 (2) SCC 142, (11) Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India, JT 1990 (4) SC 1 : 1991 (1) SCC 174, (12) Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, JT 1992 (Supp) SC 496 : 1993 (1) SCC 572, (13) Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 487, (14) Ram Kishan v. U.P.S.R.T.C., 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 507 and (15) Warlu v. Gangotribai, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 37, the following observations in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors., JT 1996 (3) SC 371 : 1996 (3) SCC 132, are very pertinent in such cases, and therefore, they are highlighted :
"It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 percent of the cases filed in this Court-be it by private party or the State are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/ agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the course or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued fay the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants."
It is further observed as follows :-
"To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma, JT 1996 (7) SC 204 : 1996 (10) SCC 634.
13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, JT 1995 (7) SC 69 : 1995 (6) SCC 614, this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, JT 1998 (6) SC 242 : 1998 (7) SCC 123, this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context, it was observed :
"It is axitomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain Other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court."
14. Looking into the facts and circumstances of the case, as noticed earlier and with the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned, we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been made out by the petitioners which has persuaded us to condone the delay in filing the petitions. Dismissing the appeals on technical grounds of limitation would not, in any way, advance the interests of justice but admittedly, result in failure of justice as the impugned judgments are likely to affect not only the parties before us, but hundreds of other persons who are stated to be senior than the respondents. The technicalities of law cannot prevent us from doing substantial justice and undoing the illegalities perpetuated on the basis of the impugned judgments. However, while deciding the petitions, the reliefs in the case can appropriately be moulded which may not amount to unsettle the settled rights of the parties on the basis of judicial pronouncements made by the Courts regarding which the State is shown to have been careless and negligent. It is paramount consideration of this Court to safeguard the interests of all the litigants and persons serving the Police Department of the State of Bihar by ensuring the security of the tenure and non-disturbance of accrual of rights upon them under the prevalent law and the rules made in that behalf. Accordingly, delay in filing the petitions is condoned."
II. In the case of Union of India v. A. Vasu, reported in 1998 (8) SCC 562, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows ;-
"2. So far as the delay is concerned, Mr. Shetye, learned Counsel for the respondent, says that there is no proper explanation for the delay of 407 days and that in fact the respondent was reinstated pursuant to the impugned order on 8-10-1992. Only when the respondent took out proceedings for recovery of the arrears that the Government appears to have woken up and filed these proceedings. It is also brought to our notice that a fresh enquiry has been held and the respondent has been again punished with compulsory retirement vide an order dated 17-11-1992 against him. He has again approached the Tribunal and that matter is pending there.
3. We are now concerned only with the validity of the order dated 11-6-1992 and the delay in filing the S.L.P. Having regard to the nature of the charges and of the facts and circumstances of the case mentioned above, we are inclined to condone the delay. The delay is condoned."
III. In the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, reported in 1996 (3) SCC 132, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows :-
"3. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act') extends prescribed period of limitation, in filing an application or an appeal except under the provisions of Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short, 'the Code') and gives power to the Court to admit the appeal or application after the prescribed period. The only condition is mat the applicant/appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. In Ramlal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1962 (2) SCR 762, it was laid down that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary that the applicant/appellant has to explain whole of the period between the date of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient that the applicant/appellant would explain the delay caused by the period between the last of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is actually filed.
4. What constitute sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237, this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystalized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction. In Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156, it was observed that true guide for a Court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari & Ors., 1969 (1) SCR 1006, a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
5. In Concord of India Insurance Co, Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi & Ors., 1979 (3) SCR 694, which is a case of negligence of the Counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, 1970 (2) SCR 90, this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of Counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case, it was held that the mistake committed by the Counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.
6. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe and Ors., 1981 Supp. SCC 72, it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependant upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Smt. Milavi Devi v. Dim Nath, 1982 (3) SCR 366, it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and case was remitted for decision on merits.
7. In O.P. Kathpaliaa v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) and Ors., 1984 (4) SCC 66, a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors., 1987 (2) SCC 107, a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice-mat being the life-purpose tor the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.
8. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represent collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Smt. Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra, 1987 Supp. SCC 338, this Court had held that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.
9. In G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors. v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, 1988 (2) SCC 142, it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its Counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect, which perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural, red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude, is therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-of course, within reasonable limits-is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.
10. In Scheduled Caste Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda v. Union of India & Ors., 1991 (1) SCC 174, a Bench of three Judges of this Court held that the bona fides of the parties are to be tested on merits and the delay of 1146 to 1079 days was not condoned on the ground that the parties approached the Court after decision on merits was allowed in other cases by this Court. Therefore, it was held that it did not furnish a ground for condonation of delay under Section 5. In Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India. 1993 (1) SCC 572, it was held that it is not at all a fit case wherein the anxiety to render justice to a party so that a just cause is not defeated, a pragmatic view should be taken by the Court in considering sufficing cause for condonation of the delay under Section 5. It was held that when the party has come with a false plea to get rid of the bar of limitation, the Court should not encourage such person by condoning the delay and result in the bar of limitation pleaded by the opposite party. This Court, therefore, refused to condone the delay in favour of the party who came forward with false plea. In M/s. Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 487, a Bench of three Judges held that delay caused in filing the appeal due to fluctuation in laying down the law was held to be a sufficient cause and delay of 14 days was condoned. In Ram Krishan and Anr. v. U. P. State Roadways Transport Corporation and Anr., 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 507, this Court had held that although the story put forward by the applicant for not filing the application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act within the period of limitation was not found convincing but keeping in view the facts and circumstances and cause of justice, the delay was condoned and the appeal was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal to dispose it on merits. In Warlu v. Gangotribai and Anr., 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 37, a three-Judge Bench condoned delay of 11 years in filing the special leave petition."
IV. In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows :-
"The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation, whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. In every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitior. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. The words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice."
It is held as follows :-
"14. In this case, explanation for the delay set up by the appellant was found satisfactory to the trial Court in the exercise of its discretion and the High Court went wrong in upsetting the finding, more so when the High Court was exercising revisional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the respondent must be compensated particularly because the appellant has secured a sum of Rs. 50/- thousand from the delinquent-Advocate through the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned order by restoring the order passed by the trial Court but on a condition that the appellant shall pay a sum of rupees ten thousand to the respondent (or deposit it in this Court) within one month from this date."
V. In the case of G. Ramegowda Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 1988 (2) SCC 142, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows :-
"There is no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its Counsel. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, The expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.
The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for private citizen as for Governmental-authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it.
(ii) If appeals brought by Government are lost for such default, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. In assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause', for purpose of Section 5 it might, perhaps be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. Due recognition of these limitations on Government functioning within a reasonable limit-is necessary. It would be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters.
In the present case, there is force in the criticism that the delay on the part of the Government even after 20-1-1971 for over one year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond its control is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of the Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits.
Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd. 1962 (2) SCR 762 : AIR 1962 SC 361; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, 1969 (1) SCR 106; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi & Ors., 1979 (3) SCR 694; Lala Mala Din v. A. Narayanan, 1970 (2) SCR 90; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji. 1987 (2) SCC 107; National Bank of Wales Ltd., 1899 (2) LR 629 at 673 and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. B. M. Krishnamurthy, 1985 (1) SCC 469, referred to.
Adverting to the conduct of the Government Pleader the High Court observed :
"But how could the L.A.O. anticipate that the Government Pleader or the Assistant Government Pleader would fail to do such elementary duties like applying for such certified copies, obtaining them and forwarding them to the Government with his opinion? To say the least, the conduct of the Government Pleader and/or, the Assistant Government Pleader appears to us to be extraordinary."
13. Indeed in the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the State Government in these appeals, the Land Acquisition Officer avers :
"I beg to submit that due to the unusual conduct of the District Government Pleaders who were in office during a particular period Government had to face the problem of delay in filing of appeals in hundreds of cases. The Government was not able to know the real state of affairs till the concerned Government Pleaders relinquished their office. In fact, for some time, there was utter confusion and it became practically impossible to find out as to which are the Land Acquisition cases which has been disposed of and in which appeals were not filed though appeals ought to have been filed. It is humbly submitted that the case of the Government for condonation of delay was that on account of the fraud played by the concerned Government Pleaders delay in filing the appeals has occurred and more than a crore of rupees would be a loss to the Government on account of the said fraud played by the Government Pleaders. In fact, in innumerable cases the Hon'ble High Court has condoned the delay in fiting of the appeals, taking into consideration the most unusual conduct of Government Pleaders which had landed the Government in difficulties. I beg to further submit that almost all the appeals which had been entertained by the Hon'ble High Court after condoning the delay, have been allowed on consideration of their merits ........"
14. The contours of the area of discretion of the Courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd., 1962 (2) SCR 762; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, 1969 (1) SCR 1006; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi & Ors., 1979 (3) SCR 694; Lala Mala Din v. A. Narayanan, 1970 (2) SCR 90 and Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, 1987 (2) SCC 107 etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its Counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its Counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. In Katiji's case, (supra), this Court said :
"When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay."
"It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental-authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be some what unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning of course, within a reasonable limits-is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law-officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of these cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M. R., in the Re : National Bank of Wales Ltd., 1899 J(2) LR 629 at 673 observed, though in a different context :
"Business cannot be carried on, upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them."
In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite sometime for the Government to realise that the law-officers failed that trust.
18. While a private person can take instant decision a "bureaucratic or democratic organ" it is said by a learned Judge "hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, unmindful of time and impersonally." Now at the end, should we interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court? Shri Datar criticised that the delay on the part of Government even after 20-1-1971 for over an year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed that the Government Pleader who was in office till 15-12-1970 had applied for certified copies on 20-7-1970, but the application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a Government Pleader. In a similar context, where delay had been condoned by the High Court, this Court declined to interfere and observed :
"Having regard to the entirety of the circumstances, the High Court thought that the State should not be penalised for the lapses of some of its officers and that in the particular circumstances there were sufficient grounds justifying the condonation of delay in filing the appeals. It was a matter for the discretion of the High Court. We are unable to say that the discretion was improperly exercised ....."
We think in the circumstances of this case, we should also decline to interfere. Appeals are dismissed, but without an order as to costs."
VI. In the case of State of U. P. v. Harish Chandra, reported in 1996 (9) SCC 309, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the decision in the case of C.W.T. v. Amateur Riders Club, reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 603, which was relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondents and it has been very well explained in Para 7. The following observations are pertinent :-
"It is undoubtedly true that the applicant seeking condonation of delay is duty-bound to explain the reasons for the delay but as has been held by the Supreme Court in several cases, the very manner in which the bureaucratic process moves, if the case deserves merit the Court should consider the question of condonation from that perspective. That apart the respondents themselves approached the High Court in the year 1990 making a grievance that they had not been appointed even though they are included in the select list of 1987 and the 1987 list itself expired under the Rules on 4-4-1988. In this view of the matter and in view of the merits of the case, it has to be held that sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay and accordingly the delay is condoned. C.W.T. v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, referred to."
VII. In the case of Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing v. Mohinder Singh Jagdev, reported in 1996 (6) SCC 229, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows :-
"The Counsel who appeared for the Union of India in the High Court had sent his record and intimation of the result after the expiry of limitation. Therefore, the blame has to be laid on the Counsel who was irresponsible in not informing the Government, after the appeal was allowed by the High Court. The Government acts only through its officers at diverse stages. After the receipt of the copy of the impugned judgment from the Advocate several steps have been taken till filing the special leave petition. Proper explanation for 217 days' delay has accordingly been given in the affidavit filed in support of the S.L.P. Accordingly, the delay is condoned."
VIII. In the case of Special Tehsildar Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma, reported in 1996 (10) SCC 634, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows :
"Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every day's delay in filing the review application."
IX. In the case of State of M. P. v. Pradeep Kumar, reported in JT 2000 (10) SC 349, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows :-
"1-Civil Appeal- Delay in filing appeal-Condonation of delay-Effect of not filing an application for condonation along with filing of the appeal-Second appeal filed by appellants in December, 1996, challenging decree passed by District Court-Though appeal was belated, no application filed for condoning the delay filed in January, 1997-High Court dismissing the appeal on the motion of respondents on the ground of failure to file application for condonation of delay along with appeal-Whether dismissal of appeal proper and legal, Held that , deficiency being a curable defect and application for condonation having been filed subsequently, the appeal should be taken to have been presented in accordance with the requirements of Rule 3A of Order 41. High Court directed to consider the application for condonation and if satisfied with the explanation for the delay, then to dispose of the second appeal in accordance with law."
9. It could very well be visualized from the aforesaid propositions of law relatable to the jurisprudence of condonation of delay that the Court should be ordinarily lenient and liberal in determining the sufficiency or reasonability of ground for condonation so as to see that no meritorious matter is thrown away on a technical plea of delay, more so when the animus not to accept the impugned order, decision, judgment or award, as final, is manifested and again that too in case of parties where impersonal mechanism and machinery has been involved in decision making process.
10. In the facts and circumstances narrated hereinbefore coupled with the principles of law governing the law of delay condonation, we are fully satisfied that there has been justification for condonation of delay not only of initial period of 146 days in presentation of the appeal memo, but also the delay in affixing of the Court fees for a period of 177 days. Therefore, in our opinion, this is an appropriate and fit case for condonation of delay and since the same ground is there in all the 20 applications in this group, delay in each application shall stand condoned. AH the applications are allowed. Rule made absolute with cost, which is quantified at Rs. 5,000/- to be deposited in the name of the Secretary, High Court Legal Service Committee.
11. Office is directed to notify this group of 20 appeals for admission hearing on 1-8-2001. Office is also directed to call for R & P immediately so as to reach here on or before 31-7-2001, even if need be with a messenger.