Delhi High Court
Shri Rohtas Singh And Others vs Union Of India And Others on 5 December, 2008
Author: A.K. Sikri
Bench: A.K.Sikri, Manmohan Singh
Reportable
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP (C) No.4558/2002
Date of Hearing: 20.10.2008
Date of Decision: 05.12.2008
#Shri Rohtas Singh and Others .....Petitioners
! Through: Mr. Vikram Nandrajog
Versus
$Union of India & Others .....Respondents
Through Mr. Sanjay Poddar for LAC
Mr. V.K. Tandon for GNCT of Delhi
Mr. C. Mohan Rao for DDA
CORAM :-
*THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE A.K.SIKRI
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH
1.Whether Reporters of Local papers may be allowed to
see the Judgment?
2.To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3.Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
A.K. SIKRI, J.
:
1. In the year 1975, at the instance of the then Prime Minister, a 20 Point Programme was formulated by the government authorities. Under this Programme, plots of lands were allotted to Harijans and other poor and landless persons for their housing. These plots of lands were given from the land belonging to different Gaon Sabhas in Delhi. The petitioners herein, who are 34 in number, were the beneficiaries of the said 20 Point Programme as they were allotted plots in village Kochanpur. For WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 1 of 19 this purpose in the year 1977-78, 158 plots were carved out of the Gaon Sabha land in the said village. Out of these, 147 plots were allotted to the poor and landless persons which included the petitioners herein.
2. The Delhi Development Authority framed a housing Scheme known as Dwarka Project and for this scheme vast tracts of land have been acquired by the Government and placed at the disposal of the DDA for the development of the said scheme. Notification dated 13.12.2000 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued whereby the Government proposed to acquire lands in various villages, including village Kochanpur. The petitioners filed objections thereto under Section 5-A of the Act pointing out that plots in question were allotted to them for residential/housing purpose under the 20 Point Programme to the weaker sections of the society and therefore, there was no occasion to acquire the residential plots allotted to them for residential scheme. The primary objection was that when these plots were allotted to the petitioners, who belonged to Harijan class and poor category, for their rehabilitation/housing, it defied common sense as to why such poor people should be uprooted for the purpose of developing residential plots for other persons.
3. However, the objections of the petitioner did not find favour with the respondents and rejecting these objections, notification dated 7.12.2001 under Section 6 of the Act was issued. After the issuance of this WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 2 of 19 declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the petitioners, approached this Court by means of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in which they have prayed for issuance of writ of mandamus as well as the writ of certiorari with the following prayers:
"A. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other suitable writ, order or direction directing the respondents to produce the relevant record of their respective departments pertaining to allotment of the 147 plots in village Pochanpur in the year 1987-88 under the 20 Point Programme as well as the respective departmental records pertaining to mutation of said plots in the names of the respective allottees and the decisions that lands comprising said Khasras/plots is not and will not be made available for inclusion in any other development scheme.
B. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other suitable writ, order or direction in the like nature quashing Notification No.F.10(30)/96/L&B/LA/13417 dated 13.12.2000 issued under Section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and Notification No.F10(30) 96/L&B/LA/14062 dated 7.12.2001 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 whereby the lands of the petitioners bearing plot Nos.34, 88, 4, 98, 99, 100, 33, 20, 68, 3, 6, 119, 148, 105, 89, 39, 87, 32, 64, 65, 35, 5, 130, 107, 112, 78, 31, 58, 92, 153, 29, 19, 71 and 126 comprised in Khasra Nos.6/1, 6/2, 6/3, 6/7, 6/8, 6/9, 6/10, 7/3 and 7/4 in the revenue estate of Village Pochanpur, Block Najafgarh, Delhi has been notified for acquisition.
C. Award costs to the petitioner."
4. Thus, in a sense, the petitioners are seeking quashing of notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 respectively in respect of their land. The main plank of attack is that the land allotted to them, who were Harijans and other poor and landless persons for their housing under the WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 3 of 19 benevolent 20 Point Programme of the Prime Minister, cannot be taken for the purported scheme, which is also a housing scheme. It is their contention that for the housing need of general public, special class like the petitioners cannot be uprooted and made homeless. It is also pointed out in the petition that when the Delhi Development Authority framed a development scheme known as Dwarka Project and wanted to acquire large tracts of land, which included the petitioners' land as well, the Additional District Magistrate-cum-Director (P) vide his letter dated 8.10.1993 had written to the Vice-Chairman, DDA, pointing out the special nature of allotment of this plots to the petitioners and had directed that allottees of these lands be not disturbed. DDA vide its reply dated 22.3.1994 had sought identification of the plots in question, which was replied to vide letter dated 16.8.1995 identifying the plots belonging to the petitioners. It is also averred in the writ petition that at that time the matter was resolved between the officers of the DDA and the Revenue Department. DDA in its record noted that 147 plots were developed plots and therefore, it was not necessary to take possession thereof. It is also alleged that in the DDA records it was recorded that the land on which these plots are carved out was to be excluded from lands available or to be made available for the purpose of Dwarka Sub City. Notwithstanding the aforesaid decision of the DDA taken in 1995, impugned notification under Section 4 was issued on 13.12.2000. Even WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 4 of 19 when in the objections filed by the petitioners under Section 5-A of the Act aforesaid factual position was brought to the notice of the DDA it still went ahead with the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. It is, thus, the submission of the petitioners that the proposed acquisition of their land is entirely unjustified.
5. The petitioners have placed strong reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hukam Chand and others v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 408. That was a case where two writ petitions, which were subject matter of that judgment, were filed by members of the Scheduled Caste belonging to economically backward section of the society. They were the residents of a cluster of villages included within the Panchyat of Nasirpur located within the Union Territory of Delhi not far away from the established areas. On 25.2.1984 the Gaon Sabha resolved to grant certain lands vested in it to those petitioners and some other persons for residential purposes on the footing that they were members of the Scheduled Casts belonging to backward section of the society and did not have residential accommodation. However, in spite of this decision, lands were not allotted. In the meantime, land on which the said petitioners had their cluster of residences was sought to be acquired. It is also worthwhile to mention that after the resolution dated 25.2.1984 was passed by the Gaon Sabha wherein decision was taken to allot the said petitioners land for residential purposes, writ petitions were filed WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 5 of 19 challenging the proposal to allot the land. The Gaon Sabha had contested those petitions and defended the resolution on the ground that the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha had no right to pass such resolution for allotment of land purporting to implement the 20 Point Programme. The Lt. Governor, in these circumstances, had appointed a Committee to examine the matter and implement the resolution after such examination. Though several adjournments were taken to give final shape to the recommendation of the Committee, the matter was not finalized mainly on account of the fact that the dispute relating to residential requirement could not be resolved and the pressing objection of others to exclude on the ground of residence had stood in the way. The Supreme Court clarified that residence within the Panchayat may be taken as satisfying requirement and thus, the main objection was no more available to be pressed. The Supreme Court also observed that for this purpose ration card and voters' card were the usual type of evidence which can be looked into in support of the claim of residence. With this the Supreme Court quashed the acquisition notification in the following manner:-
"6. Growth of population and influx thereof into urban areas have among other reasons been making life competitive. The process of such competition excludes the acceptability of the concept of 'life and let live'. Everyone becomes self-centered and does not bother about others in WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 6 of 19 the community. The National Capital suffers a greater hazard in this direction. It was only the other day that the Minister stated in Parliament that the average influx was to the tune of a hundred thousand persons per year. It is time that appropriate attention is devoted to the matter so that the city limits are not required to be limitlessly extended. Those who have been living for ages in the neighbouring revenue villages in the non-urban areas are also entitled to consideration and protection as citizens and it is the obligation of Government to extend the umbrella of guarantees and protections to them too. We see no reason as to why these lands should be subjected to acquisition, particularly when it is proposed to be utilized for housing some of the underprivileged and the economically backward section of the community. The acquisition proceedings shall thus stand quashed."
(emphasis added)
6. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioners are in a better position as they have already been allotted the land under the 20 Point Programme and the respondents want to uproot them and make them homeless to accommodate others and thus, violating the concept of 'Life and Let Live' as discussed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment.
7. In the counter affidavit filed by the Land Acquisition Collector it is stated that the land is required urgently for the public purpose, namely, Dwarka Scheme. Objections of the petitioners filed under 5-A of the Act were duly considered and proper procedure was followed as there is no allegation in the writ petition that there was denial of opportunity to the WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 7 of 19 petitioners. The Competent Authority was satisfied that possession of the land should be taken over under the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act and therefore, notice to this effect was also published on 15.3.2002 whereby the LAC was directed to take possession of the land on the expiry of 15 days from the date of publication of the notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act. It is also stated that possession of the large area of the acquired land has already been taken and handed over to the DDA. Notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act were also sent to the recorded owners/interested parties. Thereafter, Award No.30/2002-03 was also announced on 9.12.2002. However, where the possession of other lands had been taken, in so far as the land, subject-matter of this petition is concerned, possession could not be taken as, in the meantime, this Court in the present petition had granted status quo order. It is submitted that merely because there are built up properties on the land would not be a ground to seek quashing of the acquisition as this Court in Shri Bhagwan and anr. v. Union of India & Ors. reported as 1991 (2) Delhi Lawyer 59 (DB) had rejected similar contention and that judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court, which is reported as Roshnara Begum v. Union of India, 61 (1996) DLT
206. It is also explained that already acquired land surrounds the land in question and as such cannot be excluded from the purview of the Dwarka Scheme and in fact, is urgently needed for Dwarka Phase II WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 8 of 19 under planned development of Delhi. It is also submitted that merely because the land in question was allotted to the petitioners under the 20 Point Programme would not mean that such a land cannot be acquired at all if it is needed for the public purpose. In this behalf, the respondents argued that the aforesaid allotment was under the administrative exercise of the executive which cannot override the statutory power to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act and in support of this proposition reliance is placed on the same judgment in the case of Shri Bhagwan (supra). It is averred that case of the petitioners was specifically examined but was rejected as the release of the land of the petitioners was not possible in larger public interest. Therefore, it was found that it is not even a fit case for de-notification under Section 48 of the Act. As per the respondents, these petitioners are being paid due compensation under the law and therefore, they are not permitted to challenge the acquisition.
8. DDA has also treaded on the same lines in its affidavit. Additionally, one another aspect is sought to be highlighted. Though it is admitted that the petitioners were allotted plots in question under 20 Point Programme by the Development Department from amongst Gaon Sabha land meant for landless Harijans and other weaker sections of the society for residential/housing purposes, as per the Delhi Government there was a pre-condition of allotment of land, namely, allottee should WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 9 of 19 take over the physical possession and use the plots for residential/housing purposes. However, the land allotted to the petitioners were not being utilized for that purpose and therefore, the very purpose of allotment of residential/housing plots was defeated and thus, it was permissible for the DDA to issue notification acquiring such a land. This aspect is, however, denied by the petitioners in the rejoinder affidavit stating that the petitioners have used the land for residential purposes and are residing therein. It is also stated by the petitioners that respondents were and are duty bound to develop the area in question in a manner so as to include the plots allotted to the petitioners and for one public purpose they cannot defeat the other public purpose under which the petitioners were allotted the land.
9. There is no denial of the principle of law that any policy decision taken on administrative side would not debar statutory authorities to take actions under the provisions of a statute. In Shri Bhagwan (supra) the Division Bench of this Court had narrated this principle in the following manner:-
"19. It is not in dispute that the decision contained in the aforesaid letter dated 18th August, 1986 is an Administrative decision. We will assume, for the sake of argument, that that decision has been taken with the concurrence of the Lt. Governor. It is, however, well established that an administrative decision can always be altered; modified or abrogated by the competent authority. It is not in dispute that the impugned award was announced after approval had been obtained from the Lt. Governor. Even if, therefore, there was a policy decision of the Lt.WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 10 of 19
Governor which was incorporated in the aforesaid letter dated 18th August, 1986, this stood varied by the Lt. Governor himself when, within one month of that policy decision, he gave his assent to the promulgation of the awards. It is further to be noted that whereas the policy of 18th August, 1986 was, at best, an administrative policy, the Lt. Governor while granting approval was exercising his statutory functions and duties under section 11 of the said Act. No policy decision could, in our opinion, vary or curb the jurisdiction of the Lt. Governor under section 11 of the said Act."
10.We may also take note of recent judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Rajesh Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., 141 (2007) DLT 493 (DB). Therein, notifications for acquisition of land were challenged on the ground that the acquisition of land was falling within the category of colonies likely to be regularized. In that case even the LAC in his report, after hearing the objections under Section 5-A, had recommended exclusion of those lands from acquisition, which were falling within the limit of 20 meters from the village abadi taking note of the fact that they were unauthorized colonies and likely to be regularized. Likewise, in some areas where houses and shops existed and the land was also adjoining the Lal Dora village but built up, LAC's recommendation was that decision be taken to de-notify the same in consultation with the requisitioning department. Notwithstanding, the declaration under Section 6 was issued acquiring the said land also by not acceding to the recommendation of the LAC. This Court upheld the WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 11 of 19 acquisition and while doing so specifically held that where large expanse of land is to be acquired for 'planned development of Delhi', it would not be proper to leave out portions therefrom only because construction had been carried on. Even for those petitioners who were covered by some policy of regularizing unauthorized colonies, proper course to be adopted was to approach the Government and not to question acquisition. Following discussion in this behalf would be useful to us:-
"B. ACQUISITION OF LANDS SLATED FOR
REGULARISATION
10. The Deputy Director (LA), Land and Building Department, Government of NCT in terms of his Affidavit dated 25.4.2007 has duly disclosed that there are 1432 applications from Resident Welfare Association for regularisation of unauthorised colonies in NCT of Delhi. Of the 1072 such clusters 46 unauthorised colonies are stated by him to be in existence in the Rohini Residential Scheme (Zone M+H). A map has also been filed with the Affidavit. There is some controversy as to whether the land in question falls within these unauthorised colonies slated for regularisation but we shall proceed on the basis that the Petitioners' lands/properties fall within the category of colonies likely to be regularised. The submission of the Respondents, however, is that regularisation has no bearing on acquisition, which has to be completed in consonance with the provisions of the Act. On the other hand learned counsel for the Petitioners contend that no purpose would be served in acquisition of the land if it is to be subsequently regularised. These arguments have already been considered by the Full Bench of this Court in Roshnara Begum -vs- Union of India, AIR 1996 Delhi 206, which stands affirmed by the Supreme Court in Murari -vs- Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 15. Their Lordships have observed that where WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 12 of 19 large expanses of land were to be acquired for the `Planned Development of Delhi', it would not be proper to leave out portions therefrom only because construction had been carried out. The Full Bench had noted that in the event that any of the Petitioners were covered by some policy of regularising the unauthorised colonies the proper course to be adopted was to approach the Government and not to question the acquisition. The Full Bench had also affirmed the approach of an earlier Division Bench in Shri Bhagwan -vs- Union of India, 1991(2) Delhi Lawyer 59 (DB). B.N. Kirpal, J., as learned Chief Justice of India then was, speaking for the Division Bench in Shri Bhagwan had observed that administrative instructions where the Lt. Governor exercises the statutory power that cannot be curtailed by Administrative authorities can always change or modify their earlier decisions, except where principles of promissory estoppel have come into operation, i.e. where the petitioners had acted to their detriment as a result of that administrative policy. The Bench also rejected the argument that where large-scale habitation on lands has already come into existence, its acquisition ought not to be carried out. The Bench pithily observed that they were not dealing with the acquisition of land for allotment to a society, but rather for the `Planned Development of Delhi'. The Bench also repulsed the postulation that agricultural land could not be earmarked for industrial or residential requirements, applying Bharat Singh -vs- State of Haryana, 1988(4) SCC 534. The opening arguments that the "petitioners will be rendered homeless and thousands, if not lacs, of families will be uprooted if the acquisition is not quashed" did not impress the Division Bench. This approach has also been favoured by another Division Bench of this Court presided over Y.K. Sabharwal, J., as the learned Chief Justice of India then was, titled Prem Chand Ramesh Chand -vs- Delhi Development Authority, 66(1997) DLT 482(DB), noting the argument "that there is any public policy to regularise unauthorised colonies or there is a policy decision not to acquire built up area, are concluded against the petitioner by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Attar Singh vs- DDA (CW 3110 of 1991) decided on 10th August, 1992". In Attar Singh the Division Bench recorded that it had been "contended that unauthorised colonies on WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 13 of 19 Government land are sought to be regularised. It is possible that a political decision to this effect may be taken with regard to some of the colonies but as far as this land is concerned, there have been valid proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. If there was any built-up area as on the date when Section 4 Notification was issued, the claimants would be entitled to receive compensation in accordance with law". Ironically, it is Mr. Ravinder Sethi who had ably argued Prem Chand Ramesh Chand, but for the Respondent/DDA. Alas, he did not bring Prem Chand Ramesh Chand to our notice. In this analysis this is now the well-entrenched view, taken by the three Division Benches of this Court, as also the Full Bench in Roshnara Begum, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Murari.
Unfortunately, the same points are agitated time and again before each and every Bench to which the Land Acquisition Roster is assigned.
C. SHOULD PUBLIC POLICY PREVAIL OVER STATUTORY LAW
11. It was in these circumstances that Mr. Lekhi has contended that statute law is always subservient to public policy. According to him, Public Policy dictates that no injury or deviation can be tolerated to the welfare of citizenry, and by the same token tendencies harmful to the public. Public Policy as defined in the Black's Law Dictionary is - "The general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures". We have read the decision of the House of Lords in Fender -vs- Mildmay, 1937 (Vol.3) All ELR 403 (at page 414). However, in our opinion, the observations are of no assistance to the Petitioners. In his speech Lord Thankerton has said that "there can be little question as to the proper function of the courts in questions of public policy. Their duty is to expound, and not to expand, such policy. That does not mean that they are precluded from applying an existing principle of public policy to a new set of circumstances, where such circumstances are clearly within the scope of the policy. Such a case might well arise in the case of safety of the state, for instance. No such case is suggested here". No such case is made out even before us. Public Policy cannot override WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 14 of 19 statutory law except in very rare circumstances. It cannot be gainsaid that Public Policy, in fact, finds expression in enactments of Parliament. It is inconceivable that Public Policy can run counter to the will of Parliament. Mr. Lekhi's reliance on the following passage from De Smith Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action is not logical. On the contrary the observations militate against the Petitioners since they have indubitably acted against the law and their endeavour is to profit from their own misdeeds:
Associated with the presumption of implied human rights is the presumption that Parliament intends the powers it confers to be exercised in accordance with "public policy". Public Policy is an "unruly horse" which must be ridden with care, but it is the public law equivalent of private law equitable principles, such as that which states that no person may benefit from his own wrong. Thus the courts will presume that Parliament did not intend to imperil the welfare of the state or its inhabitants. In a recent case public policy has even been held to override the clear terms of a statute, when to conform with the letter of the statute might have endangered a life."
11. If one has regard to the brilliant recapitulation of the statement of law, and we are supposed to give due regard, what follows is that for the larger and more comprehensive housing scheme, large tracts of land is required, as in the instant case, it would be difficult to leave out few pockets of land in between as the same may not only be counter-
productive but also create difficulties in the proper implementation of such a scheme. A comprehensive and holistic view is to be taken by policy makers while formulating schemes of this magnitude like Dwarka Residential Scheme for which entire area that is required for the WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 15 of 19 residential scheme has to be made available. These schemes are important part of planned development of Delhi and if few portions of the land are left out, the development may not take place in the manner in which it is desired by the developers, namely, the DDA in the instant case. In the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, it is specifically averred that the land which is occupied by the petitioners is also needed for carrying out the residential scheme as a whole.
12.It is not a case where land of the petitioner only is sought to be acquired and on that land residential scheme is envisaged for some other persons. However, the land of the petitioner is a miniscule of the total land sought to be acquired which comprises of a very large area. Therefore, this case does not present the same situation which was prevalent in Hukam Chand (supra). Thus, the challenge to the impugned notifications, as laid by the petitioners, is unsustainable and fails. The notifications are held to be valid.
13.Having held so, we would be failing in our duty if the interest of the petitioners at the same time is not protected. All said and done, the petitioners, who belong to weaker sections of the society - socially and/or economically - were allotted the land to enable them to get proper residences and a decent shelter. It would not, in these circumstances, be proper to snatch away their shelter without providing them the alternative accommodation. The spirit of the judgment of the WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 16 of 19 Supreme Court in Hukam Chand (supra) has to be followed by the respondents. It is equally the duty of the respondents, as a welfare State, to ensure that these petitioners are not rendered homeless forcing them to squat at the pavements or create slums. The respondents, as a model State, cannot be permitted to undo the welfare measure it had taken by providing these petitioners the sites for their rehabilitation.
14.Fortunately for the petitioners, the respondents have framed a scheme for allotment of alternate plots in respect of those whose lands are acquired. This scheme is known as "Large Scale Acquisition (Development and Disposal of Land) in Delhi, 1961." It is not necessary to highlight in detail various provisions of this scheme. Suffice it to mention that this scheme enables certain categories of land owners whose lands are compulsorily required, to be considered for allotment of alternate plots. This scheme has acquired a statutory character under the provisions of Delhi Development Act, 1957 read with Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Nazul Land) Rules, 1981. The elements of this scheme have been engrafted into the Nazul Rules as well. In 1986 some changes were brought into this scheme. We are concerned with further modification brought to this scheme by an order dated 30.1.1987. In the amendment carried out by the aforesaid orders, persons like the petitioners who are allotted agricultural land under 20 WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 17 of 19 Point Programme are specifically made eligible for the allotment of alternative plots as is clear from the reading of the said order:-
"Delhi Administration: Delhi Land & Building Department Vikas Bhawan: New Delhi.
NO. F. 37(39) 82-L&B/ 3703 Dated: the 30/1/1987 Office Order It has been decided that henceforth, the recommendation for the allotment of alternative plots may be made even where the possession of the entire land acquired has not been taken by the concerned departments of the Government/agencies. But the Zonal Officers while scrutinizing such cases will take into consideration the possession of land to the extent of 80% and not lesser than 80% of total land for which award has been announced.
It has also been decided that the Harijans and other landless persons of the villages who were allotted agricultural land under 20 point programme of the Government may also be considered for the allotment of alternative plots even if they have been declared Bhumidar/Owner of the land after notification u/s 4 of the L.A. Act. While examining such cases the Zonal Officer concerned may examine all relevant factors including the orders passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate/Revenue Asstt. by which Bhumidari rights were conferred upon the applicants u/s 74 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act.
In both these cases mentioned above, other conditions of recommendations for the allotment of alternative plot, pertaining to determination of eligibility of size etc. will remain the same.WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 18 of 19
Sd/-
(G.S.Chaturvedi) Under Secretary (Alt. Allotment)"
15.We are, therefore, of the opinion that petitioners' cases deserve appropriate consideration for allotment of alternate lands under the aforesaid scheme as modified. The petitioner shall, in these circumstances, give a representation to the respondents within four weeks and their request for allotment of alternate plots of land shall be considered favourably within eight weeks thereafter. Till then, the petitioners should not be dispossessed.
16.The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid directions.
(A.K. SIKRI)
JUDGE
December 05, 2008 (MANMOHAN SINGH)
hp. JUDGE
WP(C) No.4558/02 Page 19 of 19