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[Cites 22, Cited by 0]

Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi

Debindra Kundra vs Union Of India Through on 29 May, 2015

      

  

   

 Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench

OA No.3309/2012

     Reserved on : 05.02.2015      
                     Pronounced on : 29.05.2015

Honble Mr. Justice Syed Rafat Alam, Chairman
Honble Dr. B. K. Sinha, Member (A)

Debindra Kundra
345, Pocket-2, 
Paschim Puri,
New Delhi 110063.						. Applicant.

(Applicant is present)

Versus
1.	Union of India through
	Through Secretary (R)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

2.	Shri Lalit Kumar
	Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

3.	Shri Tashy George
	Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

4.	Shri Rajendra Pant
	Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

5.	Shri P. K. Gupta
	Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

6.	Shri Narendra Singh Negi
Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

7.	Shri Sudhir Kumar
Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

8.	Shri Balaram Dixit
Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

9.	Shri P. K. Vashist
Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

10.	Shri Umesh T. S.
Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.

11.	Shri Ajit Kumar Nair
Research Officer (Tech.)
	Cabinet Secretariat,
	Room No.7, Bikaner House Annexe,
	Shahjahan Road,
	New Delhi 110 011.					.... Respondents.

(By Advocate : Shri T. C. Gupta assisted by 
Ms. Tanuja Anthwal, Departmental representative, Section Officer, R&AW, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi.)

: O R D E R :

Dr. B. K. Sinha, Member (A):

In the instant OA filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant seeks to challenge the office order dated 13.04.2007 appointing eleven DFO (GD)/DFO (Tele) as Research Assistant (Tech) on deputation/absorption basis and the draft seniority list circulated vide memo dated 13.04.2011 by which the seniority of the applicant had been reduced by one viz., respondent no.2 in the instant OA.

2. The applicant by means of this OA has prayed for the following reliefs:-

a) An order for calling the whole records of the impugned appointment for the perusal by the Honble Tribunal including the representations of the Applicant & reply thereto by the Department.
b) To set aside the illegal appointment of Respondent No.2 to Respondent No.11 as the RAs(Tech) made vide Office Order No.137/Pers4/2007 dated 13.04.2007.
c) To set aside the seniority list as circulated vide memo no.29/04/2011-Pers.8-7727 dated 13.04.2011.
d) Grant the cost of this litigation to the applicant.
e) To pass any other & further order/relief(s) as this Honble Tribunal may deem fit & proper in the facts & circumstances of case in favour of the Applicant & against the Respondents.

3. The case of the applicant in brief is that he joined as Research Assistant in the Technical Research Cadre (TRC) of the respondents organisation on 27.12.1995. As per the then existing rules of the TRC Cadre, recruitment to the post of RA (Tech.) is to be made 100% through direct recruitment, failing which by deputation or re-employment of retired government servants. In the year 2006, the respondents circulated nine vacant posts of RA (Tech) on deputation/absorption basis by internal circulation vide their memo dated 25.10.2006 against which eleven Deputy Field Officer (T) & Deputy Field Officer (GD) were appointed by respondent No.1 under the provisions of Rule 52 (3) read with Rule 161 (A) of Research & Analysis Wing (Recruitment, Cadre & Service) Rules, 1975 [Rules of 1975 for short] which empowers respondent No.1 to fill up posts on transfer or deputation as it deems fit initially for a period of one year extendable up to three years. Upon the expiry of this period, the officers who were found suitable were to be considered for absorption in the grade of RA (Tech) in the TRC Cadre. As a consequence of this, respondent Nos.2 to 11 joined the TRC Cadre as RA (Tech).

4. The applicant who argued in person further submits that contrary to the mandatory requirement of deputation period of one year before becoming entitled to be considered for absorption in the TRC Cadre, respondent Nos.2 to 11 were absorbed prior to the expiry of the said period which would tantamount to blatant misuse of power by the respondent no.1. The respondent nos.2 to 11 after their absorption in TRC cadre relied upon the judgment of Honble the Supreme Court in the matter of S.I. Roop Lal & Others vs. Lt. Governor through Chief Secretary, Delhi [JT 1999 (9) SC 597] to claim seniority from the date of their regular appointment in their respective Telecom & GD Cadre of the Cabinet Secretariat. The seniority list was accordingly revised thereby affecting the seniority of existing RO (Tech) including that of the applicant in the TRC cadre. The promotional prospects in the TRC Cadre are extremely bleak so the applicant has reduced by one position which anticipated delay of one year and he shall remain junior to respondent No.2 forever in the TRC cadre as a consequence of this. The applicant has further submitted that the respondent organisation being a covert one by nature, the rules are not shared with the employees.

5. The applicant has questioned the very appointment of respondent Nos.2 to 11 on a number of grounds. At the first instance, Rule 153 (A) empowers respondent No.1 to induct persons in A, B, C & D posts only to the tune of 5% under each group. In the second place, while nine posts were circulated, eleven persons have been appointed. In the third place, appointment of respondent Nos.2 to 11 is not as per the operational requirements of the organisation. It has been merely for the purpose of giving haste and undue promotion to some favoured persons. It is not even sanctified by Rule 161 (A) of the Rules of 1975. In the fourth place, the applicant submits that the transfer has been made for the alleged purpose of creating a computer cell. However, there was no version for creating a computer cell and no computer cell exists to this date. The applicant submits that the entire episode of creation of computer cell was eyewash and the Deputy Field Officer (Telecom) Division continued to sit in their original places. It was only after the instant OA has been filed that respondent Nos.2 to 11 have been shifted to the technical division. The applicant has strongly urged that the entire case be viewed in the legal perspective of violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and whether the appointments could be made in contravention of the rules. The applicant has also relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the matters of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. R. Santhakumari Velusamy & Ors. (2011 (3) SC 353) and Bhiwandi & Nizampur Municipality vs. K. S. Works (AIR 1975 SC 529).

6. The respondents have filed counter affidavit, wherein, they have strongly rebutted the averments made in the OA. The argument put forth in the counter affidavit is that there were nine vacancies in the rank of RA (Tech) as issued in the advertisement but later 2 more vacancies have become available and thus eleven officers were selected invoking the special powers of the Secretary vested in Rule 161 (A) of the Rules of 1975 under which head of the organisation is entitled to fill up the posts in any grade by transfer/transfer on deputation notwithstanding any other mode of recruitment prescribed for recruitment in the Recruitment Rules. Initially, it was provided that the deputation would be for a period of one year extendable up to three years, after which respondent Nos.2 to 11 would become eligible for absorption. However, subsequently with the approval of the competent authority willingness of the selected candidates was obtained for immediate absorption in the grade of RA (Tech.). One out of the eleven selected candidates declined for absorption and, therefore, the remaining ten officials [eight DFOs (Tele) and two DFOs (GD)] were appointed to the post of RA (Tech). These posts were subsequently re-designated as RO (Tech). The respondents strongly denied that any irregularity has been committed as the competent authority has acted within the powers vested on it under Rule 153 (A) & 161 (A) of the Rules of 1975.

7. The respondents have also relied upon the DOP&T OMs dated 3.06.1986 and 27.03.2001, which provide that if a person is holding the post in same or equivalent grade on regular basis in the parent department/cadre, on the date of absorption such regular service is to be reckoned for fixing of seniority from the date he has been holding the post on deputation whichever is earlier. Learned counsel for the respondents strongly argued that the respondent-organisation is responsible for the security of the country and given certain levy in order to fulfil this role. The Rules of 1975 had been overtaken for operational requirements where recruitments of computer knowing persons have become essential. It was further submitted that earlier an open advertisement was made but none of the persons selected had joined the organisation thereby necessitating an internal selection to be made through limited advertisement.

8. The applicant has submitted rejoinder affidavit wherein in addition to reiterating the arguments already made he has alleged gross misuse of power by the authority vested on it under Rule 153 and 161 (A) of the Rules of 1975. The applicant has relied upon number of decided cases, e.g., State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Nalla Raja Reddy & Ors. (AIR 1967 SC 1458); S. G. Jaisinghani vs. UOI & Ors. (AIR 1967 SC 1427) and Suman Gupta vs. State of J & K (AIR 1983 SC 1235) etc., whereby the Apex Court has held that under any circumstances the exercise of all administrative powers has to be in conformity with the law respecting the rules of equity and it cannot be arbitrary and capricious.

9. As prayed by the applicant, relevant rules and records of the respondent organisation on the subject were summoned. We have closely examined the pleadings of the parties as also the documents/records submitted by them carefully and have also heard them.

10. On the basis of the above, the only issue that we are called upon to decide is whether exercise of powers undertaken by the respondent-authority under Rule 153 and 161(A) of Rules of 1975 is in conformity with the principles of equity, natural justice and fairness. However, in order to examine this issue it shall also become necessary to look into the scope of judicial intervention in context of the respondent-organisation which happens to enjoy the protection under Article 33 of the Constitution of India. We have to further examine as to what extent the OA is maintainable in the sense that the cause of action primarily lies against respondent No.2, Shri Lalit Kumar and not against any other respondents who are admittedly junior to the applicant in the said list. Hence, the issues are being framed as below:-

1. To what extent the OA in its present form is maintainable as cause of action could only be alleged against respondent No.2.
2. What is the harmonious interpretation of Rules 153 (1) and 161 A of the Rules of 1975.
3. To what extent the respondent organisation enjoys operational autonomy and whether the alleged act would form a part of that operational autonomy.
4. What relief, if any, could be given to the applicant.

11. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, we have already noted that the applicant in relief (b) of his prayer clause seeks quashing of illegal appointment of respondent Nos.2 to 11 as RAs (Tech.) made vide office order dated 13.04.2007. However, in the pleadings and in the grounds what has been alleged is abuse of the discretionary powers conferred upon respondent No.1 under Rules 153 (1) and 161 (A) of Rules of 1975 which appears to be a colourable exercise of discretionary powers. It has already been stated that rules do not provide for appointment by transfer/transfer on deputation. What basically the applicant has questioned is placement of respondent No.2, Shri Lalit Kumar, over him. The Seniority List of RO (Tech) as on 20.04.2011 has been provided at page 205 of File No.8/2/96-(Pers.6)-Pers.4 in which respondent No.2 is just over the applicant. However, during the course of oral submissions, the applicant has submitted that another person has been brought over him about which he has no knowledge and hence he has not mentioned him in the array of private respondents. Since the person who has been brought over the head of the applicant, has not been impleaded as a party respondent, we do not take cognizance of his existence and confine our attention to respondent No.2 alone. However, from a perusal of the documents and the seniority list, it appears that the applicant may have a cause of action against respondent No.2 who has been placed above him in the seniority list but cannot have a cause of action against the other private respondent Nos.3 to 11. Instead, as stated, the applicant has challenged the entire selection of all the respondent Nos.2 to 11 and sought quashing of their appointment. This is not permissible within the scope of powers devolved upon this Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It is well established principle that the Tribunal can only confine its adjudication to instances where there is definite cause of action only in respect of parties where such cause of action is established. Third party cannot seek remedy via Public Interest Litigation in a collateral proceeding, more particularly when the allegations or averments made in the petition are not born out of record. The Honble Supreme court has held in the case of Rajiv Ranjan Singh Lalan and Anr. Vs. Union of India & others [2006 (6) SCC 613] that Only a person acting bonafidely and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. This Bench of the Tribunal in TA No.63/2013 (WP (C)5244/2013) decided on 05.12.2013 had considered the same issue as to whether the OA filed in the case under reference was a PIL by nature. This Bench of the Tribunal after having gone through various provisions of rules and Sections 2, 3(q), 14 and 19 of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and Rule 4(5) of CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 and the subject in respect of which the application could be made, arrived at the conclusion that the Tribunal can intervene in cases where there is cause of action against the applicant arose and only to the extent that his interest has been affected. This Bench of the Tribunal relied upon a decided case of Dr. Duryodhan Sahoo and Others v. Jitendera Kumar Mishra and Others, (1998) 7 SCC 273, wherein the Honble Apex Court while answering a question that whether an Administrative Tribunal constituted under Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can entertain a Public Interest Litigation (PIL), held that a Public Interest Litigant is not a person aggrieved, in terms of Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and further held that Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Act cannot entertain a PIL at the instance of a total stranger. Of course, in this case it cannot be said that the applicant is a total stranger in respect of respondent Nos.3 to 11 as they happened to serve in other wings of the same organisation. However, the right of the applicant is only being affected by respondent No.2 who has been placed above him in the seniority list and by none others. It is our considered opinion that, insofar as the rest of the private respondents are concerned, i.e. respondent Nos.3 to 11, they do not affect the rights of the applicant and, therefore, any Application against them would acquire the nature of PIL which cannot be entertained by this Tribunal.

12. We have also taken note of the fact that the applicant has questioned the motive of respondent No.1, in amending the Recruitment Rules of the TRC Cadre. However, in the prayer clause, he has not sought to stay/annulment of the amendment brought about in the Recruitment Rules of TRC Cadre. As such, the argument that the rules were amended only to commit irregularities and favouring certain categories of employees cannot be accepted.

13. We start examining different provisions of the Rules of 1975 in respect of the controversy involved in the instant case. Rule 53 (2) of the Rules of 1975 provides that after the initial constitution of the TRC, Cadre is to be maintained as per the provisions of Schedule VI. Rule 53(2) of the Rules, of 1975 provides that there are no fixed quotas for recruitment by different methods provided in Schedule VI. It further provides that it is for the Head of Organisation to decide the discipline and orientation and the method by which the appointments are to be made, that is to say, by promotion, direct recruitment, re-employment after retirement from Government service, deputation or transfer etc. The proviso to the rules provides that out of turn promotion is to be treated as ad hoc until regularisation. Rule 153 A provides that where Head of the Organisation feels that there is need to relax the rules, it is his discretion but upto a limit of maximum 5% under each group A , B , C & D posts. Rule 161 of the Rules of 1975 provides that the Government has the power to relax any of the provisions of these rules with respect to any class or category of persons. Rule 161 A provides that notwithstanding the various modes of recruitment prescribed in schedules I, IV to XIV, XVII and XVIII of the Research and Analysis Wing (Recruitment, Cadre and Service) Rule, 1975, the Head of the Organisation may, if he deems fit, fill up the posts in any grade by transfer/transfer on deputation.

14. Here, what the applicant has sought is to interpret the rules in conflict mode. He has contended that the discretion of exercise of powers under Rule 161 is flattered by the provisions of Rule 153A, i.e, not more than 5% can be recruited under the relaxed rules and, therefore, what has been done by the respondent No.1 is illegal and liable to be quashed. However, we apply the principle of harmonious interpretation of rules. The very nature of the rules, particularly Rule 53 (2) and Rule 161 (A) are pointers to the fact that a good deal of flexibility has been given to this organisation in matters of recruitment, placement and utilisation and not without a purpose. We purposely desist from putting the rules in full for the simple plea of confidentiality put forth by Shri T. C. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents which has to be accepted in the interest of countrys security. However, we feel that nature of interpretation is to be defined; interpretation is the act of making intelligible what was before not understood, ambiguous, or not obvious. It is the method by which the meaning of the language is ascertained. Resort of interpretation is never to be had where the meaning is free from doubt. As per the Law Lexicon, The Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary, interpretation means as follows:-

Common sense and good faith are the leading stars of all genuine interpretations. In arriving at the meaning of the parties to a contract, the language must be given a reasonable interpretation. If the language involving the intent of the parties is uncertain, an interpretation of it which is unreasonable and places one of the contracting parties at the mercy of the other must give way to one which is equitable, and if one of the contracting parties has by artifice or duplicity in the use of language misled the other respecting its meaning, the sense in which the latter understood it will prevail n the interpretation of the language.

15. Here while the applicant has sought to project the rules in conflict, we seek to invoke the principle of harmonious interpretation of statutes. It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature. In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of Sales Tax, Bihar, [AIR 1963 (SC) 1207], the Honble Supreme Court held that where an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning, the Court would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which renders the exercise of its power invalid.

16. It would be useful to summarise the core principle which emerges after reading of both these sets of rules together, which is as follows:-

1. That the Head of the Organisation has been bestowed a good deal of flexibility and operational leeway.
2. That no fixed quotas have been marked for recruitment by different methods as specified in Schedule VI.
3. The Government has power to relax these rules without making a distinction in respect of any class or category of persons.
4. Notwithstanding the powers prescribed, the method of recruitment prescribes the head of the organisation to fill up any of the post by transfer/ transfer on deputation.

17. The applicant has primarily used two arguments in support of the OA- (1) that 5% rule has been infringed and (2) while nine posts were advertised, by internal circulation eleven persons have been appointed.

18. The respondents have submitted in their counter affidavit that there was a need to induct computer knowing persons for the sake of operational efficiency and initially attempts were made to fill up the posts from other departments for which advertisement had been issued. However, no person turned up. As a consequence of which the posts are to be filled up by internal circulation in which nine posts were advertised. Subsequently, two more posts became available and thus number of posts became eleven (paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit at page 32 of the paper book). When we perused the files, we find that the issues had been discussed in detail, including the pros and cones of this decision, its impact upon the morale of the employees and the different possible solutions. We also note that admittedly absorption was not a prescribed mode of recruitment for RA (Tech.). We also recognise that it was necessary for giving the benefit of counting of service in the same or equivalent grade in the parent department/cadre. In case of absorption, it was imperative that the mode of recruitment prescribed in the Recruitment Rules should be followed. Absorption of DFOs(Tele/GD) as RA (Tech) has been brought out by invoking special powers of the Secretary under Rule 161 A of the Rules of 1975 which bestows overriding powers to the Secretary for induction in any grade of a cadre by absorption/transfer on deputation notwithstanding other modes of recruitment prescribed in the respective schedules of the rules. This provision, which is undoubtedly a part of the recruitment rules of the respondents, is to be invoked in exceptional deserving cases as induction of personnel by deputation/absorption in a cadre affects the career prospects of its employees. Normally, this was done in respect of highly qualified persons or from the lower scales and prior to 14.11.1999 only benefit of service rendered in tentative posts or equivalent posts in the parent cadre on recruitment basis which was later reckonable for fixation of seniority. However, with the amendment of rules effective from 14.12.1999 services rendered is also made reckonable for fixation of seniority on absorption. Thus, in such cases where the persons proposed to be absorbed holding the same post and cadre in the parent cadre they are entitled to their seniority.

19. Now we take up the question as to whether the induction was justified or not. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that there was need for constitution of a computer cell. We also noticed from perusal of the files that this need has been reflected at several places. The applicant has submitted several orders which indicate that the Secretary had transferred the administrative control of the computer cell from Telecom Division to R & D Division as early as in the year 2012. From the perusal of the files it is apparent that a need for computer knowing persons was felt in the department and entire exercise had been done and the special powers of the respondent-authority had been invoked under Rule 161 A of the Rules of 1975 fully for the purpose of providing this computer support. Here, we would like to state specifically that those files within the domain of the policy laying powers which have been bestowed into the head of the organisation it is not for the Courts/Tribunals to examine the justifiability for such operational decisions. In this regard, it is now almost axiomatically accepted that policy decisions are not to be questioned by the Courts/Tribunals. This view had been expressed by the Honble Apex Court in a number of decisions including Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board, Hoshiarpur Vs. Ranjodh Singh and Ors. [2007 (2) SCC 491] that it is beyond the expectation of the Courts/Tribunals to direct that the Recruitment Rules should be relaxed in favour of appointees to secure appointment for them. This view has been reiterated in the matter of Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand and Ors. [2008 (10) SCC 1], wherein, the Apex Court was of the opinion that Courts cannot sit on appeal over the decision of the employer regarding the number of posts created or to be filled up by a particular mode. In Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr. [2006 (2) SCC 1]; Neelkanth B. Desai vs. General Manager Telecom, BSNL and Anr. [2014 (1) SLJ 192]; Jitender Kumar & Anr. Vs. Union of India and Others [OA No.4340/2011 decided on 27.07.2012] and Lekhraj & Others vs. Union of India & Ors. [OA No.3272/2010 decided on 20.01.2011], similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court and this Tribunal. Besides, there is another reason why the policy decisions of the respondent organisation cannot be questioned. This reason has been discussed in context of the next issue. However, for the present, we put the instant issue to rest by deciding the same against the applicant. Insofar as the instant issue is concerned, this Bench of the Tribunal had discussed it at length in the matter of Prabhu Dayal Baitha vs. Union of India and Ors. [OA No.2612/2010 decided on 17.07.2013]. The first of the issues in this case related to the constitutional status of the respondent organisation has been examined and summed up in paragraphs 8 & 9 of the aforesaid order dated 17.07.2013 which has since attained finality. The same reads as under:-

8. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [AIR 1973 (SC) 1461] the Honble Supreme court has held that this Article shows the care with which the circumstances in which the fundamental rights can be restricted or abrogated were contemplated and precisely described. However, the framers of the Constitution being anxious that no more restriction should be imposed upon the employees of such organizations unless it is absolutely necessary for ensuring proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline amongst armed force personnel empowered the Parliament to restrict or abrogate rights conferred in Part-III of the Constitution within the permissible extent.
9. In the matter of Sunil Batra versus Delhi Administration [1978 (4)SCC 494]1, the Honble Supreme Court has held that even persons serving in armed forces do not cease to be the citizens of this country. Even prisoners who have been deprived of personal liberty shall not be wholly denuded of their fundamental rights. However, in the larger interest of the State and national security, the Parliament may impose conditions upon them, which extends, as per the decision in the case of Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi versus Union of India & Others [1982(3)SCC 140] not only to the armed forces but also to the ordinary police personnel, who are charged with maintenance of public order. These exemptions, inter alia, also emphasize maintenance of secrecy when they relate to vital public interest. The R&AW being a sensitive organization has made significant efforts to keep away his officials from the media or to conduct/ communicate with any person to avoid disclosure of any matter relating to function, structure, personal or organizational affairs of the organization and it keeps a close watch on its personnel for that matter. The Research and Analysis Wing (Recruitment, Cadre and Service) Rules, 1975 have been designed to achieve these objectives amongst others. Thus we may conclude that the respondent organization has been bestowed a constitutional status on account of its job profile related to national security. This also implies that its employees have to forgo a part of their fundamental rights in furtherance of the organizational objectives and goals. This question is answered accordingly.

20. Therefore, as already stated, we hold that it is beyond the competence of this court to judge the efficacy and operational parameters and requirements in respect of any organisation. While judging the case relating to the respondents organisation, we can never overlook the constitutional protection that it enjoys under Article 33 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we rest at the instant moment by holding that operational parameters and requirements cannot be questioned. It is also substantiated from the perusal of the files which reflects deep anxiety to have a computer friendly environment within the organisation. Accordingly, this issue is decided against the applicant.

21. In conclusion we hold that we have taken note of the various aspects. We find that the first issue regarding cause of action has only been alleged against private respondent No.2. There also we have held that private respondent No.2 is senior to the applicant in service and, therefore, the rules amended as a consequence of judgment in SI Ropoplal (supra), he is entitled to seniority from the date on which he has been holding this grade. Against other respondents, there is no cause of action. The Tribunal is barred from entertaining PIL. We have further held that the apparent conflict which has been sought to be highlighted by the applicant ought to get interpretation using the principles of harmonious construction. When viewed in this light, it emerges that there is no conflict between the two sets of instructions and Rule 161 (A) shall prevail over Rule 53 (2) of Rules of 1975. It means that Rule 153 is for normal application but where power of Rule 161 (A) has been invoked it loses its significance.

22. Insofar as the third issue is concerned, we take cognizance of the constitutional protection provided to the organisation and hold that this Tribunal cannot go into the justifiability of any operational aspect.

23. In view of the above factors, we hold in respect of issue No.4 that the OA is bereft of merit and is hence, dismissed without costs.

(Dr. B. K. Sinha)						      (Syed Rafat Alam)
    Member (A)							    Chairman


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