Madras High Court
Mohammed Yahya (Died) vs Kottakuppam Town Dravida on 7 September, 2022
Author: C.V.Karthikeyan
Bench: C.V.Karthikeyan
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on : 12.08.2022
Pronounced on : 07.09.2022
CORAM :
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.V.KARTHIKEYAN
S.A.No. 943 of 2005
1. Mohammed Yahya (died)
2. R.Gani
3. Y.Abdul Rajak
4. Y.Hathijamma
5. Vahitha Banu ... Appellants/Respondents 2 & 3/2nd and
3rd Defendants
[ 1st appellant died, appellants 3 to 5 brought on record as LRs of the
deceased 1st appellant vide Court order dated 22.07.2021 made in CMPS
11073, 11068 and 11064/2021 in S.A.No. 943/2005]
Vs.
1. Kottakuppam Town Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam
Rep. by its Secretary Mr.Shanmugam
Kotturkuppam Village, Vanur Taluk.
2. N.Shankar
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
2
... 1st & 2nd Respondents/Appellants/Plaintiffs
3. Hazimunniza ... 3rd Respondent/Respondent-1/1st Defendant
PRAYER: This Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of Civil
Procedure Code, against the Judgment and Decree dated 30.01.2003
made in A.S.No. 161 of 2002 on the file of the Additional District, FTC-
1, Tindivanam reversing the Judgment and Decree dated 20.09.1996, and
made in O.S.No. 52 of 1995 on the file of District Munsif-cum-Judicial
Magistrate, Vanur.
***
For Appellants : Mr. V.Balasubramanian
For RR 1 & 2 : Mr. D.Ravichander
JUDGMENT
The second and third defendants in O.S.No. 52 of 1995 on the file of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Vanur are the appellants herein.
2. The suit in O.S.No. 52 of 1995 had been filed by the Kottakuppam Town Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam represented by its Secretary Shanmugam and by N.Shankar, Building Fund President, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 3 Kottakuppam Village, Vanur Taluk against Hazimunniza and against the appellants herein, Mohammed Yahya and R.Gani, seeking specific performance of an oral agreement of sale dated 11.10.1981 said to have been entered into by the first defendant Hazimunniza with them. The said suit had been tried along with an earlier suit filed by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants in O.S.No. 14 of 1995. In that suit, the relief sought was for a declaration that the plaintiffs were the tenants under the defendants and for permanent injunction to protect possession.
3. By common Judgment dated 20.09.1996, the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Vanur, decreed O.S.No. 14 of 1995, namely, the suit filed for declaratory relief that the plaintiffs were tenants and for injunction but dismissed O.S.No. 52 of 1995 which was the suit filed for specific performance of the oral agreement of sale dated 11.10.1982.
4. Aggrieved by the said common Judgment, the plaintiffs filed A.S.No. 161 of 2022 questioning the dismissal of O.S.No. 52 of 1995 and also filed A.S.No. 18 of 2002 questioning the Judgment in O.S.No. 14 of 1955. Both the Judgments were taken up together by the Additional https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 4 District Court/ Fast Track Court No.I, Tindivanam, and by common Judgment dated 30.01.2003, A.S.No. 18 of 2002 was dismissed and A.S.No. 161 of 2002 was allowed.
5. The first and second defendants have filed the present Second Appeal against the Judgment in A.S.No. 161 of 2002. During the pendency of the Second Appeal, the first appellant died and his legal representatives had been brought on record as third to fifth appellants.
6. The Second Appeal had been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:-
“i.) Whether not the vendor in title is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale without seeking to set aside in a suit for specific performance?;
ii) Whether the suit is maintainable on the basis of an oral agreement to sell without proper evidence?; and https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 5
iii) Whether the suit for specific performance is maintainable without the basic ingredients?” O.S.No. 52 of 1995 [ District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Vanur]:
7. The suit was originally presented before the District Munsif Court at Tindivanam in O.S.No. 627 of 1990 and on formation of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court at Vanur, had been transferred to that Court and renumbered as O.S.No. 52 of 1995.
8. In the plaint, it had been contended that the suit property originally belonged to the first defendant, Hazimunniza. It was stated that the party office of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam was functioning in the suit property as tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.40/-. It was further stated that the first defendant had agreed to sell the property to the plaintiffs by way of an oral agreement on 11.10.1982 for total consideration of Rs.10,000/-. It had been stated that however, the first defendant had sold the property to the second defendant. Since the second defendant interfered with possession, the plaintiffs had filed https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 6 O.S.No. 601 of 1983 seeking a declaration that they are tenants under the first defendant and for permanent injunction. It was stated that in the said suit, the plaintiffs had filed I.A.No. 1891 of 1987 to amend the relief sought to include the relief of specific performance. Though that application was allowed, subsequently in C.R.P.No. 729 of 1989, the application was dismissed by order dated 03.05.1990. This had necessitated the plaintiffs to file a separate suit seeking specific performance of the oral agreement dated 11.10.1982.
9. The suit schedule property had been described as shop in Door No. 163 to the East of Main Road at Kottakuppam at Vanur.
10. The first defendant filed a written statement admitting that the plaintiffs were tenants under the property and that she had entered into an oral agreement of sale of the property for a total sale consideration of Rs.10,000/-. However, it is stated that the third defendant had misrepresented to her that a sale deed has to be executed and accordingly she executed the sale deed in favour of the second defendant under the impression that she was selling the property to the plaintiffs. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 7
11. The second defendant filed the written statement denying the averments regarding the alleged oral agreement of sale. He stated that he had purchased Door No.165 from the plaintiff for adequate consideration by registered sale deed dated 25.06.1983. It was stated that the sale deed was a lawful document executed by free consent by the first defendant. It was stated that the suit was barred by law of limitation. It was stated that the suit should be dismissed.
12. As stated, the said suit in O.S.No. 52 of 1995 and the earlier suit filed in O.S.No.14 of 1995 were tried jointly.
13. On the basis of the pleadings, necessary issues were framed whether the first defendant had agreed to sell the suit schedule property and whether the oral agreement was lawful and true and subsisting and whether the plaintiff was entitled for the relief of specific performance and whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement and whether the sale deed in favour of the second defendant was a true and lawful document and whether the suit was https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 8 barred by the law of limitation and whether the second defendant was a bona fide purchaser of the property.
14. During trial, the plaintiffs examined four witnesses and marked Exs. A-1 to A-12. The documents related to the proceedings initiated by the DMK party against the third defendant and connected documents. The defendants examined three witnesses and filed two documents. The first document was the sale deed dated 25.08.1983 in favour of the second defendant and the second document was the earlier sale deed in favour of the first defendant dated 29.02.1980.
15. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, owing to the written statement filed by the first defendant and her oral evidence, the learned District Munsif found that the oral agreement of sale dated 11.10.1982 was true but held against the plaintiffs on the ground that they were never ready and willing to perform the said agreement in view of the fact that they had not even come forward to deposit the sale consideration into Court. It was also found that since there was no relief sought to set aside the sale deed in Ex.B-1 relief of specific performance https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 9 cannot be granted. In effect, the suit in O.S.No. 52 of 1995 was dismissed.
A.S.No. 161/2002 [ Additional District Court, FTC-1, Tindivanam]:
16. Questioning that Judgment, the plaintiffs filed the First Appeal. The plaintiffs had also filed A.S.No. 18 of 2002 questioning the Judgment in O.S.No. 14 of 1995. Common Judgment was pronounced on 30.01.2003. The learned Additional District Judge found that since the agreement of sale had been established, it would only follow that specific performance must be granted. The learned First Appellate Judge was of the opinion that the second defendant in the suit was not a bona fide purchaser since the oral agreement was subsisting as on the date of that particular sale. The oral evidence of the first defendant was relied upon to hold that the agreement stood proved and established. In view of that particular finding, the Appeal suit was allowed and the Judgment of the trial Court dismissing O.S.No. 52 of 1995 was set aside and decree granted as prayed for in that suit.
S.A.No. 943 of 2005:
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 10
17. The second and third defendants filed the present Second Appeal. Pending the Second Appeal, the second appellant died and his legal representatives were brought on record as third to fifth appellants.
The second Appeal had been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:-
“i.) Whether not the vendor in title is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale without seeking to set aside in a suit for specific performance?;
ii) Whether the suit is maintainable on the basis of an oral agreement to sell without proper evidence?; and
iii) Whether the suit for specific performance is maintainable without the basic ingredients?”
18. Heard arguments advanced by Mr.V.Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr.D.Ravichander, learned counsel for the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 11 first and second respondents.
19. For the sake of convenience, the appellants would be referred as second and third defendants, the first and second respondents as plaintiffs and the third respondent as first defendant. This was how they were referred to in the trial Court.
20. The plaintiffs had come to Court seeking specific performance of an oral agreement of sale dated 11.10.1982 entered into with the first defendant Hazimunniza with respect to the suit schedule property namely shop at Door No.163 Main Road in Kottakuppam Village, Vanur, for a total consideration of Rs.10,000/-. They had impleaded the second defendant since it was claimed that he had purchased the property by sale deed dated 25.10.1983. That sale deed was marked as Ex.B-1. They had impleaded the third defendant since it was claimed that he had negotiated with the first defendant to purchase the property for the plaintiffs but had misrepresented to the first defendant and obtained a sale deed in favour of the second defendant. Reliefs to set aside the sale deed in favour of the second defendant was not sought.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 12
21. It must be mentioned that the sale deed in favour of the second defendant was with respect to property bearing Door No.165, Main Road, Kotturkuppam Village, Vanur. The trial Court had held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove readiness and willingness. It was noted that the plaintiffs had not even deposited any amount before the Court towards the sale consideration. They had not even expressed readiness and willingness in any pre-suit notice. It was also held that the suit was bad for not seeking the relief of aside the sale deed Ex.B-1 in favour of the second defendant.
22. The First Appellate Court however found that since the first defendant had admitted to the oral agreement of sale, the only issue which had to be examined was whether the specific performance relief can be granted or not and since the agreement had been admitted, the Court proceeded to grant the relief of specific performance and allowed the appeal.
23. The first substantial question of law is whether the sale deed in favour of the second defendant should have been set aside or not. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 13
24. The evidence in this regard points out that the first defendant claimed that she was under the mistaken impression that she was executing a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs/DMK party but the sale deed was executed in favour of the second defendant. Her competency to execute the sale deed is not questioned. It is not denied. It is not disputed. She was the lawful owner of the property and she had every right to execute a sale deed. She only claims that the recitals have been misrepresented to her. If she had conveyed a property for which she had no title, then such document would be void abnitio. Such a void document need not be sought to be set aside. But if the recitals in a document had been obtained by misrepresentation, then the document become voidable.
25. Sections 18 and 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, are as follows:-
18. “Misrepresentation” defined.
—“Misrepresentation” means and includes https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 14 (1) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true;
(2) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gains an advantage of the person committing it, or any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any one claiming under him;
(3) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement, to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement.
19. Voidability of agreements without free consent.—When consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. A party to a contract whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may, if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be performed, and that https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 15 he shall be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true.
Exception.—If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence.
Explanation.—A fraud or misrepresentation which did not cause the consent to a contract of the party on whom such fraud was practised, or to whom such misrepresentation was made, does not render a contract voidable.”
26. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is as follows:-
“31. When cancellation may be ordered.— (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 16 who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered;
and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation. ”
27. Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, is the pari materia provision. This provision had come up for interpretation by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1960 Madras 1 [Muppudathi Pillai, Appellant v. Krishnaswami Pillai and others]. This Full Bench Judgment had been referred with an approval by a three Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2021) 4 SCC 786 [Deccan Paper Mills Company ltd., Vs. Regencies Mahavir Properties and Others], https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 17 wherein their Lordship had held as follows:-
“17. When it comes to Section 31(1), the important expression used by the legislature is “any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable…”. An instructive judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court reported as Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaswami Pillai [Muppudathi Pillai v. Krishnaswami Pillai, 1959 SCC OnLine Mad 5 : AIR 1960 Mad involved the determination of the scope of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 [Section 33(1) of the 1963 Act is the pari materia provision].
This judgment, after referring to Section 41, then referred to Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (which is the pari materia provision to Section 31 of the 1963 Act). The Court then went on to notice the distinction between Section 35 (which is the pari materia provision to Section 27 of the 1963 Act) and Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 as follows :
“11. … It may be noticed that the above section applies not merely to the case of an instrument which is voidable but also one that is void. Section 35 provides for the case of https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 18 rescission of voidable contracts. It is evident that Section 39 covers not only a case contemplated under Section 35, but also a wider field, that is, a case of a void document, which under the law need not be set aside.”
18. In an extremely important paragraph, the Full Bench then set out the principle behind Section 39(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 as follows :
“12. The principle is that such document though not necessary to be set aside may, if left outstanding, be a source of potential mischief. The jurisdiction under Section 39 is, therefore, a protective or a preventive one. It is not confined to a case of fraud, mistake, undue influence, etc. and as it has been stated it was to prevent a document to remain as a menace and danger to the party against whom under different circumstances it might have operated. A party against whom a claim under a document might be made is not bound to wait till the document is used against him. If that were so he might be in a disadvantageous position if the impugned document is sought to be used after the evidence attending its execution has disappeared. Section https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 19 39 embodies the principle by which he is allowed to anticipate the danger and institute a suit to cancel the document and to deliver it up to him.
The principle of the relief is the same as in quia timet actions.”
19. The Court then continued its discussion as follows :
“13. … The provisions of Section 39 make it clear that three conditions are requisite for the exercise of the jurisdiction to cancel an instrument : (1) the instrument is void or voidable against the plaintiff; (2) plaintiff may reasonably apprehend serious injury by the instrument being left outstanding; (3) in the circumstances of the case the court considers it proper to grant this relief of preventive justice. On the third aspect of the question the English and American authorities hold that where the document is void on its face the court would not exercise its jurisdiction while it would if it were not so apparent. In India it is a matter entirely for the discretion of the court.
14. The question that has to be considered depends on the first and second conditions set out https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 20 above. As the principle is one of potential mischief, by the document remaining outstanding, it stands to reason the executant of the document should be either the plaintiff or a person who can in certain circumstances bind him. It is only then it could be said that the instrument is voidable by or void against him. The second aspect of the matter emphasises that principle. For there can be no apprehension if a mere third party asserting a hostile title creates a document. Thus relief under Section 39 would be granted only in respect of an instrument likely to affect the title of the plaintiff and not of an instrument executed by a stranger to that title.
28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court then held as follows:
21. A reading of the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench would make the position in law crystal clear. The expression “any person” does not include a third party, but is restricted to a party to the written instrument or any person who can bind such party. Importantly, relief under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 would be granted only in respect of an instrument likely https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 21 to affect the title of the plaintiff, and not of an instrument executed by a stranger to that title.
The expression “any person” in this section has been held by this Court to include a person seeking derivative title from his seller [see Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa [Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa, (1996) 7 SCC 767] , at p. 771]. The principle behind the section is to protect a party or a person having a derivative title to property from such party from a prospective misuse of an instrument against him. A reading of Section 31(1) then shows that when a written instrument is adjudged void or voidable, the Court may then order it to be delivered up to the plaintiff and cancelled—in exactly the same way as a suit for rescission of a contract under Section 29. Thus far, it is clear that the action under Section 31(1) is strictly an action inter partes or by persons who obtained derivative title from the parties, and is thus in personam.
29. The position of law is clear. If an instrument affects the title of the plaintiff and that the instrument had been executed by a person competent to so execute the instrument then a relief should be sought to https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 22 set aside that instrument. 'Misrepresentation' is defined under the Contract Act under Section 18 and under Section 19, it is clear that a document so obtained, is a voidable document, and it should be set aside in manner known to law.
30. The first defendant had admitted to executing Ex.B-1. She only claims that she was under the impression that she was executing a sale deed in favour of the DMK party and that it was so represented that she was actually executing the sale deed by the DMK party to the third defendant. If that be so, then the document is voidable, since only since only the recitals are not correct and the document had been obtained by misrepresentation and any document obtained by misrepresentation, under Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act is voidable and has to be set aside. Failure to do so would render a decree for specific performance on the basis of an oral agreement of sale as null and void and non est. The sale deed in favour of the second defendant prevails over the oral agreement of sale.
31. In AIR 1928 Madras 546 [Kuppuswami Goundan Vs. Chinnaswami Goundan and Ors.], the Madras High Court had to weigh a registered document viz-a via an oral agreement, subsequently reduced https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 23 to writing. It was very clearly held that the registered document would take precedence.
32. In the instant case, quite apart from the written statement of the first defendant and her oral evidence that she had actually agree to sell the property, there is no other evidence to substantiate the same. Every other witness, who speaks about the same are only interested witnesses.
33. The statement that she orally agreed must also be read in conjunction with Ex.B-2, the document under which she purchased the property. That was by a written registered sale deed. She also sold the property to the second defendant by a written registered sale deed. Thus, even prior to the said oral agreement of sale and immediately thereafter she has had experience of registration of a document and its importance. She further had the experience of a written document being signed and presented for registration.
34. It must also be pointed out that O.S.No.601 or 1983 subsequently renumbered as O.S.No.14 of 1995 was instituted only after https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 24 the sale deed had been executed in favour of the second defendant and this sale deed stares at the face of the plaintiffs. Title had immediately passed on to the second defendant.
35. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the same and it is as follows:-
“54. “Sale” defined.—‘‘Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.— 3Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. 1In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.—A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 25 shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. ”
36. Thus, the second defendant is a bona fide purchaser for lawful consideration.
37. The learned counsel for the respondent had relied on 2015 11 SCC 12 [Inbasagaran and another Vs. S.Natarajan (dead though LRS) and Others] with respect to the cause of action and with respect to the right to file two separate suits. But the issue involved in this case is whether the sale deed in favour of the second defendant should be sought to be set aside or not. It is clear from the Full Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court had laid down the law in the first instance in AIR 1960 Madras 1, Muppudathi Pillai, (referred supra) and which proposition had been affirmed and as a matter of fact termed as an “instructive Judgment” by a three Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd., (referred supra – (2021) 4 SCC 786) that unless the sale deed executed in favour of the second defendant is set aside, any decree granting specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 26 would be null, void and non est in law. The first substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
38. The second substantial question of law has become otiose in view of the discussion above. It is with respect to the oral agreement and whether it is maintainable without proper evidence.
39. It is only the first defendant, who actually a perdnashin lady, who spoke about the oral agreement of sale. I am not convinced with the evidence recorded. The written statement had been typed and at the end, she had signed the written statement. It is not clear whether she understood what she had signed. The oral evidence was not recorded in open Court. A Commission had been appointed to record evidence. Even though she had admitted to the agreement of sale, the only witnesses present at the time of the agreement were all interested witnesses.
40. No credence can be given to their evidence. They spoke as if tutored. The repeated the same facts.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 27
41. The plaintiffs did not issue any pre-suit notice, did not record such oral agreement in writing, did not even seek for its confirmation in any document in any manner whatsoever in writing.
42. The suit was filed seeking specific performance, but an attempt was made to include that relief in the existing suit which suit was for declaration that the plaintiffs were tenants. The first defendant had already conveyed the property to the second defendant and a cause of action had arisen, since the sale deed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant was a clear indication of refusal to perform the oral agreement by the first defendant.
43. Thus, I hold that the plaintiffs will have to necessarily fall for not producing credible, admissible reliable and relevant and independent evidence to establish the oral agreement of sale. The second substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
44. The third substantial question of law surrounds the ingredients for grant of specific performance. The primary ingredients is to examine whether there was consensus ad ideim between the parties, who entered https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 28 into such oral agreement of sale. In the suit, the schedule is given as Door No. 163, Main Road, Kottakuppam Village, Vanur. Ex.B-1 is with reference to Door No. 165, Main Road, Kottakuppam Village, Vanur.
45. It is claimed by the learned counsel for the appellant that this is an attempt to grab the property in Door No. 165 by the plaintiffs. I am not entering into a discussion on the said statement. But in the absence of a written agreement, a valuable property cannot be forced to be sold by an order of Court on the basis of an alleged oral agreement. The second aspect is with respect to readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. There has been no pleading with respect to the same. There has been no pre-suit notice offering to pay the consideration. There has been no deposit in Court of the sale consideration. There is absolute absence of all the necessary ingredients. The First Appellate Court had erred and it is fervently hoped, not deliberately erred, in favour of the plaintiffs and had granted the relief of specific performance. The said finding has to be set aside. The substantial question of law is answered as aforesaid.
46. In view of the above reasons, the Second Appeal is allowed with costs of the first and second respondents. The Judgment and Decree https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 29 dated 30.01.2003 made in A.S.No. 161 of 2002 on the file of the Additional District, FTC-1, Tindivanam, is set aside. The Judgment and Decree dated 20.09.1996 made in O.S.No. 52 of 1995 on the file of District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Vanur, is restored and confirmed.
07.09.2022 Index :Yes/No Internet:Yes/No vsg To
1. Additional District, FTC-1, Tindivanam.
2. District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court, Vanur.
C.V.KARTHIKEYAN, J.
vsg https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 30 Pre-Delivery Judgment made in S.A.No. 943 of 2005 07.09.2022 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis