Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K.Bhaskar & Others.: vs Government Of A.P., Rep. By Principal ... on 16 December, 2014
Author: A.V.Sesha Sai
Bench: A.V.Sesha Sai
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI
WRIT PETITION Nos.15825 of 2008 and batch
16-12-2014
K.Bhaskar & others.: Petitioners in W.P.No.15825/08
K.J.Chandra Sekhar & others.: Petitioners in W.P.No.15826/08
Government of A.P., rep. by Principal Secretary,Revenue Department (Land
Acquisition), Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad & others. Respondents in both
W.Ps.
Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri M.S.Prasad, Senior Counsel,
representing Sri Vinod K.Reddy
Counsel for the Respondents: G.P for Land Acquisition.
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 443
2. 2012(3) ALT 676
3. 2013(3) ALT 385
4. 2000(5) ALT 553 (DB)
5. 2010(4) ALT 538 (DB)
6. Law Summary 1995 (2) AP 441
7. 2011(1) ALD 676
8. (1983) 1 SCC 125
9. 2004 (2) ALD 451
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI
W.P.Nos.15825 & 15826 of 2008
COMMON ORDER:
In both these Writ Petitions, challenge is to the Order of the Joint Collector and Additional District Magistrate, Chittoor passed vide proceedings D.Dis.No.E4/864/2011 dated 15.3.2011. By way of the said Order, the Joint Collector rejected the payment of exgratia to the Petitioners.
2. Heard Sri M.S.Prasad, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Vinod K.Reddy, counsel on record for the petitioners, learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition for the Respondents, apart from perusing the material available before the Court.
3. Petitioners were assigned various extents of lands, by the authorities, situated at Cherivi Village, Satyavedu Mandal, Chittoor District in the years 1983 & 1985 and the petitioners herein were issued Pattadar Pass Books and Title Deeds. On the requisition of A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) in the year 2006, State Government took possession of the said assigned lands and alienated to APIIC and in turn APIIC alienated to Sri City (SEZ) by way of a Sale Deed dated 17.3.2008. Complaining non-payment of exgratia, the present Writ Petitions came to be filed and this Court initially on 23.7.2008 disposed of these Writ Petitions, leaving it open to the respondents to take further steps for acquisition of the lands in question after payment of exgratia to the petitioners as provided under G.O.Ms.No.1307 dated 23.12.1993 subject to the subsistence of the DKT Pattas granted in favour of the petitioners. Subsequently in Review Petition Nos.17719 & 37106 of 2011 dated 24.1.2013, the said orders were reviewed and this Court restored the Writ Petitions to file. Thus, these Writ Petitions.
4. The Mandal Revenue Officer-4th respondent vide Notice R.O.C.No.B/418/05 dated 16.9.2009 informed the petitioners about taking possession of the land for industrial purpose for APIIC and asked the petitioners to show cause. Subsequently vide proceedings ROC.B/418/2005 dated 30.9.2009, the Tahsildar, Satyavedu passed orders of resumption and informed about the quantum of exgratia amount also. The material available on record further shows that the Tahsildar vide Letter Roc.B/418/2005 dated 14.10.2009 addressed to the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (SEZ), Unit-III, Tirupathi recommended for payment of exgratia to the petitioners in terms of the earlier orders dated 23.7.2008. Thereafter, vide Roc.B/182/09 dated 19.12.2009 the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (SEZ) Unit-III, Tirupathi sent a report to the District Collector, Chittoor. The District Collector vide proceedings D.Dis. G2/13556/09 dated 1.2.2010 asked the Special Deputy Collector to take action for payment of exgratia and the Tahsildar by virtue of letters Roc.B/333/07 dated 18.9.2010 and 30.9.2010 requested the District Collector, Chittoor to sanction the exgratia amounts. The Revenue Divisional Officer vide letters dated 18.9.2010 and 30.9.2010 made similar request to the District Collector.
5. It is appropriate to mention at this juncture that in the month of September, 2010, the petitioners filed C.C.Nos.1318 & 1355 of 2010. Thereafter, the respondents filed Review Petitions vide W.P.M.P.Nos.17719 & 37106 of 2011 in the month of May, 2011 and the same were allowed and Contempt Cases were dismissed consequently. The record further shows that vide Notice Roc.E4/864/2011 dated 27.1.2011, the Joint Collector, Chittoor asked the petitioners to show cause as to how the petitioners are entitled for exgratia. In response to the same, the petitioners, through their counsel, sent a reply dated 2.2.2011. Thereafter, on 15.3.2011, the Joint Collector passed the impugned order vide D.Dis.E4/864/2011 dated 15.3.2011, rejecting the payment of exgratia to the petitioners, alleging violation of conditions of assignment and ineligibility. Ultimately, the validity and the legal sustainability of the said action is under challenge in these Writ Petitions.
6. It is contended by the learned senior counsel, representing the counsel for the petitioners, that having resumed the subject lands for industrial purpose and taken possession of the lands from the petitioners, the respondents are not justified in rejecting the claim of the petitioners. It is further submitted that in view of the letter dated 1.2.2011 of the District Collector, directing the Special Deputy Collector and the other correspondence of the other authorities, the action of the Joint Collector is totally one without jurisdiction. It is further argued that so long as the assignment is intact, the respondents cannot deny compensation amount to the petitioners. It is nextly contended that the after the orders of resumption passed by the authorities for public purpose, the passing of the impugned order dated 15.3.2011 is impermissible. It is further contended that the impugned action, after a long lapse of time from the date of grant is illegal and unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 & 300-A of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that the reasons indicated in the impugned orders are fallacious and without any foundation and basis. To bolster his submissions and contentions, the learned senior counsel placed reliance on the following judgments:
(1) Union of India and others v. Kamlakshi Finance
Corporation Ltd. .
(2) Vajja Shantamma and others v. State of A.P., rep. by the
Secretary, Revenue Department and others .
(3) Neella Balraj and another v. Mandal Revenue
Officer/Tahsildar, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal and another . (4) Government of A.P., Revenue (UC.I) Department and another v. Pentakota Nagayamma and another .
(5) Joint Collector, R.R. District at Khairtabad, Hyderabad and another v. D.Narasing Rao and others .
(6) Smt.P.Mangamma and others v. The Womens Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., and others .
(7) Mujeebunnisa Begum v. Joint Collector, Medak District at Sangareddy and another .
(8) Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak and others .
7. Per contra, it is vehemently contended by the learned Government Pleader, appearing for respondents that there is no illegality nor any irregularity in the impugned action and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and the petitioners are not entitled for any relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Government Pleader further strenuously contended that in view of violation of conditions assignment and the ineligibility for grant of pattas as indicated and assigned in the impugned order, the petitioners herein are not entitled for any indulgence of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. In the above background, now the issues which this Court is called upon to answer in these Writ Petitions are;
(1) Whether the order impugned in the present Writ Petitions is sustainable and tenable?
(2) Whether the Petitioners are entitled for any relief from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
9. The issues in the instant Writ Petition are required to be considered, analysed and examined in the light of the material available before this Court and in the light of the principles laid down in the Judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. There is absolutely no controversy with regard to the realities that the pattas were granted during the years 1983 and 1985 and the lands were resumed from the petitioners for public purpose and that there are no orders, cancelling the said pattas. It is also a fact that pending these Writ Petitions and the Contempt cases and Review Applications, the Joint Collector passed the Orders dated 15.3.2011, rejecting payment of exgratia in favour of the petitioners. At this juncture, it may be apt and appropriate to refer to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
(1) In Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd. (1 supra), at paragraph 6, the Honble Supreme Court held as under:
6. Sri Reddy is perhaps right in saying that the officers were not actuated by any mala fides in passing the impugned orders. They perhaps genuinely felt that the claim of the assessee was not tenable and that, if it was accepted, the Revenue would suffer. But what Sri Reddy overlooks is that we are not concerned here with the correctness or otherwise of their conclusion or of any factual malafides but with the fact that the officers, in reaching in their conclusion by-passed two appellate orders in regard to the same issue which were placed before them, one of the Collector (Appeals) and the other of the Tribunal. The High Court has, in our view, rightly criticised this conduct of the Assistant Collectors and the harassment to the assessee caused by the failure of these officers to give effect to the orders of authorities higher to them in the appellate hierarchy. It cannot be too vehemently emphasised that it is of utmost importance that, in disposing of the quasi-judicial issues before them, revenue officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities; The order of the Appellate Collector is binding on the Assistant Collectors working within his jurisdiction and the order of the Tribunal is binding upon the Assistant Collectors and the Appellate Collectors who function under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The principles of judicial discipline require that the orders of the higher appellate authorities should be followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. The mere fact that the order of the appellate authority is not "acceptable" to the department - in itself an objectionable phrase - and is the subject matter of an appeal can furnish no ground for not following it unless its operation has been suspended by a competent court. If this healthy rule is not followed, the result will only be undue harassment to assessees and chaos in administration of tax laws.
(2) In Vajja Shantamma v. State of A.P., rep. by the Secretary, Revenue Department (2 supra), this Court at paragraph 9 held as under:
The right to be paid exgratia inheres in the petitioners as long as the assignment is intact. The same can be taken away only by proving a specific fact that disentitles them. Further, the assertion and proof of such fact must be before the date of resumption of the land. It is not competent for respondent No.4 to assert after resumption of the land for public purpose that the petitioners were not in possession. This Court takes serious exception to the manner in which the respondents have denied to the petitioners, their right to receive exgratia.
(3) In Neella Balraj v. Mandal Revenue Officer/Tahsildar, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal (3 supra), this Court at paragraph 8 held as under:
7. The 1st respondent was duty bound to implement the directions issued by the 2nd respondent. In case he found that any factual error has crept into the proceedings, he ought to have simply brought it to the notice of the 2nd respondent and awaited further action. However, he passed the impugned order, that too, without issuing notice to the petitioners, much less bringing the factum to the notice of the 2nd respondent. It is not only a case of flagrant violation of law, but also an act of insubordination. If there was no dispute between petitioners 1 and 2, and the cheque was prepared after verification of the records, it was not at all open to the 1st respondent to deny the payment that was directed by the 2nd respondent. Further, the question of passing an order under the Act, after the land was resumed to the Government for a public purpose, and ex-gratia was awarded; does not arise.
(4) In Government of A.P., Revenue (UC.I) Department and another v. Pentakota Nagayamma (4 supra), the Division Bench of this Court at paragraph 6 held as under:
6. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellants submits that there is power for the Government to initiate suo motu revisional proceedings, that they cannot be hauled-up at the there should and that the respondents are obligated to show cause and the Government is entitled to pass the order after affording opportunity to the respondents.
Bone of contention is that even if it is assumed that the possession was taken over in the year 1972, the same was not taken over by the Government and the taking over possession by the requisitioning authority cannot amount to taking possession under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and as such, the land did not vest in the Government and still continued to be with the respondents and hence, there is no legal embargo for taking over the land under the provisions of ULC Act, subject to the revision being allowed. We cannot agree. The acquisition was at the instance of the requisitioning authority. The requisitioning authority with a promise of getting the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had taken over advance possession in the year 1972, and as such, the land was divested from the holding of the respondents and was not capable of being computed in the holding of the respondents. With the gazetting of notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 12-10-1982, the promise of the requisitioning authority had crystalised into statutory action and the land was deemed to have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. It is pertinent to mention that since the requisitioning authority is not the Government and cannot acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act, it may requisition and the Government after taking possession always makes it over to the requisitioning authority. But, in the instant case, the requisitioning authority felt urgency and took over advance possession and then land acquisition proceedings were initiated as referred to above. In view of the above, Urban Land Ceiling Authority had rightly held that there was no vacant land. If the Government was of the view that the order of the Special Officer and competent Authority under Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam was erroneous, it ought to have initiated suo motu revision proceedings before 12-10-1982. Not only the Government did not think fit to initiate suo motu revision proceedings under Section 34 of ULC Act, but it had also faced the earlier round of litigation and was unsuccessful even in the Apex Court and the show-cause notice which was later issued on 20-7-1994 is an affront to the judicial decision and such a conduct on the part of the Government cannot be countenanced. What is more, the Government had re-issued the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in G.O. Rt. No.264, dated 31-3-1995 and that itself shows that the show-cause issued on 20-7-1994 purporting to be under Section 34 of ULC Act is a colourable exercise of power. Learned single Judge has rightly held (following the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav [1970]1SCR335 , that the revisional proceedings cannot be initiated after long lapse of time. We are also of the same view, that by no stretch of imagination, fourteen years can be said to be a reasonable time and that the revisional proceedings are the result of arbitrary exercise of power apart from the fact that it is an affront to the final judicial verdict.
(5) In Joint Collector, R.R. District at Khairtabad, Hyderabad v. D.Narasing Rao (5 supra), the Division Bench of this Court at paragraphs 6, 8 to 11 held as under:
6. Fairly well settled is the proposition of law that even if no period of limitation is prescribed, the power of revision must be exercised within a reasonable time which must be determined by the facts of each case and the nature of the order being revised (State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (2) AIR 1969 SC 1297, Mohd. Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim (3) (1997) 6 SCC 71 and State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd.) (4) (2007) 11 SCC 363. In Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale (5) 2009(2) ALT (Crl.) 386 (SC) = 2009(5) SCJ 100 = (2009) 9 SCC 352, the Supreme Court observed:
11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein.
7. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
8. Closer home, a Division Bench of this Court while considering Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act in P.Mangamma v. Womens Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., Barkatpura, Hyderabad (6) 1995 (3) ALT 330 (DB) held that exercise of revisionary jurisdiction thereunder after a lapse of 31 years was totally irrational, unreasonable and violaltive of fair play in administrative action. Reference was made therein to the earlier Division Bench Judgements of this Court in A.Kodanda Rao v.
Government of Andhra Pradesh (7) 1981 (2) ALT 280 (DB) and K.Venkat Reddy v. Director of Settlements, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad (8) 1975 (2) An.W.R. 43 = 1975 (1) APLJ 11 (DB) enunciating the same principle.
9. Viewed thus, the contention of the State that the exercise of revisional power under Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act is temporarily unbounded must necessarily fail. In the present case, admittedly, the State proposes to exercise its revisionary jurisdiction to upset entries dating back to more than half a century. No valid reasons are forthcoming to justify the delay so as to make this exercise reasonable.
10. Apropos the contention that a writ petition was not maintainable against a Show Cause Notice, the Notice dated 31.12.2004 was not merely a Show Cause Notice but was indicative of the initiation of suo motu revisional power. The exercise of such revisional power after a lapse of over 50 years being moot, the very jurisdiction to commence such exercise fell for examination. In this regard, the observations of the Supreme Court in Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (1 supra) relied upon bythe State are of guidance:
This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition.
11. As the delay in the present case had the effect of wiping out the very jurisdiction of the revisionary authority to initiate such exercise suo motu, the Notice dated 31.12.2004 was amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contention of the State in this regard is therefore rejected.
(6) In Smt.P.Mangamma v. The Womens Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., (6 supra), this Court held as under:
In the present case the certificate issued in Form Appendix 'C dt.4-l-'53 in favour of Sevalli Sayanna who is the predecessor in title of the appellants in W. A. No. 560/1990wasproduced before the Court. This certificate is a possession certificate issued by the Tahsildar. Clause (v) of the certificate makes it very clear that the said certificate was issued under orders of the Collector, Hyderabad district and the grantee was allowed to take possession of the laid From 4-1-1953. At the time of hearing the Court asked the learned Government Pleader for Revenue to produce the similar certificates issued in favour of other assignees and for that purpose the case was adjourned. The learned Government Pleader was not in a position to place any records in that regard. Under these circumstances we are inclined to believe that similar certificates were also issued in favour of the other assignees. If by the possession certificates issued in the month of January, 1953 the assignees were permitted to take possession of the land in that month itself after obtaining necessary orders from the Collector of Hyderabad district, it is totally untenable and impermissible for the respondent-authorities now to contend that the lands were assigned to the assignees by the Tahsildar without seeking approval of the District Collector. The certificate dated 4-1-1953 clearly belies the claim of the respondent- authorities.
15. sufficient materials are placed before the Court by the petitioners and the appellants to show that after the assignment of the land in question in the year 1953 much water has flown under the bridge and large number of third parties have acquired rights and interests in the lands during this long passage of 30 20 years. The claims of the petitioners and the appellants that the lands were purchased by the Society from the original allottees and the purchasers from them; the lay out plan submitted by the Society was approved by the Municipal Corporation; betterment charges were paid to the Corporation and all these developments took place as far back as in the year 1969 and earlier and subsequently the plots were allotted to the members-allottees and some of them in turn sold those plots in favour of third parties and both the allottees and the purchasers of the plots from the allottees have constructed pucca buildings in the respective plots investing huge sum of money and they are staying therein are not seriously disputed and cannot be disputed by the respondent-authorities. Therefore, it seems to us that the action initiated by the District Collector at this distance of time, nearly after a lapse of 31 years from the date of assignment of the lands and particularly in the premise of the attending facts and circumstances of the case, is totally irrational and unreasonable and violative of fair play in administrative action. If that is so the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and Ors. (1 supra) and this Court in A. Kodanda Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2 supra) and in Writ Appeal No. 1521 of 1988 - S.B. Dharma Reddy v. The Director of Settlements, A.P., Hyderabad and Anr.
(2-A supra) squarely applies to the facts of this case also. No purpose would be served by permitting the District Collector to decide the case afresh after hearing the petitioners and the appellants at this distance of time. We are not persuaded to hold that the respondent-public authorities were totally ignorant or unaware of the original assignments made in the year 1953 and the subsequent developments.
(7) In Mujeebunnisa Begum v. Joint Collector, Medak District at Sangareddy (7 supra), this Court at paragraphs 27, 33 and 34 held as under:
27. The pattas were granted as early as 1978, 1983 and 1990 and after a lapse of considerable time, resumption proceedings were initiated only in the year 2001. The question whether suo-motu action could be initiated after such a long lapse of time or not, is no longer res Integra.
33. On the consideration of the principles enunciated in the judgments referred to above and applying the said principles to the facts of the present case it is to be held that the suo motu powers exercised by Respondent No. 1 is wholly unjustified.
34. On the above analysis, I am of the considered view that the impugned orders are unsustainable and are liable to be set aside.
Accordingly, the order, dated 20.12.2006 passed by Respondent No. 1 - Joint Collector, Medak District at Sangareddy, is hereby set aside and the writ petitions are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. (8) In Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak (8 supra), the Honble Supreme Court at paragraph 12 held as under:
12. What is stated hereinbefore is sufficient to quash and set aside the order of the House Allotment Officer. However, there is one more aspect of the matter which we cannot overlook. The appellant entered the premises in 1954. There have been numerous proceedings between him and the late Basantrai Sharma who let out the premises to the appellant but no one ever raised the question whether the appellant had entered the premises in contravention of Clause 22(2). Till Basantrai Sharma died, no one raised the controversy about the entry of the appellant in the premises as being unauthorised or in contravention of Clause 22. Basantrai Sharma in his life time tried to obtain possession of the premises from the appellant alleging grounds available to him under the Rent Control Order other than unauthorised entry. This would permit an inference that Basantrai Sharma accepted the appellant as his tenant and his tenancy did not suffer from any infirmity. After Basantrai Sharma died, . her Successor in interest one Smt. Usha Rani N. Sharma did not raise any controversy about the occupation of the premises by the appellant. One Mr. S.P. Pathak, a total stranger has come forward to complain about the unauthorised entry of the appellant in the premises. The unauthorised entry according to the appellant was in the year 1954. Appellant retired in 1967. Basantrai Sharma was alive in 1967. If appellant came into the premises because he was holding an office of profit, obviously Basantrai Sharma would not miss the opportunity to evict the appellant because he was otherwise also trying to do the same thing. Rent was accepted without question from the appellant by Basantrai Sharma till his death and thereafter. Could he be at this distance of time, thrown out on the ground that his initial entry was unauthorised. To slightly differently formulate the proposition, could the initial unauthorised entry, if there be any, permit a House Allotment Officer, 22 years after the entry, to evict the appellant on the short ground that he entered the premises in contravention of Clause 22(2) ? Undoubtedly, power is conferred on the Collector to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order which disclosed a public policy are effectively implemented and if the Collector therefore, comes across information that there is a contravention, he is clothed with adequate power to set right the contravention by ejecting anyone who comes into the premises in contravention of the provisions. But when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, no limitation is prescribed in this behalf but one would stand aghast that a landlord to some extent in pari delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant. In such a situation, even though the House Allotment Officer was to reach an affirmative conclusion that the initial entry 22 years back was an unauthorised entry and that failure to vacate premises till 9 years after retirement was not proper, yet it was not obligatory upon him to pass a peremptory order of eviction in the manner in which be has done. In such a situation, it would be open to him not to evict the appellant. In this connection, we may refer to Murlidhar Agarwal and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. [1975]1SCR575 wherein one Ram Agyan Singh who came into possession of premises without an order of allotment in his favour as required by Section 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was permitted to retain the premises by treating his occupation lawful and this Court declined to interfere with that order. No doubt it must be confessed that Section 7A conferred power on the District Magistrate to take action against unauthorised occupation in contravention of the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, but there was a proviso to the section which enabled the District Magistrate not to evict a person found to be in unauthorised occupation, if the District Magistrate was satisfied that there has been undue delay or otherwise it is inexpedient to do so. There is no Such proviso to Clause 28 which confers power on the Collector to take necessary action for the purpose of securing compliance with the Rent Control Order. But as stated earlier, where power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercises of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time. This is too well established to need buttressing by a precedent. However, one is readily available in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Nathn and Ors. : [1970]1SCR335 In that case Commissioner exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction Under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which did not prescribe any period of limitation for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The Commissioner exercised revisional jurisdiction one year after the Collector made the order which was sought to be revised. The High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner. In the appeal by State of Gujarat, this Court declined to interfere holding inter alia that the revisional power in the absence of prescribed period of limitation must be exercised within a reasonable time and period of one year was held to be too late. This aspect must be present to the mind of House Allotment Officer before just rushing in on an unproved technical contravention brought to his notice contrived by the successor in interest of the deceased landlord, and evicting the appellant 22 years after his entry and 9 years after his retirement on the short ground that his entry in the year 1954 was in contravention of Clause 22(2).
10. The material available before this Court, if viewed, tested and examined in the light of the principles laid down in the above referred judgments, vividly and candidly demonstrates that there is absolutely no justification and reasonability on the part of the Joint Collector to reject the claim of the petitioners. In the absence of any orders of cancellation of pattas and since the pattas granted in the years 1983 and 1985 are still intact, in the considered opinion of this Court, the respondents are not justified in rejecting the claim of the petitioners. It is also noteworthy that no provision of law is pointed out which authorises and empowers the Joint Collector to resort to the impugned action and in the absence of any legal and statutory sanction and foundation, the order impugned is liable to be declared as one without jurisdiction.
11. Coming to the aspect of payment of amounts to the petitioners, it is significant to note that in view of the Larger Bench Judgment of this Court in Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, Domalguda, Hyderabad v. Mekala Pandu , petitioners are now entitled for compensation on par with private properties as per new legislation i.e. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, - Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. It is also significant to note in this connection that the Honble Apex Court vide order dated 4.8.2014 in Civil Appeal Nos.7904-7912/2012 dismissed the appeals filed against the above referred judgment and confirmed the view taken by the Larger Bench of this Court in the above referred judgment.
12. For the aforesaid reasons and having regard to the principles laid down in the above referred judgements, the Writ Petitions are allowed, setting aside the proceedings D.Dis.No.E4/864/2011 dated 15.3.2011 passed by the Joint Collector and Additional District Magistrate, Chittoor and consequently, the respondents are directed to initiate proceedings under the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and pay compensation to the petitioners. This exercise including payment shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.
______________ A.V.SESHA SAI, J Date: 16.12.2014