Kaushik Behra vs The State Of Chhattisgarh on 2 April, 2026

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Chattisgarh High Court

Kaushik Behra vs The State Of Chhattisgarh on 2 April, 2026

Digitally signed
YOGESH by YOGESH
TIWARI
TIWARI Date: 2026.04.02
17:28:45 +0530

2026:CGHC:15338

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 18.02.2026
Order Delivered on : 02.04.2026

WPS No. 1488 of 2023

Kaushik Behra S/o Shri Hajaru Behra Aged About 43 Years (Terminated
Constable -1210), R/o Village- Amapali, Police Station - Basna, District
Mahasamund Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through - The Secretary, Department of
Home Affairs, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur
Chhattisgarh.
2 - The Director General of Police, Head Office of The Chhattisgarh
Police, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur Chhattisgarh.
3 - The Assistant Director General of Police (Administration) Head
Office of The Chhattisgarh Police, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur
Chhattisgarh.
4 - The Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Lalbag, Jagadalpur
Chhattisgarh.
5 - The Superintendent of Police, District - Bastar -Jagdalpur
Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner : Mr. Roop Ram Naik, Advocate
For State/Respondents : Mr. Arpit Agrawal, Panel Lawyer
2

Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order

1. Heard Mr. Roop Ram Naik, learned counsel for the petitioner as

well as Mr. Arpit Agrawal, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the

State/respondents.

2. The petitioner, by filing the present writ petition, has assailed the

impugned order dated 29.09.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by

respondent No. 2, whereby the mercy petition/departmental

appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed and the

order dated 30.09.2020 (Annexure P-2) passed by respondent No.

4 as well as the final order dated 04.10.2019 (Annexure P-3)

passed by respondent No. 5 have been affirmed, seeking

quashment of the said orders and a consequential direction for

reinstatement on the post of Constable with seniority, full back

wages, salary and all consequential benefits, including counting of

the period from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 for all service purposes.

3. The petitioner has sought for following reliefs:-

"10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue a appropriate writ/order by
setting aside/quashing the impugned order
dated 29.09.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by
the respondent No. 2 whereby the mercy
petition /departmental appeal of the petitioner
has been dismissed and confirmed the order
dated 30.09.2020 passed by the respondent
No. 4 (Annexure P-2) and final order dated
3

04.10.2019 passed by the respondent no. 5
(Annex. P-3).

10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue a writ/order by directing the
respondent authorities to reinstatement the
petitioner in his service (post of Constable) with
seniority, salary, full back wages and all
consequential benefits with effect from date of
removal from service i.e. 04.10.2019 and also
count/treat the working period from 13.06.2018
to 12.01.2019.

10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to grant other relief which may be
suitable in the facts and circumstances of the
case, may also be granted in the favour of the
petitioner."

4. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was

appointed as a Constable and, after completing his basic PTS and

CIT training in the 5th Battalion, Jagdalpur, was posted at Police

Camp Jiramgaon, P.S. Darbha, District Bastar, a naxalite-affected

area. He discharged his duties sincerely and honestly. However,

he remained absent from duty from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 due

to the death of his uncle (who had adopted him), performance of

last rites, his own ill health, his wife's pregnancy and other family

difficulties, and he could not intimate the superior authorities

during that period.

5. A charge-sheet dated 07.02.2019 was issued alleging

unauthorized absence for about 213 days in violation of Rule 64(2)
4

(4) of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations and Rule 7 of the Civil

Services Conduct Rules, along with an allegation that he was a

habitual absentee and unfit for service. A departmental enquiry

was instituted and an enquiry officer was appointed. According to

the petitioner, no proper show cause notice was served, nor was

he afforded an effective opportunity to defend himself or cross-

examine the prosecution witnesses.

6. The enquiry officer submitted his report dated 21.05.2019 holding

the charges proved. Thereafter, by order dated 04.10.2019,

respondent No. 5 imposed the major penalty of removal from

service. The petitioner preferred a departmental appeal before

respondent No. 4, which came to be rejected on 30.09.2020,

affirming the order of removal.

7. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred a further appeal/mercy

petition before respondent No. 2 on the grounds of violation of

principles of natural justice and disproportionate punishment. The

same was rejected by order dated 29.09.2021, which was

communicated to the petitioner on 07.01.2023. Aggrieved by the

concurrent orders imposing the major penalty of removal from

service, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

8. Mr. Roop Ram Naik, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that

the impugned order dated 29.09.2021 passed by the respondent

No. 2 - Director General of Police is illegal, arbitrary and suffers

from complete non-application of mind, as the departmental
5

appeal/mercy petition has been rejected mechanically without

proper consideration of the record and the specific grounds raised

by the petitioner. It is contended that the order merely affirms the

punishment imposed by respondent No. 5 without independently

examining whether the departmental enquiry was conducted in

accordance with law and principles of natural justice. It is further

submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable on

12.02.2007 and had successfully completed his training before

being posted in a naxalite-affected area at Camp Jiramgaon, P.S.

Darbha, District Bastar, where he discharged his duties sincerely.

His absence from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 was neither willful nor

deliberate, but was on account of the death of his uncle, who had

adopted him, performance of last rites, his own ill health and

serious family circumstances including his wife's pregnancy.

Despite such compelling circumstances, the disciplinary authority

failed to consider the defence version in its proper perspective.

9. Mr. Naik further submits that the departmental enquiry was

conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. No proper

show cause notice was served prior to initiating the proceedings,

and the petitioner was not afforded an effective opportunity to

cross-examine witnesses or to submit a proper written

representation against the enquiry report. The findings recorded

by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority

are stated to be perverse and unsupported by evidence,

particularly inasmuch as there is no finding that the absence was
6

willful or intentional. It is also contended that the punishment of

removal from service is grossly disproportionate to the alleged

misconduct. Under Regulation 226 of the Chhattisgarh Police

Regulations, withholding of increment is prescribed as a suitable

punishment for serious dereliction of duty; however, the

respondents have imposed the extreme penalty of removal,

overlooking the statutory scheme. The appellate and revisional

authorities have also erred in taking into consideration the past

service record without following the procedure contemplated under

Regulation 228.

10. In support of his submissions, Mr. Naik places reliance upon the

judgment in Kudiam Bhima vs. State of C.G. & others, WPS

No. 227/2020, wherein this Court interfered with the order of

removal on the ground of non-consideration of relevant material.

Reliance is also placed on Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of

India & Another, (2012) 3 SCC 178, wherein the Hon'ble

Supreme Court held that in cases of unauthorized absence, there

must be a finding that such absence was willful. Further reliance is

placed on Chhel Singh vs. MGB Gramin Bank, Pali & Others,

(2014) 13 SCC 166, Ramsagar Sinha vs. State of C.G. &

Others, WA No. 172/2025 and Drigpal Singh vs. State of M.P. &

Others, 2014 SCC Online MP 1860, to contend that

disproportionate punishment and violation of natural justice vitiate

the disciplinary proceedings.
7

11. On these grounds, it is prayed by Mr. Naik that the impugned

orders be set aside and the petitioner be reinstated with all

consequential benefits.

12. On the other hand, Mr. Arpit Agrawal, learned Panel Lawyer

appearing for the State/respondents, vehemently opposes the

submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and

submits that the present writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable

to be dismissed. It is contended that the impugned order dated

29.09.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No. 2 - Director

General of Police - has been passed after due consideration of

the mercy petition, the entire departmental enquiry record, and the

service history of the petitioner, and therefore does not suffer from

any illegality, perversity or non-application of mind.

13. Mr. Agrawal further submits that the petitioner remained

unauthorizedly absent for 213 days continuously from 13.06.2018

to 12.01.2019 while posted at Camp Jiramgaon, P.S. Darbha,

District Bastar, without any prior sanction of leave or intimation to

the competent authority. Despite issuance of notices dated

26.06.2018, 27.07.2018, 28.08.2018 and 23.10.2018 directing him

to resume duty, the petitioner failed to report back or furnish any

satisfactory explanation. It is argued that such prolonged and

continuous absence in a disciplined force like the police,

particularly in a naxalite-affected area, amounts to gross

indiscipline and serious misconduct. It is further submitted that the
8

departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with

law and the applicable rules. The petitioner was served with a

charge-sheet, an enquiry officer was duly appointed, and the

entire proceedings were conducted in his presence. Adequate

opportunity of hearing and defence was afforded to him. The

enquiry was not conducted ex parte, and the petitioner was

allowed to participate and produce defence evidence. The charges

were found proved on the basis of evidence on record, and

thereafter the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of removal

from service by order dated 04.10.2019, which was affirmed in

appeal and in the mercy petition.

14. It is submitted by Mr. Agrawal that the petitioner is a habitual

absentee and had earlier been inflicted with five minor penalties

and two major penalties for unauthorized absence. Despite

repeated opportunities to improve his conduct, there was no

improvement. In such circumstances, retention of the petitioner in

a disciplined force would be detrimental to institutional discipline. It

is argued that the punishment imposed is proportionate to the

gravity of misconduct and cannot be said to be shockingly

disproportionate so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India. It is lastly submitted that under Rule 24 of

the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1977, willful

absence renders a Government servant liable to disciplinary

action, and the petitioner admittedly remained absent without

sanctioned leave. The constitutional safeguards under Article
9

311(2) of the Constitution of India were duly complied with, as the

petitioner was informed of the charges and given reasonable

opportunity of hearing. Therefore, no interference is called for in

exercise of writ jurisdiction and the petition deserves to be

dismissed being sans merit.

15. Mr. Agrawal, learned State counsel has placed reliance upon the

judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Lal v.

State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 369, State of Andhra Pradesh v. S.

Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, Moti Ram Deka v. General

Manager, North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 600 and

State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 to contend

that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India in matters arising out of departmental

enquiries and consequential orders of dismissal or removal is

extremely limited. As such, prays for dismissal of the writ petition.

16. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned

counsel appearing for the respective respondents and have

perused the pleadings and documents placed on record.

17. From perusal of the order dated 04.10.2019 passed by the

Superintendent of Police, Bastar, Jagdalpur, it is apparent that the

disciplinary authority has recorded a detailed finding regarding the

habitual unauthorized absence of the delinquent employee,

namely Kaushik Behera. The order reflects that the delinquent

remained absent from Camp Jiramgaon, Police Station Darbha,
10

with effect from 13.06.2018 without any prior information or

permission and continued to remain absent for 213 consecutive

days, reporting back only on 12.01.2019. Despite repeated notices

and reminders, he neither resumed duty within time nor submitted

any satisfactory explanation in defense of his absence.

18. The order further discloses that the delinquent had a past service

record marked by repeated instances of unauthorized absence

and punishments, including censures, withholding of increments

with cumulative effect, and adjustment of absence periods under

relevant leave rules. The disciplinary authority has specifically

taken into consideration his previous misconduct and the fact that

earlier minor and major penalties failed to bring about any

improvement in his conduct. The charge-sheet was duly served,

and even after receipt of multiple reminders, the delinquent failed

to submit any reply, thereby indicating lack of interest in contesting

the allegations.

19. It is also evident from the order that a regular departmental inquiry

was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

An Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed,

prosecution witnesses were examined, copies of statements were

supplied, and opportunity for cross-examination as well as for

leading defense evidence was granted. The Inquiry Officer, after

detailed analysis of oral and documentary evidence, held Charges

No. 1 and 2 to be fully proved. A copy of the inquiry report was
11

supplied to the delinquent along with a notice for representation;

however, he again failed to submit any representation within the

stipulated time despite reminders.

20. Upon independent consideration of the inquiry report, evidence on

record, and the service history of the delinquent, the disciplinary

authority concluded that the misconduct stood fully established

and that the delinquent, being habitually absent, was unfit to be

retained in a disciplined force like the police department.

Consequently, the penalty of "discharge from service" was

imposed with effect from 04.10.2019 (forenoon), and the period of

absence from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 (213 days) was treated

under the principle of "no work no pay."

21. Further, from perusal of the order dated 30.09.2020 passed by the

appellate authority, i.e., the Office of the Inspector General of

Police, Bastar Range, Jagdalpur, it transpires that a detailed

consideration was undertaken of the departmental enquiry

conducted against Kaushik Behera, District Bastar. The appellate

authority noted that the petitioner remained unauthorizedly absent

from Camp Jiramgaon, P.S. Darbha, for 213 consecutive days

from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 without any prior information or

permission, thereby violating Para 64(2) & (4) of the

M.P./Chhattisgarh Police Regulations and Rule 7 of the Civil

Services Conduct Rules, and further that he was habitual of

remaining absent from duty despite earlier punishments.
12

22. It further transpires that the Superintendent of Police, Bastar had

conducted the enquiry in accordance with Rule 14 of the

M.P./Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and

Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, 'Rules of 1966'), appointed an

Enquiry Officer, and after receipt of the enquiry report, supplied a

copy thereof to the petitioner and granted opportunity to submit

representation. However, the petitioner did not submit any

representation. Considering the gravity of the proved charges and

the past service record reflecting imposition of multiple minor and

major penalties for similar misconduct, the disciplinary authority

imposed the penalty of removal from service by order dated

04.10.2019 and treated the period of absence on the principle of

"no work no pay" and the suspension period accordingly.

23. The appellate authority, after examining the entire record under

Rule 27 of the Rules of 1966 and affording personal hearing to the

appellant, recorded that no new grounds or mitigating

circumstances were brought on record warranting interference

with the punishment. It was also observed that despite repeated

opportunities in the past, the petitioner failed to improve his

conduct and that his prolonged unauthorized absence in a

naxalite-affected and sensitive area like Bastar adversely affected

discipline and morale of the police force. Accordingly, the appellate

authority found the punishment proportionate to the misconduct

proved and upheld the order of removal passed by the

Superintendent of Police, Bastar, dismissing the appeal preferred
13

by the petitioner.

24. Lastly, from perusal of the impugned order dated 29.09.2021

passed by the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh, it

transpires that the competent authority has undertaken a detailed

examination of the mercy petition submitted by Ex-Constable

Kaushik Behera, District Bastar, along with the other relevant

documents. The authority has specifically considered the grounds

raised by the petitioner regarding alleged violation of principles of

natural justice, personal and family difficulties, and the

proportionality of punishment. The impugned order reflects that

the Director General of Police has recorded a categorical finding

that the departmental inquiry was conducted strictly in accordance

with the prescribed procedure and in compliance with the

principles of natural justice. It has been observed that the

delinquent was afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself,

that notices were duly served, and that he participated in the

inquiry proceedings. The plea that the inquiry was one-sided or

that reasonable opportunity was denied has been expressly

rejected as being contrary to the record.

25. It further transpires that the authority has taken into account the

past service record of the petitioner, which discloses repeated

instances of unauthorized absence and imposition of both minor

and major penalties. The impugned order notes that despite earlier

punishments and opportunities to reform, the petitioner remained
14

habitually absent and continued to exhibit indiscipline. The

prolonged absence of 213 days from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019

without prior permission or intimation has been treated as grave

misconduct, particularly in the context of service in a disciplined

force like the police department.

26. The Director General of Police has also considered the personal

grounds urged in the mercy petition, including illness of family

members and domestic disputes, but has observed that no

contemporaneous intimation or sanctioned leave was obtained,

nor were satisfactory supporting documents furnished during the

inquiry. Consequently, the authority has concluded that the

punishment of dismissal from service imposed vide order dated

04.10.2019 is neither excessive nor disproportionate and does not

warrant interference in exercise of mercy jurisdiction.

27. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is well settled.

This Court does not sit as an appellate authority to reappreciate

evidence or to substitute its own opinion on the quantum of

punishment unless the same is shockingly disproportionate or

suffers from patent illegality. From a perusal of the orders dated

04.10.2019 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Bastar;

30.09.2020 passed by the Appellate Authority; and 29.09.2021

passed by the Director General of Police while rejecting the mercy

petition, it is evident that the authorities have acted strictly within

the framework of law, after affording due opportunity to the
15

petitioner and after considering his past service record, gravity of

misconduct and the requirements of discipline in a uniformed

force.

28. Rule 24 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1977 (as

amended in 2010) deals with the consequences of absence after

expiry of sanctioned leave, which reads as under:-

"24. Absence after expiry of leave.- (1)
Unless the authority competent to grant leave
extends the leave, Government servant who
remains absent after the end of leave, the
period of such absence not covered by grant of
leave shall have to be treated as 'dies-non' for
all purpose including leave. He will not be
entitled to any leave salary for the period of
such absence and that period shall be debited
against his leave account as though it were half
pay leave to the extent such leave is due, the
period in excess of such leave due being
treated as extraordinary leave.

(2) Willful absence from duty after the expiry of
leave renders a Government servant liable to
disciplinary action."

29. A bare perusal of Rule 24 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services

(Leave) Rules, 1977 (as amended in 2010) goes to show that in

the event a Government servant remains absent after the expiry of

sanctioned leave without extension by the competent authority,

such period of absence is required to be treated as dies-non for all

purposes including leave, and the employee is not entitled to any
16

leave salary for that duration; the period is to be debited against

the leave account as half pay leave to the extent due and, for the

excess period, treated as extraordinary leave. More significantly,

sub-rule (2) categorically provides that willful absence from duty

after the expiry of leave renders the Government servant liable to

disciplinary action, thereby making it clear that unauthorized and

willful absence constitutes misconduct inviting initiation of

departmental proceedings in accordance with the applicable

service rules.

30. The legal position regarding dismissal and removal from service

has been settled since the Constitution Bench judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Lal (supra), wherein the Court

authoritatively held that dismissal or removal from service as a

measure of punishment entails penal consequences and casts a

stigma, but once imposed in accordance with law and after due

inquiry, it cannot be interfered with merely on sympathetic

considerations. The Court clarified that termination by way of

punishment, after compliance with procedural safeguards, is

legally sustainable and does not warrant interference unless

vitiated by mala fides or procedural illegality.

31. Similarly, in the Constitution Bench decision in Moti Ram Deka

(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that where

termination is founded on misconduct and preceded by an inquiry

consistent with Article 311(2) of the Constitution, such action is
17

punitive but valid, provided reasonable opportunity has been

afforded. The Court emphasized that the essence lies not in the

form of the order but in its substance; and where misconduct is

duly established in a regular departmental inquiry, the penalty

cannot be invalidated on hyper-technical grounds.

32. In N. Gangaraj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while

exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, is not required to

reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own conclusions in

place of those arrived at by the competent authority. Interference

is warranted only when the decision-making process is vitiated by

patent illegality, perversity, violation of statutory provisions, or

breach of principles of natural justice.

33. Further in S. Sree Rama Rao (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court

authoritatively held that in proceedings under Article 226, the High

Court is concerned not with the correctness of the decision but

with the decision-making process. It was categorically observed

that the High Court cannot review the evidence and arrive at an

independent finding on the facts. The adequacy or sufficiency of

evidence is not a matter for judicial review. The departmental

authorities are the sole judges of facts, and so long as there is

some evidence which reasonably supports the conclusion, the

findings cannot be interfered with. It was also clarified that the

standard of proof applicable in criminal trials proof beyond

reasonable doubt, is not attracted in departmental proceedings,
18

where preponderance of probabilities is the governing standard.

34. The principle governing the scope of interference has been further

reiterated in Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran,

(2015) 2 SCC 610, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down

that in proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, the

High Court shall not reappreciate evidence, examine adequacy or

reliability of evidence, or substitute its own view for that of the

disciplinary authority, unless the findings are perverse or the

enquiry is vitiated on account of violation of statutory rules or

principles of natural justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held

as under :-

"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is
painfully disturbing to note that the High Court
has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even
the evidence before the enquiry officer. The
finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by
the Central Administrative Tribunal. In
disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not
and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its
powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into
reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court
can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent
authority;
19

(b) the enquiry is held according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair conclusion by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves
to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so
wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
failed to admit the admissible and material
evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which
influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no
evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been
conducted in accordance with law;
20

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence
on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience.

14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of
A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC
1723] , many of the above principles have been
discussed and it has been concluded thus :
(AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)

"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution as a court of appeal over the
decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public
servant : it is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf, and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to
hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty
of the charge, it is not the function of the
High Court in a petition for a writ under
21

Article 226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly
interfere where the departmental authorities
have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the
rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair
decision by some considerations extraneous
to the evidence and the merits of the case or
by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of
facts and if there be some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not
a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution."

15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao
[(1975) 2 SCC 557, the principles have been
further discussed at paras 21-24, which read as
follows : (SCC pp. 561-63)

"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
22

departmental inquiries has come up before
this Court. Two propositions were laid down
by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] . First, there is no
warrant for the view that in considering
whether a public officer is guilty of
misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is
not established unless proved by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction
of the Court must be applied. If that rule be
not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry
the High Court in a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution is not competent to
declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court
is not a court of appeal under Article 226
over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public
servant. The Court is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Second, where there is some
evidence which the authority entrusted with
the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
and which evidence may reasonably support
the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of
the High Court to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may interfere
23

where the departmental authorities have held
the proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence
and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on
the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion. The
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of
facts and if there is some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not
a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226.

22. Again, this Court in Railway Board v.
Niranjan Singh [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3
SCR 548] said that the High Court does not
interfere with the conclusion of the
disciplinary authority unless the finding is not
supported by any evidence or it can be said
that no reasonable person could have
reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh
case [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548]
this Court held that the High Court exceeded
its powers in interfering with the findings of
24

the disciplinary authority on the charge that
the respondent was instrumental in
compelling the shutdown of an air
compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on 31-5-1956.
This Court said that the Enquiry Committee
felt that the evidence of two persons that the
respondent led a group of strikers and
compelled them to close down their
compressor could not be accepted at its face
value. The General Manager did not agree
with the Enquiry Committee on that point.
The General Manager accepted the
evidence. This Court said that it was open to
the General Manager to do so and he was
not bound by the conclusion reached by the
committee. This Court held that the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary
authority should prevail and the High Court
should not have interfered with the
conclusion.

23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction.
The Court exercises it not as an appellate
court. The findings of fact reached by an
inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence are not reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of
law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an
error of fact, however grave it may appear to
be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown
that in recording the said finding, the tribunal
25

had erroneously refused to admit admissible
and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has
influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which
can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged on the ground that the
relevant and material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal is insufficient or
inadequate to sustain a finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a
point and the inference of fact to be drawn
from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (See Syed
Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC
477] .)

24. The High Court in the present case
assessed the entire evidence and came to its
own conclusion. The High Court was not
justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that
the High Court does not correct a finding of
fact on the ground that the evidence is not
sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the
present case which was considered by the
Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High
Court to justify the conclusion that there is no
evidence which would justify the finding of
the Tribunal that the respondent did not make
the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its
conclusions. It is not possible for the High
Court to say that no reasonable person could
26

have arrived at these conclusions. The High
Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the
evidence and then rejected the evidence as
no evidence. That is precisely what the High
Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari should not do."

16. These principles have been succinctly
summed up by the living legend and
centenarian V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in State of
Haryana v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 .
To quote the unparalleled and inimitable
expressions : (SCC p. 493, para 4)

"4. ... in a domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the
Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All
materials which are logically probative for a
prudent mind are permissible. There is no
allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true
that departmental authorities and
administrative tribunals must be careful in
evaluating such material and should not
glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not
relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For
this proposition it is not necessary to cite
decisions nor textbooks, although we have
been taken through case law and other
authorities by counsel on both sides. The
essence of a judicial approach is objectivity,
exclusion of extraneous materials or
considerations and observance of rules of
natural justice. Of course, fair play is the
27

basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias
or surrender of independence of judgment
vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,
even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot
be held good."

17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court
up to the latest in Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali
Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4
SCC 108, these principles have been
consistently followed adding practically nothing
more or altering anything.

***

20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford Dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, 28 righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence, etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values."

35. Similarly, in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited represented by Managing Director (Administration and HR) v. C. Nagaraju and another, (2019) 10 SCC 367, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that misconduct involving indiscipline and repeated unauthorized absence justifies strict action and that the constitutional courts must not lightly interfere with penalties imposed after a valid enquiry and observed as follows :-

"11. Reliance was placed by the High Court on a judgment of this Court in G.M. Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 :

2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] whereby the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 was allowed. In the said case, the delinquent officer was charged for an offence punishable under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988. He was honourably acquitted by the criminal court as the prosecution failed to prove the charge. Thereafter, a departmental inquiry was conducted and he was dismissed from service. The order of dismissal was upheld [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC OnLine Guj 487] by the High Court. In the appeal filed by the delinquent officer, this Court 29 was of the opinion that the departmental proceedings and criminal case were based on identical and similar set of facts. The evidence before the criminal court and the departmental proceedings being exactly the same, this Court held that the acquittal of the employee by a criminal court has to be given due weight by the disciplinary authority. On the basis that the evidence in both the criminal trial and departmental inquiry is the same, the order of dismissal of the appellant therein was set aside. As stated earlier, the facts of this case are entirely different. The acquittal of Respondent 1 was due to non-availability of any evidence before the criminal court. The order of dismissal was on the basis of a report of the inquiry officer before whom there was ample evidence against Respondent 1.

12. In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh [Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, (2004) 8 SCC 200, this Court was concerned with the validity of the termination of the services of workmen after acquittal by the criminal court.

Dealing with a situation similar to the one in this case, where the acquittal was due to lack of evidence before the criminal court and sufficient evidence was available before the Labour Court, this Court was of the opinion that the judgment in M. Paul Anthony case [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 cannot come to the rescue of the workmen.

13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and Respondent 1, we are of the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a criminal court does not preclude a departmental inquiry against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment of the criminal court if the evidence that is produced in the departmental inquiry is different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a departmental inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a departmental inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the evidence before the inquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available to the criminal court, is justified and needed no interference by the High Court."

36. Applying the aforesaid settled position of law to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the petitioner, being a member of a disciplined police force deployed in a sensitive and naxalite- affected area, remained unauthorizedly absent for 213 consecutive days from 13.06.2018 to 12.01.2019 without prior sanction of leave or proper intimation to the competent authority. The record reflects that repeated notices were issued directing 31 him to resume duty, yet he failed to comply within reasonable time or furnish any contemporaneous explanation supported by credible material. In a uniformed force entrusted with maintenance of law and order, prolonged absence without leave cannot be viewed as a mere technical lapse; rather, it undermines discipline, operational preparedness and institutional integrity. The departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed procedure under the relevant service rules. A charge-sheet containing definite and specific articles of charge was served; an Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were duly appointed; opportunity to participate in the proceedings, cross- examine witnesses and adduce defence evidence was afforded; and a copy of the enquiry report was supplied before imposition of penalty. The petitioner failed to avail several of these opportunities despite reminders. The disciplinary authority, upon independent consideration of the enquiry report, evidence adduced and the petitioner's past service record, which discloses repeated instances of unauthorized absence resulting in both minor and major penalties arrived at a reasoned conclusion that the misconduct stood proved and that the petitioner had exhibited habitual indiscipline rendering him unfit for retention in service.

37. The record placed before this Court clearly demonstrates that the departmental enquiry was conducted by a competent authority strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the relevant statutory framework, including Rule 14 of the Rules of 32 1966 and Rule 24 of the Rules, 1977 governing imposition of major penalties. The petitioner was served with a definite and distinct charge-sheet; an Inquiry Officer was duly appointed; oral and documentary evidence was recorded; opportunity of cross- examination and defence was afforded; and a copy of the enquiry report was supplied before imposition of penalty. Thus, the mandatory procedural safeguards contemplated under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India stood fully complied with.

38. The contention of violation of principles of natural justice is not borne out from the record. On the contrary, it transpires that despite repeated notices and opportunities, the petitioner failed to submit timely explanation or representation and did not avail the opportunities extended to him in full measure. The enquiry was not conducted ex parte; rather, it was conducted after affording adequate opportunity. In such circumstances, the plea of denial of reasonable opportunity is clearly untenable.

39. The charge against the petitioner pertains to prolonged unauthorized absence for 213 consecutive days while posted in a sensitive naxalite-affected area. In a disciplined force like the police, such conduct strikes at the very root of institutional discipline and operational efficiency. The disciplinary authority has also taken into consideration the past service record of the petitioner, which reflects repeated instances of unauthorized absence and imposition of both minor and major penalties. The 33 finding that the petitioner is a habitual absentee is based on documentary material forming part of the service record. There is, therefore, "some evidence" supporting the conclusions reached by the authorities.

40. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Sree Rama Rao (supra), this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own view for that of the disciplinary authority so long as the enquiry is conducted in accordance with law and the findings are supported by evidence. Similarly, in P. Gunasekaran (supra), it has been categorically held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, shall not act as a court of appeal in disciplinary matters and shall not interfere with findings of fact unless they are perverse or based on no evidence. The present case does not fall within any of the exceptional contingencies enumerated therein.

41. The nature and effect of the penalty of removal from service have been authoritatively explained by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shyam Lal (supra), wherein it was held that removal is a punishment founded upon misconduct or deficiency personal to the officer. Further, in Moti Ram Deka (supra), it has been clarified that where termination is punitive and preceded by a lawful enquiry consistent with Article 311(2), the same cannot be invalidated merely on sympathetic considerations. In the case at hand, the penalty of removal has been imposed only 34 after a regular departmental enquiry and upon due consideration of the gravity of misconduct and the petitioner's antecedent service record.

42. The argument of disproportionate punishment also does not merit acceptance. In N. Gangaraj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court cannot interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it shocks the conscience of the Court. Considering the prolonged unauthorized absence of 213 days in a disciplined force, coupled with the petitioner's past history of similar misconduct, the punishment of removal from service cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate. On the contrary, the disciplinary authority has recorded cogent reasons as to why retention of the petitioner in service would be detrimental to discipline.

43. This Court is also mindful of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. Nagaraju (supra), wherein it has been held that misconduct involving indiscipline and repeated unauthorized absence justifies strict action and that constitutional courts must exercise restraint in interfering with penalties imposed after a valid enquiry. The factual matrix of the present case squarely attracts the said principle.

44. The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the decision itself. No material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that 35 the enquiry suffered from procedural illegality, that the authorities were influenced by extraneous considerations, or that the findings are so arbitrary that no reasonable person could have arrived at such conclusions. The petitioner essentially seeks reappreciation of evidence and substitution of punishment, which is impermissible within the limited scope of judicial review.

45. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds that the orders dated 04.10.2019 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Bastar; 30.09.2020 passed by the Appellate Authority; and 29.09.2021 passed by the Director General of Police rejecting the mercy petition are well-reasoned, lawful and passed after due compliance with statutory and constitutional safeguards. No case of perversity, arbitrariness, violation of natural justice or disproportionate punishment is made out.

46. Consequently, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh The date when the The date when the The date when the judgment is judgment is judgment is uploaded on the website reserved pronounced Operative Full 18.02.2026 02.04.2026 ------ 02.04.2026 36 Head-Note Misconduct involving indiscipline and repeated unauthorized absence constitutes a serious breach of service discipline and justifies the imposition of strict penalties by the disciplinary authority. The courts ought not to lightly interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is shown to be shockingly disproportionate or vitiated by procedural irregularity, mala fides, or violation of principles of natural justice.

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Kaushik Behra vs The State Of Chhattisgarh on 2 April, 2026