Gujarat High Court
Kheda Jilla General Mazdoor Mandal vs State Of Gujarat And Ors. on 8 April, 1993
Author: J.M. Panchal
Bench: J.M. Panchal
JUDGMENT
1 . XX XX XX.
2. XX XX XX.
3. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Nityanand v. L. I. C. of India reported in (1969-II-LLJ-711) the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Moreover, the appropriate Government is not a court to which the provisions of Limitation Act can be made applicable. In view of this position of law the appropriate Government has committed grave error in relying upon the provisions of Limitation Act and refusing to refer the dispute to the appropriate forum. It is true that there is some delay in raising the dispute. But delay alone is no ground for refusing to make reference. More lapse of time is not a relevant circumstance. It should further be shown that on account of the lapse of time certain rights have been accrued to the other side and on account of the dispute being raised and on account of accrual of such rights, the reliefs that may be prayed for by the petitioner are not capable of being granted without causing serious prejudice to the other side. This is the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co. Ltd, v. District Board, Bhojpur reported in AIR 1993 SC page 802. Be it noted that in this case the appropriate Government is not required to consider whether the reliefs is to be granted or not. While making reference the appropriate Government has only to see as to whether there is genuine dispute or not. If there is dispute or apprehended dispute, the function of the appropriate Government is to make reference. This is the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh v. State of Bihar reportedin (1989-II-LLJ-558)
4. xx xx xx.
5. Rule made absolute.