Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Battarusetti Chenna Kesavarao And Ors. vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Anr. on 20 March, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1995(2)ALT282
ORDER A. Gopal Rao, J.
1. These Writ Petitions are filed by the Government Pleaders and the Assistant Government Pleaders in the District, for issuing a Writ of Mandamus declaring the respective Government Order issued by the respondent-Government of Andhra Pradesh, terminating their services even before expiry of their term of office, as arbitrary, illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice.
2. At the stage of admission itself, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitions in all these writ petitions as well as the learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents have made their submissions at length. After the arguments are concluded, both sides represented that the main writ petitions may be decided on merits, at this stage, considering the submissions made by them respectively. Therefore, the main Writ Petitions are being disposed of by this common order.
3. Petitioners in these Writ Petitions were appointed as Government Pleaders or Assistant Government Pleaders for a period of three years from the dates they assumed change. Admittedly, the term of office of the petitioners is not yet over. After the General Elections held in the year 1994, there is a charge in the Ruling Party of the State Government, and the Orders impugned in these Writ Petitions are issued by the present Government, terminating the services of all the petitioners.
4. For the sake of convenience and for understanding the issues involved in these Writ Petitions, the facts, as stated in Writ Petition No. 2054 of 1995 are extracted.
5. Petitioner in this Writ Petition (2054/1995) is a practising Advocate in the Courts at Kandukur in Prakasam District. Due to the resignation tendered by the erstwhile assistant Government Pleader, Kandukur, a vacancy arose for the post of Assistant Government Pleader in Kandukur. The respondent-Government called for a fresh panel from the District Collector, Prakasam. The District Collector, Ongole requested the District and Sessions Judge, Ongole, to sponsor the names of eligible Advocates for appointment as Assistant Government Pleader. The District and Sections Judge, Ongole, in turn, consulted the Subordinate Judge, Kandukur and sent a panel of four names to the District Collector, Ongole. The petitioner was placed at serial number one in the said penal. The District Collector, Ongole, in exercise of his discretion, approved the panel sent by the District and Sessions Judge, Ongole, and forwarded the same to the Government. The State Government, by G. O. Rt. No. 369, Law (L) Department, dated 31-10-1994 have appointed the petitioner as Assistant Government Pleader of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kandukur and for the District Munsif's Court, Kandukur, for a period of three years from the date of assuming charge by the Petitioner. Petitioner assumed charge on 28-12-1984 and since then he is discharging his duties as Assistant Government Pleader, without any blemish. While so, the respondent Government, by G. O. Rt. No. 35, Law Department, dated 17-1-1995, terminated the services of the petitioner as Assistant Government Pleader, Kandukur. By this Government Order, the services of all the Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders working in the District Ongole District, along with the petitioner, were terminated giving one month's notice from the date of receipt of the said order by the petitioner and others. No reason are assigned in the order impugned in the writ petition, for terminating the services of the Government Pleaders and the Assistant Government Pleaders in the Prakasam District en masse, by a single order. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent-Government issued Executive instructions in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990, laying down the procedure to be adopted for appointment of Assistant Government Pleaders and Government Pleaders for all the Court in the Districts in the State. Petitioner claims that while appointing him as the Assistant Government Pleader, the procedure laid down in G. O. Ms. Nos. 55 and 57, Law Department, dated 16th March 1990 has been duly followed by the respondent-Government. It is the further case of the petitioner that even for terminating his services by giving one month's notice, as contemplated under paragraph 5 of G. O. Ms. No. 57, dated 16-3-1990, there must be a valid reason for doing so and as there is no reason at all, the order impugned in the writ petition is illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional, apart from being violative of the principles of natural justice. It is also the case of the petitioner that termination of the services of the petitioner merely on the ground that there is a change in the Ruling Party of the Government, is untenable. The post of Government Pleader or Assistant Government Pleader is a 'public post' and, therefore, the method in which the services of the petitioner are terminated is illegal and improper.
6. Similar are the facts in the other writ petitions. The language adopted in the respective Government Orders terminating the services of the petitioners in those writ petitions is also the same. Therefore, it is not necessary to enumerate the facts in detail in each of those writ petitions.
7. These Writ-Petitions are contested by the respondent-Government of Andhra Pradesh on several grounds, viz., that the appointments of the petitioners as Government Pleaders or Assistant Government Pleaders subsequent to the issuance of the Election Notification on 1-11-1994 is contrary to the Code of Conduct under the Election Law; there are no guidelines for selecting the petitioners as Government Pleaders or Assistant Government Pleaders on merit basis; the Rules framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution of India are not applicable; the appointments of the petitioners as Government Pleaders of Assistant Government Pleaders are professional engagements, resulting the in relationship of 'client' and 'advocate' between the respondent-Government and the petitioners, and hence the respondent-Government has got the right to terminate the professional engagements en masse, and the said action is not justiciable; in any event, as the orders impugned in the writ petitions are passed after giving one month's notice in compliance with paragraph 5 of G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court in these Writ Petitions, as the validity of the said paragraph 5/Rule was already upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Vilas Rao v. State of A. P. 1993 ALT (Sup.)(1) 588.
8. In view of the rival contentions raised in these writ petitions by the petitioners and the respondents, the point for determination in this batch of writ petitions is whether the impugned action of the respondent-Government in terminating en masse the services of the Government Pleaders and the Assistant Government Pleaders, viz., petitioners-herein, is legal and proper?
9. The appointments of the petitioners, either as Government Pleaders or as Assistant Government Pleaders, as the case may be, were made by the Government in terms of G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990. The relevant portion of the said G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990 is in following terms :
"Order :- The Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby issue the following executive instructions regulating the recruitment, conditions of service and remuneration of Law Officers of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, other than the Advocate-General :-
1. Government will appoint such number of Law Officers on behalf of the State, Local Authorities, Statutory Institutions, State Public Undertakings and Apex Co-operative Bodies before various Courts and Tribunals, as they may consider necessary.
2. xxxx xxxx xxxx
3. Law Officers in all Courts and Tribunals subordinate to the High Court shall be made on the basis of the recommendations of the District Collector concerned, who shall ascertain the views of the concerned District and Sessions Judge before making the recommendations.
4. xxxx xxxx xxxx
5. Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. However, either party may terminate the engagement by giving one month's notice.
6. xxxx xxxx xxxx
7. xxxx xxxx xxxx
8. No Law Officer shall hold an office either by election or nomination in any Local Authority or its Committee.
9. All Law Officers are precluded from practising Law against the State and Local Authorities, Statutory institutions and State Public Undertakings.
xxxx xxxx xxxx .....".
The above G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990 was amended by G. O. Ms. No. 15, Law Department, dated 29-1-1994. Paragraph 3(a)(2) of G. O. Ms. No. 15 provides that atleast seven years standing at the Bar must be there for a person to be appointed as Assistant Government Pleader and that he should be an income-tax assessee and paragraph-5 provides that the normal term is three years, subject to the termination of the same by providing one month's notice or one month's remuneration. Similarly, guidelines are provided by the other G. Os. for the appointment of Government Pleaders.
10. Following the procedure laid down in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990, after obtaining the recommendation from the District Collectors concerned, in consultation with the District and Sessions Judges, the petitioners in all these writ petitions were appointed by the respondent-Government, from out of the panel of names recommended by the concerned District Collectors. Appointment of the petitioners as Law Officers in all these Writ Petitions are tenure appointments, for a period of three years from the date of taking charge by the individual concerned. All the petitioners in these writ petitions, after taking charge, are discharging their duties as Government Pleaders or Assistant Government Pleaders, as the case may be, without any blemish.
11. After the General Elections in the year 1994, there is a change in the Ruling Party of the State Government. According to the learned Advocate-General, the present Ruling party of the Government wanted to have a change and appoint their own Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders, in the Districts, and hence issued several Government Orders, impugned in these Writ Petitions, whereby the Government have terminated the services of Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders working in various Districts, to facilitate the Government for making fresh appointments to the said posts with persons of their own choice.
12. The language adopted in the various G. Os. impugned in these writ petitions, is in the following terms :
"Under paragraph 5 of the Executive Instructions issued in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law, dated 16-3-1990, the Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby terminate the services of the following Law Officers appointed in the references cited, with one month's notice from the date of receipt of this order.
1. .........
2. .........
3. .........
4. .........
5. .........
6. .........
2. The District Collector xxxxxxxxx is requested to serve the notice on the Law Officers concerned and send the compliance report immediately.
3. The District Collector xxxxxxxxx is however further requested to continue the Law Officers in their respective posts till new Law Officers are appointed to the said posts.
4. The District Collector xxxxxxxx is also requested to send the fresh panels for the above posts and also fresh panels of Assistant Government Pleaders for xxxxxx in terms of G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law, dated 16-3-1990 immediately".
The procedure laid down in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law, dated 16-3-1990 is the only procedure contemplated for appointment of Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders at the District Level in the State. It is not denied by the respondents that the procedure laid down under G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990, has been duly followed by the Government while appointing the petitioners as Law Officers. When an Advocate is appointed as Law Officer (Government Pleader or Assistant Government Pleader), his right to contest any elections or right to practice law against the interests of the Government or local authorities etc., has been curtailed. The Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Nivedita Jain, , observed as follows :
"In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendranath, the executive have a power to make any regulation which should have the effect of a law so long as it does not contravene any legislation already covering the field......"
"Under Art. 162 of the Constitution the executive power of a State, therefore, extends to the matter with regard to which the legislature of a State has power to make laws. As there is no legislation covering the field of selection of candidates for admission to Medical Colleges, the State Government, would, undoubtedly, be competent to pass executive orders in this regard".
The above decision of the Supreme Court clearly lays down that the 'Executive Instructions' issued by the Government are the 'law', in the absence of any statute. Therefore, it follows that any action taken by the Government is open to Judicial Review.
13. The learned Advocate-General strenuously contended that while appointing the Government Pleaders/Assistant Government Pleaders, no selection process is followed. What the learned Advocate-General means is that, there was no written test or oral interview and there are no guidelines or parameters fixed for making selections on merit basis. The learned Advocate-General submits that in the circumstances, the Government Pleaders/Assistant Government Pleaders, cannot be treated as 'Public Servants' and their rights are no way affected by the orders of termination, impugned in these writ petitions, issued by the State Government.
14. This contention of the learned Advocate-General is devoid of any merit. As mentioned already, except the procedure laid down in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990, there is no other Order or Rule - which has to be followed by the authorities while making the selections to the posts of Government Pleaders or Assistant Government Pleaders. It is not the case of the respondents that the procedure laid down in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law, dated 16-3-1990 is in any way contravened while appointing the petitioners as Law Officers. The District and Sessions Judge concerned has nothing to do with the Ruling Party of the Government and his recommendation is purely based on merit and performance of the advocates concerned, whose names are included by him in the panel. The respondent-State Government have issued guidelines in G. O. Ms. No. 15, Law, dated 29-1-1994 etc., which have to be followed by the District and Sessions Judges concerned while making their recommendations. On receipt of the penal of names from the District and Sessions Judge, the District Collector concerned makes his own enquiries before approving the panel and forwards the same to the Government. In the circumstances, the selection and appointment of the Government Pleaders/Assistant Government Pleaders is made on merit basis only. In this connection, it is pertinent to note the observations of the Supreme Court in Mundrika Prasad v. State of Bihar, , which run thus :
"It is heartening to notice that the Bihar Government appoints these lawyers after consultation with the District Judge. It is in the best interest of the State that it should engage competent lawyers without hunting for political partisans regardless of capability. Public Officer - and Government Pleadership is one - shall not succumb to Tammany Hall or subtler spoils system, if purity in public office is a desideratum. After all, the State is expected to fight and win its cases and sheer patronage is misuse of power. One effective method of achieving this object is to act on the advice of the District Judge regarding the choice of Government Pleaders. When there were several thousand cases in Patna Courts and hundreds of cases before a plurality of Tribunal, it was but right that Government did not sacrifice the speedy conduct of cases by not appointing a number of pleaders on its behalf, for the sake of the lucrative practice of a single Government Pleader......"
The selection process laid down in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990 and the selection process in the case before the Supreme Court (Mundrika Prasad v. State of Bihar), , is same. Therefore, it follows that the respondent-Government have made all efforts to make selections for appointment of Government Pleaders or Assistant Government Pleaders on merit basis, on the recommendations of the District and Sessions Judges concerned. Merely because the election procedure, as contended by the learned Advocate-General, has not been followed, it does not follow that the appointments of the petitioners, as they were made, as Law Officers is in any way illegal or improper.
15. The fact, that categorical instructions were issued by the respondents to the District Collectors concerned to continue the Law Officers (petitioners-herein) in their respective posts till the new Law Officers are appointed to the said posts, itself makes it clear that the Government have confidence in the existing Law Officers (petitioners-herein). In the impugned orders, the District Collectors were requested by the Government to send fresh recommendations for appointing new Government Pleaders or Assistant Government Pleaders, in place of the petitioners, following the very same instructions and procedure contemplated in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990. In the circumstances, I hold that the appointment of petitioners as Law Officers (G. Ps. or A. G. Ps.) made in terms of G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990 are, on merit basis only.
16. The services of the Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders are terminated by the Government en masse, by issuing the Government Orders, District-wise. As stated already, there are absolutely no reasons in the orders impugned in these writ petitions, as to why the petitioners have to be removed. The only reasons, given by the learned Advocate-General, appearing for the respondents, is that due to the change in the Ruling Party of the State Government, the present State Government should have the liberty to appoint their own Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders. This contention of the learned Advocate-General has no legal basis. The Government Pleaders and the Assistant Government Pleaders, as the case may be, will act upon the instructions issued by the Government, for protecting the interests of The Government in the pending litigation before the Courts. The stand of the Government in pending litigation will not be altered or changed due to the change in the Ruling Party of the State Government. As mentioned already, the post of Government Pleader or Assistant Government Pleader is a 'Public Post', involving discharge of Public functions by the persons holding the same. The petitioners having been selected by following the due procedure laid down in G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law, dated 16-3-1990 by the State Government, and they being the holders of 'Public Posts', their termination en masse by the Government without assigning any reasons is illegal and improper.
17. The learned Advocate-General also submitted that the appointments of the petitioner are already questioned in this Court, by filing writ petitions, which are pending disposal. This aspect no way advances the case of the respondent-Government.
18. No doubt, the validity of Paragraph 5 of G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law, dated 16-3-1990, was already upheld by this Court in the decision, Vilas Rao v. State of A. P. (supra). The validity of this paragraph 5 has not been challenged by the petitioners in the present batch of writ petitions. The power to terminate the services of the Government Pleaders and the Assistant Government Pleaders, no doubt, vests with the State Government by resorting to paragraph 5 of G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990. This course of action should be adopted by the Government only in the event of there being any complaint or in the case of incompetence of a particular Government Pleader or Assistant Government Pleader. Paragraph 5 of G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990 cannot be resorted to by the Government for terminating the services of the Government Pleaders or the Assistant Government Pleaders working in the Districts en masse by issuing single order in respect of all the Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders of a District, without assigning any reasons. The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Vilas Rao v. State of A. P. (supra) relates to an individual case, where recourse to paragraph 5 of G. O. Ms. No. 57, Law Department, dated 16th March 1990 was taken by the Government for terminating the service of a particular Government Pleader for valid reasons. Therefore, the said decision will not advance the case of the respondent-Government.
19. In almost similar circumstances when the services of the Government Pleaders and the Law Officers at the District level were sought to be terminated in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the said action was questioned, on the same grounds now raised in this batch of Writ Petitions. The Supreme Court, in those circumstances, in Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P. :
"Unlike a private party whose acts uninformed by reason and influenced by personal predilections in contractual matters may result in adverse consequences to it alone without affecting the public interest, any such act of the State or a public body even in this field would adversely affect the public interest. Every holder of a office by virtue of which he acts on behalf of the State or public body is ultimately accountable to the people in whom the sovereignty vests. As such, all powers so vested in him are meant to be exercised for public good and promoting the public interest. This is equally true of all actions even in the field of contract. Thus every holder of a public office is a trustee whose highest duty is to be people of the country, and therefore, every act of the holder of a public office, irrespective of the label classifying that act, is in discharge of public duty meant ultimately for public goods. With the diversification of State activity in a Welfare State requiring the State to discharge its wide-ranging functions even through its several instrumentalities, which requires entering into contracts also, it would be unreal and not pragmatic, apart from being unjustified to exclude contractual matters from the sphere of State actions required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14".
In the same ruling (Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P.) (supra), the Supreme Court also observed :
"It cannot be said that the appointment of District Government Counsel by the State Government is only a professional engagement like that between a private client and his lawyer, or that it is purely contractual with no public element attaching to it, which may be terminated at any time at the sweet will of the Government excluding judicial review. The presence of public element attached to the 'office' or 'post' of District Government Counsel is sufficient to attract Art. 14 of the Constitution and bring the question of validity of the impugned circular terminating appointments of all District Government Counsel in State of U. P. within the scope of judicial review. Para 7.06 of Legal Remembrancer has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected provisions. The expression 'professional engagement' is used therein to distinguish it from 'appointment to a post under the Government' in the strict sense. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a Government servant holding a post under the Government does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attaching to it. This part of Clause 3 of para 7.06 means only this and no more. The other part of Clause 3 enables the Government to terminate the appointment 'at any time without assigning any cause'. The expression 'at any time' merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and 'without assigning any cause' means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, 'without assigning any cause' is not to be equated with 'without existence of any cause'. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not be assigned or communicated to the appointee. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. Clause 3 of para 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated with the appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense, which does not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character; and that the appointment may be terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termination without communicating the reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the Government which can be terminated at any time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. In the case of Public Prosecutors, the additional public element flowing from statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, undoubtedly, invest the Public Prosecutors with the attribute of holder of a public office which cannot be whittled down by the assertion that their engagement is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it.
Therefore, the impugned circular G. O. No. 284 - Seven Law Ministry, dated 6-2-1990 issued by the State of U. P. terminating appointments of all District Government Counsel in all the districts of State of U. P., even though these appointments were all individual would be arbitrary and liable to be struck down under Art. 14. No common reason applicable to all of the justifying their termination in one stroke on a reasonable ground was shown. The plea by the State of Uttar Pradesh that many of them were likely to be reappointed is by itself ample proof of the fact that there was total non-application of mind to the individual cases before issuing the general order terminating all the appointments. This was done inspite of the clear provisions in the L. R. Manual laying down detailed procedure for appointment, termination and renewal of tenure and the requirement to (......) the existing incumbent for (......) of his tenure and to take steps for a fresh appointment in his place only if the existing incumbent is not found suitable in comparison to more suitable persons available for appointment at the time of renewal. In the case of existing appointees, a decision has to be first reached about their non-suitability for renewal before deciding to take steps for making fresh appointments to replace them. None of these steps were taken and no material has been produced to show that any existing incumbent was found unsuitable for the office on objective assessment before the decision to replace all by fresh appointees was taken. The prescribed procedure laid down in the L. R. Manual which has to regulate exercise of this power was totally ignored. The impugned circular must, therefore, perish on the ground of arbitrariness which is an available ground for judicial review in such a situation.
Ground of streamlining the conduct of Government cases and effective prosecution thereof cannot be reasonable basis for the drastic and sweeping action throughout the State, particularly when the provisions in the Legal Remembrancer's Manual provide ordinarily for renewal of the tenure of the appointees. It would be too much to assume that every Government Counsel in all the districts of the State of U. P. was required to be replaced in order to streamline the conduct of Government cases especially when the State itself allege that many of them were to be reappointed.
Even apart from the premise that the 'office' or 'post' of D. G. C. S. has a public element which alone is sufficient to attract the power of judicial review for testing validity of the impugned circular on the anvil of Art. 14 this power is available even without that element on the premise that after the initial appointment, the matter is purely contractual. The personality of the State, requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Art. 14, does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Art. 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts, which cannot co-exist. The Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the Preamble. Exclusion of Art. 14 in contractual matters is not permissible in constitutional scheme. The scope and permissible grounds of judicial review in such matter and the relief which may be available are different matters but that does not justify the view of its total exclusion. Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract Art. 14 and permit judicial review, it can be said that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. Therefore, it would be difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made, from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Art. 14. Thus, the wide sweep of Art. 14 undoubtedly taken within its fold the impugned circular issued by the State of U. P. in exercise of its executive power, respective of the precise nature of appointment of the Government Counsel in the districts and the other rights, contractual or statutory, which the appointees may have".
The above decision of the Supreme Court in Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P. (supra) applies in all fours, to the facts and circumstances of the present writ petitions. As already held by me, change in the Ruling Party of the State Government cannot be a valid reason for terminating the services of all the Government Pleaders and the Assistant Government Pleaders in the Districts en masse, by giving one month's notice.
20. The learned Advocate-General strenuously contended that the latter decision of the Supreme Court, State of U. P. v. U. P. State Law Officers' Association, 1994 I CLR 668, considered the earlier decision in Srilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra), and ultimately the Supreme Court held that termination of appointments of Government Pleaders, without any reasons, is not arbitrary. It is the submission of the learned Advocate-General that this latter decision of the Supreme Court (State of U. P. v. U. P. State Law Officers' Association, (supra)) holds the field, and following the same, it must be held that the orders passed by the respondent-Government terminating the services of the petitioners in the present Writ Petitions are valid and not arbitrary. The learned Advocates-General, relied upon the following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. U. P. State Law Officers' Association, (supra) :-
"..... The appointments may, therefore, be made on considerations other than merit and there exists no provision to prevent such appointments. The method of appointment is indeed not calculated to ensure that the meritorious alone will always be appointed or that the appointment made will not be on considerations other than merit. In the absence of guidelines, the appointments may be made purely on personal or political considerations and be arbitrary. This being so, those who come to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the termination of their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those who come by the back-door have to go by the same door. This is more so when the order of appointment itself stipulates that the appointment is terminable at any time without assigning any reason. Such appointments are made, accepted and understood by both sides to be purely professional engagements till they last. The fact that they are made by public bodies cannot vest them with additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public office, howsoever made, is not necessarily vested with public sanctity. There is, therefore, no public interest involved in saving all appointments irrespective of their mode. From the inception, some engagements and contracts may be the product of the operation of the spoils system. There need be no legal anxiety to save them".
21. In the above latter decision of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. U. P. State Law Officers' Association, (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the appointments of Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the High Court and not at the District Level. The selection process of Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the District Level being totally different from that of the appointment of Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the High Court, the Supreme Court, dealing with the same observed thus :
"It will thus be seen that the appointment of two sets of officers, viz., the Government Counsel in the High Court with whom we are concerned, and the District Government Counsel with whom the said decision was concerned are made by the dissimilar procedures. The latter are not appointed as a part of the spoils system. Having been selected on merit and for no other consideration, they are entitled to continue in their office for the period of the contract of their engagement and they can be removed only for valid reasons. The people are interested in their continuance for the period of their contracts and in their non-substitution by those who may come in through the spoils system. It is in these circumstances that this Court held that the wholesale termination of their services was arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The ratio of the said decision can hardly be applied to the appointments of the Law Officers in the High Court whose appointment itself was arbitrary and was made in disregard of Art. 14 of the Constitution, as pointed out above. What is further, since the appointment of District Government Counsel is made strictly on the basis of comparative merit and after screening at different levels, the termination of their services is not consistent with the public interest".
It is, therefore, clear that the Supreme Court not only distinguished the decision in Srilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra) but also upheld the ratio laid down in that decision. I, therefore, hold that the decision in Srilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra), in all fours, applies to the facts of the present writ petitions, and not the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. U. P. State Law Officers' Association, (supra).
22. In the result, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P. (supra), I hold that the Government Orders, impugned in the respective Writ Petitions, are not sustainable and therefore, the same are hereby quashed. Consequently, all the Writ Petitions are allowed.
23. This Order will apply only to the petitioners in these Writ Petitions and to none-else. It is further made clear that such of the Writ Petitioners, whose term had already expired and who are continuing in their respective posts tentatively without there being any fresh appointment or re-appointment orders in their favour, are not entitled to have any relief under this Order.
24. Having decided this batch of Writ Petitions, on merits, before parting with the same, I wish to state that the petitioners should ponder over the issue, and take a decision, as to whether it is desirable for them to defend the cases of their Client (Government of Andhra Pradesh), who is not willing to retain them as their Advocates.
25. There shall be no order as to costs, in all these Writ Petitions.