Gujarat High Court
Amrutbhai S Patel vs State Of Gujarat & on 10 October, 2013
Author: Harsha Devani
Bench: Harsha Devani
AMRUTBHAI S PATEL....Applicant(s)V/SSTATE OF GUJARAT R/SCR.A/2078/2012 ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2078 of 2012 ================================================================ AMRUTBHAI S PATEL....Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: MR MJ MEHTA, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 MR VIJAY H NANGESH, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2 MR AN SHAH, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE HARSHA DEVANI Date : 10/10/2013 ORAL ORDER
Rule.
Mr. A. N. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the first respondent. Mr. Kamlesh Kotai, learned advocate for Mr. Vijay Nangesh, learned advocate waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the second respondent.
Having regard to the facts of the case and with the consent of the learned counsel for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing today.
By this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code ), the applicants seek quashing of the first information report registered vide Vadgam Police Station I C.R. No.3016 of 2012.
The second respondent lodged the above referred first information report against the applicant alleging commission of the offences punishable under sections 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocity) Act. It appears that in a cross case, a first information report also came to be lodged against the second respondent.
Subsequently, it appears that both the parties have amicably resolved the disputes between them pursuant to which, they do not desire to proceed further with the first information reports lodged by them against each other.
In the present case, the second respondent has filed an affidavit dated 26.12.2012, wherein it has been stated that a settlement has been arrived at between the parties and the grievance of the original complainant, namely, the second respondent does not survive and that he has no objection if the first information report in question is quashed. It is categorically stated that the second respondent does not want to prosecute the applicants and continue the criminal proceedings against them.
Mr. M. J. Mehta, learned advocate for the applicant and Mr. Kamlesh Kotai, learned advocate for Mr. Vijay Nangesh, learned advocate for the second respondent have jointly submitted that in the light of the fact that amicable settlement has been arrived at between the parties, the first information report in question is required to be quashed.
This Court has also heard Mr. A. N. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the first respondent.
Before adverting to the merits of the case, it may be germane to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein the Supreme Court after considering its earlier decisions in this regard held thus:
61.
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused. The High Court had taken the view that since the offence punishable under section 406 was not compoundable, the settlement between the parties could not be recognised nor the pending proceedings quashed. The court summed up the approach to be adopted in such cases in the following words:
6.
We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.
Examining the facts of the case in the light of the above decisions, the parties who have filed cross cases against each other, have subsequently resolved the disputes between them and as a consequence thereof, they do not desire to prosecute each other. In the aforesaid premises, when the dispute involved is purely private in nature and the parties have amicably resolved the disputes between them, no useful purpose would be served by permitting the prosecution to continue. Under the circumstances, this is a fit case for exercise of powers under section 482 of the Code For the foregoing reasons, the application succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The first information report registered vide Vadgam Police Station I C.R. No.3016 of 2012, is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute accordingly.
(HARSHA DEVANI, J.) parmar* Page 5 of 5