Jharkhand High Court
Dilip Kumar Ghosh vs Union Of India Through The Directorate ... on 22 April, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2026:JHHC:12131
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.1861 of 2025
------
Dilip Kumar Ghosh, aged about 56 years, son of Late Nitya Gopal Ghosh, resident of P-162, C.I.R. Road, Scheme-VII, M. Kankurgachi, P.O. & P.S.-Phoolbaghan, District-Kolkata, Kolkata-700054 (West Bengal). .... .... Petitioner Versus Union of India through the Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Plot No.1502, Airport Road, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi-834002, Jharkhand.
.... .... Opp. Party CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
------
For the Petitioner : Mr. S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Advocate (Through V.C.) Ms. Amrita Sinha, Advocate Mr. Rohit Ranjan Sinha, Advocate Mr. Abhishek Agrawal, Advocate Ms. Pragunee Kashyap, Advocate Mrs. Shweta Suman, Advocate Mr. Md. Imran Beig, Advocate For the E.D. : Mr. Amit Kr. Das, Advocate Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
------
12/Dated: 22.04.2026 Prayer
1. The present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 528 of B.N.S.S., 2023 and prayer has been made for quashing and setting aside the entire criminal proceedings including the Complaint in ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022] for the offences punishable under Section 3 read with Section 70 and punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and all other consequential orders including order taking cognizance dated 19.06.2023 (Anneuxre-3) whereby cognizance of the alleged offence under Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of the PML 1 2026:JHHC:12131 Act has been taken by the PMLA, Court, Ranchi; order dated 12.03.2024 (Annexure-4) whereby discharge application filed vide Misc. Cr. Application No.197/2024 stood rejected by the PMLA, Court Ranchi and order framing charges dated 8.7.2024 (Annexure-5) passed by the Judge, PMLA, Ranchi; and the case is presently pending in the Court of Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi.
Prosecution case/Facts
2. The brief facts of the case are that an FIR was lodged by Bariatu P.S. Case for offences under Sections 420, 467 and 471, Indian Penal Code (IPC) on the complaint of one Mr. Dilip Sharma, Tax Collector posted at Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Ranchi. It has been alleged in the FIR that the holding nos.0210004194000A1 and 0210004031000A5 pertaining to Ward No.21, Lotus Garden Complex, Block-B of the accused Pradip Bagchi were verified by him and in the process of verification it was found that the accused Pradeep Bagchi was not residing in the said Apartment. It has been further alleged that the documents submitted by the accused/Pradeep Bagchi for obtaining holding numbers upon verification were found to be forged, i.e. Aadhar Card, Electricity Bill and Possession Letter.
3. The Opposite Party recorded an ECIR No.18/2022 dated 21.10.2022 against the suspected person on the basis of the aforesaid FIR No.141/2022 dated 4.6.2022 registered by 2 2026:JHHC:12131 Bariatu P.S. Case for offences under Sections 420, 467 and 471, Indian Penal Code (IPC). As per the ECIR No.18/2022 recorded on 22.10.2022 by Opposite Party, following allegation has been made which are as follows: -
(a) New holding number 0210004194000A1 in Ward No.21, and new Ward No.19 was obtained on the basis of the self-
assessment declaration form. The self-assessment declaration form bearing No.2101934R was submitted by accused Pradeep Bagchi, son of Late Prafull Bagchi on the basis of which Ranchi Municipal Corporation issued holding No.0210004194000A1, under Memo No. SAM/021/0167/21/22 dated 13.9.2021.
(b) Self-assessment declaration form was submitted by the accused Pradeep Bagchi for property having the description as Plot No.MS 557, Morabadi Mouza, Ward No.21/19, having an area of the plot measuring 455 decimals at Ranchi.
(c) For obtaining the holding number of the above said property, forged Aadhar Number, Electricity bill and the possession letter of the Flat at 101, Block-B, Lotus Garden Complex, Bariatu Road, Morabadi, Ranchi, was submitted by the accused Pradeep Bagchi, which was later found fake.
(d) The said property at Plot No.MS 557, Morabadi Mouza, Ward No.21/19, having an area of 455 decimals at Ranchi had been sold by Pradeep Bagchi (Aadhaar No.511337882315, PAN AMBPB13173) to M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. 3
2026:JHHC:12131 (PAN AABCJ3705F), represented by its director Dilip Kumar Ghosh (the petitioner herein) and it is registered at the office of the SRO Ranchi, bearing deed No.6888, Vol. No.919, Page No.525-576, Year 2021.
(e) Sale deed of the said property registered on 1.10.2021, it was seen that the declared government value/guideline Value of the said property was Rs.20,75,84,200/- whereas the said property had been sold for an amount of Rs.7,00,00,000/- which was highly undervalued as compared to the declared government rate.
(f) In the description of the above said landed property measuring 4.55 acres, Mouza Morabadi, P.S Bariatu, District Ranchi, Ward No.21, the holding number of the above said property had been mentioned 0210004194000A1, which had been obtained fraudulently.
(g) Pradeep Bagchi had allegedly created forged documents and had dishonestly cheated the government authorities for the above-said property admeasuring 4.55 acres, which are criminal activities relating to scheduled offences under the PMLA. He had obtained holding No.0210004194000A1 in order to frivolously show the ownership of the property measuring 4.55 acres at Plot No.MS 557, Morabadi Mouza, Ward No.21/19, and to further transfer the ownership of the property to M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., represented by its director Dilip Kumar Ghosh (present petitioner). The 4 2026:JHHC:12131 declared government value/guideline Value of the said property was Rs.20,75,84,200/- whereas the said property had been sold for an amount of Rs.7,00,00,000/- which was highly undervalued as compared to the declared government rate thus, the said property has been sold to the M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., represented by its director Dilip Kumar Ghosh (present petitioner) by creating forged documents in the connivance of the accused persons including the present petitioner and the said alleged act comes under the purview of Section 3 of the PML Act 2002 punishable under Section 4 of the Act 2002.
4. The petitioner was arrested on 7.6.2023 and on 12.6.2023, the Enforcement Directorate had filed a Prosecution Complaint under Section 45 read with Section 44 PMLA, 2002 against 13 accused persons for commission of alleged offence of money- laundering as defined under Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 read with Section 70 of the PMLA Act, 2002.
5. On the basis of the said complaint and material available on record, the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offence under Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 read with Section 70 of the PMLA Act, 2002.
6. Thereafter, the petitioner has preferred bail application being B.A. No. 7233 of 2023 before the co-ordinate Bench of this Court and vide order dated 28.11.2023, the aforesaid application has been allowed and petitioner was consequently 5 2026:JHHC:12131 released on the bail.
7. Thereafter, the discharge application being Misc. Cr.
Application No.197/2024 has been filed before the special Court but vide order dated 12.03.2024 (Annexure-4), the said discharge application stood rejected by the PMLA, Court Ranchi and consequent thereto, vide order dated 08.07.2024 (Annexure-5), the order framing charges has been passed by the Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi against the petitioner.
8. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid orders, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner on 02.05.2025 under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C. and quashing of the aforesaid orders, i.e., order taking cognizance dated 19.06.2023 (Anneuxre-3), order dated 12.03.2024 (Annexure-4) whereby discharge application filed by the petitioner stood rejected, order framing charges dated 8.7.2024 (Annexure-5) including the entire criminal proceeding has been sought for.
9. It requires to refer herein that vide order dated 28.01.2026, status report of the trial of the ECIR Case No. 01 of 2023 was called for by this Court and consequently, the status report of the trial has been received and the same has been kept on record. It is evident from the aforesaid report that the trial in the said ECIR case is in progress and till 19.01.2026, out of 31 witnesses, 6 witnesses have already been examined.
10. It needs to refer herein that the present matter was argued on merit by the learned senior counsel representing the petitioner 6 2026:JHHC:12131 but the argument having not been concluded on earlier occasion, therefore, the present matter was posed for hearing on 11.02.2026.
11. It is evident from the order dated 11.02.2026, the learned counsel for ED has sought two weeks' time to file additional affidavit by way of supplementary counter affidavit and accordingly, time as sought for, has been granted by this Court, for ready reference, the order dated 11.02.2026 is being quoted as under:
"1. Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel for the Opp. Party-E.D. has sought for two weeks' time to file additional affidavit by way of supplementary counter affidavit.
2. Such submission has been made in presence of Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, who has appeared through virtual mode assisted by Mrs. Amrita Sinha, Advocate.
3. Time, as has been sought for, is allowed.
4. Accordingly, list this matter on 18.03.2026.
5. If any affidavit will be filed, the copy thereof will be supplied well in advance to the learned counsel for the petitioner so that response of the aforesaid affidavit, if any, be filed on or before the next date of hearing."
12. Accordingly, in compliance of order dated 11.02.2026, the respondent-ED has filed supplementary counter affidavit wherein, the issue of maintainability of the present petition filed under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C., has been raised.
13. Thereafter, on 08.04.2026 learned senior counsel for the petitioner appeared through virtual mode and sought time for taking instruction from the petitioner and accordingly, time was 7 2026:JHHC:12131 granted and the present case was directed to be listed on 10.04.2026, for ready reference, the order dated 08.04.2026 is being quoted as under:
"10/Dated: 08.04.2026
1. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner through virtual mode has sought for time to have an instruction from the litigant, petitioner and for the aforesaid purpose, has prayed to list this case day after tomorrow, i.e., on 10.04.2026.
2. Considering the aforesaid, let this matter be listed on 10.04.2026 at 4:15 p.m."
14. Accordingly, the case was heard on 10.04.2026 and the learned counsel for the parties have argued on the issue of maintainability of the present petition and accordingly, the instant matter was fixed 'for orders' on 22.04.2026 on the issue of maintainability of the present petition which has been filed under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C wherein quashing of the entire criminal proceeding including the orders taking cognizance, order rejecting discharge and consequent order framing charge, have been sought for.
15. It requires to refer herein that the supplementary rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner in response to the supplementary affidavit filed by the ED by taking ground in support of the maintainability of the present petition.
Submission of the learned counsel for the E.D:
16. Learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-E.D. has filed one supplementary counter affidavit raising the issue of 8 2026:JHHC:12131 maintainability by taking the following grounds: -
i. It is the well settled principle of law that a petitioner cannot challenge multiple, distinct judicial orders passed at different stages of a criminal trial each arising from a separate exercise of judicial mind through a single, rolled-up Criminal Miscellaneous Petition.
ii. This multiplicity of prayers in a single application is a procedural irregularity that renders that the petition is not maintainable in its current form.
iii. The petitioner has deliberately by-passed the statutory remedies available under the law. Both the order rejecting the discharge application dated 12.03.2024 and the order framing charges dated 08.07.2024 are revisable orders under the law. The petitioner could have challenged these specific orders by way of criminal revision within the statutory period of 90 days. However, the petitioner chose not to avail these remedies at the appropriate time and only in order to escape the limitation period the present petition has been filed under section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C.
iv. Further, the instant petition has been filed on 02.05.2025, almost a year after the discharge application was rejected and presently trial of the said ECIR case is in progress and substantial witnesses have already been examined.
v. The inherent jurisdiction cannot be used as a 9 2026:JHHC:12131 substitute for a statutory revision that has bene barred by limitation and the petitioner is attempting to circumvent the law.
vi. The jurisdiction of this Court to quash criminal proceedings is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly and not when the trial has already gathered momentum. The petitioner, having participated in the trial and cross-examined the witnesses, is now estopped from invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to derail a trial which is effectively in progress and further the petitioner's discharge application has already been dismissed on merits by a speaking order, as such filing of the instant petition is a manifest abuse of process of law. vii. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the present petition may not be entertained, otherwise, it will be the sheer misuse of inherent power conferred to this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS or 482 Cr.P.C.
Submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
17. Rejoinder to the supplementary counter affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the petitioner. The ground in rebuttal has also been taken on behalf of the petitioner.
18. Per contra, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the present petition in the present form of Section 482 CrPC pari materia to Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., is well maintainable.
10
2026:JHHC:12131
19. It has been submitted that the nomenclature has got no issue in entertaining the petition, rather, the substantial justice is to be made, as such, in any form, if any grievance has been raised before this Court, the same is required to be decided irrespective of nomenclature of petition.
20. It has been contended that for the first time, objection as to the maintainability was raised by the opposite party in course of hearing dated 10.12.2025 (being the 4th date in the matter before the Hon'ble Court). Thus, at this advance stage of the proceeding/hearing, raising an objection as to the maintainability of the present Cr.M.P. is not fit to be sustained.
21. It has further been contended that there is no statutory bar in maintaining the present Cr.M.P. challenging different orders passed at different stage of the criminal proceeding, including the entire criminal proceeding and the present petition is absolutely maintainable and fit to be sustained under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 528, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita/482 Cr.P.C.
22. It has further been submitted that even if the petitioner has participated in a criminal trial, it does not debar the petitioner from invoking High Court's jurisdiction under Section 528, BNSS to quash the criminal proceeding. The inherent power is to be exercised to prevent abuse of process of law or process of court or to secure the ends of justice.
23. It has further been contended that Section 528 starts with non 11 2026:JHHC:12131 obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, this clause makes it very clear that section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. (Section 438 and 442 of the BNSS Act) could not deter this Hon'ble Court from exercising its inherent power in the circumstances as stated above, therefore, the present petition is maintainable.
24. Learned senior counsel, however, has relied upon the following judgments, i.e.,
(i) Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited & Ors. Vrs. State of Maharashtra & Another, (2009) 2 SCC 370;
(ii) Prabhu Chawla Vrs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2016) 16 SCC 30;
(iii) Amit Mittal & Anr. Vrs. Punjab Government, passed in Criminal Appeal No.326 of 2025 [arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.6729 of 2019]
25. Learned senior counsel, however, has submitted that he is ready to convert the instant petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C. pari materia to Section 438 of BNSS, if the liberty would be granted by this Court to convert it.
Response of the learned counsel for Opp. Party-E.D.
26. Mr. Amit Kr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-
E.D., on the issue of applicability of the judgment upon which reliance has been placed, has submitted that all the judgments are in different context on facts and has not dealt with the issue, as to whether, Section 482 Cr.P.C. pari materia to 12 2026:JHHC:12131 Section 528 of BNSS, can be invoked by giving go-by to the revisional jurisdiction as conferred to this Court only in order to misuse the inherent power conferred to the High Court in a situation where every stages of the proceeding was known to the petitioner, even then, the conventional forum has not been approached and belatedly, this petition has been filed, therefore, the judgments as relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable in the facts of the instant case.
27. It has been submitted that so far as the submission made on behalf of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the leave may be granted to convert this petition, the same will also not be proper, reason being that, if it will be allowed to be converted, then, what happen to the period of limitation in absence of any condonation delay application.
28. It has been submitted that the matter would have been different, if the present petition would have been filed within the period of 90 days, then, there would not have been difficulty in allowing such leave to convert this petition under revisional jurisdiction and in such circumstances, the prayer would also been confined restricting the revision to one prayer as per the High Court Rules but that is not the situation herein, rather, no delay condonation application is available on record.
29. Hence, the prayer of conversion of the present petition filed under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., may not be allowed. 13
2026:JHHC:12131 Analysis
30. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties on the issue of maintainability. Since, the affidavit for maintainability of the present petition under Section 528 of the BNSS has been filed and as such, this Court has heard the issue of maintainability first and depending upon its outcome, is to hear the matter on merit.
31. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., pari materia to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
32. This Court, before proceeding, needs to refer herein the provision as contained under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., pari materia to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which is being quoted hereinbelow: -
"528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. - Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to given effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
33. It requires to refer herein that the Section 528 BNSS/482 C.P.C. merely safeguards all existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court, necessary, among other purposes, to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 Cr.P.C., are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code/BNSS, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
34. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the High Court 14 2026:JHHC:12131 has been conferred with inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
35. Before adverting into facts of the instant case, it will be profitable to discuss herein the ambit and scope of inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS.
36. In Didigam Bikshapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2008 SC 527, the Supreme Court held that section 482 of Cr. P.C. does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court; (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any 15 2026:JHHC:12131 express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res itsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of Appeal or Revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly.
37. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist.
38. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the power, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
39. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
16
2026:JHHC:12131 (corresponding section 528 BNSS) are the exception and not the rule. Under this section, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions "abuse of process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191.
40. It is settled proposition of law that to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (corresponding section 528 BNSS) the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. Reference in this regard may be taken by the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court 17 2026:JHHC:12131 in the case of Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC 330] which reads as under:
"29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably 18 2026:JHHC:12131 refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice."
41. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1 SCC 568] the powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India were highlighted and the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:
"29. Regarding the argument of the accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of the Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426]."
42. In Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home [(2019) 11 SCC 706], referring to the provisions of Section 482, Cr. P.C., the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:
"16. There is nothing in the words of this section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only 19 2026:JHHC:12131 to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513. Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 237]. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced and the allegations have materialised into a charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court."
43. Thus, it is settled position in exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.
44. As can be gathered from the above, Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS recognizes the inherent powers of the High Court to 20 2026:JHHC:12131 quash initiation of prosecution against the accused to pass such orders as may be considered necessary to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is a statutory power vested in the High Court to quash such criminal proceedings that would dislodge the charges levelled against the accused and based on the material produced, lead to a firm opinion that the assertions contained in the charges levelled by the prosecution deserve to be overruled.
45. While exercising the powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS, whether at the stage of issuing process or at the stage of committal or even at the stage of framing of charges, which are all stages that are prior to commencement of the actual trial, the test to be applied is that the Court must be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused would lead to a conclusion that their defence is based on sound, reasonable and indubitable facts. The material relied on by the accused should also be such that would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss the accusations levelled against them as false.
46. The interpretation of word "inherent power" by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judicial pronouncement which clarifies that the High Court is to exercise the power, in the ends of justice, so there may not be any mis-use of judicial proceeding and to exercise the power to avoid the miscarriage of justice to face 21 2026:JHHC:12131 the litigant concerned, the unnecessary litigation to restrict the abuse of process of law.
47. At the same time, the Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.
48. While exercising power under section 482 of the Cr PC, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceedings if it finds initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise defeat the ends of justice when no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.
22
2026:JHHC:12131
49. This Court is not averse what has been submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner regarding the conferment of inherent power upon the High Court as also the reference of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases referred hereinabove.
50. The law is well settled as rendered in the said judgments. It is also well settled that the parties may not be relegated to other forum, rather, to meet the ends of justice if the application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable, then, it needs to be converted into revision so as to decide the issue on merit.
51. At this juncture, it requires to refer herein the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court as stipulated in Section 397 Cr.P.C/438 BNSS. For ready reference, Section 438 BNSS is being quoted herein which reads as under:
"438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.-(1) the High Court or any sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate 23 2026:JHHC:12131 jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purpose of this sub-section of section 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."
52. The object of the provisions of revision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders which upon the face of them bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. Revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. Another well accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be exercised against an interim or interlocutory order, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex 24 2026:JHHC:12131 Court in the case of Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
53. Though, Section 397 CrPC does not specifically use the expression "prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice", the jurisdiction u/s 397 CrPC is a very limited one. The legality, propriety or correctness of an order passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction u/s 397 CrPC but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction can be exercised where there is palpable error, noncompliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily.
54. It is settled position of law that Inherent power of the High Court can be exercised when there is no remedy provided in the CrPC for redressal of the grievance. It is well settled that inherent power of the High Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision in the Code under which order impugned can be challenged, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohit Vs. State of UP, AIR 2013 SC 2248 (Para
23). Meaning thereby, if convention or alternate forum like revisional jurisdiction has not been exhausted then the invoking the jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr. P.C is not suitable, particularly when the learned trial court after appreciating the evidence has already applied its mind and 25 2026:JHHC:12131 consequent thereto discharge application has been dismissed and charges has already been framed which is the case herein.
55. Further, it is also settled position of law that the remedy of revision to Sessions Judge u/s 399 CrPC does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court u/s 482 CrPC but the High Court should not act as a second revisional court under the garb of exercising inherent powers u/s 482 CrPC. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ganesh Narayan Hedge vs. S. Bargarappa, (1995) 4 SCC 41.
56. The learned counsel for the petitioner has put his reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited & Ors. Vrs. State of Maharashtra & Another (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that at the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC cannot be dismissed merely because an alternative remedy of revision under Section 397 CrPC exists.
57. Further reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex in the case of Prabhu Chawla Vrs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (supra) wherein it has been observed that the inherent powers of the High Court are not curtailed by the availability of revision under Section 397.
58. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed his 26 2026:JHHC:12131 reliance on the ratio rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Amit Mittal & Anr. v. Punjab Government, (supra) wherein it has been held that the High Court erred in dismissing a petition under Section 482 CrPC merely on the ground that revision under Section 397 CrPC was available.
59. Thus, there is no dispute about the settled position of law that only because revision petition u/s 397 CrPC is maintainable, an application u/s 482 CrPC is not barred but generally inherent power of the High Court can be exercised when there is no remedy provided in the CrPC for redressal of the grievance. Section 482 CrPC empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of court and to quash the proceeding instituted on the complaint but such power could be exercised only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is vexatious or oppressive.
60. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, basing upon the aforesaid observation made in the said judgments, has also made prayer before this Court that he may be allowed to convert this petition said to be filed under its revisional jurisdiction.
61. There would not have been any difficulty in granting such leave but the riders as available in the present case are of two folds, i.e., 27 2026:JHHC:12131
(i) That altogether four prayers have been made in the instant petition as referred hereinabove. If the present petition would be allowed to be converted, then, what would happen to all four prayers and the petitioner is to restrict to one prayer, for which, the learned senior counsel has not agreed to.
The obvious reason of not agreeing is that after taking cognizance, the discharge application has been rejected, charge has been framed and now the trial has already been commenced wherein substantial number of witnesses have already been examined and therefore, the prayer for quashing of the entire proceedings have also been made.
As such, at the midst of trial, all the prayers which have been made in the instant petition, has become inter- related.
(ii) The second reason is that under the provision of Section 397 Cr.P.C. pari materia to Section 438 of the B.N.S.S., the statutory period of limitation as per the statutory requirement, the revision is to be filed within the period of 90 days.
62. The admitted position herein is that the present petition has been filed after 90 days period, meaning thereby, the present petition has not been filed within the period of limitation and if the petition would have been filed within the period of 28 2026:JHHC:12131 limitation, there would not have been difficulty in granting leave for its conversion to that of revision on the principle that the litigant has approached to the Court of law within time but before the wrong forum but that is not the case herein, rather, the present petition has been filed after delay of 90 days and as such, there cannot be any order of reversion of the present petition to that of revision.
63. On the basis of discussions made hereinabove and after going through the settled position of law, this Court is now re- adverting to the facts of the instant case.
64. The Petitioner, by way of the instant application, has sought a composite and omnibus relief. The prayers are as follows:
(i) Quashing of the entire criminal proceedings,
(ii) Quashing of the order taking cognizance dated 19.06.2023,
(iii) Quashing of the order rejecting discharge dated 12.03.2024, and
(iv) Quashing of the order framing charges dated 08.07.2024.
65. Admittedly, each of these impugned orders arise from a distinct judicial exercise of mind and constitutes a separate cause of action.
66. It is the well-settled principle of law that multiple, distinct judicial orders passed at different stages of a criminal trial cannot be challenged together in a single, rolled-up Criminal Miscellaneous Petition. The rejection of discharge and the subsequent framing of charges are substantive judicial milestones. These cannot be brushed aside under a general 29 2026:JHHC:12131 prayer for "quashing of entire proceedings." Each order requires an independent challenge through appropriate proceedings.
67. Further, both the order rejecting the discharge application dated 12.03.2024 and the order framing charges dated 08.07.2024 are revisable orders within the contemplation of the Code/BNSS. The Petitioner had the efficacious and conventional remedy of filing a Criminal Revision against these specific orders within the statutory period of ninety days. The Petitioner, however, chose not to avail the said remedies at the appropriate time. Instead, the present petition has been instituted belatedly on 02.05.2025, almost a year after the rejection of the discharge application. Such conduct demonstrates that the instant petition is a clear afterthought. The inherent jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court cannot be invoked as a substitute for a statutory revision that has already been barred by limitation. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, 2023, is not intended to resurrect challenges, which the Petitioner has effectively waived by his own inaction. By seeking to file a quashing petition at this extremely belated stage, when the trial has already progressed and witnesses have been examined, the Petitioner is attempting to circumvent the law and reopen issues that stand concluded. Such an attempt is impermissible and amounts to an abuse of the process of Court.
30
2026:JHHC:12131
68. This Court is conscious of the settled position of law that the mere availability of an alternative forum does not, by itself, bar the invocation of jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C. However, in the present case, the conduct of the Petitioner assumes significance. The Petitioner, having actively participated in the trial and having cross-examined witnesses, has now approached this Court seeking the aforesaid relief. Such conduct is indicative of an attempt to circumvent the conventional forum and the limitation period prescribed for revision. The petition thus appears designed to protract and linger the judicial process rather than to seek bona fide redress.
69. This Court is mindful that the jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances and herein, the trial has already gathered momentum and petitioner has actively participated in the trial and if at this stage, the said jurisdiction will be invoked, then, it will amount to giving premium to the petitioner to abuse the process of law.
70. It is a matter of record that as on the date of filing of the instant petition, i.e., 02.05.2025, the Learned Special Court has already commenced the recording of evidence and two prosecution witnesses had been examined and now substantial witnesses have already been examined. 31
2026:JHHC:12131
71. It is pertinent to reiterate herein that the discharge application of the petitioner has already been dismissed and consequent thereto, charges have already been framed in July, 2024 itself and after lapse of one year, the instant petition has been preferred, therefore, in such circumstances, the invocation of inherent jurisdiction is impermissible. The petition, being a belated attempt to by-pass statutory remedies and further multiple, distinct judicial orders passed at different stages of a criminal trial cannot be challenged together in a single, rolled-up Criminal Miscellaneous Petition and further, once the discharge application has been dismissed and consequent thereto, the charges have been framed in the month of July, 2024 and the aforesaid orders have not been challenged before the higher forum in conventional revisional jurisdiction and the Petitioner has pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, then in such situation, the legally appropriate remedy available to the petitioner is to face the trial and attempt to prove his innocence on the basis of evidence, therefore, the filing of the present petition at such a belated stage, after the trial has advanced and substantive judicial orders have been passed, amounts to a circumvent the process of law.
72. It is settled position of law that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C. cannot be permitted to be used as a device to abuse the process of law. 32
2026:JHHC:12131
73. Therefore, in these circumstances, it is the considered view of this Court that the instant petition is not fit to be maintainable.
74. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the petitioner, being conscious with all proceedings right from the date of cognizance, the filing of application for discharge and the framing of charge and even on commencement of trial and even in the trial, he has already cross-examined the said witness, for examination/cross-examination of the witnesses, then, at this juncture, will it be proper for the petitioner to grant leave to convert this petition to that of revision.
75. This Court, is of the view that the statutory remedy is to have the recourse to the sufferers/parties who are to face the rigour of trial on institution of criminal case and as such, it is the bounden duty of such litigant to approach the Court of law for redressal of his/her grievance for either quashing the order taking cognizance or the rejection of discharge or even the order by which the charge has been framed but the petitioner has chosen not to avail the said statutory remedy at each and every appropriate stages and now after commencement of trial, i.e., at the stage of examination of witnesses, the present petition has been filed.
76. The inherent power does not mean that the other remedy as provided under the procedural law is to be given go-by or discarded, rather, all the statutory remedies available under the procedural law have been mandated for specific purposes 33 2026:JHHC:12131 and not to mis-use by not availing the statutory remedy, which was to be availed at the appropriate stage.
77. This Court, therefore, is of the view that allowing the present petition will not be just and proper. Further, even no order can be passed granting leave to convert this petition by converting it into the criminal revision application due to the expiry of the period of limitation.
78. This Court, based upon the aforesaid reasoning, is of the view that the present petition is not maintainable as also it is not the case where the leave is to be granted to convert the instant petition to that of criminal revision application.
79. Accordingly, the instant petition stands dismissed.
80. Pending interlocutory application(s), also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Dated:22.04.2026 Rohit/-A.F.R. Uploaded on 24.04.2026 34