Jharkhand High Court
Anjani Kumar Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand Through C.B.I ... on 1 March, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 JHA 758
Author: Aparesh Kumar Singh
Bench: Aparesh Kumar Singh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. M.P. No. 941 of 2018
Anjani Kumar Singh ...... Petitioner
Versus.
The State of Jharkhand through C.B.I ........ Opposite Party
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE APARESH KUMAR SINGH For the Petitioner : M/s Bindhyachal Singh, Subodh Kr. Dubey For the CBI : Mr. Rajiv Nandan Prasad Amicus Curiae : Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, Mr. Ashutosh Anand & Mr. Nipun Bakshi
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09/01.03.2019 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, the C.B.I and learned Amicus Curiae.
2. This petition has been filed invoking the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing of the order dated 09.03.2018 passed in R.C. Case No. 45(A)/1996-Pat by learned Special Judge-VII, CBI (AHD Scam), Ranchi where under the learned Trial Court in exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C has found a prima facie case made out against the petitioner under Section 120(B) r/w Section 409,420, 467,468,471 and 477A of the I.P.C and under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) &(d) of the P.C. Act and directed the C.B.I to seek sanction for his prosecution from the competent authority and file it within 1 month as the petitioner is an I.A.S Officer.
3. It is relevant to mention here that this R.C. case related to fraudulent withdrawal under Animal Husbandry Department (AHD) from Dumka Treasury for the financial year 1991-1996 one of the commonly known Fodder Scam Cases. By this common impugned order the learned Court has in exercise of its power under Section 319 Cr.P.C found prima facie case as against several persons including the petitioner, all of whom have assailed their arraignment in respective criminal miscellaneous petition. The final judgment of this case was pronounced on 09.04.2018 where by certain accused were convicted and some of them were acquitted.
It has been pointed out by learned counsel for the CBI that the instant R.C. case no.45(A)/1996-Pat was taken over for investigation upon the directions of the Hon'ble Patna High Court in a public interest litigation from Dumka (Town) P.S. Case No.22/1996 lodged on 22.02.1996 by the informant, an IAS officer Rajeev Arun Ekka, Probationary Assistant Collector cum 2 Executive Magistrate. He was examined as P.W.1 in the instant case and has supported the case of the prosecution. After conclusion of the investigation 72 persons were charge-sheeted as accused, 17 died during trial and charges were framed against 42 persons. Certain accused persons like Shiv Kumar Patwari, Dr. Md. Syeed were later on produced as approver after they were granted pardon by the learned Court on acceptance of their complete and truthful disclosure of the material circumstances in relation to the offence and to the accused persons. A total of 197 prosecution witnesses were examined. This petitioner was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka between June 1993 to June 1996. The fact that this R.C. case was registered by the CBI after taking over the Dumka(T) P.S. Case No. 22/1996 lodged by the informant Rajeev Arun Ekka, IAS on the basis of a written complaint bearing letter no. 480 dated 21.02.1996 in connection with fraudulent withdrawal under AHD, Dumka during the financial year 1991-96 under Head No. 2403 have been taken note of in the opening paragraph of the impugned order as well.
4. The question posed before this Court is whether the order of arraignment passed under Section 319 Cr.P.C meets the test laid down by the Apex Court in the Case of Hardeep Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92. Petitioner has, while relying upon a judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Jogendra Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, (2015) 9 SCC 244, para 9, taken the plea of violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner has also questioned legality and correctness of the impugned order, directing the CBI to produce the sanction order for prosecuting the petitioner in the light of the legal position laid down in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622.
5. It is considered proper to reproduce the extract of the order dated 09.03.2018 so far as it concerns the petitioner herein:
"During argument, it is noticed that during investigation many accused persons left by the I.O but evidence on record shows their involvement in the occurrence of the case. After perusal of oral and documentary evidence as on record the following order pass U/s-319 of Cr.P.C in the ends of justice.
Order It is clear from perusal of record that R.C. Case No. 45A/1996 registered by the C.B.I which previously registered Dumka Town P.S. 22/1996 dated 22.02.1996 U/s-109,120(B),409, 466, 468, 471, 473, 474,477A of I.P.C whose informant Rajeev Arun Ekka, I.A.S, Probationary. Informant had written letter no. 480 dated 21.02.1996 that during 1991-92 during financial year 1991-92 to 1995-96 in head 2403, the Regional Director, AHD, Santhal Pargana, Dumka had 3 withdrawn illegally for non plan purpose, the total withdrawn received from A.G., Vihar, Ranchi. Further written that Shesh Muni Ram time period January-1991 to July-1994 and O.P.Diwakar since July-1994 till date had been withdrawn more money then allotted by the Government, Shesh Muni Ram had withdrawn Rs.17,73,32,561/- illegally which is ten times more allotted money. Further written that many forge firms prepared forged vouchers and got payment without supplying material. Further written that Shiv Kumar Patwari, Sanjay Kumar, Dumka, Anand Kumar, Jamtara and Rajendra Prasad, Dumka withdrawn payment Rs.1,00,000,00/- ( One Crore) without transporting the medicine and feed/fodder. It is also mentioned in the written petition that live animals transported from Delhi and Md. Sayeed issued false receipts without supply and endorse in store register, in charge-sheet page no.62 written that the then Deputy Commissioner, Anjani Kumar Singh, imposed condition for Dumka Treasury that not processing or pasing any bill of and above Rs. One Lakh as the same is not inconsistent with the provision of Treasury Code. The then Deputy Commissioner, on 31.05.1994 itself on the note of co-accused Dr. Shesh Muni Ram had in order to check the over follow of the fund from the treasury and issued an order on 17.08.1993 to the effect. The effect of above condition is that supplier of AHD reduced the limit of claim below Rs.1,00,000/- during the period from 17.08.1993 to 31.05.1994. It shows that the then DC, Dumka Anjani Kumar Singh have full knowledge about illegally withdrawn money from Dumka Treasury but do not dare to lodge case in the concerned P.S. against accused persons. Court finds that the then D.C had full knowledge about illegal/ excess withdraw from Dumka Treasury since 17.08.1993 and involve in criminal conspiracy with other co-accused of Fodder Scam-asters. It is also clear that the then D.C. By post was incharge of Treasury but they are negligent or in collusion of AHD Officials allow criminal misappropriation of government money, so they are also liable in Prevention of Corruption Act.
In the light of above discussion, court finds that the then D.C. Anjani Kumar Singh misused his post in collusion with Scam-asters so prima faice case is made out U/s-120(B),r/w Section- 409,420,467,468,471 and 477A of I.P.C and further made out U/s- 13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) and (d) of P.C. Anjani Kumar Singh, I.A.S. Employee so C.B.I is directed to seek Sanction for prosecution from competent authority and file it within one month in the court."
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner apart from the legal ground urged in support of the challenge, questioned the impugned order on factual grounds as well. It is submitted that the entire scam was exposed by the petitioner as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. He has relied upon the statement of the prosecution witness no.1 i.e. the informant Rajeev Arun Ekka, I.A.S, Probationary Assistant Collector cum Executive Magistrate specifically at para 1,7,13 and 29 where he stated that this F.I.R bearing Dumka (T) Case No. 22/1996 was registered on 22.02.1996 on the instruction of the D.C. Dumka i.e., the petitioner. Upon inquiries and inspections made from the office of Regional Director, AHD, Dumka, fraudulent withdrawal much beyond the sanctioned allotment to the tune of Rs.17,73,32,561/- were noticed and the 4 involvement of senior officers of the Regional Directorate of the AHD Dumka and others were found. It is further pointed out that petitioner was responsible for imposing a bar on passing of any treasury bill above Rs.1 lakh concerning AHD Dumka by the order dated 17.08.1993. That was revoked by the then Commissioner, Dumka on the proposal of the Regional Director, AHD Mr. Shesh Muni Ram on 31.05.1994. As a result of revocation of his order, none of the bills related to fraudulent withdrawal were routed through the D.C. Dumka i.e., the petitioner during the relevant period of time. The learned Court has undeservedly drawn a negative inference from these facts though they show the bonafides of the petitioner. The learned Court has also committed a serious error in coming to a finding that this petitioner was involved in criminal conspiracy with co-accused of Fodder Scam having full knowledge of the illegal / excess withdrawal from Dumka Treasury since 1993 being the In- charge of the Treasury and that prosecution had not dared to lodge case against the accused persons. The fact of the matter is that it was only upon inquiry conducted by the petitioner that F.I.R. bearing Dumka (T) P.S. Case No. 22/1996 was lodged as against AHD Official and others relating to fraudulent withdrawal under the AHD for the period in question. This F.I.R was taken up for investigation by the CBI upon direction of the Hon'ble Patna High Court and re-instituted as R.C. No. 45(A)/1996-Pat.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the same learned Court of Special Judge-VII ( AHD Scam), Ranchi by order dated 05.03.2018 passed in R.C. Case No. 38(A)/1996 -Pat framed a prima facie opinion for taking cognizance against this petitioner in exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C and directed the CBI to obtain sanction for his criminal prosecution from the competent authority. He submits that this Court has been pleased to quash the impugned order therein as it was vitiated in law and on several factual grounds as well vide judgment dated 25.01.2019 passed in Cr. M.P. No. 910/2018. This Court has also taken note of the steps taken by the petitioner in his capacity as D.C. Dumka in revealing the scam. In the said case also inquiry conducted by this petitioner as D.C. Dumka led to the institution of Dumka (T) P.S. Case No. 16/1996 on 02.02.1996 as against officials of AHD Dumka including the Regional Director, Dr. O.P. Diwakar. This court has taken note of the confidential letter dated 03.02.1996 written by the petitioner to the Finance Commissioner describing the modus operandi followed by the AHD officials 5 in causing fraudulent withdrawal from Dumka Treasury and the action recommended against the Treasury Officer and other officials of the AHD by the petitioner. R.C. Case No. 38(A)/1996 related to the period of fraudulent withdrawal between December 1995 to January 1996 to the tune of Rs. 3,76,38,853/-. This Court found that the inference drawn by the learned Court relating to his complicity in causing fraudulent withdrawal were not tenable in law as also facts. This Court had also taken note of the order dated 17.08.1993 passed by this petitioner stopping withdrawal above Rs.1 Lakh from the Treasury without approval of the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka and the subsequent order dated 30.05.1994 passed by the Commissioner, Santhal Pargana Division on the proposal of the Regional Director, AHD, Dumka by which the bar was lifted. As such the bills related to fraudulent withdrawal were never placed before the petitioner in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the findings rendered by this Court in the case of this petitioner in Cr.M.P. No. 910 of 2018 apply with full force in the facts of the present case as well. Petitioner has enjoyed the reputation of an honest and upright Officer of the Indian Administrative Service Cadre during his service career. He has superannuated from the post of Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar on 31.05.2018. It is also emphatically submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that not a shred of evidence has come during inquiry or trial which is incriminating in nature and could be a basis for the learned Court to arraign him as an accused under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. Learned Court has also not referred to any such incriminating material evidence brought on record during trial or inquiry while passing the impugned order. As such the order impugned deserves to be set aside, lest it may cause grave miscarriage of justice.
9. Learned counsel for the CBI has in addition to the submission noted above, further stated that this petitioner was responsible for exposing the scam in Dumka Division and institution of the F.I.R. Dumka (T) P.S. Case No. 22/1996 which was taken over by the CBI and re-instituted as present R.C. Case No.45(A)/1996-Pat upon direction of the Patna High Court. During course of investigation no incriminating material was found by the C.B.I to implicate him as an accused. The decision to implicate a person as an accused in the Fodder Scam cases was taken at a highest level by the Director, CBI 6 himself. Learned Court by the impugned order has referred to the letters dated 17.08.1993 passed by the petitioner and the order dated 31.05.1994. These materials were obtained during investigation and formed part of the charge- sheet. Learned Court has committed an error of record while observing that the then Deputy Commissioner, Dumka had on 31.05.1994 revoked such an order. It was the Commissioner, Santhal Pargana who on the proposal of the Regional Director, AHD, Dr. Shesh Muni Ram had revoked the order of the petitioner dated 17.08.1993 as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. Learned Counsel for the CBI further submitted there were no incriminating evidence brought on record during trial or inquiry against the petitioner though 197 Prosecution Witness were examined. The CBI had not moved any application for his arraignment under Section 319 Cr.P.C nor any such application was made by any other accused persons. The CBI did not find any evidence of illegal gains out of fraudulent withdrawal flowing to the petitioner. Learned Trial Court is obliged to refer to and deal with such incriminating material evidence adduced during inquiry or trial which could enable it to form prima facie opinion more than that required at the time of framing of the charge and which, if went unrebutted, would lead to the conviction of the person. This proposition has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra) followed in later judgments as well.
10. Learned Amicus Curiae has assisted the Court on both factual and legal grounds. On the factual score, it is submitted that the petitioner was responsible for imposing a ceiling upon withdrawal above Rs.1 Lakh under the AHD without his approval as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. This order of the petitioner dated 17.08.1993 as Deputy Commissioner, Dumka was subsequently revoked by the Commissioner, Dumka Division dated 31.05.1994. The learned Court in exercise of its powers under section 319 of the Cr. P.C is required to form a prima facie opinion which is more than that at the time of the framing of the charge on the basis of such incriminating evidence brought during inquiry or trial, which if went unrebutted, could lead to the conviction of the petitioner.
11. Learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that for the exercise of such an extraordinary and discretionary power, a strict test has been laid down in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra) followed in the case of S. Mohammed Ispahani Vs. Yogendra Chandak & Ors. reported in (2017) 16 SCC 226.
7Therefore, this Court may examine the correctness of the impugned order in that light and on the basis of all other material brought on record. Learned Amicus Curiae has also placed reliance upon a latest judgment of the Apex Court passed in Criminal Appeal No. 395 of 2019 in the case of Sunil Kumar Gupta & others Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others dated 27.02.2019, which follows the ratio laid down in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra).
12. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, CBI and learned Amicus Curiae and gone through the impugned order as well as the materials on record. It is now beyond cavil that the Trial Court exercising the discretionary and extra ordinary power under section 319 of the Cr. PC, has to follow the strict test laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (Supra,) consistently followed in the later judgment as well in the case of Brijendra Singh &Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2017) 7 SCC 706, taken note of in the case of S. Mohammed Ispahani (Supra). The Apex Court at para-106 of the report in the case of Hardeep Singh (Supra), has held as under:
"106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr PC. ...........................(emphasis supplied to the original text)"
13. In the case of Hardeep Singh (Supra), the precise scope of the power under section 319 Cr.PC; the stage at which such power is to be exercised; the meaning of the expression 'evidence' used therein; the nature of satisfaction required to invoke the power to arraign an accused and whether the power under section 319 of the Cr. PC extended to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charged or who have been discharged been answered. The Apex Court after a detailed survey of the precedence on this subject, and the discussions on the law, underlined the object behind conferring such an extra ordinary power on the Trial Court. The Maxim judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur contains the concept of a fair trial and that a real culprit should not get away unpunished. In this light, the powers under section 319 of the Cr. PC were examined by the Apex Court and its conclusion was summed up at para-
8117 of the Report, which is quoted hereunder with profit.
"117.We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows:
Questions (i) and (iii)
-- What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr PC can be exercised?
AND
-- Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr PC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? Answer 117.1. In Dharam Pal case, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of the investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Cr PC and the Sessions Judge need not wait till "evidence" under Section 319 Cr PC becomes available for summoning an additional accused.
117.2. Section 319 Cr PC, significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) inquiry (2) trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr PC, and under Section 398 Cr PC are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr PC. Materials coming before the court in course of such inquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr PC, and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet.
117.3. In view of the above position the word "evidence" in Section 319 Cr PC has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.
Question (ii)--Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr PC could only mean evidence tested by cross-
examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?
Answer 117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 Cr PC a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Cr PC the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.
Question (iv)--What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr PC to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) Cr PC can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted?
Answer 117.5. Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr PC the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Cr PC would be the same as for framing a 9 charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.
Question (v)--Does the power under Section 319 Cr PC extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged?
Answer 117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Cr PC provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, insofar as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Cr PC has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh."
14. Evidently, the learned Trial Court had the responsibility to examine whether evidence as understood in its wider sense, both at the stage of trial and at the stage of inquiry under section 319 of the Cr. PC., incriminating in nature, had been brought before it to form a prima facie opinion more than as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if went unrebutted, could lead to conviction of the person i.e. petitioner. The Apex Court has, in the case of S. Mohammed Ispahani (Supra) further explained the principles laid down in the case of Hardeep Singh (Supra) at para-29 and quoted the opinion rendered in the case of Brijendra Singh (Supra). The opinion of the Apex Court contained at para-13 in the case of Brijendra Singh (Supra) is also reproduced for better appreciation:
"13. In order to answer the question, some of the principles enunciated in Hardeep Singh case may be recapitulated: power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised by the trial court at any stage during the trial i.e. before the conclusion of trial, to summon any person as an accused and face the trial in the ongoing case, once the trial court finds that there is some "evidence"against such a person on the basis of which evidence it can be gathered that he appears to be guilty of the offence. The "evidence" herein means the material that is brought before the court during trial. Insofar as the material/evidence collected by the IO at the stage of inquiry is concerned, it can be utilised for corroboration and to support the evidence recorded by the court to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC. No doubt, such evidence that has surfaced in examination-in-chief, without cross-examination of witnesses, can also be taken into consideration. However, since it is a discretionary power given to the court under Section 319 CrPC and is also an extraordinary one, same has to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. The degree of satisfaction is more than the degree 10 which is warranted at the time of framing of the charges against others in respect of whom charge-sheet was filed. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised. It is not to be exercised in a casual or a cavalier manner. The prima facie opinion which is to be formed requires stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity."
15. Examined in this light, this court finds that the learned Court has made no mention of any incriminating material evidence brought on record during trial or inquiry as against this petitioner, apart from what was already there before the investigating authorities while filing the charge sheet. Whatever has been discussed by the learned Trial Court is also apparently based upon the materials contained in the charge sheet.
16. It is pertinent to mention here that the Apex Court in answer to question no. (i) and (iii) posed, had at para-117.1 in Hardeep Singh (Supra), held that if a person is not named as an accused, but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of the investigation, cognizance can be taken under section 319 Cr. PC and the Sessions Judge need not wait till evidence under section 319 Cr. PC becomes available for summoning an additional accused. The Learned Trial Court which took cognizance of the offence at the initial stage after filing of the charge sheet at the relevant point of time, did not feel it necessary to take cognizance on the basis of the materials found during investigation as against this petitioner who was not named as an accused in the charge sheet. In the absence of any incriminating material evidence brought on record during trial or inquiry as against the petitioner, the learned Trial Court had no occasion to exercise such power. The inference drawn by the learned Trial Court that he was involved in criminal conspiracy with other co-accused in the Fodder Scam, does not follow from the discussions made in the impugned order as the materials on record shows that the petitioner was responsible for exposing the Scam and instrumental in institution of the FIR as against the AHD officials and others. Learned Trial Court has itself taken note of the evidence of the informant Rajeev Arun Ekka, the Probationary I.A.S. Officer, who in his deposition, has stated that it was only upon the direction of the petitioner, the then Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, that FIR was instituted. Learned Trial Court does not make any reference of evidence which shows that reaps or the fruits of the fraudulent withdrawal by the Fodder Scam accused passed on to this petitioner. Considered in this light, this court is of the opinion that the findings of the 11 learned Court failed to pass muster the strict legal test prescribed in the case of Hardeep Singh (Supra) and other later judgments of the Apex Court on the same line.
17. This court also finds that no opportunity of hearing or notice to show- cause was given to the petitioner before the learned Court proceeded to form an adverse opinion against him. Learned Court fell short of following the principles of natural justice, as laid down in the case of Jogendra Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, (2015) 9 SCC 244, para-9. The necessity to give such an opportunity and the rationale behind it, has also been dealt with in the same paragraph. A person arraigned as an accused under section 319 of the Cr. PC does not have an opportunity to seek discharge under section 227 of the Cr. PC, which an accused person originally charge sheeted can avail of.
18. This Court also finds that the direction issued upon the CBI to obtain sanction for prosecution from the competent authority is not proper in the eyes of law as the sanctioning authority stands denuded from exercising its independent discretion on the basis of materials placed before it, whether to grant sanction or to refuse sanction. It is contrary to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mansukhlal Visthaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat [(1997) 7 SCC 622].
19. On the basis of the conspectus of facts and circumstances discussed above, it appears that findings rendered by this Court on the legal grounds in the case of petitioner in Cr.M.P. No. 910 of 2018 apply with equal force in the facts of the present case as well. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion and the reasons recorded above, this Court is of the view that if the impugned order seeking to arraign the petitioner as an accused is not set aside, it would lead to grave miscarriage of justice. The impugned order is accordingly set aside. Instant petition is allowed.
20. Before parting, this Court records it appreciation to the valuable assistance rendered by learned Amicus Curiae during hearing of this case. His admissible legal remuneration be borne from the funds of High Court Legal Services Committee. Secretary, HCLSC is required to do the needful.
(Aparesh Kumar Singh, J) A.Mohanty