Gujarat High Court
Chaudhary Hiteshbhai Karshanbhai & 3 vs State Of Gujarat & on 11 June, 2015
Author: Abhilasha Kumari
Bench: Abhilasha Kumari
R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 9883 of 2015
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE ABHILASHA KUMARI
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed Yes
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of No
the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of No
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of
India or any order made thereunder ?
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CHAUDHARY HITESHBHAI KARSHANBHAI & 3....Applicant(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR PRATIK B BAROT, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 - 4
MR SADIK A ANSARI, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR LB DABHI, LEARNED ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE ABHILASHA
KUMARI
Date : 11/06/2015
ORAL JUDGMENT
Page 1 of 26
R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT
1. Rule. Mr.L.B. Dabhi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, waives service of notice of Rule for respondent No.1. Mr. Sadik A. Ansari, learned advocate, waives service of notice of Rule for respondent No.2 (complainant). On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and with the consent of the learned counsel for the respective parties, the application is being heard and decided finally.
2. By preferring this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code"
for short), the applicants have, interalia, prayed that the First Information Report being C.R. No.I31 of 2015, registered with Visnagar Taluka Police Station against the present applicants on 29.03.2015, at the behest of respondent No.2 (complainant) for offences punishable under Sections 394, 324 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act, may be quashed and set aside. The FIR in question was filed against the applicants by respondent No.2 original complainant on the allegations that on 28.03.2015, when the complainant was passing through the Wada of accused, Chaudhary Page 2 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT Karshanbhai Khumabhai, at about 5:30 in the evening, applicant No.1 Chaudhary Hiteshbhai Karshanbhai all of a sudden ran towards him with a Dhariya in his hands and inflicted a blow, due to which the complainant fell down. It is further alleged that applicant No.2 Chaudhary Karshanbhai Khumabhai, along with applicants Nos.3 and 4, Chaudhary Jayantibhai Khumabhai and Chaudhary Ambaben Karshanbhai respectively, rushed in with iron rods in their hands and soon after, applicant No.4 inflicted a rod blow on the right hand of the complainant. Indiscriminate blows were inflicted by the accused persons. Thereafter, the village people gathered there and the complainant was rescued from further beating. In the process, it is alleged that two gold rings which the complainant was wearing on his fingers were snatched by applicant No.1. The gold chain worn by the complainant was also snatched. Under the circumstances, the FIR in question came to be registered.
3. Before this Court, it is the case of the applicants, as endorsed by respondent No.2 (complainant) by filing an affidavit affirmed on Page 3 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT 26.05.2015, that the dispute between them has been amicably settled. All of them hail from the same community and are residents of the same village. Feelings of brotherhood now prevail between the parties and a Settlement Deed dated 12.05.2015 has been drawn up between them, which is annexed along with the affidavit. It is further stated by respondent No.2 in the affidavit that in view of the settlement, he has no objection, if the FIR in question is quashed and set aside by this Court.
4. It may be noted that prior to the settlement between the parties, the applicants had preferred an application under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the very same FIR, which was permitted to be withdrawn by this Court vide order dated 21.04.2015, passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.7453 of 2015. It is after the withdrawal of the said application, that the settlement has been arrived at between the parties, which is recorded in the Settlement Deed dated 12.05.2015. Pursuant thereto, the present application has been preferred.
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R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT
5. Mr.Pratik B. Barot, learned advocate for the applicants, has submitted that the present application has been preferred under changed circumstances, therefore, the withdrawal of the earlier application would not come in the way of this Court in entertaining the present application and granting the prayers made therein.
5.1 In support of the above submissions, the learned advocate for the applicants has placed reliance upon the following judgments:
(1) Simrikhia Vs. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and another reported in (1990) 2 SCC 437 (2) State represented by DSP, SB CID, Chennai Vs. K.V. Rajendran and others reported in (2008)8 SCC 673 5.2 Insofar as the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, in view of the compromise between the parties is concerned, the learned advocate for the applicants has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Vijayander Kumar and others Vs. State of Page 5 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT Rajasthan and another reported in (2014) 3 SCC 389.
He has further pressed into service the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 4 SCC 582.
6. Mr.L.B.Dabhi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has submitted that the law ought to be permitted to take its own course, therefore, the prayers made in the application may not be granted.
7. Mr.Sadik A. Ansari, learned advocate for respondent No.2, has reiterated the stand of the said respondent (complainant) as encapsulated in the affidavit filed by him. He has stated that in view of the fact that the applicants and the complainant belong to the same village and a settlement has been arrived at between them, the prayers made in the application for quashing the FIR and resultant proceedings, may be granted.
8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the averments made in the application and other documents on record. Page 6 of 26
R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT
9. The applicants had earlier preferred an application under Section 482 of the Code, praying for the quashing the very same FIR that is in question in the present petition. That application was permitted to be withdrawn by this Court as is recorded in the order dated 21.04.2015, passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.7453 of 2015.
10. In Simrikhia Vs. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and another (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the question whether power under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised on a second application by the same party, on the same grounds. The principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in this regard, are extracted hereinbelow:
"3. The learned counsel for the appellant contended before us that the second application under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not entertainable, the exercise of power under Section 482, on a second application by the same party on the same grounds virtually amounts to the review of the earlier order and is contrary to the spirit of Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the High Court Page 7 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT was, therefore, clearly in error in having quashed the proceedings by adopting that course. We find considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel. The inherent power under Section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had been change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. Where there is no such changed circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order, the exercise of the power to reconsider the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a review, which is expressly barred under Section 362."
(emphasis supplied)
11. Similar principles of law have been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Vijayander Kumar and others Vs. Page 8 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT State of Rajasthan and another (supra), wherein the Supreme Court stated as below:
"9. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants also placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Devendra v. State of U.P., only to highlight that a second petition under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be entertained because the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance gives rise to a new cause of action. This issue does not require any deliberation because the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2, the informant, has not raised any objection to the maintainability of petition under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
12. In the present case, the facts reveal that after the withdrawal of the earlier application, there has been a change in circumstances, inasmuch as a settlement has been arrived at between the parties. In light of the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above judgment, this Court is of the view that the present application would be maintainable in view of the changed circumstances. Page 9 of 26
R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT
13. This view is further fortified by another judgment of the Supreme Court in State represented by DSP, SB CID, Chennai Vs. K.V. Rajendran and others (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has held that in a case where there is a subsequent development, the appropriate remedy would be to file an independent petition under Section 482 of the Code, rather than reopening the disposed of petition.
14. Regarding the aspect whether the FIR in question can be quashed in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, especially when one of the allegations is that under Section 394 relating to voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery, reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiji Alias Pappu and others Vs. Radhika and another reported in (2011) 10 SCC 705, wherein the Supreme Court has held as below:
"5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. enlists offences that are compoundable with the permission of the Court before whom the prosecution is pending and those Page 10 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT that can be compounded even without such permission. An offence punishable under Section 354 of the IPC is in terms of Section 320(2) of the Code compoundable at the instance of the woman against whom the offence is committed. To that extent, therefore, there is no difficulty in either quashing the proceedings or compounding the offence under Section 354, of which the appellants are accused, having regard to the fact that the alleged victim of the offence has settled the matter with the alleged assailants. An offence punishable under Section 394 IPC is not, however, compoundable with or without the permission of the Court concerned. The question is whether the High Court could and ought to have exercised its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the prosecution under the said provision in the light of the compromise that the parties have arrived at.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the first informantcomplainant had, in the affidavit filed before this Court, clearly admitted that the complaint in question was lodged by her on account of a misunderstanding and misconception about the facts and that the offences of which the appellants stand accused are purely personal in nature arising out of personal disputes between the parties. It was also evident that the complainant was no longer Page 11 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT supporting the version on which the prosecution rested its case against the appellants. According to the learned counsel there was no question of the Trial Court recording a conviction against the appellants in the light of what the complainant had stated on affidavit. That was all the more so, when the other two prosecution witnesses were none other than the husband and the brother of the complainant who too were not supporting the charges against the appellants. Such being the case, continuance of criminal trial against the appellants was nothing but an abuse of the process of law and waste of valuable time of the Courts below. Exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent such abuse is perfectly justified, contended the learned counsel. Reliance in support was placed by the learned counsel upon the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Abbot's case."
(emphasis supplied) In the context of the above submissions, the Supreme Court after examining several decisions of the Supreme Court, further held as below:
"18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the Page 12 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situation in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstance of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
19. Coming to the case at hand, we are of the view that the incident in question had its genesis in a dispute relating to the access to the two plots which are adjacent to each other. It was not a case of broad daylight robbery for gain. It was a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute has, it appears, been resolved by them. That Page 13 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations which are now described by her as arising out of some "misunderstanding and misconception" will be a futile exercise that will serve no purpose. It is noteworthy that the two alleged eyewitnesses, who are closely related to the complainant, are also no longer supportive of the prosecution version. The continuance of the proceedings is thus nothing but an empty formality. Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below."
(emphasis supplied)
15. Further, in the case of Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab (supra), the Supreme Court has held that it is advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Courts should ordinarily accept the terms of compromise, even in criminal proceedings, since keeping the matter alive, with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution, is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot Page 14 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT afford. The time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow:
"5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has, on 1112004 passed away and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be ruled out.
6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common Page 15 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law."
(emphasis supplied)
16. In the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab And Another reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Supreme Court has dealt with the question whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings involving noncompoundable proceedings, in view of a compromise arrived at between the parties can be exercised and, if so, under what circumstances. It has been held by the Supreme Court that where the offences concerned are purely private offences and do not involve any question of public policy, the power to quash criminal proceedings on the basis of a compromise can be exercised. However, where the offences are serious and heinous in nature, such power ought not ordinarily to be used. It has been elaborated by the Supreme Court in the above decision, that offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or like transactions or offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or family disputes where the Page 16 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT wrong is basically private or personal in nature and parties have resolved the dispute, come under the category of offences where the criminal proceedings may be quashed after the parties have amicably resolved and settled the issue. The principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above decision are encapsulated in the following paragraph of the judgment:
"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and Page 17 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite Page 18 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
(emphasis supplied)
17. In a later judgment in the case of Narinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Supreme Court after examining the entire law on the point whether the criminal proceedings ought to be quashed on the ground of a compromise between the parties in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code has laid down clear principles of law as below:
"29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the Page 19 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2 When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3 Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Page 20 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4 On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has Page 21 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal Page 22 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a Page 23 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT convict found guilty of such a crime."
18. Examining the case of the applicants in light of the above principles of law, in the view of this Court, it would be in furtherance of the intent and purpose for which Section 482 of the Code was enacted by the Legislature, that is to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, if the present proceedings are quashed.
19. It would be clear from the nature of the allegations made against the applicants in the FIR in question that the dispute is personal in nature. According to the stand now taken by the complainant, an amicable settlement has been arrived at between the parties. It would be in the interest of peace and harmony amongst the applicants and the complainant, who belong to the same community and are residents of the same village, that the dispute between them is brought to its logical, legal end by exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code.
20. It may be noted that there is no bar to the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in Page 24 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT respect of the offence under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code, as stated by the Supreme Court in Shiji Alias Pappu and others Vs. Radhika and another (supra) quoted hereinabove. The other offences are neither heinous nor serious in nature and the incident appears to have occurred in the heat of the moment due to an altercation between the parties. The misunderstanding and misconception that has led to the incident has now been cleared as is evident from the affidavit filed by respondent No.2 (complainant). The applicants and the complainant reside in the same village and in the interest of society and harmony, if the power under Section 482 of the Code is exercised, it would secure the ends of justice. No fruitful purpose would be served, if the applicants are compelled to be dragged through the criminal prosecution, especially when no hard feelings remain between the parties.
21. For the aforestated reasons, this Court is of the view that the following order would secure the ends of justice:
The FIR being C.R. No.I31 of 2015 registered Page 25 of 26 R/CR.MA/9883/2015 JUDGMENT with the Visnagar Taluka Police Station on 29.03.2015 and any consequential proceedings are hereby quashed and set aside.
22. The application is allowed in the above terms. Rule is made absolute, accordingly.
Direct Service is permitted.
(SMT. ABHILASHA KUMARI, J.) piyush Page 26 of 26