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[Cites 4, Cited by 0]

Gujarat High Court

Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited vs Bharvad Gokalbhai Vaghabhai Mundhava on 2 March, 2026

                                                                                                               NEUTRAL CITATION




                              C/SA/569/2022                                    ORDER DATED: 02/03/2026

                                                                                                                undefined




                                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                                              R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 569 of 2022

                                                          With
                                       CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2022
                                           In R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 569 of 2022
                      ==========================================================
                                      PASCHIM GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LIMITED
                                                     Versus
                                  BHARVAD GOKALBHAI VAGHABHAI MUNDHAVA & ORS.
                      ==========================================================
                      Appearance:
                      MR VIRAL J DAVE(5751) for the Appellant
                      NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4
                      ==========================================================

                         CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

                                                           Date : 02/03/2026

                                                            ORAL ORDER

1. This Second Appeal challenges concurrent judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below, whereby the learned 14th Additional District Judge, Rajkot vide order dated 9.12.2021 dismissed the Regular Civil Appeal No.96 of 2014 and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 31.3.1994 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jasdan in Regular Civil Suit No.43 of 2006.

2. For the sake of convenience and brevity, parties are referred to as per their original status before the learned trial Court.

3. The facts born out from the impugned judgment and decree are as under:-

Page 1 of 7 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Mar 09 20:40:15 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/569/2022 ORDER DATED: 02/03/2026 undefined 3.1 Munnabhai - son of the plaintiff on 17.5.20025 went to water sump constructed by the Gram Panchayat on water tank in village Jangvad to fill water sump by opening water pump and in that process, he came in contact with iron staircase and got electrocuted and died on the spot.
3.2 The plaintiff therefore, approached the civil Court for getting compensation for the tortious liability of the PGVCL and sought compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- with interest for death of his son.
3.3 In response to the notice issued by the learned trial Court, the PGVCL appeared and raised multiple contentions including the contention that it is the Gram Panchayat who is at the fault and not the PGVCL. It is further contended that the deceased got electrocuted at the place which falls under the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat and therefore, the PGVCL has nothing to do with the maintainability work of sump or electric motor placed on the water tank to fill the sump and in view of that, the PGVCL is not directly or indirectly liable or responsible with the death of the deceased. He would further submit that there is no negligence which could be attributed to the PGVCL or its officers. Therefore, it is submitted to dismiss the suit.
3.4 The learned trial Court vide judgment and decree allowed the suit and granted compensation to the tune of Rs.1.5 lakh to be paid to the plaintiff along with interest at 8% from the date of filing of the suit till realization.
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NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/569/2022 ORDER DATED: 02/03/2026 undefined 3.5 Being aggrieved, the PGVCL has filed first appeal before the learned appellate Court, which was dismissed.

3.6 Hence, this Second Appeal.

4. The defendant posed following questions of law as substantial questions of law:-

"(A) Whether the respondent No.1 to 3 have proved negligence of the appellant in view of S.101 of the Evidence Act, 1872?
(B) Whether both the Hon'ble Courts below have committed serious error in discarding the evidences of the appellant?
(C) Whether both the Hon'ble Courts below have committed serious error in not considering the provisions of Rule 80 of Electricity Rules, 1956?"

5. Assailing the impugned judgment and decree, learned advocate Mr. Dave for the defendant would submit that the learned Courts below have committed serious and manifest error in decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff on the ground of strict liability, whereby involvement of the PGVCL is remotely even not possible. He would further submit that though it is a tragic and incident and taking away human life, negligency cannot be attributed to the PGVCL. He would further submit that it was a Gram Panchayat, which was negligent. He would further submit that the water pump through which the electricity runs and the deceased got electrocuted, was maintained by the Gram Panchayat and Page 3 of 7 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Mar 09 20:40:15 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/569/2022 ORDER DATED: 02/03/2026 undefined therefore, it is a Gram Panchayat, which has to pay the amount of complainant, if any, to the plaintiff and not the PGVCL.

5.1 Upon above submissions, he would submit to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and decree, exonerate the PGVCL and to pass the judgment and decree against the Gram Panchayat.

6. The High Court in order to admit second appeal is required to be satisfied that substantial questions of law is involved in the case and having so satisfied has to formulate that question. Existence of a substantial question of law is sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of section 100 of the Code. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. [See: Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148].

7. The scope of section 100 of the Code is well explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Govindaraja v. Mariamman, AIR 2005 SC 1008, whereby, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court in second appeal under section 100 is limited to the substantial question of law. To be a substantial question of law it must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent and answer to the same will have a material bearing of the party before the Court.

8. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Gurbachan Page 4 of 7 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Mar 09 20:40:15 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/569/2022 ORDER DATED: 02/03/2026 undefined Singh (Dead) Through Lrs Versus Gurcharan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs And Others, 2023 (20) SCC 104, in para 7, 14 and 15 held as under:-

"7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing muster are well established. The section itself dictates that such an appeal shall only be maintainable when the case involves a substantial question of law or that the appellate decree has been passed ex parte. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100.
14. The principles of law cited herein may be undoubtedly good law, but, however, in the considered view of this court, they do not hold in the case put forward by the Appellant. A perusal of the witness statements of DW-3 as duly recorded by the High Court, (the court also relies on the cross examination portions of DW-4 although the same do not form part of the record before this court.) shows that father of the Appellant had indeed partitioned the property during his lifetime. In such situation selling a part of his share in an undivided property, is a question that does not arise. Reliance on Shyam Sunder (supra) does not support the case of the Appellant as there is nothing on record to reflect any effort having been made by him to substitute himself in place of the Respondents in buying the 4 marlas of land from Faqir Singh in order to keep a stranger, namely Gurcharan Singh from entering into family- owned property. Had the Appellant made any such effort and the same would be reflected from record, then it could have been argued that he has a right to exclude the Respondents.
15. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgement entering into a reappreciation of evidence. While it is true that ordinarily, in second Page 5 of 7 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Mar 09 20:40:15 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/569/2022 ORDER DATED: 02/03/2026 undefined appeal, the court must not disturb facts established by the lower court or the first appellate court. However, it is also equally well recognised that this rule is not an absolute one or in other words, it is not a rule set in stone."

9. Taking the aforesaid settled principles of law for consideration, what is undisputed that the son of the plaintiff has expired due to electrocution on 17.5.2005. Even the factual aspect asserted by the plaintiff is not much of dispute. The PGVCL disputed the impugned judgment and decree on the ground that it is not liable to pay compensation. The learned Courts below followed the principles of strict liability and referred to various judgments on the subject matter and fastened the liability to pay compensation to the PGVCL as well as Gram Panchayat jointly and severally.

10. I could notice that in para 20 of the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, it has been held that the defendants i.e. PGVCL and Gram Panchayat are jointly liable to pay compensation. However, the learned trial Court did not apportion the liability, but at the same time, held the Gram Panchayat also liable to pay compensation under the word "jointly". A simple meaning therefore can be taken that the PGVCL and Gram Panchayat are responsible to pay 50% each of total compensation. However, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the same jointly and severally from the defendant Nos.2 and 3 i.e. PGVCL and Gram Panchayat or can recover the entire amount from any one of the defendants. The word "jointly" mentioned by the learned trial Court in para 20 denotes that both the defendant Nos.2 and 3 i.e. Page 6 of 7 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Mar 09 20:40:15 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/569/2022 ORDER DATED: 02/03/2026 undefined PGVCL and Gram Panchayat are equally negligent and therefore, 50% each tortious liability is attributed upon the defendant Nos.2 and 3 i.e. PGVCL and Gram Panchayat.

11. In view of the foregoing reasons, while fixing the liability of defendant Nos.2 and 3 i.e. PGVCL and Gram Panchayat to pay 50% each of total compensation to the plaintiff as per judgment and decree, I see no reason to admit the Second Appeal. Accordingly, Second Appeal stands dismissed at threshold. Notice discharged.

12. The PGVCL is at liberty to recover the amount, if any, paid excess to the plaintiff than its tortious liability, from the co-defendant.

13. Registry is directed to return back the R & P, if any, to the concerned Court forthwith.

(J. C. DOSHI,J) SHEKHAR P. BARVE Page 7 of 7 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Mon Mar 02 2026 Downloaded on : Mon Mar 09 20:40:15 IST 2026