Meghalaya High Court
Shri Shiv Kumar Agarwala And Anr vs The State Of Meghalaya And Ors on 8 July, 2014
Equivalent citations: AIR 2015 MEGHALAYA 8, (2014) 3 GAU LT 425
Author: T Nandakumar Singh
Bench: T Nandakumar Singh
THE HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
WP(C)No.212/2014
1. Shri. Shiv Kumar Agarwala,
S/o (L) Rukmananad, Mandawewala,
District: East Khasi Hills, Meghalaya.
2. Shri. Sitaram Agarwalla,
S/o (L) Nandlal Ghoriwalla of Qualapaty,
Shillong, District: East Khasi Hills, Meghalaya. :::: Petitioners
-Vs-
1. The State of Meghalaya, represented by its
Secretary & Commissioner (Registration),
Shillong.
2. The Registrar of Societies,
Government of Meghalaya, Shillong.
3. The Secretary,
Executive Committee,
Shree Rajasthan Vishram Bhawan,
Luckier Road, Shillong, Meghalaya. :::: Respondents
BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T NANDAKUMAR SINGH For the Petitioners : Mr. AS Siddiqui, Adv For the Respondents : Mr. ND Chullai, Sr. GA, Mr. KP Bhattacharjee, GA Mr. MF Qureshi, Adv for respdt.No.3 Date of hearing : 08.07.2014 Date of Judgment & Order : 08.07.2014 JUDGMENT AND ORDER(ORAL) By this writ petition, the petitioners are challenging (i) the Resolution No.3 of the Annual General Body Meeting of Shree Rajasthan Vishram Bhavan held on 04.08.2013 for amendment of the Constitution of the society and (ii) order/letter of the Registrar of Societies, Meghalaya, Shillong dated 23.04.2014 for approving the said Resolution of the Annual General Body Meeting of Shree Rajasthan Vishram Bhavan only on the ground that the impugned Resolution and order/letter of the Registrar of Page 1 of 9 Societies, Meghalaya, Shillong are in clear infraction of Section 8 of the Meghalaya Societies Registration Act, 1983.
2. Heard Mr. AS Siddiqui, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. ND Chullai, Sr.GA assisted by Mr. KP Bhattacharjee, learned GA appearing for the respondents No.1&2. Also heard Mr. MF Qureshi, learned counsel for the respondent No.3.
3. Factual Matrix:- "Shree Rajasthan Vishram Bhavan" is a society registered under the Meghalaya Societies Registration Act, 1983 (for short 'the said Act of 1983'), inasmuch as, Section 37 of the said Act of 1983 provides that:
"37. (1) The Societies Registration Act, 1860 in its application to Meghalaya, is hereby repealed.
(2) Any society registered in any place within Meghalaya under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, shall be deemed to have been registered under this Act, and its principal offices shall be deemed to be the registered office;
Provided that -
(a) the memorandum and regulations of any such society, if they are repugnant to any of the provisions of this Act and the rules, shall be brought in conformity within six months from the commencement of this Act or within such further period as the Registrar may allow, and thereafter to the extent of such repugnancy, be deemed to be void and of no effect;
(b) any officer elected or appointed to and holding any office immediately before the commencements of this Act shall continue to hold such office until the expiry of his term of office or until such office lawfully terminated;
(c) nothing in this section shall effect any right, privilege, obligation, liability or punishment under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and any investigation, remedy or proceedings, including proceeding for dissolution commenced before the coming into force of this Act, may be continued or enforced as if this Act had not been passed."
The copy of the Constitution of the Society is available at Annexure-II to the present writ petition. Article 6 of the Constitution of Society clearly provides that (a) Members of the General Body shall be the Marwaris, Page 2 of 9 who have contributed financial assistance/donation to the Bhavan; (b) any person who is a major i.e. who is at least 18 years of age, can be its member; (c) only those persons who are permanent residents of Shillong can be its members. List of the members of the society i.e. voters list for 2011- 2012 is annexed at Annexure-III to the present writ petition and it consists of 657 voters.
4. The respondent No.3 had filed affidavit-in-opposition wherein, the copy of the revised list of the members of the society for the year 2011- 12 is annexed at Annexure-A and it consists of 491 voters. On perusal of the said list of the members annexed in the writ petition and also the revised list of the members annexed in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.3, it is clear that the number of the members of the society is more than 400 voters. It is stated in the writ petition that in the Annual General Meeting held on 04.08.2013 only 91 members were present. In that Annual General Body Meeting held on 04.08.2013 passed the impugned Resolution for amendment of the Constitution. It is also categorically stated in the writ petition that only 36 members out of 95 members present in the meeting were in favour of the proposed amendment. Therefore, it is the further case of the petitioners that as three-fourths of the members were not in favour of the proposed amendment of the Constitution, the said Resolution for amendment of the Constitution is illegal and also that for amendment of the Constitution prior approval from the Registrar of Societies will be required. Mr. AS Siddiqui, learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention had referred to Section 8 of the said Act of 1983, which reads as follows:-
"8. (1) A society shall not alter its memorandum except with the previous permission of the Registrar in writing. The alteration should then be approved by a majority of three-fourths of its members.Page 3 of 9
2. Before granting permission under Sub-section (1) the Registrar shall satisfy himself that the alteration does not make the society ineligible for registration under this Act.
3. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the rules and memorandum, a society may, by the votes of three-fourths of the members, alter its regulations."
5. On plain perusal of Section 8 of the said Act of 1983, it is clear that the Memorandum of Society can be amended or altered with the previous permission of the Registrar in writing and also the alteration should be approved by the votes of three-fourths of its members. The words "votes of three-fourths of the members" are defined in Section 2(q) of the said Act of 1983, which read as follows:-
"Definitions 2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:-
***** ***** ***** *****
(q) 'votes of three-fourths of the members' mean the votes of at least three-fourths of the total membership in a society given at any general meeting of the society including votes, by proxy where voting by proxy is allowed under its regulations."
6. It is fairly well settled law that when the legislature has spoken, the judges cannot afford to be wiser. (Reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Shri. Mandir Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi & Ors reported inAIR 1974 SC 1868).
7. It is, no doubt, well settled that it is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and word by word. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or in-consistency therein and not otherwise. An effort should be made to give effect to all parts of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered superfluous or redundant. True meaning of a Page 4 of 9 provision of law is to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law (Reference may be made to Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111. It is cardinal rule of construction that no word should be construed redundant or surplus in interpreting the provision of a statute or rule (Ref: Dinesh Chandra Sangma Vs. State of Assam & Ors:
AIR 1978 SC 17). The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Santosh Shanker Acharya: (2000) 7 SCC 463 held that it is too well known principle of construction of statute that the legislature engrafted every part of the statue for a purpose. The legislative intention is that every part of the statute should be given effect. Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. The Apex Court in Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors.:
(2003) 2 SCC 111 held that it is the basic principle of construction of statute that statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to their plain meaning and no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.
8. The Apex Court in State of Gujrat & Anr v. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retired) & Ors: (2013) 3 SCC 1 held that:
"96. In the process of statutory construction, the court must construe the Act before it, bearing in mind the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat which means it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be made void, i.e., a statute must be construed in such a manner, so as to make it workable. Viscount Simon, L.C. in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.: 1940 AC 1014: (1940) 3 All ER 549 (HL) stated as follows: (AC p.1022) Page 5 of 9 "......if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result."
97. Similarly in Whitney v. IRC: 1926 AC 37 (HL), it was observed as under: (AC p.52) "...... A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable."
98. The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to statutory provisions, and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable. The rules of interpretation require that construction, which carries forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred, looking into the text and context of the statute. Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. "The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of the statute must be so construed so as to make it effective and operative." The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute was enacted, as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus, legislative futility must be ruled out. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the Act itself does not become a dead letter, and the obvious intention of the legislature does not stand defeated, unless it leads to a case of absolute intractability in use. The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy and "to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico". The court must give effect to the purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute. (Vide: M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa: AIR 1961 SC 1107, S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta: (1987) 1 SCC 191: AIR 1987 SC 222, RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.: (1987) 1 Page 6 of 9 SCC 424: AIR 1987 SC 1023, Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam: (1989) 3 SCC 709: AIR 1990 SC 123 SCC p.754 para 118, UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor:
(2008) 5 SCC 257: (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 263 and Grid Corpn.
of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys: (2011) 11 SCC 334)."
9. The Apex Court in Raghunath Rai Bareja & Anr v. Punjab National Bank & Ors: (2007) 2 SCC 230 held that:
"40. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India: (2004) 11 SCC 641: AIR 2004 SC 4219. As held in Prakash Nath Khanna v. C.I.T.: (2004) 9 SCC 686, the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result, vide Delhi Financial Corpn. v. Rajiv Anand: (2004) 11 SCC 625. Where the legislative intent is clear from the language, the Court should give effect to it, vide Government of A.P. v. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Assn.: (2004) 6 SCC 210 and the Court should not seek to amend the law in the garb of interpretation.
46. The rules of interpretation other than the literal rule would come into play it there is any doubt with regard to the express language used or if the plain meaning would lead to an absurdity. Where the words are unequivocal, there is no scope for importing any rule of interpretation vide Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT: (2003) 5 SCC 590.
47. It is only where the provisions of a statue are ambiguous that the court can depart from a literal or strict construction vide Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal: (2003) 2 SCC 577: AIR 2003 SC 1543. Where the words of a statue are plain and Page 7 of 9 unambiguous effect must be given to them vide Bhaiji v. Sub- Divisional Officer: (2003) 1 SCC 692."
10. On conjoint reading of Section 2(q) and Section 8 of the said Act of 1983, it is clear that the Memorandum of Society or Constitution of Society can be altered by a Resolution in any General Body Meeting approved by the votes of three-fourths of the members of the society including votes by proxy where voting by proxy is allowed under its regulations. Therefore, the plain meaning of Section 2(q) and Section 8 of the said Act of 1983 would be the one indicated above. Admittedly, the previous permission of the Registrar in writing was not obtained before passing the impugned Resolution No.3 for amendment of the Constitution of the Society in the said General Body Meeting held on 04.08.2013 and also there is no clear indication that the votes of three-fourths of the members within the meaning of Section 2(q) of the said Act 1983 had approved the impugned Resolution No.3 of the General Body Meeting held on 04.08.2013 for amendment of the Constitution of the Society.
11. In the above factual backdrop, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned Resolution No.3 of the General Body Meeting held on 04.08.2013 and also the impugned letter/order of the Registrar of Societies, Meghalaya, Shillong dated 23.04.2014 for approval of the alteration or amendment of the Constitution vide Resolution No.3 of the General Body Meeting of the Society held on 04.08.2013 are in clear infraction of Section 8 of the said Act of 1983. Accordingly, the impugned Resolution No.3 of the General Body Meeting held on 04.08.2013 and the impugned letter/order dated 23.04.2014 of the Registrar of Societies, Meghalaya, Shillong are hereby quashed. However, it is left to the society to take recourse under the law to amend the Constitution of the Society, if necessary.
Page 8 of 9
12. This writ petition is allowed.
JUDGE Lam Page 9 of 9