Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Arindam Choudhury vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 4 February, 2019
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
Hon'ble Justice Dipankar Datta
and
Hon'ble Justice Bibek Chaudhuri
W.P.S.T. 35 of 2018
Arindam Choudhury
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & ors.
With
W.P.S.T. 38 of 2018
Anirban Jana
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & ors.
For the petitioner in : Mr. Aritra Shankar Roy.
W.P.S.T. 35 of 2018
For the respondents in : Mr. Sirsanya Bandhyopadhyay,
W.P.S.T. 35 of 2018 Ms. Sudeshna Das Mazumder.
For the petitioner in : Mr. Goutam Chakraborty,
W.P.S.T. 38 of 2018 Mr. J.N. Manna.
For the respondents in : Mr. Joytosh Majumdar,
W.P.S.T. 35 of 2018 Mr. Pinaki Dhole,
Ms. Kakali Samajpati,
Mr. Avishek Prasad.
Heard on : December 10, 2018
Judgment on : February 04, 2019
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.:
1. These two writ petitions were heard separately but on the same day. Since the questions of law emerging for decision are somewhat common, we propose to decide the same by this common judgment and order.
2. W.P.S.T. 35 of 2018 dated June 12, 2018, at the instance of the petitioner (hereafter Arindam), is directed against the judgment and order dated May 8, 2018 of the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal (hereafter the tribunal), dismissing O.A. 1159 of 2016 that he had presented. Rejection of the prayer of Arindam for appointment on compassionate ground is under challenge.
3. The petitioner in W.P.S.T. 38 of 2018 dated June 21, 2018 (hereafter Anirban), is similarly aggrieved by the judgment and order dated May 17, 2018, whereby the tribunal dismissed O.A. 1195 of 2015 presented by him seeking appointment on compassionate ground. The order impugned regretting the prayer for compassionate appointment was, thus, upheld.
4. Apart from other questions that would arise for decision on these writ petitions, one common thread that runs through both the writ petitions is that Arindam and Anirban had not attained majority when their mother and father respectively, both Government employees, died-in-harness. Thus, one common issue that we would be required to consider is, how far a minor's right to obtain appointment on compassionate ground after attaining majority is preserved in the applicable notifications/guidelines/circulars embodying the policy of the Government relatable to compassionate appointment.
5. However, before looking into the individual cases of Arindam and Anirban, we may summarise below certain well settled principles:
a) Public employment in offices or posts under the State or its instrumentalities or any other authority covered by Article 12 of the Constitution must be in accordance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, meaning thereby that appointment must be preceded by an invitation to the public for offering one's candidature for consideration, providing equal opportunities to each of the applicants to participate in the process and subject to fulfilment of the eligibility criteria, selection on the basis of merit.
b) Appointment based solely on descent is inimical to the Constitutional scheme.
c) Appointment on compassionate ground, which is offered on humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the above rule of equality in the matter of public employment. However, compassionate appointment is not permissible in the absence of any scheme therefor.
d) None can claim compassionate appointment, on the occurrence of death/medical incapacitation of the concerned employee (the sole bread earner of the family), as if it were a vested right, and any appointment without considering the financial condition of the family of the deceased is legally impermissible.
e) The whole object of granting compassionate employment by an employer being intended to enable the family members of a deceased/incapacitated employee to tide over the sudden financial crisis, appointments on compassionate ground should only be made in exceptional cases to save the family of the deceased/incapacitated staff from destitution where, but for such appointment, they would not survive.
f) An application for compassionate appointment has to be made immediately upon death/incapacitation and in any case within a reasonable period thereof or else a presumption could be drawn that the family of the deceased/incapacitated employee is not in immediate need of financial assistance. Such appointment not being a vested right, the right to apply cannot be exercised at any time in future and it cannot be offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.
g) Compassionate appointment can only be made on Group C and Group D posts.
h) Satisfaction that the family members have been facing financial distress and that an appointment on compassionate ground may assist them to tide over such distress is not enough; a dependent must fulfil the eligibility criteria for appointment.
i) A decision on an application for compassionate appointment ideally ought to be made within a given time or else the object of such appointment might be frustrated.
j) The idea of compassionate appointment is not to provide for endless compassion.
k) The object of compassionate employment is not to give a member of a family of the deceased employee a post much less a post for post held by the deceased.
l) Compassionate employment cannot be granted after lapse of reasonable period, which must be specified in the scheme.
m) There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the applicant becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions.
n) Compassionate employment being an exception to the general rule, the scheme therefor has to be strictly construed and confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve.
o) Compassionate employment is permissible to one of the dependents of the deceased/incapacitated employee.
p) An appointment on compassionate ground made many years after the death/incapacitation of the employee or without due consideration of the financial resources available to the dependant of the deceased/incapacitated employee would be directly in conflict with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
q) Although administrative process might result in delay in disposal of the pending claims under the scheme either due to non-availability of vacancies or if other eligible candidates are in the queue ahead of the concerned applicant waiting for appointment, for which appointment may not be offered to an applicant immediately upon death/incapacitation, the date of the application for appointment in particular cases might have some bearing on the right claimed having regard to the object of the scheme.
r) Irrespective of the time taken for offering compassionate appointment, rejection of a claim for compassionate appointment on the ground that the family members of the deceased/incapacitated employee are not in financial distress cannot be followed by an application by a different dependent.
s) Having regard to the fixation of minimum and maximum age by an employer answering the definition of State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution for entering service, it is axiomatic that while an over-aged dependent cannot seek appointment, even an under-aged dependent cannot also seek such appointment.
t) It is only in rare cases, if provided by the scheme for compassionate appointment and not otherwise, that a dependent who was a minor on the date of death/ incapacitation, can be considered for appointment upon attaining majority.
u) Having regard to the object of compassionate appointment, time frame fixed in the schemes for making an application ought to be considered mandatory unless of course a different intention appears from a reading of the scheme.
6. These principles have been culled out from several decisions of the Supreme Court on the point of compassionate appointment. Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 138, SBI v. Jaspal Kaur, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 571, SBI v. Anju Jain, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 475, V. Sivamurthy v. State of A.P., reported in (2008) 13 SCC 730, SAIL v. Madhusudan Das, reported in (2008) 15 SCC 560, Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 209, State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 545, Union of India v. Shashank Goswami, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 307, are some of such decisions which we have considered.
7. Now, it would be appropriate to examine the claims of Arindam and Anirban in the light of the aforesaid principles.
8. Phalguni, mother of Arindam, while working as a Staff Nurse in the district hospital at Medinipore, passed away on December 4, 2006 leaving behind her as her surviving heirs her son, Arindam, and husband, Bidhan. Bidhan had applied for compassionate appointment for self on February 15, 2008. He was 48 years old then. An enquiry committee constituted to consider the application made a recommendation dated March 7, 2009 for immediate financial assistance as "the family was dependant on the applicant" (sic deceased). During the pendency of such application, Arindam attained majority on April 1, 2013. Since despite such recommendation there was no positive result, another application followed on May 2, 2013 at the instance of Bidhan seeking Arindam's appointment on compassionate ground. The first application of Bidhan was rejected as late as on April 22, 2015 on the twin grounds that Bidhan was over-aged and that the family members of Phalguni were not in financial distress. Immediately thereafter, Arindam sent a "REMINDER" on July 8, 2015 seeking compassionate appointment for self on the ground that Bidhan was 55 years old and hence, unable to work. Since his prayer was not considered, the tribunal was approached. The tribunal noted that Bidhan sought for Arindam's appointment seven years after the death of Phalguni and Arindam himself had applied nine years thereafter, and rejected his prayer on the ground that the application of Arindam "submitted through his father initially and thereafter by him cannot be considered by the respondents after rejection of prayer of the father of ... for compassionate appointment".
9. Bibekanada, father of Anirban, died-in-harness on February 23, 2007. He was employed as a clerk in the Public Works Department on the material date. An application made on February 30, 2007 by the widow of Bibekananda, Swapna, for compassionate appointment of her son having evoked no response, she made an application dated July 14, 2008. There was no reference to the earlier application therein. Exactly two years later, on July 14, 2010, Swapna once again applied but without reference to her earlier applications. It was followed by a lawyer's notice dated December 15, 2012. In the meanwhile, Anirban attained majority on January 8, 2010. The respondents having maintained complete silence, Anirban sued them by presenting O.A. 669 of 2013 before the tribunal. It was disposed of with a direction for consideration of the application for compassionate appointment in accordance with law and disposal thereof by passing a reasoned order. Upon communication thereof, an enquiry committee was constituted. It submitted a report dated March 24, 2015. By an order dated June 12, 2015, Anirban was informed of the respondents' inability to offer him compassionate appointment on the ground that he was a minor on the date of death of Bibekananda. It is this order that the tribunal upheld by its judgment and order, which is impugned before us.
10. It could be seen from the aforesaid factual narrative that Phalguni and Bibekananda passed away on December 4, 2006 and February 23, 2007 respectively. The notifications/guidelines/circular of the Government, prevalent then, may be noted.
11. In exercise of the power conferred by section 3(c) of the West Bengal Regulation of Recruitment in State Government Establishments and Establishments of Public Undertakings, Statutory Bodies, Government Companies and Local Authorities Act, 1999 (hereafter the Act), notification nos. 301-Emp and 303-Emp, both dated August 21, 2002, were issued. While the former notification identified who would comprise the 'Exempted Category' candidates, the latter provided for the procedure to be followed in the matter of compassionate appointment for such 'Exempted Category' candidates. Inter alia, dependants of employees dying-in- harness were included in the 'Exempted Category', in terms of the former notification. Under the 'general procedure to be followed in respect of different Exempted Categories', engrafted in the latter notification, one of conditions is this. If the administrative department decides that a particular case is fit where employment on compassionate ground could be given, a suitable vacancy has to be identified under the appointing authority concerned for providing employment subject to the condition that the candidate satisfies the qualification and other requirements prescribed for recruitment to the post.
12. In the middle of 2005, the Government introduced 'principles and procedures to be followed in dealing with the issue of appointment on compassionate ground to the dependants of employees who die-in-harness, or who retire prematurely on being declared permanently incapacitated' vide notification no. 97-Emp dated June 6, 2005. Paragraph 9 of the notification stipulated that unless there are exceptional reasons, the department to which the name of a person is forwarded by the Labour Department in terms of paragraph 8 thereof will issue the letter of appointment after observing usual formalities, implying thereby that a verification be made as to whether the name of the candidate, forwarded for appointment by the Labour Department pursuant to the recommendation of the Nodal Committee, satisfies the qualification and other requirements for entry in Government service. Paragraph 13 ordained that this notification would come into force from the date of issue and shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any previous notification, circular, order or memorandum on the subject.
13. The notification dated June 6, 2005 was followed in quick succession by corrigenda nos. 131-Emp dated August 26, 2005, 151-Emp dated September 8, 2005, 27-Emp dated February 8, 2006, memorandum dated February 8, 2006, and notification nos. 69-Emp dated June 26, 2007 and 133-Emp dated October 1, 2007.
14. Notification no. 97-Emp dated June 6, 2005 was in force till notification no.30- Emp dated April 2, 2008 saw the light of the day. It (notification dated April 2, 2008) rescinded the notification dated June 6, 2005 along with corrigenda/orders/notifications issued in the context thereof and restored the position which was prevailing prior to June 6, 2005 subject to modifications/clarifications as specifically mentioned therein. In effect, all notifications issued prior to June 6, 2005 revived.
15. Notification dated June 6, 2005 which was governing the field of compassionate appointment when Phalguni and Bibekananda passed away, provided in paragraph 2 as follows:
"2. One of the dependents of an employee who dies-in-harness or who retires prematurely on being declared permanently incapacitated may be offered appointment on compassionate ground subject to fulfilment of the following conditions:
(i) The employee has died, or retired on being permanently incapacitated before completing 20 years of service or before attaining the age of 50 years, whichever is earlier,
(ii) The family of the deceased or the retired employee, as the case may be, is in need of immediate assistance and appointment of a dependant of the employee is absolutely essential for survival of the family.
*****".
16. In terms of the notification dated April 2, 2008, the basic eligibility criteria is laid down in the following words :
"2 (1) One of the dependants of a Government employee who dies in harness or who retires prematurely on being declared permanently incapacitated may be offered appointment on compassionate ground if -
(i) The family of the deceased or the retired employee as the case may be is in need of immediate assistance; and
(ii) The employee had at the time of death or premature retirement at least two years of service left to reach the normal age of superannuation.
Provided that in the case of appointment of a dependant of a Government employee who retires *** (2) *** (3) One of the conditions that needs to be fulfilled for offering appointment on compassionate ground is that the family of the deceased or prematurely retired employee is in need of immediate financial assistance. ***"
17. The notification dated June 6, 2005 did not specify any time frame for making an application for compassionate appointment. However, a time frame is found in paragraph 4 of the notification dated April 2, 2008. It reads as follows:
"4. The dependant of an employee seeking appointment on compassionate ground shall henceforth make an application in the prescribed proforma within six months from the date of death of the deceased employee or his retirement on permanent disablement. If no application is submitted within this stipulated period, it will be presumed that the family does not require immediate financial assistance".
18. Although all the relevant clauses of the applicable notifications have not been referred to above, the procedure appears to be clear on a conspectus thereof. A dependant of an employee, dying-in-harness/retiring owing to physical incapacitation, who is in need of immediate assistance, has to pass through a multi-tier check process. The first is relatable to ascertainment of the need for assistance, which is of paramount importance. Unless there is a crisis in the family arising out of death/incapacitation, there can be no valid claim requiring examination. Secondly, the Committee which examines the claim at the first instance, apart from ascertaining whether the family of the deceased/retired employee is in dire need of assistance, ought also to ideally examine whether the dependant who has applied is otherwise qualified to hold a post under the Government. If, however, the Committee fails to examine this aspect, it is always open to the Government in the relevant administrative department to verify whether the dependant who has been recommended is otherwise qualified. In case the applying dependant falls short of any of the qualifications, it is also open to the Government to ascertain whether any other dependant member of the family is so qualified and interested to obtain employment to further the object of compassionate appointment. If so, he could be considered. Once a dependant member is found to be eligible qua the basic qualifications, he is required to be sent for medical examination and his antecedents verified prior to finally accepting the recommendation. Only upon clearance from all quarters being received, would the offer of appointment follow.
19. While considering the claims of the petitioners, we need to keep the aforesaid summary of the procedure in mind apart from the judicial pronouncements.
20. Phalguni was 46 years of age when she died. She had put in little less than 20 years' service. Therefore, any application for compassionate appointment by her heirs would not be barred by reason of paragraph 2(i) of the notification dated June 6, 2005.
21. The application for compassionate appointment of Bidhan was disposed of on April 22, 2015 by the respondents. Several modifications/clarifications were issued in the meanwhile in respect of the guidelines for compassionate appointment. In none of these was any provision made for entry of an individual into Government service above 40 years and below 18 years of age. Since Bidhan did not belong to any of the backward classes, relaxation of upper age limit for him was not permissible. The application that Bidhan made for compassionate appointment on February 15, 2008 could not have been favourably considered under any circumstances. Bidhan was over-aged (48 years) and Arindam under- aged (12 years). True it is that the respondents took almost 7 years' time to finally decide the same, but nothing really turns on it. From day one, Bidhan was ineligible for entering Government service because of his advanced age. Arindam was also not eligible, being a minor. The initial application made by Bidhan, which was rejected inter alia on the ground of his age, did not therefore call for any interference.
22. What remained was the application of Arindam. We propose to give our decision on this point a little later after we discuss Anirban's case.
23. Bibekananda died 4 days before he would have completed the age of 58 years. He had, however, completed more than 30 years of service. If the notification dated June 6, 2005 is held to be the applicable notification, any application for compassionate appointment by his heirs would be barred by reason of paragraph 2(i) thereof; but if the notification dated April 2, 2008 were applicable, paragraph 2 thereof would not operate as a bar. There is, however, no material to evince that any exercise was undertaken in terms of paragraph 3 of the notification dated April 2, 2008 or not. We shall assume that paragraph 3 also did not create a bar.
24. However, if the notification dated April 2, 2008 were applicable to Anirban, paragraph 4 required an application to be made within a period of 6 months from the date of death/incapacitation of the employee. It also carried a clause specifying the consequence for not applying within such time frame. If no application were made within the time frame, it would be presumed that the family is not in need of assistance for survival.
25. There is no material on record to suggest that Swapna had applied in the prescribed proforma. Confronted with the same, our attention was drawn by Mr. Chakraborty, learned advocate for Anirban to Swapna's applications, forming part of Annexure-P 1 to the writ petition, and to overcome omission or failure to apply in the prescribed proforma it was contended that we ought to consider the substance of the applications and not its form. Swapna being over-aged, had applied for appointment of Anirban on compassionate ground and notwithstanding the fact that Anirban was a minor at the time of his father's death, it was contended by Mr. Chakraborty that we ought to apply the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Syed Khadim Hussain v. State of Bihar, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 195, and the unreported decision of a learned Judge of the Madras High Court in W.P. 25784 of 2010 (J. Jeba Mary v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board).
26. The tribunal in its impugned judgment had noted that none of the applications said to have been made by Swapna bore any endorsement acknowledging receipt; hence, the same could not be treated as evidence of service of the applications on the respondents. In any event, the respondents proceeded to consider the applications only upon being directed by the tribunal in that behalf by its order dated January 10, 2014.
27. We have noted earlier that in none of the several applications said to have been made by Swapna following her first application, there is reference to the immediately preceding application. That apart, the date of the first application appears to be February 30, 2007. We would only record that bona fides are lacking in the present case.
28. Now, we come to the core question as to whether Arindam and Anirban as minors have right to claim compassionate appointment resting on the decision in Syed Khadim Hussain (supra) and J. Jeba Mary (supra).
29. It appears from Syed Khadim Hussain (supra) that the widow of the concerned employee (who died-in-harness on September 12, 1991) had applied for compassionate appointment within time, i.e., on April 2, 1993 to be precise, but not in the prescribed proforma. On that ground the application was rejected. The appellant had thereafter applied on September 7, 1995, when he was 13 years' old. Such application was rejected after 6 years on the ground that when he had applied, the appellant was under- aged and, therefore, could not be appointed in Government service. The Court, after noting these facts, was of the following view:
"5. *** and the reason given by the authorities was incorrect as at the time of rejection of the application he must have crossed 18 years and he could have been very well considered for appointment. Of course, in the rules framed by the State there is no specific provision as to what should be done in case the dependents are minors and there would be any relaxation of age in case they did not attain majority within the prescribed period for submitting application.
6. As the widow had submitted the application in time the authorities should have considered her application. As eleven years have passed she would not be in a position to join the government service. In our opinion, this is a fit case where the appellant should have been considered in her place for appointment. Counsel for the State could not point out any other circumstance for which the appellant would be disentitled to be considered for appointment. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the respondent authorities to consider the application of the appellant and give him appropriate appointment within a reasonable time at least within a period of three months. ***"
(underlining for emphasis by us)
30. The Court clearly recorded that there was no provision in the rules as to how an application from a minor applicant would be dealt with or for relaxation of age qua an application by an applicant who was a minor on the date of death. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case before it, the Court proceeded to make an order in favour of the appellant.
31. A distinction has to be drawn between a decision which declares a law that is binding on all Courts under Article 141 of the Constitution and a decision which makes an order having regard to the provisions of Article 142 thereof. We can do no better than quote below a passage from the decision in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 883, reading as follows:
"12. *** The directions issued by the Court can normally be categorised into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. "Declaration of law" as contemplated in Article 141 of the Constitution: is the speech express or necessarily implied by the highest court of the land. This Court in ..... has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down that the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court has compartmentalised and differentiated the relief in the operative portion of the judgment by exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution as against the law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case."
(underlining for emphasis by us)
32. In the light of the guidance we draw from the afore-quoted passage, the Court in Syed Khadim Hussain (supra) appears to us to have moulded the relief claimed in favour of the appellant and, therefore, such decision clearly falls in the category of a decision where directions were made in exercise of the Court's power to do complete justice in a given case, recognised by Article 142 of the Constitution. Syed Khadim Hussain (supra) does not, thus, constitute a binding precedent within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution.
33. Decisions of coordinate Benches of this Court in W.P.S.T. 18 of 2018 (Kamal Adhikari v. State of West Bengal) and W.P.S.T. 110 of 2018 (Mithun Madraji v. State of West Bengal) have been placed before us by Mr. Majumdar, learned Government Pleader, wherein the decision in Syed Khadim Hussain (supra) was distinguished in view of the peculiar facts obtaining therein.
34. We, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that no relief can be claimed by the petitioners by relying on Syed Khadim Hussain (supra).
35. The decision in J. Jeba Mary (supra) does reveal that relief was granted to the petitioner despite her being a minor at the time of applying for compassionate appointment. However, the Court noted that the petitioner's mother had applied for compassionate appointment within a year of her husband's (father of the petitioner) death and such application had not been disposed of. In such circumstances, rejection of the petitioner's application on the ground that she was a minor was held to be bad and treating the petitioner's application as one filed in continuation of her mother's application, the same was directed to be reconsidered without reference to the objection in the order impugned before the Court.
36. The facts here, in both the writ petitions, as well as the guidelines/policy for compassionate appointment are quite different and hence, we hold the decision in J. Jeba Mary (supra) to be distinguishable on facts.
37. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision of the notifications which preserves the right of a minor applicant to obtain an appointment on compassionate ground till he attains majority. From the principles summarised in paragraph 5 (supra), it is clear that an applicant for compassionate appointment does not acquire a right of appointment only upon proving the distressed condition of the family members of the employee who has died-in- harness. An aspirant for a post must have other necessary qualifications which, inter alia, would include being of the required age for entry in service, possessing the minimum educational qualifications and bearing good moral character as well as health. Financial crisis would not automatically guarantee an appointment. If there is any deficiency, such deficiency can be relaxed by the Government but not by any direction of Court. Needless to observe, a Court by issuing a mandamus cannot direct the Government to act contrary to law.
38. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 718, the Supreme Court has sounded caution in the following words:
10. Of late, this Court is coming across many cases in which appointment on compassionate ground is directed by judicial authorities. Hence, we would like to lay down the law in this regard. The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration. No doubt Shakespeare said in 'Merchant of Venice':
'The quality of mercy is not strain'd;
It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place beneath it is twice bless'd; It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes;' These words will not apply to all situations. Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that 'law is the embodiment of all Wisdom'. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be.
11. At this juncture we may usefully refer to Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529. At page 535 of the Report the following observations are found:
'A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a Court likes the result or not.' The courts should endeavour to find out whether a particular case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law. Disregardful of law, however, hard the case may be, it should never be done. ... The appellant Corporation being a statutory Corporation is bound by the Life Insurance Corporation Act as well as the Statutory Regulations and Instructions. They cannot be put aside and compassionate appointment be ordered.
12. Further it is well-settled in law that no mandamus will be issued directing to do a thing forbidden by law. ...
13. It is true that there may be pitiable situations but on that score, the statutory provisions cannot be put aside."
39. Our sympathies are with Arindam and Anirban, both of whom lost one of their parents at a very young age. However, in the absence of any provision in the statutory notifications (which owe their origin to the Act) creating any source of legal right in favour of the petitioners to claim compassionate appointment, we are unable to grant them any relief on these writ petitions.
40. The end result is that the impugned orders deserve to be upheld. The writ petitions fail and, accordingly, stand dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
Photocopy of this judgment and order, duly countersigned by the Assistant Court Officer shall be retained with the records of W.P.S.T. 38 of 2018.
(Bibek Chaudhuri, J.) (Dipankar Datta, J.)