Allahabad High Court
Ram Sukh Yadav S/O Jag Deo Yadav, ... vs State Of U.P. Through The Principal ... on 10 April, 2007
Author: Sudhir Agarwal
Bench: Sudhir Agarwal
JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal, J.
1. All these writ petitions involve common questions of law and fact and, therefore, as requested by learned Counsel for the parties, they have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.
2. All these petitioners have sought a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Forest, Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Conservator of Forest and Divisional Forest Officer to correct the service book of the petitioner and treat them as regularly appointed from the date of initial appointment instead of their respective date of regularization. The petitioners have also challenged the validity of Rule 7 of the U.P. Regularization of Daily Wages Appointment on Group 'C' Posts (Outside the Purview of the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission) Rules, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1998 Rules"), alleging the same to be ultra vires and contrary to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Putti Lal 2002(2) UPLBEC 1595
3. The brief facts as stated in writ petition are that the petitioners appear to have been engaged on daily wage basis in the Forest Department on the following dates:
S.N. Name of the petitioner Date of initial appointment 1. Ram Sukh Yadav 1.7.1997 2. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava 16.10.1989 3. Junaid Ahmad 1981 4. Awadhesh Prasad Pandey November 1975 5. Shyam Lal November 1983 6. Suresh Prasad Tripathi November 1979 7. Ram Krishna Dwivedi November 1979
4. The question of continuance of daily wage employees in Forest Department for a long time drew attention of this Court in a large number of cases and the matter was decided by a Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Putti Lal 1998(1) UPLBEC 313 wherein direction was issued to the State Government for framing a policy so as to consider regularisation of daily wage employees of Forest Department working for a long time. The State of U.P. preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and during the pendency of the matter before the Apex Court, the 1998 Rules were promulgated which were placed before the Apex Court and considering the same, the Apex Court disposed of all the petitions vide judgment dated 23.5.2001, observing that the State Government shall consider the daily wage employees of forest department for regularization in accordance with 1998 Rules. The petitioners pursuant to the aforesaid directions appear to have been considered for regularization and have been regularized on various posts vide various orders as mentioned hereinbelow:
S.N. Name of the petitioner Date of Post on which
Reguiariz regularization
ation was made.
1. Ram Sukh Yadav 4.12.2001 Forester
2. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava 16.10.1989 Typist-cum-clerk
3. Junaid Ahmad 16.4.2002 Forester
4. Awadhesh Prasad Pandey 4.12.2001 Forester
5. Shyam Lal 4.12.2001 Forester
6. Suresh Prasad Tripathi 4.12.2001 Forester
7. Ram Krishna Dwivedi 4.12.2001 Forester
5. These petitioners now are aggrieved by Rule 7 of 1998 Rules which lays down principle of seniority of a person regularized under 1998 Rules since it ignores their entire service rendered as daily wage employee for the purpose of seniority. Sri Pankaj Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has assailed the validity of Rule 7 mainly on the following grounds:
1. The aforesaid Rule ignores the long and continuous service of more than ten years and therefore, is unjust, illegal and violative of Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India.
2. The omission of service before regularisation for the purpose of seniority also results in loss of pensionary benefits and thus also the Rule is illegal and arbitrary.
3. Before the Apex Court the State of U.P. filed various affidavits and in one of the affidavit it was said that the State Government is visualising the necessity of regularisation of daily wagers of forest department of U.P., which means that the service rendered by such persons would be given due weight for all purposes but Rule 7 operates contrary to the stand taken by the State of U.P. before the Apex Court and hence, it is illegal.
4. Wiping out long past service for the purpose of seniority is per se arbitrary. Reliance is placed on The Direct Recruit Class-ll Engineering Officers' Assocn v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. ; R. Hariharan and Ors. v. K. Balachadran Nair and Ors. ; Gujarat Agricultural University v Rathod Labhu Bechar and Ors. ; Thiru A. Balakrishnan and Anr. v. Government of Tamilnadu and Ors. (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 108; International Airports Authority Employees Union and Anr. v. Airport Authority of India and Ors. and Pran Krishan Goswami and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. .
5. While considering the validity of statutory provision, the legislative intention of the substantive provision has to be gathered and where ancillary provision is inconsistent to the intention of legislature, evident from the substantive provision, the ancillary provision would be ultra vires.
6. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel opposing the writ petitions submitted that the vires of statute or rule framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can be assailed on the similar grounds which are available for assailing the vires of a principal enactment. Rule 7 of 1998 Rules provides seniority to a person who is regularized in service and has become a member thereof, from the date, he has so become member of the service which is consistent to the well settled principles of law enunciated in a catena of cases of the Apex Court including the Constitution Bench judgment in The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers' Association (supra) and, therefore, Rule 7 is neither arbitrary nor ultra vires and the writ petitions based on misconceived submissions deserve to be dismissed.
7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record as also the various authorities cited by both the sides.
8. The provision pertaining to regularization had not been made for the first time in the State of U.P. in 1998 but similar Rules are available from the past having been made earlier also, i.e., about two decades earlier and as amended from time to time which also contain similar provision regarding seniority. In the State of U.P., regular recruitment against public posts were deferred for one or the other reasons and instead, casual and precarious kind of appointments, without following the procedure laid down under Rules, were made from time to time by the authorities, sometimes to meet the exigencies of requirement of work load and sometimes for various other reasons. The appointments were made under various heads namely, "daily wage", 'casual', "stop gap arrangement", "ad hoc", 'temporary', "contract appointment" and so on. Sometimes, the appointments were made against the vacancies substantively available but in the absence of recruitment on regular basis in accordance with Rules and sometimes the persons were engaged even in the absence of any vacancy against sanctioned post in the concerned department. These incumbents continued for quite sometime creating a force by themselves sufficient to exert pressure and due political influence on the government to provide security of tenure to this group of persons which resulted in enactment of regularisation rules. The process started with the promulgation of two Rules, namely, (a) The U.P. Regularisation of Ad Hoc Appointments (On Posts Within the Purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules 1979 and (b) The U.P. Regularisation of Ad Hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules 1979, published in U.P. Gazette dated 14.5.1979. To start with, the Rules framing authority intended to regularise the service of only those persons who were appointed on ad hoc basis before 1.1.1977 and were continuing as such on the commencement of the aforesaid Rules. Two other conditions were made necessary for entitling such ad hoc appointees before considering their case for regularisation i.e., they must possess requisite qualification prescribed for regular appointment at the time of such ad hoc appointment and have completed three years' continuous service.
9. It appears that initially it was sought to be a one time indulgence granted but despite exercise of regularization undertaken pursuant to the aforesaid Rules, still ad hoc arrangement continued unabated which resulted in some amendments in the aforesaid Rules. In both the sets of the aforesaid Rules of 1979 the first amendment was published in gazette dated 22.3.1984 whereby Rule 9 was inserted and the cut-off date for the purpose of regularisation was extended to 1.5.1983. The second amendment was published in the gazette dated 7.8.1989 inserting Rule 10 and the cut off date for regularisation was extended upto 1.10.1986. Lastly, the third amendment was published in the gazette dated 20.12.2001 whereby Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 was substituted having the effect of making provison for regularisation for the persons appointed on ad hoc basis on or before 30.6.1998 and continuing in service on the date of commencement of Third Amendment Rules of 2001.
10. The Rules framing authority besides regularisation of ad hoc appointees also sought to make provisions for regularisation of daily wage employees and promulgated 1998 Rules and the U.P. Regularisation of Daily Wages Appointments on Group 'D' Posts Rules 2001. In both these Rules the cut-off date prescribed for the purpose of regularisation of daily wage employees working on Group 'C' and 'D' posts is 29.6.1991.
11. Further under 1979 Rules, 1998 Rules and 2001 Rules, provision for seniority was also made and in all the said Rules, it is pari materia. It would be appropriate to reproduce Rule 7 of 1979 Rules as under:
7. Seniority. -(1) A person appointed under these rules shall be entitled to seniority only from the date of order of appointment after selection in accordance with these rules and shall, in all cases, be placed below the persons appointed in accordance with the relevant service rules, or as the case may be, the regular prescribed procedure, prior to the appointment of such person under these rules.
(2) If two or more persons are appointed together their seniority inter se shall be determined in the order mentioned in the order of appointment.
12. The validity of 1979 Rules, challenged on the ground of violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Lala Ram Katiyar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1985 UPLBEC 433 but the challenge was negatived and the validity was upheld as under:
20. In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that the Regularisation Rules are valid and they do not offend Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution....
13. Similar provisions pertaining to regularisation were also made in the State of U.P. in various other services. In respect to seniority, the regularisation rules, invariably provided that the same would count from the date of order of appointment in accordance with regularisation rules, i.e., from the date of regularisation.
14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners despite repeated opportunity, could not bring to the notice of this Court any provision under Regularisation Rules applicable to any service wherein benefit of seniority has been given from a date anterior to the date of regularisation. In other words, it is not disputed that the service rendered by daily wage or ad hoc appointee before his regularisation has not been recognised for the purpose of seniority after regularisation. The reason is easily understandable. If the service rendered before regularisation would have been recognised, seniority always being a concept which is comparative, it would have affected adversely the employees who are already serving in the department having been appointed on regular basis and such a provision, if would have been enacted, may have the risk of violating of equality clause under Article 16 of the Constitution, treating unequals as equals. An employee who had been engaged on daily wage basis or as stop gap arrangement or on contract basis or purely on ad hoc basis without undergoing the process of selection and recruitment provided under the Rules, cannot claim as a matter of right that the aforesaid service rendered by him should be recognised for the purpose of seniority. The quality of service in the aforesaid capacity obviously cannot be placed at par with the service rendered by a person after his regular appointment. If the two kinds of service cannot be equated, I doubt whether a provision which does not recognise ad hoc or daily wage service for the purpose of seniority, can be assailed on the ground of infringing the right of equality enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution.
15. In S.B. Patvardhan v. State of Maharashtra , it was held that when the appointment is made by way of stop gap arrangement, without considering the claims of the available eligible candidates and without following the rules of appointment, the experience on such appointment cannot be equated with the experience of regular appointee because of the qualitative difference in the appointment. To equate the two would be to treat two unequals as equal which would violate the equality clause. The same view was reiterated in Baleshwar Dass and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. and Delhi Water Supply and Sewage Disposal Committee and Ors. v. R.K. Kashyap . The Constitution Bench in Direct Recruits Class II Engineers Case (Supra) in para 44 in proposition (A) held where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop gap arrangement, officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for seniority. The same view was reiterated in a catena of decisions and I need not burden this judgment except to refer the Full Bench judgment in Farhat Hussain Azad v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2005) 1 UPLBEC 474 wherein all the aforesaid cases have been considered and referred and the exposition of law has been described as under:
Thus, the law stands crystallised that a person appointed on ad hoc basis on a post de hors the Rules or without following any procedure prescribed by law, cannot claim the benefit of reckoning the period of service rendered by him as such for the purpose of seniority or promotion.
16. It is true that in the absence of Rules, the length of service has been held to be a golden rule for the purpose of seniority but where the statute itself provides the manner in which the seniority has to be determined, the same would have to be computed in accordance with the rules and not otherwise for the reason that the seniority has been held to be an incidence of service (See A.K. Bhatnagar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. ; Indian Administrative Service (SCS) Association U.P. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1993) Suppl. 1 SCC 730). The Constitution Bench in Prafulla Kumar Das and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors. held that seniority is an incidence of service and when Rules provide the method of computation, it is squarely governed by such Rules since no one has a vested right of seniority. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that no person has a vested right of seniority by virtue of mere rendering some kind of service with the employer irrespective of the fact that the nature of appointment did not permit him any benefit of seniority for the reason that the engagement/appointment was not in accordance with the rules.
17. 1998 Rules which are up for consideration basically had been enacted with the object to provide security of tenure to daily wage employees who admittedly were engaged without undergoing the process of selection and recruitment in accordance with the Rules consistent with the scheme of equal consideration for employment enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution, yet since such engagement has continued for considerable length of time, the rule framing authority in its wisdom decided to confer protection of tenure to such persons and to make their engagement regular for future. The question of seniority therefore, would be attracted only when such incumbent becomes a member of service, namely, is appointed in service in accordance with the Rules. Unless and until the appointment is made in accordance with the rules, such an incumbent being stranger to the service, has no claim with respect to seniority qua others who have been recruited and appointed on regular basis in accordance with law. Seniority is always comparative while benefit of regularisation is individual. When a daily wage employee is said to be regularised, the persons who are already in service may not have a valid objection in case such person is given benefit of security of tenure and other service benefits. But if such person is sought to be given any benefit of seniority by recognising the length of service prior to their regular appointment, this would be prejudicial to the persons who are already regularly appointed and working in the department since, as I already said, seniority is comparative and, therefore, the issue of seniority has to be dealt with in a different manner than the question of regularisation.
18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it cannot be said that ignoring the past service, i.e., service rendered prior to appointment on regular basis under the Rules would perse be illegal and arbitrary since such service cannot be equated with service rendered by those who were appointed on regular basis.
19. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further submits that Rule 7 of 1998 Rules is 'contrary to the spirit of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Putti Lal (Supra). The submission is noted to be rejected outright being wholly misconceived. The Rule framing power exercised by the Governor which is up for consideration is the one which has been exercised under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The said power is exercised by the Governor in absence of any enactment by the competent legislature on the matter of recruitment and conditions of service of a person holding civil post in the State. The said power can be exercised by the Governor co-extensive with the legislative power in absence of legislation on the subject by the principal legislature. The validity of a rule framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution can be assailed on limited ground, namely, it is violative of any provision under the Constitution or a statute enacted by the State or Central legislature on the subject concerned. A rule cannot be challenged on the ground that it is violative of spirit of a judgment of the Court. The Rule framing power vested in an authority can be exercised within the limits provided in the relevant statute and if it transcends such limits, the same would be ultra vires. In State of Kerala v. K.M.C. Abdulla and Co. it was held that a rule may be ultra vires if it has overstepped the scope of the parent Act or if it has been promulgated in breach of some mandatory statutory provision, prescribing the procedure for rule making or it fraudulently seeks to accomplish a purpose which is not envisaged by the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioners could not place any authority where a rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution can be held to be ultra vires on the ground that it is against the spirit of some judgment of the Court. However, I still require the learned Counsel for the petitioners to show and point out that part of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Puttl Lal (supra) where against it can be said that Rule 7 is inconsistent thereto. Sri Pankaj Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioners could not place anything from the entire judgment except showing that the Apex Court permitted the State Government to consider the case of regularisation of daily wage employees in accordance with 1998 Rules and when certain learned Counsel appearing for the employees sought to object some provisions of the Rules, the Apex Court observed that it is not considering the validity of the Rules at all and it is open to the respective parties to raise such dispute in an appropriate forum. The said observation only leaves it open to the employees concerned to challenge the validity of the Rule to be considered by the appropriate forum but this it by itself cannot be said to be an observation against any particular provision of 1998 Rules.
20. Learned Counsel for the petitioners sought to place before the Court some pleadings and affidavits filed by the State Government before the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Putti Lal (supra) to buttress his submission that Rule 7 of 1998 Rules is inconsistent to the stand taken in the affidavits before the Apex Court. The aforesaid submission is rejected on two counts. Firstly, the affidavit which have been placed before the Court filed along with rejoinder affidavit nowhere shows such stand that the State Government gave any understanding or undertaking before the Apex Court that for the purpose of seniority, the services rendered by the daily wage employee prior to the regularisation would be counted. Secondly, the legislative power cannot be controlled by the affidavits filed by certain officers on behalf of the Government. The principle of estoppal has no application in the field of legislation.
21. The case of R. Hariharan (supra), cited by learned Counsel for the petitioners to support his contention that past service of ad hoc employee ought to have been considered for the purpose of seniority, does not apply to the instant case and is totally distinguishable. There certain appointments were made between 26.12.1976 to 1.8.1979 on the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) by Kerala State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as K.S.E.B.) against 10% quota reserved for in-service engineer graduates. The appointment letter stipulated that the appointments were provisional and in case the appointees passed two departmental tests and completed probationary period satisfactorily, their services would be regularised. Ultimately, K.S.E.B. regularised the said appointees on completion of probation period satisfactorily from the date of their joining as Assistant Engineers. However, the Public Service Commission refused to recognise the order of the Board regularising the said persons from the date of joining. There being a difference of opinion between K.S.E.B. and the Commission, the matter was referred to the State Government under Section 3(2) of the Kerala Public Service Commission (Additional Functions) Act, 1963. The State Government overruled the advice of the Commission and approved the decision of the K.S.E.B. with the direction that seniority of the aforesaid appointees who have been regularised, shall be determined from the date they acquired necessary qualifications. Consequently, the apex court upheld the aforesaid act of KSEB and State Government, holding that the service of the said appointees prior to regularisation was required to be counted for the purpose of seniority as provided under Rule 27 of Kerala State and Subordinate Services Riies 1958. Therefore, in the aforesaid case, the seniority was allowed to the said persons from the date they acquired qualification and having already been appointed as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules. The issue raised in the said case does not arise in the present case.
22. In Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar and Ors. (supra) which was a matter involving the question of regularisation of the employees who were workmen as defined under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, employed by Gujarat Agricultural University, the dispute pertained to regularisation raised through industrial dispute and the Industrial Tribunal directed the University to regularise all such daily wage labourers who had completed ten years of service. The University challenged the award in writ petition which was partly allowed and a direction was issued to the University to pay minimum of the pay to workmen and also to frame scheme for regularisation of such daily rated labourers. The University not satisfied, went in appeal before the Apex Court and when the matter was pending thereat, instead of contesting various issues, the University submitted a scheme framed for absorption of such employees and the respondents raised some objections to certain clauses of the Scheme which came to be considered by the Apex Court, as is evident from paras 9 and 10 of the judgment. Therefore, nothing in the aforesaid judgment lends support to the petitioners in respect to the issue raised in this set of the writ petitions.
23. In Thiru A. Balakrishnan (supra) the Apex Court held that in absence of any specific order denying seniority from the date of initial appointment, the incumbents are entitled to count whole period of service for the purpose of seniority after regularisation. Thus, the said judgment has no application since here Rule 7 of 1998 Rules itself provides the reckoning point of seniority and denying any period of service prior to the date of order of regularisation. The said judgment, therefore, also does not support the petitioners in any manner.
24. International Airports Authority Employees Union (supra), the Apex Court directed the employer to give benefit of past service of the contract labour for the purpose of retiral benefit only and no issue of seniority was involved. Therefore, I do not find the said authority supporting the petitioners' proposition that wiping out long past service for the purpose of seniority is per se arbitrary irrespective of the nature of service and other relevant factors.
25. In Pran Krishan Goswami (supra) the dispute was with respect to the principle of seniority inter se direct recruits and promotees. Therein, relying on various earlier judgments it was held that in the absence of rules to the contrary regulating the question of seniority between direct recruits and the promotees, the general principle to be applied and followed to determine seniority is to base it on continuous officiation in non-fortuitous vacancies. Therefore, the said judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners also has no application to the facts of the instant case.
26. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also urged that it is not open to the respondents to legislate a provision having the effect of overruling a decision of the Court wiping out or depriving the petitioners of benefit of the judgment which has become final. Reliance is placed on S.R. Bhagwat and Ors. v. State of Mysore and T.N. Teachers' Association v. Association of the Heads of the Government (B Wing) High and Higher Secondary Schools and Ors. . I fail to understand as to how these two judgments and the proposition advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners would have any application with the present case. There has been no litigation between the parties at any earlier point of time with respect to the issue of seniority or the principle of seniority which would apply to these petitioners. As pointed out above, despite my repeated query, learned Counsel for the petitioners could not show from the judgment in State of U.P. v. Putti Lal (supra) that the issue of seniority was even touched by this Court or the Apex Court. In these circumstances, this Court fail to appreciate as to how it can be said that the issue pertaining to seniority had already attained finality by virtue of the judgment in Putti Lal (supra) and Rule 7 cannot be said to have deprived the petitioners of certain benefits which had already accrued to the petitioners. The argument is thoroughly misconceived and does not arise at all In the present case, and, appears to have been made in sheer desperation.
27. Lastly, Sri Srivastava citing Santosh Kumar v. State of A.P. And Ors. and Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. submitted that after regularisation the ad hoc or stop gap nature of appointment does not survive and, therefore, the incumbents would be entitled to count entire period of service for the purpose of seniority. The argument is noted to be rejected. It is not the case where in respect to any service benefit after regularisation of the petitioners, the respondents are making any distinction between such regularised employees and those who were already appointed in regular manner. The petitioners on the contrary, are trying to take advantage of the service rendered by them, while they were not at all regular and their endeavour is to place the "daily wage service" rendered by them prior to regularisation at the same pedestal at which the service was rendered by other "regularly appointed incumbents". This has not been recognised by the Rules nor it is not a case of making any discrimination after regularisation.
28. In Santosh Kumar (supra) the Government issued orders in exercise of power under Rule 47 of the A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules 1962, relaxing the relevant recruitment rules and regularising certain employees w.e.f. the date of their temporary appointments. These orders were challenged before the Tribunal which held that the orders in so far as they give benefit of seniority from the date prior to issuance of the said orders, are invalid but the order of the Tribunal was reversed in writ petition by the High Court which held that since the power of relaxation was available under the Rules, the said order cannot be said to be invalid. The Apex Court upheld the view taken by the High Court and held that since the power of relaxation was available which could be exercised retrospectively, there was nothing wrong with the order issued by the Government. In the present case, the learned Counsel for the petitioners could not show that any such rule is available and the power of relaxation has been exercised in their favour. On the contrary, Rule 7 specifically excludes the period before regularisation to be counted for the purpose of seniority and its validity cannot be assailed by referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in Santosh Kumar (supra) which has no application to the issue involved in the instant case.
29. In Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court clearly held that mere directions given in a case without laying down a principle of law do not constitute a precedent and such directions can be treated as given under Article 142 of the Constitution. Further referring to the Constitution Bench in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi it also held that those who are working on daily wage, form a class by themselves and cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on employment on daily wage to claim that such employee should be treated at par with regularly recruited candidates and made permanent in employment as that would be treated as 'unequals' as 'equals'. The aforesaid proposition of law rather demolishes the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners instead of supporting him in any manner and fortify the view which this Court has taken in this judgment.
30. Moreover, pari materia, provision i.e., Rule 7 of 1979 Rules which also provides that seniority shall count from the date of the order of appointment after selection in accordance with regularisation rules, its validity on the anvil of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India has been upheld by this Court in Chatar Singh Sajwan v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1993 (3) ESC 79 (All.)
31. In nutshell, I have no hesitation in upholding the validity of Rule 7 of 1998 Rules and it cannot be said that the same is invalid or ultra vires. The contentions raised otherwise are, therefore, rejected.
32. No other point has been argued.
33. In the result, the writ petitions lack merit and are dismissed accordingly with no order as to costs.