Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Dr. Nazrul Islam vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 25 June, 2008
1
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice S.P. Talukdar
W.P No. 3693 (W) of 2008
Dr. Nazrul Islam
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioner: Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee
Mr. Joydeep Kar,
Mr. Billwadal Bhattacharyya
For the State: Mr. Pratik Dhar
Mr. Tapas Majumdar.
Judgment on: 25.06.2008.
S. P. Talukdar, J.: The petitioner, Dr. Nazrul Islam, is a member of the
Indian Police Service, at present posted as Inspector General, Enforcement
Branch, West Bengal. His grievances are as follows: -
2
Many officers, including some members of the I.A.S and I.P.S, were not
comfortable with him due to his rigid attitude, commitment and conviction, as
reflected from the manner of discharging his duties. His various acts demanding
transparency caused embarrassment to some others.
The news that the petitioner was facing 'vigilance inquiry - investigation' in
connection with his construction of a house was telecast in one T.V. Channel on
18.3.2006. The petitioner wrote to the Additional Chief Secretary (Home
Department) on 30th March, 2006 seeking confirmation. He received a memo
No.501-P & AR (Vig.) dated 3.5.2006 from Special Secretary Vigilance Cell, Home
(P & AR) Department on 5.5.2006 whereby it was intimated that Vigilance
Commission had decided to examine him 'by way of open investigation and
scrutiny of documents involved therewith'. He submitted a representation on
10.5.2006. On 17.5.2006, a daily reported that he had been directed to appear
before Vigilance Commission. He received memo No.501-P & AR (Vig.) dated
17.5.2006 from Special Secretary, Vigilance Cell, Home (P-& AR) Department on
19.5.2006 whereby he was directed to appear before Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Vigilance Commission. On 23rd May, 2006, he addressed a letter to the
Hon'ble Chief Minister, West Bengal. On 29.5.2006, he again received a memo
directing him to appear before Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance
Commission and to produce documents, which had already been submitted.
From Memo No.714 - P & AR (Vig.) dated 9.6.2006, which he received on
12.6.2006, he could learn that Vigilance Commission had decided to conduct a
technical assessment of his house by Superintending Engineer of the Vigilance
3
Commission on 15.6.2006 in his presence. On 13.6.2006, the petitioner again
approached the concerned authority and sought for details. But he was informed
on 20.6.2006 that such technical assessment would be conducted on 22nd June,
2006. Date for such assessment was again shifted to 30.6.2006. A team of
officers actually visited his house on 30.6.2006.
The petitioner filed writ application being W.P. No.16654 (W) of 2006 which
was disposed of by learned Single Bench by order dated 27th July, 2006. During
the period from 4.9.2006 to 23.10.2007, the petitioner while praying for closure
of the pending proceeding sought for supply of materials, if any, collected against
the petitioner. In response to his approach under Right to Information Act, he
received certain information on 30.11.2007.
On 3rd December, 2007, he asked for copy of the alleged pseudonymous
letter, as received by the Vigilance Commission. It was turned down by S.P. I.O.,
Vigilance Commission.
The petitioner, thereafter, made correspondences pointing out illegalities in
initiation of inquiry. He preferred an appeal under Section 19 (1) of the R.I. Act
on 3rd January, 2008. He then sought for further details like designation of the
officer who directed preliminary inquiry but it was denied. On 30th January,
2008, he preferred another appeal.
The petitioner is the founding Chairman of Basantapur Education Society,
Domkal, Murshidabad. The Vigilance Commission through its Inspector General
sought for audit and accounts report of the society for the period from 2000 to
4
2005. This was in connection with a secret inquiry undertaken by the Anti
Corruption Bureau of the Vigilance Commission.
The petitioner claimed that having regard to the fact that he is a member of
All India Service, the Vigilance Commission, West Bengal, could not have any
authority over him and the State Government cannot authorize the same. It was
claimed that the State Government cannot command or/ direct a member of any
All India Services to appear before it for examination ' in the way of open
investigation'. It cannot command him to produce any document. It cannot send
a team for technical assessment of his house without his consent. It cannot
command him to be present in such assessment. It cannot publish such
direction for confidential inquiry in the T.V. or Press. The State Government has
no authority to command a member of an All India Service to do all these at the
behest of the Vigilance Commission.
The petitioner claimed that in directing preliminary inquiry - open
investigation, the State Government has not followed its own prescribed method
in the Vigilance Commission Manual. It could be ordered only on receipt of
report of preliminary inquiry from the Inquiring Officer and after being satisfied
that there is prima facie case for further investigation.
Challenging such illegal actions taken by the respondents/authorities, the
petitioner filed an application being W.P.No.16654 (W) of 2006. In it, the petitioner sought for an order declaring that the respondents/Vigilance Commission has no authority to proceed against the petitioner who is a member of All India Service and that it can in no way compel the appearance of the 5 petitioner. The petitioner also prayed for directing the respondents/authorities not to proceed with technical assessment of the petitioner's dwelling house at 579, Madurdah, Calcutta. He sought for direction for not compelling the petitioner to appear before the Vigilance Commission. The petitioner approached the court for an order directing the respondents/authorities not to proceed with the sham investigation as well as for other reliefs. The said application was taken up for consideration by the learned Single Bench of this court on 27th July, 2006. It was disposed of with the following directions: -
"In view of the order of this Court passed on 16.5.2001 in W.P. 5856 (W) of 2001 (Annexure P 16) as well as the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in civil appeal No.2196 of 1994 which was produced in Court today by Mr. S. Srimani, the following order is passed on agreement of the parties disposing of the writ petition.
The petitioner will be allowed to appear before the Secretary, Department of Home instead of before the Vigilance Commission.
The State Government through the Secretary, Department of Home will furnish to the writ petitioner, all materials collected by the Vigilance Commission in respect of the petitioner to clarify the points arising out of such materials or any further material (s) that may be available against the petitioner. The Vigilance Commissioner is at liberty to be present before the Secretary, Department of Home as well as at the time of such clarifications being made/given by the petitioner.6
This writ petition stands disposed of in the manner indicated above and as per the agreement of the parties but without entering into the merits of the case at this stage.
Parties therefore, will be at liberty to raise all points that may be available to them before the Secretary, Department of Home.
Upon appropriate application being made, let a plain copy of this order, duly countersigned by Assistant Registrar (Court) be given to the learned counsel appearing for the parties on the usual terms and conditions."
The said order was duly communicated to the respondents/authorities. The petitioner even thereafter submitted representations on different dates i.e., on 4.9.2006, 4.10.2006, 1.11.2006, 28.2.2007, 18.6.2007, 29.8.2007 and 23.10.2007 to the Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police) Department. In such representation, the petitioner sought for supply of materials if any collected against him in compliance with the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta and in the alternative, closure of the said proceeding. The respondents/authorities continued to remain indifferent. The petitioner again sought information by filing an application dated 20.3.2007 under the Right to Information Act, 2005. There was no response to the same. The appeal to the appellate authority did not yield any result. Ultimately, some information was communicated vide memo dated 30.11.2007. There was no reply to the query as to who directed the preliminary inquiry.
The petitioner alleged that such a preliminary inquiry was ordered on 1st of March, 2006 on the basis of a pseudonymous complaint which was not sent to 7 the Home (Police) Department or the West Bengal Police Directorate. The Vigilance Commission took the decision for such preliminary inquiry on 1st of March, 2006 and on its own directed open investigation on 3.6.2006. The copy of the pseudonymous complaint was not furnished though it was repeatedly sought for.
The petitioner again alleged that as an enclosure to the letter dated 19.12.2007 the respondent/authorities forwarded a xerox copy of an envelope, which allegedly contained the pseudonymous complaint. The envelope contained the name of one Abu Hassan, Murshidabad, without any definite address. It transpired that such an envelope was posted in the Sech Bhawan Post Office at Salt Lake. All these circumstances led to the apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that everything was cooked up by respondents Nos. 6 & 7 who had personal grudge against the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Right to Information Act seeking further information. The same were refused.
The petitioner in such circumstances was left with no choice but to seek redress before this court against such consistent illegal exercise of power by the Vigilance Commission as well as by the State/respondents. The petitioner alleged that all such actions were taken by the Vigilance Commission as well as State/respondents who acted in collusion with one another in order to humiliate the writ petitioner. It was the sole intention of the respondents/authorities to cast a stigma on the service career of the petitioner.
8
The writ petitioner is expecting to receive police medal for his commendable performance. His vertical movement in his service career has also been sought to be unreasonably disturbed by the respondents/authorities and taking advantage of pendency of the said disciplinary proceedings, the authorities sought to ruin the future career of the writ petitioner as well as lower his dignity in the society.
Petitioner, thus, approached this court by filing the instant application praying for quashing of the proceeding initiated against him as well as all decisions arrived at respondents/authorities in the said proceeding. The petitioner also sought for other reliefs including costs.
Respondent No.1 by filing an affidavit-in-opposition denied, inter alia, all the material allegations made by the writ petitioner. It claimed that pursuant to the order dated 27th July, 2006 passed by learned Single Bench of this court in W.P. No.16654 (W) of 2006, the Additional Chief Secretary - Secretary Home Department, Government of West Bengal passed an order dated 7th March, 2008 inter alia, holding that there is no reasonable ground to continue open inquiry against the writ petitioner and the open inquiry was ordered to be closed with immediate effect. In such changed circumstances, there remains nothing in the writ petition.
The writ petitioner, however, chose to proceed with the writ application and prayer was made for a token cost of Rs.1/- against the respondents/Vigilance Commission.
The State/respondent claimed that this is not a fit case where such costs can be imposed upon the State/respondents. It was also claimed that the 9 initiation of the preliminary inquiry by the Vigilance Commission was in consonance with different circulars issued by the State of West Bengal and the steps taken by the respondents are neither malafide nor biased or arbitrary warranting any imposition of cost.
The writ petitioner submitted an affidavit-in-reply thereby reiterating its earlier stand as made in the writ application.
At the very outset, Mr. Dhar, appearing as learned Counsel for the State/respondents challenged the instant writ proceeding on the ground that this court does not have the determination to entertain the same. Mr. Dhar in this context relied upon the relevant classification list of different types of writ proceedings as indicated in Schedule 'B' of the Calcutta High Court Appellate Side Rules. It was submitted that this court has the determination to deal with 'Group-VI' matters. This may be clarified by reproducing the said classification, which is as follows: -
'Group-VI' - Matters relating to service regulations may be divided under the following sub-heads: -
(a) Transfer,
(b) Seniority,
(c) Promotion,
(d) Suspension,
(e) Reversion,
(f) Dismissal/Removal,
(g) Departmental proceedings/2nd show cause, 10
(h) Confirmation,
(i) Age dispute,
(j) Compulsory retirement,
(k) Leave and condition service,
(l) Post retirement benefit,
(m) Miscellaneous.
Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee appearing for the writ petitioner emphatically submitted that this court has the determination to deal with service matters. According to him, it is the choice of the writ petitioner as to where he would go. He wondered as to why should writ petitioner have to go to the residuary bench. The question may arise as to whether the High Court should be justified in entertaining the grievances of the writ petitioner or he should be directed to ventilate such grievances before the Central Administrative Tribunal. In this context, Mr. Mukherjee, referred to the decision in the case of Arun Prosad Mukherjee & Ors. vs. Birendra Kumar Saha., reported in 1994 (1) CLJ, 153. Learned Division Bench of this court in the factual background of the said case observed that there may be matters relating to service yet they do not relate to conditions of service. It was observed that purported directives and orders to appear before the Vigilance Commissioner and to produce evidence/documents and to face interrogation in an open inquiry/investigation does not and cannot come within the scope and ambit of conditions of service. Reference was further made to the Apex Court Order in connection with Civil Appeal No.2106 of 1994, which does not seem to have disturbed the aforesaid finding. 11
Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 is as follows: -
"28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court.- On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matters concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, [no court except-
(a) the Supreme Court; or
(b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have], or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters."
It follows therefrom that the grievances raised in the present application do not come within the scope and ambit of Section 28 of the said Act.
So far the determination of this court is concerned, I think that the objection raised in this regard is at best misplaced. Leaving aside the Original Side List, this court has the determination to take all Motions and Matters which are ready for hearing under Article 226 of the Constitution relating to Education, under Sub-Groups (a), (b) and (d) of Group II and Services under Group-VI and applications relating thereto. This court has further determination to take all 12 matters under Article 226 of the Constitution, which are ready for hearing irrespective of classification of cases and irrespective of years and application relating thereto.
In such view of the matter, the anxiety expressed by Mr. Dhar, as learned Counsel for the State/respondents, does not seem to have any rational basis.
Relying upon the decision in the case of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi vs. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2005) 7 SCC 791, it was submitted by Mr. Dhar on behalf of the respondents that the jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The Apex Court observed that so far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity.
In the backdrop of the controversy raised at the time of hearing of the present application, it may be necessary to refer to Halsbury's Law of England, (4th Edn.) reissue, Vol. 10 which is as follows: -
13
"Where the court has jurisdiction over the particular subject matter of the claim or the particular parties and the only objection is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the court ought to exercise jurisdiction, the parties may agree to give jurisdiction in their case; or a defendant by entering an appearance without protest, or by taking steps in the proceedings, may waive his right to object to the court taking cognizance of the proceedings".
It is well settled that a defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court and such a defect cannot be cured by consent of the parties. (Ref: -Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan., (1955) 1 SCR 117).
Mr. Dhar also referred to the decision in the case of Hasham Abbas Sayyad vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad & Ors., reported in (2007) 2 SCC 355 while submitting that an order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction would be a nullity.
In this context, he further referred to the decision in the case of Prabir Banerjee vs.Union of India & Ors., reported in (2007) 8SCC 793.
But any further detailed discussion in this regard does not seem to be necessary in view of the fact that this court has the determination to take up any application under Article 226 of the Constitution for hearing irrespective of classification.
On behalf of the respondents/authority, Mr. Dhar submitted that initiation of the Vigilance Inquiry was under challenge in the earlier application. According to him, it is not open any more. Any attempt to reopen the said issue is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata.
14
To this, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the earlier application was disposed of without entering into the merits of the grievance. There was no adjudication whatsoever of the controversy raised. Thus, according to Mr. Kar, who was assisting Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee as learned Counsel for the writ petitioner, there could not be any question of res judicata or constructive res judicata.
Mr. Dhar referred to the decision in the case of Anil Singh & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2006) 13 SCC 421 while submitting that the issues raised in the present application being substantially the same as those adjudicated in the earlier writ application, the principle of res judicata will certainly apply.
The principle of res judicata prohibits the court from trying an issue which has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties and has been heard and finally decided by that court. What is important to note is that there must be an adjudication of an issue in a former litigation which has again been raised in a subsequent case. Moreover, it is decision on an issue, and not a mere finding on any incidental question to reach such decision, which operates as res judicata. In this context, the learned Counsel for the respondents sought to derive further support from the decision in the case of Jai Narain Parasrampuria (Dead) & Anr. vs. Pushpa Devi Saraf & Ors., reported in (2006) 7 SCC 756. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents/authority that while applying the procedural law like the principle of estoppel or acquiescence, the court would be concerned with the conduct of a party for determination as to 15 whether he can be permitted to take a different stand in a subsequent proceeding, unless there exists a statutory interdict. Lord Denning in his Book "The Discipline of Law" dealt with the principles of the estoppel by conduct as well as proprietary estoppel. He observed "there are many cases where the true owner of goods or of land has led another to believe that he is not the owner, or, at any rate, is not claiming an interest therein, or that there is no objection to what the other is doing. In such cases it has been held repeatedly that the owner is not to be allowed to go back on what he has led the other to believe. So much so that his own title to the property, be it land or goods, has been held to be limited or extinguished, and new rights and interests have been created therein. And this operates by reason of his conduct - what he has led the other to believe
- even though he never intended it." (P-218).
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not find any scope, which would justify attracting the principle of res judicata since, as indicated earlier, there had been no adjudication of any issue in the earlier writ application, which has been sought to be raised once again in the present case.
Mr. Kar, in response to the submission made on behalf of the respondents/authority did not forget to mention that the dispute regarding jurisdiction was not raised in connection with earlier writ application. It was contended that the writ petitioner in the present application sought to assail the initiation of the inquiry but in fact, had gone a step further by claiming the initiation of inquiry was bad and illegal - that too, relying upon the order passed 16 by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home Department) Government of West Bengal.
Attention of the court was invited to the report dated 7.3.2008 submitted by Mr. P. Ray, Additional Chief Secretary, (Home Department) Government of West Bengal. Referring to the same it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the preliminary inquiry against Dr. Nazrul Islam was ordered on 1.3.2006 on the basis of a specific complaint but the complaint was found to be pseudonymous. Referring to a relevant Circular i.e., Memo 321/4/91-AVD-III dated 29.9.1992, it was mentioned that "many anonymous and pseudonymous are false and malicious and very often such complaints are not a reliable source of information and inquiries into such complaints do have an adverse effect on the morale of the services. The Government of India are, therefore, of the view that generally no action is warranted on anonymous/pseudonymous complaints against government servants and they are to be filed".
In the said report, the Additional Chief Secretary clearly mentioned that the "procedure laid down for dealing with anonymous/pseudonymous complaints have not been followed in the instant case. The Vigilance Commission has, instead of referring the matter to the Home Department or the Police Directorate for inquiry, started a preliminary inquiry and subsequently an open inquiry by themselves. This is certainly not in consonance with the provisions of the Vigilance Manual of the Vigilance Commission, West Bengal".
The Additional Chief Secretary while concluding that there is no reasonable ground to continue the open inquiry against Dr. Nazrul Islam, further observed 17 that there is no reason to come to the prima facie conclusion that Dr. Nazrul Islam had acquired property much beyond his means. This led the Additional Chief Secretary to order that the open inquiry be closed with immediate effect.
In course of submission Mr. Dhar contended that the directions given in a case without laying down any principle of law do not constitute a precedent. Attention of the court was invited to the decision in the case of Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Workmen, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., reported in (2007) I SCC 498.
It is true, that a mere direction or observation without laying down any principle of law is not a precedent. But even when the ratio decidendi, of a previous case is merely a persuasive authority, it must be followed in later cases unless the Judge has good reason to disapprove of it.
In this context, I would like to refer to the observation of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem, (Ref: 1911 AC 495): -
" Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found." It is well settled that a case is only authority for what it actually decides.
In absence of any effective adjudication of the issues raised in the earlier writ application, as already discussed, question of holding the instant writ application barred by the principles of res judicata just cannot arise. 18
It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that since the authority concerned has directed to close the inquiry since there is no reasonable ground for proceeding with the same, there is hardly anything left for adjudication in the present application. But Mr. Kar on behalf of the writ petitioner vehemently submitted that the action on behalf of the concerned authority which is under challenge in the writ application certainly demands compensating the petitioner with cost. It was submitted that the petitioner in view of such initiation of an inquiry and its undue publicity in various T.V. Channels and Newspapers suffered humiliation. This went far to lower the prestige and position of the writ petitioner in the estimation of others. It was emphatically mentioned that as subsequently observed by the Additional Chief Secretary in his report dated 7.3.2006, there could be no reasonable ground to continue the open inquiry and there could be no such material so as to justify initiation of such inquiry. It also cannot be disputed that the writ petitioner while chasing litigation had to spend good amount of his time and money. It is all for what? Question was raised as to what could be the reason for the persons placed in high offices to combine in order to harass and humiliate the writ petitioner. Thus, Mr. Kar submitted that the writ petitioner by way of recognition of his legitimate grievance and in view of the illegal action taken by the authorities must be compensated with cost of at least one rupee. This is by way of symbolic recognition. Mr. Dhar in this context deriving inspiration from the decision in the case of CH. Jawahar Singh vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 152 submitted that when an individual officer is not personally liable and when such an officer acts 19 in discharge of his official duties without bias and mala fides, he does not deserve to be saddled with costs. The factual backdrop of the said case is significantly different from that of the present case. Here, as discussed earlier, it cannot be said that none of the respondents/authority is personally responsible for all that has been done. Assuming that there is no unholy alliance, it cannot be denied that some persons holding high positions in the government, taking advantage of their status and position, did certain things, which are not permissible. The fact that inquiry was initiated on the basis of a pseudonymous complaint, that such complaint was received in an envelope bearing the stamp of Sech Bhawan, Salt Lake, Calcutta and that the complainant was not exactly identifiable - should not have escaped the attention of the authorities.
Unfortunately we are living in a society where initiative, commitment and dynamism of a government officer do not always get the appreciation. It is usually experienced that those who choose to follow the path of least resistance are favoured. Persons in authority go for 'yes - men'. The first grade people ordinarily do not hesitate to select first grade persons. It is the second grade people who because of their inherent insecurity prefer to have third grade subordinates. Curiously enough, mere honesty is regarded as a virtue. I must mention that honesty by itself on the part of any individual, far less a well placed government officer, is not a virtue but dishonesty is certainly a vice. Honesty is normally expected, like the sweat of body. Dishonesty is it's bad odour.
In the backdrop of the present case, it cannot be doubted that the writ petitioner had to unnecessarily and unreasonably suffer humiliation. There 20 could be no reason for giving such wide publicity of initiation of an inquiry against him in different T.V. Channels or Press. Apprehension that it was done in a designed and calculated manner cannot just be brushed aside. It is sad that even amongst the so-called honest public servants, there are many who do not have intellectual integrity. It is no wonder that there are many others who derive sadistic pleasure in trying to put others into inconvenience.
This court certainly appreciates the attitude on the part of the writ petitioner in his taking up arms against the sea of troubles.
I feel tempted to quote from Shakespeare's 'Othello':
"Who steals my purse steals trash - 'tis something - nothing, 'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands -
But he that filches from me my good name Robs me of that which not enriches him And makes me poor indeed."
In the peculiar backdrop of the present case, it cannot be denied that the writ petitioner by virtue of initiation of an inherently illegal inquiry has suffered serious harassment. The fact that the State/respondents subsequently took care of the lapse and finally did not choose to proceed cannot by itself take care of the entire grievance of the writ petitioner. Ordinarily, cost follows the event. In the present case, in view of subsequent change of attitude, though belated, the writ petitioner did not have to chase with the instant litigation beyond a point. His grievance regarding initiation and continuation of the inquiry has already been 21 settled in view of the direction given by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home Department), Government of West Bengal.
But this court fully appreciates the stand of the writ petitioner as ventilated by learned Counsel Mr. Kar, being led by Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, that symbolic recognition of the fact that a wrong had been committed against the writ petitioner is necessary. I find it difficult to ignore the claim of the writ petitioner in this regard and hold that the respondent/Vigilance Commission must pay cost of one rupee to the writ petitioner. The said amount must be paid within a period of four weeks from this date. It is for the appropriate authority of the Vigilance Commission to probe as to who was actually responsible for initiation of such an inquiry and it is for the said respondent to pass necessary order for deduction of the aforesaid amount of cost from his monthly salary. This writ application being W.P.No.3693 (W) of 2008 is, thus, disposed of.
Urgent Xerox certified copy of the judgment be supplied to the parties, if applied for, as expeditiously as possible.
(S.P.TALUKDAR, J.) 22 Later: -
25.6.08 Immediately after passing of the order, Mr. Dhar appearing as learned Counsel for the State-respondent prays for stay of operation of the said order.
This has been strongly opposed by Mr. Kar appearing as learned Counsel for the writ petitioner.
After due consideration of all relevant aspects, such prayer for stay is rejected.
(S.P.TALUKDAR, J)