Karnataka High Court
Dr. Madhukar G Angur vs The State on 22 April, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF APRIL, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.11024 OF 2023
BETWEEN:
DR. MADHUKAR G. ANGUR
S/O LATE GUDDAPPA BASAPPA ANGUR
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
R/AT NO. 1128, 21ST 'A' CROSS
14TH MAIN, HSR 3RD SECTOR
HSR LAYOUT, BDA COMPLEX
BENGALURU SOUTH, HSR LAYOUT
BENGALURU - 560 102.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI KIRAN S. JAVALI, SR. ADVOCATE FOR
SRI SRIVASTHAVA H. K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE - THROUGH
THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
CYBER CRIME P.S. CID
REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. MR. ABHAY CHEBBI
S/O SRI GOVIND CHEBBI
ALLEGED DIRECTOR
ALLIANCE BUSINESS SCHOOL
2
NO.2 AND 3, 2ND CROSS, 36TH MAIN
DOLLARS SCHEME, BTM 1ST STAGE
R/AT NO.100, 34TH MAIN, 2ND CROSS
BTM LAYOUT, 1ST STAGE
BENGALURU - 560 078.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R1;
SRI M.S.SHYAM SUNDAR, SR. ADVOCATE A/W.,
DR. VANDANA P. L., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET FILED BY THE
POLICE IN CR.NO.60/2016 OF CYBER CRIME POLICE STATION CID
BENGALURU WHICH IS NOW REGISTERED AS C.C.NO.3218/2021
ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF I ADDITIONAL CHIEF
METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE AT BENGALURU FOR THE OFFENCES
P/U/S.465 AND 468 OF IPC AND SEC.66 AND 66 D OF IT ACT 2000
AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question
proceedings in C.C.No.3218 of 2021 pending before the I Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, arising out of Crime
No.60 of 2016 registered for offences punishable under Sections
3
465 and 468 of the IPC and Sections 66 and 66D of the information
Technology Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short).
2. Heard Sri Kiran S.Javali, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioner, Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State
Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 and Sri M.S. Shyam Sundar,
learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
The issue in the lis revolves around domain name of Alliance
University. In the year 2006, it appears, one Sudhir G. Angur
registers a domain name 'www.alliance.edu.in' with ERNET India
and is said to have regularly renewed the same. The renewal
certificate and the renewal request at the relevant point in time are
appended to the petition. In 2010, Alliance Business School Private
Limited, a company registered under Section 25 of the Companies
Act, 1956. The Alliance Business School Private Limited is the
sponsoring body to the Alliance University, which was established
through an Act called Alliance University Act, 2010. Since Alliance
Business School Private Limited was the sponsoring body to Alliance
4
University, the official website of both the Alliance Business School
and the Alliance University was common, which is quoted
hereinabove. It is the case of the prosecution that the domain
name of the Alliance Business School Private Limited is registered
as www.alliance.edu.in with ERNET India, on 16.03.2010. In July
2012, the domain name is hosted on the server of Net4 India on
behalf of Sudhir G.Angur. The petitioner is the Ex-Chancellor of
Alliance University. It appears that huge dispute arose between the
members of the Board of Directors of Alliance University. Owing to
certain financial irregularities, embezzlement of funds and other
allied misgivings, the petitioner was terminated from the post of
Chancellor by the Board of Directors of the sponsoring body -
Alliance Business School. After the termination, comes the
impugned complaint on 15-06-2016. The complaint was with
regard to creation of email ID by the petitioner as
'[email protected]' and using it fraudulently, sent a letter on
the Alliance University letter head to the administrator of ERNET
India, New Delhi, claiming himself to be the Chancellor of Alliance
University, requested to change the Admin e-mail ID of the domain
name - 'www.alliance.edu.in' from '[email protected]' to
5
'[email protected]'. This is said to be the fraudulent act on
the part of the petitioner. The Police registers a crime on the basis
of the complaint so registered by the 2nd respondent in Crime No.60
of 2016, initially only for offences punishable under Sections 66 and
66D of the Act. The Police then conduct investigation and file a
charge sheet against the petitioner only and dropped all others,
who were arrayed as accused in the crime, adding offences
punishable under Sections 465 and 468 of the IPC. The learned
Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences and registers a criminal
case in C.C.No.3218 of 2021. It is the taking of cognizance and
issuance of summons that has led the petitioner to this Court in the
subject petition.
4. The learned senior counsel Sri Kiran S.Javali, appearing for
the petitioner would contend that the dispute between the
petitioner and Sudhir G.Angur has led to registration of several
cases against the petitioner and several cases by the petitioner
against Sudhir G. Angur. He would submit that the petitioner is the
founder of Alliance University and so he is the lifetime Chancellor by
virtue of Section 15(2) of the Act. It is his submission that Sudhir
6
G. Angur, the current Chancellor is allegedly involved in the murder
of former Vice-Chancellor of Alliance University and to get over the
same, has sought to register several crimes against the petitioner.
He would submit that the domain name 'www.alliance.edu.in' was
the one funded by the petitioner on the score that the petitioner
has a right for creation of a domain name and accordingly, created
the domain name. There is no fraud played. There is no forgery
nor there is any violation of the Act. It is his submission that the
complainant and Sudhir G.Angur along with their associates have
attempted to fraudulently appoint themselves as Directors and had
in fact, fabricated digital signature of the petitioner. He would
submit that these are not the matters concerning the subject
petition. He would submit that the High Court of Delhi in the case
of ALLIANCE BUSINESS SCHOOL V. MADHUKAR G. ANGUR in
CM(M) No.1587/2018, C.M.Appls.No.53754/2018 and
53090/2019, disposed on 18.12.2019 had directed both parties
to exercise restraint with regard to publishing defamatory articles
against each other. In all, he would submit that for a dispute that
has to be thrashed out before a competent civil Court, criminal law
is set into motion.
7
5. Per contra, the learned senior counsel Sri M.S. Shyam
Sundar, appearing for respondent No.2 would vehemently refute
the submissions to contend that the petitioner has after being
terminated from the post of Chancellor of Alliance University has
been fraudulently using the domain name for the purposes of illegal
gains. He would further contend that the Police after investigation
have filed a charge sheet. It is a matter of trial for the petitioner to
come out clean as there is prima facie evidence against the
petitioner for the offences punishable under the Act and forgery.
6. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would also
toe the lines of the learned senior counsel Sri M.S. Shyam Sundar,
in seeking dismissal of the petition on the score that the petitioner
has to come out clean in a full-fledged trial.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned senior counsel and have perused
the material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of events are
all, a matter of record. The petitioner was the founder Chancellor
8
of Alliance University and when dispute arose, he is terminated and
the said termination is a subject matter of challenge before
different fora. The issue in the lis would commence on 15-06-2016,
when a complaint comes to be registered against the petitioner
before the CEN Police Station, which is a Cyber Crime Police
Station. Since the entire issue has triggered from the complaint, I
deem it appropriate to notice the same.
"Subject: Impersonation, cheating, causing denial to access
of Alliance University CRN ID: 000359137 because of the
illegal activities done by following persons:
(1) Dr. Madhukar G. Angur, residing at Flat, "Happy
Builders", Opp. to 48/B, 1st Floor, 27th Main, 1st Cross, BTM
1st Stage, Bengaluru - 560 068
(2) Ponnanna address not known but having Mobile
No.9686179119,
(3) Dayanand having [email protected] (claiming
himself as Vice-Chancellor of Alliance University)
(4) Kirthikumar address not known but having Mobile
No.9591111144.
1. I under signed is the Director of Alliance Business
School which is a sponsoring body for Alliance University
established in 2010 by an eanctment. The university has
the domain name www.alliance.edu.in which is
registered under the name of Alliance Business School.
The registered office of Alliance University is # 2 & 3,
36th Main, 1st Cross, Dollars Scheme, BTM 1st Stage,
Bangalore - 560068. Alliance University is one of the top
private universities in the country. The university has
9
6500 students, 600 employees and 360 faculty
members.
2. The Alliance Business School company's domain name
www.alliance.edu.in was registered on 16th March 2010.
3. On 10th June 2016, our IT Head Mr. Santosh Kawari
received an email at 9:30 am stating that "Your contact
details for domain: www.alliance.edu.in has been
updated successfully." Sensing some foul play, Mr.
Santosh Kawari immediately contacted the Domain
Registrar ERNET India over phone raising objection
regarding change in admin e-mail ID of Domain, for
which he came to know that Mr. Madhukar Angur, Ex-
Chancellor, who had been terminated from the post and
designation of the Chancellor of Alliance University on
7th April 2016, had created a fraudulent email id
[email protected], and sent a forged letter on
university letterhead to ERNET India, New Delhi,
claiming himself as Chancellor and requesting for
changing the admin mail id of the domain. Thereafter
[email protected] replied to both the email ids
mentioned in the forged letterhead and requested for
confirmation on the same. The confirmation mail sent
by [email protected] was received by the IT
Department, which is headed by Mr. Santosh Kawari,
and further he brought it to the notice of the present
Chancellor of Alliance University, Mr. SudhirAngur.
4. Mr. SudhirAngur immediately sent a letter to the ERNET
India to update the Registrant and Administrative
contact mail id for the domain www.alliance.edu.in on
10th June 2016, and now the contact details of the
domain www.alliance.edu.in has been updated
successfully.
5. Alliance University for its web hosting requirement has
taken services from Net 4 IndiaLtd, D - 25, Sector -3,
Noida, UP-201301. Net 4 India has registered a CRN ID:
000359137 for Alliance University web hosting
requirement and other related services. The Alliance
University website under the domain name
10
www.alliance.edu.in is hosted in Net 4 India under the
above CRN ID: 000359137.
6. This being so, on 13th June 2016, University IT
team was not able to login to the control panel of
the above CRN ID immediately, IT team contacted
Net4 customer support center and was told by the
customer support executive that above CRN ID is
blocked on the direction of Karnataka Cyber Crime
police and also told that under the directions of
Mr. Madhukar Angur, Ponnanna Mobile
No.9686179119, Dayanand having mail id
[email protected] (claiming himself as
Vice-Chancellor of Alliance University),
Kirthikumar address not known but having Mobile
No.9591111144 (who are not related to the
Alliance University) has submitted some related
documents to Net4 India.
7. The website maintenance of the University and its
colleges are affected due to blocking of the above
CRN ID. The Alliance Business School and Alliance
University other domain names are also registered
and hosted under this same CRN ID. Due to
blocking of this all the related services under this
CRN ID are not accessible.
8. It is to bring to your kind notice that Mr. Madhukar
Angur was terminated from the post and designation of
Chancellor of Alliance University on 7th April, 2016 by
the authority of the Board of the Sponsoring Body, Ms.
Alliance Business School by following due process and
procedure of law. Prior to the termination, the Board
issued order of suspension cum notice for explanation
for having committed financial irregularities,
embezzlement of funds, breach of trust, serious
illegalities, creating fraudulent documents, and misusing
official positions. Subsequently, by following due
process and procedure of law, Mr. Madhukar Angur was
terminated from the post and designation of Chancellor
of Alliance University. (A copy of suspension and
termination order is enclosed for kind purusal).
11
9. The Honourable City Civil Court and Session Judge
Bangalore vide CCH/9 O.S. 2911/2016 dated
12-04-2016 passed an order of injunction restraining
Mr. Madhukar Angur, Priyanka B. S. and his associates
from interfering in the administration, management and
operations of Alliance Business School and Alliance
University, in any manner (Copy of the injunction order
is enclosed).
10. The Higher Education Department, Government of
Karnataka took note of his termination and the
irregularities he has committed as the ex-chancellor and
appointed a one man commission comprising Dr. M. I.
Savadatti to investigate into all allegations against him.
(A copy of the order is attached herewith).
11. The Board of Directors of the Sponsoring Body,
Alliance Business School vide resolution has
appointed Mr. Sudhir G. Angur as the new
Chancellor of Alliance University. (A copy of the
appointment of Mr. Sudhir G. Angur as the new
Chancellor of Alliance University order is
enclosed).
12. Mr. Madhukar Angur who is dismissed from the
services and positions of Alliance University, has
been going around misusing the nomenclature,
seals, assets and intellectual property of the
University with his false claims that he is the
Chancellor of University. A complaint of
impersonation has filed before the Anekal Police
Station on 27-4-2016 following which a case in
Anekal PS Crime No. 124/2016 u/s 419, 420,
120B, 469, 468 has been registered.
13. By unauthorised access, Mr. Madhukar Angur and
others who are named above are trying to disrupt
the functioning of the university and is trying to
hijack the website and domain and also tried to
unsuccessfully change the email-d. By this act the
intention of Mr. Madhukar Angur was to stop the
huge transaction online facility which is basically
meant for students and thereby causing huge loss
12
to the university and wrongful gain for him. This
act is cheating by personation by Mr. Madhukar
Angu, Ponnana, Dayanand and Kirthikumar has
led to denial to access of Alliance University CRN
ID: 000359137 hosted by Net 4 India, wherein
causing loss to university and students at large.
14. In the larger interest of students, faculty and staff, we
request you to please initiate action under the law
against Mr. Madhukar G. Angur and Mr. Ponnana and
issue direction to Net 4 India to unblock the CRN ID
000359137 and suitable action against the above said
persons."
(Emphasis added)
It is the allegation that the petitioner had been dismissed from the
services of all positions of Alliance University and he has misused
the nomenclature, seals, intellectual property of the University and
making false claims that he is the Chancellor of the University.
9. The crux of the allegation is that, the petitioner is trying to
hijack the website and domain and has unsuccessfully tried to
change the email ID. The intention alleged was stopping of huge
transaction in the online facility. The Police conduct investigation.
The investigation leads to filing of final report - charge sheet. The
summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in column No.17 reads
as follows:
"17. ೇ ನ ಸಂ ಪ ವರ/ ೋ ಾ ೋಪ ೆ (ಅವಶ ದ ಪ ೆ ೕಕ ಾ ೆ ಲಗ" )
13
Brief facts of the case / Charge (Add separate sheet, if
necessary)
The following facts have been proved in the investigation:-
Alliance Business School is a company registered
under Section: 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 and is the
sponsoring body of the Alliance University established in the
year 2010 as per the Alliance University Act, 2010. The
official website of Alliance Business School as well as Alliance
University is www.alliance.edu.in.
The domain www.alliance.edu.in, was registered
with Ernet India by Mr. Sudhir Angur On 13-03-2006 and
hosted on the server of Net4India in July 2012 on behalf of
Alliance Business School and is being regularly renewed by
Mr. Sudhir Angur and Mr. Santosh Kawari (IT head of
Alliance Business School & Alliance University). The admin
email id and the technical email id of this domain during June
2010 was [email protected] as per the records.
The accused, who was appointed as the first
Chancellor of the Alliance University, was terminated from
the post of Chancellor by the Directors of sponsoring body -
Alliance Business School in the month of April 2016, as per
the powers vested by the provisions of Sec: 11(i) of Alliance
University Act, 2010 for various reasons of moral turpitude
cheating and other offences (for which various FIRs have
been registered in Anekal and other police stations). In spite
of his termination, the accused illegally entered the campus,
proclaimed and impersonated himself as the Chancellor of
Alliance University with ulterior motive and dishonest intent
to make wrongful gain and also to cause wrongful loss to the
complainant's institution.
The accused, as an ex-chancellor, was well aware of
the reputation of complainant's institution and the fact that
the main source of income to the institution is its official
domain "www.alliance.edu.in" having online banking
facilities/payment link, through which students used to pay
the fees. As such, the accused with a malafide and dishonest
intention to exploit the income and resources of the
university and to make wrongful gain, had appointed/hired
14
many employees including Ponnanna, Dayanad Tejeswi,
Syed Tousif, Naresh Koupri, Madhwa Kolhar and many more.
As the collection of fees from students was an online
process through the official website www.alliance.edu.in,
the accused in order to take control of the said website. on
10-06-2016, impersonated himself as the Chancellor of
Alliance Univerisity and sent enter to the Ernet India
(Registrar of the domain "alliance.edu.in") on the letter
head of University, through an e-mail ID:
"[email protected]" and got the Admin E-mail ID of
the domain www.alliance.edu.in updated from
"[email protected]" to "[email protected]",
which is not the official e-mail ID of alliance university or its
chancellor or office bearers. On receiving the alerts on
updation of admin e-mail ID of the domain, Mr. Sudhir Angur
contacted Ernet India and got the admin e-mail ID re-
updated to e-mail ID: "[email protected]"
Further, on 12-06-2016, the accused instigated one of
his employee Mr. Ponnanna to sign on a printed complaint,
drafted against the complainant and other directors and IT
Head of Alliance Business School, and through the said
complaint, without knowledge of Mr. Ponnanna, filed an FIR
in Anekal police station vide FIR No. 161/2016.
After filing FIR, the accused instigated his another
employee Mr. Dayananda Tejasvi to send the soft copies of
FIR to Ernet India(Domain Registrar) and Net4India
(Domain Hoster) to block the website alliance.edu.in from
Dayananda Tejasvi's private email ID:
[email protected] on 13-06-2016. Based on the
said e-mail, the Net4 India blocked CRN ID: 000359137 of
the said Website, for which, the complainant and his
institution's IT team were unable to access the CRN ID and
to update the contents of website and hence, access was
denied to the lawful user to the website. This has resulted in
causing wrongful monitory loss to the complainant's
institution, as the complainant's IT team was unable to
update the website and to provide online facility to the
students for Admission, fee payments etc.,
15
On 12-06-2016, the complainant purchased a
new domain with an impersonating name
"www.allianceuniversity.education" from "Godaddy'
through Keerthi kumar, and later hosted the
impersonating website in the name of Alliance
University in parallel to the existing official website
"www.alliance.edu.in" with an ulterior motive and
intention to mislead the students and divert them from
the official website, and to get wrongful gain in the
form of Fees.
On 26-12-2016, the accused has sent a soft copy
of letter prepared on the Letter Head of Alliance
University to the Ernet India through e-mail ID:
[email protected], to change the admin e-mail
ID of the five domains "www.allianceuniversity.edu.in,
www.allianceuniversity.ac.in. www.alliance
university.res.in. www.alliance.ac.in.
www.alliance.res.in" which were registered by Mr.
Sudhir Angur on behalf of Alliance Business School and
got the Admin name changed and updated in the name
of one Mr. Syed Tousif and updated the admin e-mail
ID to [email protected], for the above said five
domains. Later, by instigating Mr. Syed Tousif, accused
hosted another impersonating website of Alliance
Universityin the name and style
www.allianceuniveristy.edu.in in parallel to the official
website "www.alliance.edu.in".
By instigating Mr. Madhwa Kolhar and Mr.
Naresh Kopuri, the accused availed Payment gateway
services from PayU with ID: 6316165614 (Merchant
ID: 139996 and Merchant Website:
www.allianceuniversity.edu.in) in the name of Alliance
University, but provided the Bank Account details of
Srivari Educational Services with Account number
134611100004614 held at Andhra Bank, Marathalli
Branch, Bangalore, purely with malafide intention of
diverting the fee amount of Alliance University.
Further by instigating Mr. Syed Tousif, the accused
embedded the said PayU payment gateway link in the
website www.allianceuniversity.edu.in and through
the said payment gateway, from 01-08-2017 to 08-11-
16
2017, the accused fraudulently collected an amount of
Rs 62,97,398 (Rs. Sixty-Two Lakhs Ninety-Seven
Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Eight) from the
students and others through 413 transactions.
Hence, the charge against the accused under the
Sections: 66, 66(D). of IT Act 2000 (Amended Act 2008) and
Sec: 465, 468 IPC."
(Emphasis added)
A perusal at the complaint and the summary of charge sheet is
indicative of the fact that the entire crime is based upon change of
domain name and usage of domain name by the petitioner allegedly
after his termination. Whether this would amount to offences under
Section 66 or under Section 66D of the Act is required to be
noticed. Section 66 of the Act reads as follows:
"66. Computer related offences.--If any person,
dishonestly or fraudulently, does any act referred to in
Section 43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years or with fine which
may extend to five lakh rupees or with both.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,--
(a) the word "dishonestly" shall have the meaning
assigned to it in Section 24 of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860);
(b) the word "fraudulently" shall have the meaning
assigned to it in Section 25 of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860)."
17
Section 66 deals with computer related offences. Section 66 of the
Act makes one punishable, if he dishonestly or fraudulently does
any act referred to in Section 43 of the Act. Section 43 of the Act
reads as follows:
"43. Penalty and Compensation for damage to
computer, computer system, etc.--If any person without
permission of the owner or any other person who is in-
charge of a computer, computer system or computer
network,--
(a) accesses or secures access to such computer,
computer system or computer network or computer
resource;
(b) downloads, copies or extracts any data, computer
database or information from such computer,
computer system or computer network including
information or data held or stored in any removable
storage medium;
(c) introduces or causes to be introduced any computer
contaminant or computer virus into any computer,
computer system or computer network;
(d) damages or causes to be damaged any computer,
computer system or computer network, data,
computer database or any other programmes residing
in such computer, computer system or computer
network;
(e) disrupts or causes disruption of any computer,
computer system or computer network;
(f) denies or causes the denial of access to any person
authorised to access any computer, computer system
or computer network by any means;
18
(g) provides any assistance to any person to facilitate
access to a computer, computer system or computer
network in contravention of the provisions of this Act,
rules or regulations made thereunder;
(h) charges the services availed of by a person to the
account of another person by tampering with or
manipulating any computer, computer system, or
computer network,
(i) destroys, deletes or alters any information residing in
a computer resource or diminishes its value or utility
or affects it injuriously by any means;
(j) steals, conceals, destroys or alters or causes any
person to steal, conceal, destroy or alter any computer
source code used for a computer resource with an
intention to cause damage;
he shall be liable to pay damages by way of
compensation to the person so affected.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,--
(i) "computer contaminant" means any set of computer
instructions that are designed--
(a) to modify, destroy, record, transmit data or
programme residing within a computer,
computer system or computer network; or
(b) by any means to usurp the normal operation of
the computer, computer system, or computer
network;
(ii) "computer database" means a representation of
information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions
in text, image, audio, video that are being prepared or
have been prepared in a formalised manner or have
been produced by a computer, computer system or
computer network and are intended for use in a
computer, computer system or computer network;
19
(iii) "computer virus" means any computer instruction,
information, data or programme that destroys,
damages, degrades or adversely affects the
performance of a computer resource or attaches itself
to another computer resource and operates when a
programme, data or instruction is executed or some
other event takes place in that computer resource;
(iv) "damage" means to destroy, alter, delete, add, modify
or rearrange any computer resource by any means;
(v) "computer source code" means the listing of
programmes, computer commands, design and layout
and programme analysis of computer resource in any
form."
Section 43 of the Act deals with penalty and compensation for
damage to computer and computer system. It has several sub-
sections. It punishes any person without permission of the owner
or any other person who is in charge of the computer accesses and
the computer system becomes open to punishment. Section 66D of
the Act, reads as follows:
"66-D. Punishment for cheating by personation
by using computer resource.--Whoever, by means of any
communication device or computer resource cheats by
personation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years and
shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh
rupees."
Section 66D punishes any person for cheating or impersonation by
using computer resource. The petitioner in the case at hand claims
20
to be the founder of Alliance University and a life time Chancellor
under Section 15(2) of the Alliance University Act. The petitioner,
on that strength has continued to operate the domain and even
according to the complaint, has unsuccessfully tried to change E-
mail ID. All this, the petitioner admits to have done on the ground
that he is the Chancellor and continued to be the Chancellor of the
Alliance University.
10. The other allegations are, for offences punishable under
the IPC viz., Sections 465 and 468 of the IPC. They read as follows:
"465. Punishment for forgery.--Whoever commits
forgery shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.
... .... ...
468. Forgery for purpose of cheating.--Whoever
commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic
record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine."
Section 465 of IPC punishes for forgery and Section 468 punishes
for commission of forgery for the purpose of cheating. Section 66D
of the Act and Section 468 of the IPC have a common ingredient
21
i.e., cheating with dishonest intention. Wherefrom dishonest
intention has sprung in the case at hand is ununderstandable. The
petitioner on the strength of him being the Chancellor of Alliance
University and on the reason that he has continued as Chancellor of
the University has operated the domain or opened the domain as
the case may be. It was always open to the complainant to register
a civil suit seeking an injunction against the petitioner for usage of
domain name. But, instead, the complainant chooses to set the
criminal law into motion. None of the ingredients that are
necessary to be found in the afore-quoted offences are found even
to their semblance in the case at hand. A seemingly civil dispute of
usage of domain name is projected to become a crime. It is in such
circumstance, the Apex Court holds that the complaint should be
read between the lines to see the real intent of the complainant.
11. The Apex Court in the case of MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE
OF UTTAR PRADESH1 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
Analysis
1
2023 SCC OnLine SC 950
22
8. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and having gone through the materials on record, the
only question that falls for our consideration is whether the
FIR bearing No. 127 of 2022 should be quashed?
9. We are of the view that even if the entire case of
the prosecution is believed or accepted to be true, none of
the ingredients to constitute the offence as alleged are
disclosed. It is pertinent to note that the FIR in question
came to be lodged after a period of 14 years from the
alleged illegal acts of the appellants. It is also pertinent to
note that in the FIR no specific date or time of the alleged
offences has been disclosed.
10. The entire case put up by the first informant on
the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this
stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this
Court for quashing of an FIR in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . The parameters
are : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
"102. ... (1) Where the allegations made in
the first information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
23
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
We are of the view that the case of the present appellants
falls within Parameters 1, 5 and 7, respectively, of Bhajan
Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] .
11. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused comes
before the Court invoking either the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal
proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that
such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious
or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the court owes
a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more
closely.
12. We say so because once the complainant decides
to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for
wreaking personal vengeance etc. then he would ensure that
24
the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary
pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments
made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence.
Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint
alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence
are disclosed or not.
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the
Court owes a duty to look into many other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case
over and above the averments and, if need be, with
due care and circumspection try to read in between
the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of
a case but is empowered to take into account the
overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take
for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been
registered over a period of time. It is in the background of
such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes
importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking
vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
14.State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of
A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004
SCC (Cri) 1805] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated
on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash
an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between
consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence
and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that
manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be
considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda
Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy,
(2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , SCC p. 527,
paras 5-7)
25
"5. ... Authority of the court exists for
advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court
has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse
of the process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of
the process of court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of
fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it
is permissible to look into the materials to assess
what the complainant has alleged and whether
any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR
1960 SC 866] , this Court summarised some categories
of cases where inherent power can and should be
exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC
para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance e.g.
want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at its face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the
evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to
prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between a case
where there is no legal evidence or where there is
evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
26
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence
in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable
appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained.
That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process,
no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
needless harassment. Court should be circumspect
and judicious in exercising discretion and should
take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would
be an instrument in the hands of a private
complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any
person needlessly. At the same time the section is
not an instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its
sudden death."
(emphasis supplied)
15. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order [Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.,
2022 SCC OnLine All 2568] passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal
proceedings arising from FIR No. 127 of 2022 dated 4-6-
2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur,
State of U.P. are hereby quashed."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court holds that in frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the
Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case, over and above the
averments. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should
not restrict itself to the stage of the case but has to consider overall
circumstance. If the complaint and the charge sheet are considered
27
on the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court for
examination of the issue, it would unmistakably emerge that a
seemingly civil dispute is projected to become a crime.
12. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of DEEPAK GABA v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH2, wherein it is held as follows:
".... .... ....
20. In the present case, the ingredients to constitute
an offence under Section 420 read with Section 415 IPC are
absent. The pre-summoning evidence does not disclose and
establish the essential ingredients of Section 415 IPC. There
is no assertion, much less legal evidence, to submit that JIPL
had engaged in dishonesty, fraud, or intentional inducement
to deliver a property. It is not the case of Respondent 2
complainant that JIPL had tried to deceive them, either by
making a false or misleading representation, or by any other
action or omission; nor is it their case that JIPL had offered
any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver a
property. As such, given that the ingredients of Section 415
IPC are not satisfied, the offence under Section 420 IPC is
not made out.
21. Section 471IPC [ "471. Using as genuine a
forged document or electronic record.--Whoever
fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or
electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to
be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished
in the same manner as if he had forged such document or
electronic record."] is also not attracted. This Section is
applicable when a person fraudulently or dishonestly uses as
genuine any document or electronic record, which he knows
or has reasons to believe to be a forged document or
2
(2023) 3 SCC 423
28
electronic record. This Court in Mohd. Ibrahim [Mohd.
Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 929. This Court, in this case, has cautioned that the
ratio should not be misunderstood, to record the clarification,
which in the present case, in our opinion, is not of any avail
and help to Respondent 2 complainant. We respectfully
concur with the clarification as well as the ratio explaining
Sections 415, 464, etc. IPC.], has elucidated that the
condition precedent of an offence under Section 471 IPC is
forgery by making a false document or false electronic record
or part thereof. Further, to constitute the offence under
Section 471 IPC, it has to be proven that the document was
"forged" in terms of Section 470 [ "470. Forged
document.--A false document [or electronic record] made
wholly or in part by forgery is designated "a forged document
or electronic record"."] , and "false" in terms of Section
464IPC [ "464. Making a false document.--A person is
said to make a false document or false electronic record--
First.--Who dishonestly or fraudulently--(a) makes, signs,
seals or executes a document or part of a document;(b)
makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any
electronic record;(c) affixes any electronic signature on any
electronic record;(d) makes any mark denoting the execution
of a document or the authenticity of the electronic
signature,with the intention of causing it to be believed that
such document or part of a document, electronic record
or *[electronic signature] was made, signed, sealed,
executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a
person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was
not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or*
Substituted for "digital signature" by Act 10 of 2009, Section
51(e) (w.e.f. 27-10-2009)Secondly.--Who without lawful
authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or
otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any
material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or
affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any
other person, whether such person be living or dead at the
time of such alteration; orThirdly.--Who dishonestly or
fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter
a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic
signature on any electronic record knowing that such person
by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or
that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not
29
know the contents of the document or electronic record or
the nature of the alteration."] .
22. Section 470 lays down that a document is "forged"
if there is:
(i) fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as
genuine; and
(ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part
of the person using the document that it is a forged
one.
Section 470 defines a "forged document" as a false
document made by forgery.
23. As per Section 464IPC, a person is said to have
made a "false document":
(i) if he has made or executed a document
claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone
else;
(ii) if he has altered or tampered a document;or
(iii) if he has obtained a document by practising
deception, or from a person not in control of his
senses.
24. Unless the document is false and forged in
terms of Sections 464 and 470IPC respectively, the
requirement of Section 471IPC would not be met.
25. In the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent 2
complainant, it is submitted that a few bills were
faked/forged, as the goods were not ordered. Reference is
made to balance of Rs 79,752 shown on 30-3-2013, which
was objected to and thereupon as per the complaint itself the
demand/bill was withdrawn. This would not make the bill a
forged document or false document, in terms of Sections 470
and 464 IPC. The complaint was made in the year 2017, four
years after the bill/claim had been withdrawn, reflecting no
criminal intent. The bill was not fake or forged, and at best it
could be stated that it was wrongly raised. Moreover, the
30
pre-summoning evidence is silent with regard to this bill and
mens rea on the part of the accused is not shown and
established. Same would be the position with regard to the
bill/invoice of Rs 53,215 which was as per the complaint,
sent directly to Manav Rachna International at Faridabad.
The bill/invoice is not doubted as "forged" or "false" within
the meaning of Sections 470 and 464 IPC. No doubt, Adhunik
Colour Solutions is mentioned as the buyer, and Manav
Rachna International as the consignee, albeit the invoice was
issued by JIPL. Pre-summoning evidence does not help and
make out a case predicated on this bill/invoice. In the
counter-affidavit filed before us, it is alleged that since this
bill was sent to Faridabad, JIPL had added the GST in the
invoice. It is argued that had Respondent 2 complainant
supplied the goods, instead of GST, VAT as applicable in
Delhi would have been levied, as Respondent 2 complainant
was based in Delhi. This argument is rather fanciful and does
not impress us to justify summoning for the offence under
Section 471 IPC. Besides, the assertion is not to be found in
the complaint, and cannot be predicated on the pre-
summoning evidence.
26. For completeness, we must record that the
appellants have placed on record the dealership agreement
dated 11-4-2012, which, inter alia states that JIPL has a
discretion to establish direct contractual relationship with
specific customers, if JIPL feels they can be served better.
Further, in such a situation, the dealer, if JIPL agrees, can
act as an intermediary. Assuming the bill/invoice had
wrongly recorded Respondent 2 complainant as the buyer, it
is not doubted that Manav Rachna International was the
consignee. At best, Respondent 2 complainant would not be
liable, had Manav Rachna International failed to pay. Non-
payment is also not alleged in the complaint or the pre-
summoning evidence. Reliance on objections vide emails
dated 4-7-2014 and 21-7-2014 are of no avail, as they are
for the period prior to 31-7-2014, when the bill/invoice was
raised.
27. It is evident from the pre-summoning evidence led
and the assertions made in the criminal complaint that the
dispute raised by Respondent 2 complainant primarily
pertains to settlement of accounts. The allegations are:
31
(i) goods supplied by JIPL were not as per the
requirements and demands of Respondent 2
complainant,
(ii) goods supplied were different from the order
placed, and
(iii) goods lying with, and returned by
Respondent 2 complainant have not been accounted
for.
These assertions, even if assumed to be correct, would not
fulfil the requirements of Section 405IPC, or for that matter
Sections 420 or 471. The material on record does not
reflect and indicate that JIPL indeed had the
dishonest/culpable intention for the commission of the
alleged offences under the IPC. Unless the ingredients
of aforesaid Sections of the IPC are fulfilled, the
offence under Section 120-BIPC, for criminal
conspiracy, would not be made. In fact, a combined
reading of the complaint and the pre-summoning
evidence does not disclose any element of criminal
conspiracy as per Section 120-AIPC. The complaint
discloses a civil dispute and grievance relating to the
claim made by JIPL. What is challenged by Respondent 2
complainant is the demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p raised by JIPL
as the amount payable till the year ending 2016. This
assertion made by JIPL is questioned as incorrect. The
demand, even if assumed to be wrong, would not satisfy the
ingredients of Section 405, or Sections 420 or 471IPC, so as
to justify the summoning order. As noted above, JIPL had
filed a criminal case under Section 138 of the NI Act as two
cheques for Rs 1,93,776 and Rs 4,99,610 issued by them, on
presentation, were dishonoured on account of "insufficient
funds".
28. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
assertions made in the complaint and the pre-
summoning evidence led by Respondent 2 complainant
fail to establish the conditions and incidence of the
penal liability set out under Sections 405, 420 and
471IPC, as the allegations pertain to alleged breach of
32
contractual obligations. Pertinently, this Court, in a
number of cases, has noticed attempts made by
parties to invoke jurisdiction of criminal courts, by
filing vexatious criminal complaints by camouflaging
allegations which were ex facie outrageous or pure
civil claims. These attempts are not to be entertained
and should be dismissed at the threshold. To avoid
prolixity, we would only like to refer to the judgment
of this Court in Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny [Thermax
Ltd. v. K.M. Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 : (2012) 2 SCC
(Cri) 650] , as it refers to earlier case laws in copious
detail.
29. In Thermax [Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny,
(2011) 13 SCC 412 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 650] , it was
pointed out that the court should be watchful of the
difference between civil and criminal wrongs, though
there can be situations where the allegations may
constitute both civil and criminal wrongs. The court
must cautiously examine the facts to ascertain
whether they only constitute a civil wrong, as the
ingredients of criminal wrong are missing. A conscious
application of the said aspects is required by the
Magistrate, as a summoning order has grave
consequences of setting criminal proceedings in
motion.
30. Even though at the stage of issuing process to the
accused the Magistrate is not required to record detailed
reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set
the criminal proceedings into motion. The requirement of
Section 204 of the Code is that the Magistrate should
carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record. He/She
may even put questions to complainant and his/her
witnesses when examined under Section 200 of the Code to
elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations.
Only upon being satisfied that there is sufficient ground for
summoning the accused to stand the trial, summons should
be issued. [Birla Corpn. Ltd. v. Adventz Investments &
Holdings Ltd., (2019) 16 SCC 610 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 828 :
(2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 713; Pepsi Foods Ltd. [Pepsi Foods
Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC
33
(Cri) 1400]; and Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad
Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC 420 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 124.]
31. Summoning order is to be passed when the
complainant discloses the offence, and when there is
material that supports and constitutes essential ingredients
of the offence. It should not be passed lightly or as a matter
of course. When the violation of law alleged is clearly
debatable and doubtful, either on account of paucity and lack
of clarity of facts, or on application of law to the facts, the
Magistrate must ensure clarification of the ambiguities.
Summoning without appreciation of the legal provisions and
their application to the facts may result in an innocent being
summoned to stand the prosecution/trial. Initiation of
prosecution and summoning of the accused to stand trial,
apart from monetary loss, sacrifice of time, and effort to
prepare a defence, also causes humiliation and disrepute in
the society. It results in anxiety of uncertain times.
32. While summoning an accused who resides outside
the jurisdiction of court, in terms of the insertion made to
Section 202 of the Code by Act 25 of 2005, it is obligatory
upon the Magistrate to inquire into the case himself or direct
investigation be made by a police officer or such other officer
for finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. [Vijay
Dhanuka v. NajimaMamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638 : (2015) 1
SCC (Cri) 479; Abhijit Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar
Nimbalkar, (2017) 3 SCC 528 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 192;
and Birla Corpn. Ltd. [Birla Corpn. Ltd. v. Adventz
Investments & Holdings Ltd., (2019) 16 SCC 610 : (2020) 2
SCC (Cri) 828 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 713.] In the present
case, the said exercise has not been undertaken.
33. The order sheet of the trial court enclosed with the
appeal reveals that notwithstanding that the summoning
order was limited to unnamed Manager and Chief Manager of
JIPL, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had deemed it
appropriate to issue non-bailable warrant. The non-bailable
warrant was not issued in the name of any person but by
designation against the Chief Manager JIPL, Andheri East,
Mumbai. This was also one of the reasons that had prompted
34
the appellants to the file the petition under Section 482 of
the Code.
34. We must also observe that the High Court,
while dismissing the petition filed under Section 482
of the Code, failed to take due notice that criminal
proceedings should not be allowed to be initiated
when it is manifest that these proceedings have been
initiated with ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance
and with a view to spite the opposite side due to
private or personal grudge. [Birla Corpn. Ltd. [Birla
Corpn. Ltd. v. Adventz Investments & Holdings Ltd.,
(2019) 16 SCC 610 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 828 : (2020) 2
SCC (Civ) 713]; Mehmood Ul Rehman [Mehmood Ul
Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC
420 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 124]; R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866; and State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426.] Allegations in the complaint and the
pre-summoning evidence on record, when taken on
the face value and accepted in entirety, do not
constitute the offence alleged. The inherent powers of
the court can and should be exercised in such
circumstances. When the allegations in the complaint
are so absurd or inherently improbable, on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient wrong for
proceeding against the accused, summons should not
be issued."
(Emphasis supplied)
A little earlier, the Apex Court in RANDHEER SINGH v. STATE OF
UTTAR PRADESH3 has held as follows:
"..... .... ....
3
(2021) 14 SCC 626
35
24. A fraudulent, fabricated or forged deed could
mean a deed which was not actually executed, but a deed
which had fraudulently been manufactured by forging the
signature of the ostensible executants. It is one thing to say
that Bela Rani fraudulently executed a power of attorney
authorising the sale of property knowing that she had no title
to convey the property. It is another thing to say that the
power of attorney itself was a forged, fraudulent, fabricated
or manufactured one, meaning thereby that it had never
been executed by Bela Rani. Her signature had been forged.
It is impossible to fathom how the investigating authorities
could even have been prima facie satisfied that the deed had
been forged or fabricated or was fraudulent without even
examining the apparent executant Bela Rani, who has not
even been cited as a witness.
25. Ms Deepika Kalia, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the State, competently argued the matter and
vehemently tried to persuade this Court not to intervene.
She even sought time to produce further documents.
However, the charge-sheet speaks for itself and there could
be no question of improvement of the charge-sheet read with
the FIR, either by adducing documents or by filing affidavit
or by making oral submissions.
26. Mr Chandra Prakash, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant cited certain judgments of this
Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [Mohd.
Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 929] ; Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand [Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand,
(2013) 11 SCC 673 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 76] ; Uma Shankar
Gopalika v. State of Bihar [Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of
Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 49] ; Vesa
Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [Vesa Holdings (P)
Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293 : (2015) 3 SCC
(Cri) 498] ; Robert John D'Souza v. Stephen V.
Gomes [Robert John D'Souza v. Stephen V. Gomes, (2015) 9
SCC 96 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 724] ; and Kapil
Agarwal v. Sanjay Sharma [Kapil Agarwal v. Sanjay Sharma,
(2021) 5 SCC 524 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 634] .
36
27. In Mohd. Ibrahim [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of
Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929] , this
Court held as under : (SCC pp. 757-60, paras 19-24 & 27-
30)
"19. To constitute an offence under Section
420, there should not only be cheating, but as a
consequence of such cheating, the accused should
have dishonestly induced the person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable
security (or anything signed or sealed and which is
capable of being converted into a valuable security).
20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a
property claiming ownership thereto, it may be
possible for the purchaser under such sale deed to
allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a
false representation of ownership and fraudulently
induced him to part with the sale consideration. But
in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser.
On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-
accused.
21. It is not the case of the complainant that
any of the accused tried to deceive him either by
making a false or misleading representation or by
any other action or omission, nor is it his case that
they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest
inducement to deliver any property or to consent to
the retention thereof by any person or to
intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit if he were not so
deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the
first appellant pretended to be the complainant while
executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the first accused by the act of executing
sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the
second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or
the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of
being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard
to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any
manner.
37
22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in
Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that
there was an offence punishable under Sections 417,
418, 419 or 420 of the Code.
A clarification
23. When we say that execution of a sale
deed by a person, purporting to convey a property
which is not his, as his property, is not making a
false document and therefore not forgery, we should
not be understood as holding that such an act can
never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a
property knowing that it does not belong to him, and
thereby defrauds the person who purchased the
property, the person defrauded, that is, the
purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed
the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who
is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able
to make such complaint.
24. The term "fraud" is not defined in the
Code. The dictionary definition of "fraud" is
'deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended
to gain advantage'. Section 17 of the Contract Act,
1872 defines "fraud" with reference to a party to a
contract.
***
27. The term "fraudulently" is mostly used
with the term "dishonestly" which is defined in
Section 24 as follows:
'24. "Dishonestly".--Whoever does
anything with the intention of causing wrongful
gain to one person or wrongful loss to another
person, is said to do that thing "dishonestly".'
28 [Ed. : Para 28 corrected vide Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./149/2009 dated 6-10-
2009.] . To "defraud" or do something fraudulently is
not by itself made an offence under the Penal Code,
but various acts when done fraudulently (or
fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences.
These include:
(i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property
(Sections 206, 421 and 424).
38
(ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure
(Section 207).
(iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (Sections
208 and 210).
(iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin
(Sections 239, 240, 242 and 243).
(v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin
(Sections 246 to 253).
(vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255 to
261).
(vii) Fraudulent use of false instrument/weight/measure
(Sections 264 to 266).
(viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420).
(ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to
creditors (Section 422).
(x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing
false statement of consideration (Section 423).
(xi) Forgery making or executing a false document
(Sections 463 to 471 and 474).
(xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable
security, etc. (Section 477).
(xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony
(Section 496).
It follows therefore that by merely alleging or
showing that a person acted fraudulently, it cannot
be assumed that he committed an offence
punishable under the Code or any other law, unless
that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence
under the Code or other law.
Section 504 of the Penal Code
29. The allegations in the complaint do not
also make out the ingredients of an offence under
Section 504 of the Penal Code. Section 504 refers to
39
intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of
peace. The allegation of the complainant is that
when he enquired with Accused 1 and 2 about the
sale deeds, they asserted that they will obtain
possession of land under the sale deeds and he can
do whatever he wants. The statement attributed to
Appellants 1 and 2, it cannot be said to amount to an
"insult with intent to provoke breach of peace". The
statement attributed to the accused, even if it was
true, was merely a statement referring to the
consequence of execution of the sale deeds by the
first appellant in favour of the second appellant.
Conclusion
30. The averments in the complaint if
assumed to be true, do not make out any offence
under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 504 of the Code,
but may technically show the ingredients of offences
of wrongful restraint under Section 341 and causing
hurt under Section 323IPC."
28. In Paramjeet Batra [Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 76] ,
this Court held that : (SCC p. 676, para 12)
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code the High
Court has to be cautious. This power is to
be used sparingly and only for the purpose
of preventing abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure ends of
justice. Whether a complaint discloses a
criminal offence or not depends upon the
nature of facts alleged therein. Whether
essential ingredients of criminal offence
are present or not has to be judged by the
High Court. A complaint disclosing civil
transactions may also have a criminal
texture. But the High Court must see
whether a dispute which is essentially of a
civil nature is given a cloak of criminal
offence. In such a situation, if a civil
remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted
40
as has happened in this case, the High
Court should not hesitate to quash the
criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of
process of the court."
29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika [Uma Shankar
Gopalika v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336 : (2006) 2
SCC (Cri) 49] , this Court found that the complaint, in that
case, did not disclose any criminal offence at all, much less
any offence under Section 420 or Section 120-BIPC. The
case was purely a civil dispute between the parties for which
remedy lay before the civil court.
30. In Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. [Vesa Holdings (P)
Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293 : (2015) 3 SCC
(Cri) 498] , this Court held : (SCC pp. 297-98, para 13)
"13. It is true that a given set of facts may make
out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only
because a civil remedy may be available to the
complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a
criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence
of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing
to show that at the very inception there was any
intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat
which is a condition precedent for an offence under
Section 420IPC. In our view the complaint does not
disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal
proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found
to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of
the court. The superior courts while exercising this
power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In
our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police
investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of
the process of the court and the High Court
[Maniprasad v. State of Kerala, 2011 SCC OnLine Ker
4251] committed an error in refusing to exercise the
power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code
to quash the proceedings."
31. In Robert John D'Souza [Robert John
D'Souza v. Stephen V. Gomes, (2015) 9 SCC 96 : (2015) 3
SCC (Cri) 724] , this Court held : (SCC pp. 100-01, paras
12-13 & 15-16)
41
"12. As far as the offence of cheating is
concerned, the same is defined in Section 415IPC, for
which the punishment is provided under Section 420IPC.
Section 415 reads as under:
'415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any
person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person
so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or
to consent that any person shall retain any property,
or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do
or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if
he were not so deceived, and which act or omission
causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that
person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to
"cheat".
Explanation.--A dishonest concealment of facts is
a deception within the meaning of this section.
Illustrations
***'
From the above language of the section, one of the
essential ingredients for the offence of cheating is
deception, but in the present case, from the contents of
the complaint it nowhere reflects that the complainant
was deceived or he or anyone else was induced to
deliver the property by deception. What was done, was
so reflected in the resolutions, and sale deeds.
13.In MadhavraoJiwajiraoScindia v. Sambhajirao
ChandrojiraoAngre [MadhavraoJiwajiraoScindia v. Samb
hajiraoChandrojiraoAngre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988
SCC (Cri) 234] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has
laid down the law as to quashment of proceedings under
Section 482CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 695, para 7)
'7. The legal position is well settled that when
a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be
quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima
facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to
take into consideration any special features which
appear in a particular case to consider whether it is
expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a
prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that
the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose
and where in the opinion of the court chances of an
ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful
purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal
42
prosecution to continue, the court may while taking
into consideration the special facts of a case also
quash the proceeding even though it may be at a
preliminary stage.'
15. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal [Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259]
, this Court in paras 25 and 46 has observed as under :
(SCC pp. 10-11 & 16)
'25. Reference to the following cases would
reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view
that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent
injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English
courts have also used inherent power to achieve the
same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown
Court has inherent power to protect its process from
abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [Connelly v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, 1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145
(HL)] Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal
proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court
is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to
proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Humphrys [Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Humphrys, 1977 AC 1 : (1976) 2 WLR
857 (HL)] stressed the importance of the inherent
power when he observed that it is only if the
prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the
court and is oppressive and vexatious that the Judge
has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that
the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great
constitutional importance and should be jealously
preserved.
***
46. The court must ensure that criminal
prosecution is not used as an instrument of
harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an
ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis
of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion
that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an
inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Section 482CrPC though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned
cases. In view of the settled legal position, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained.'
43
16. In view of the above discussion and the facts
and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that
none of the offences for which the appellants are
summoned, is made out from the complaint and
material on record. We further find that it is nothing but
abuse of process of law on the part of the complainant
to implicate the appellants in a criminal case after a
period of twelve years of execution of registered sale
deeds in question, who is neither party to the sale deeds
nor a member of the Society. Therefore, we allow the
appeal and set aside the orders passed by the High
Court [Walter D'Mello v. Stephen V. Gomes, 2014 SCC
OnLine Kar 12058] and that of the courts below.
Accordingly, the order passed by the Magistrate
summoning the appellants in the criminal complaint filed
by Respondent 1, in respect of the offences punishable
under Sections 406, 409 and 420IPC, also stands
quashed."
32. In Kapil Agarwal [Kapil Agarwal v. Sanjay
Sharma, (2021) 5 SCC 524 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 634] ,
this Court observed that Section 482 is designed to
achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal
proceedings are not permitted to generate into
weapons of harassment.
33. In this case, it appears that criminal
proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon
of harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at
the cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose
any offence so far as the appellant is concerned. There
is no whisper of how and in what manner, this
appellant is involved in any criminal offence and the
charge-sheet, the relevant part whereof has been
extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no
doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC should
be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse
of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal
offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation
and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the
High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint
disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal
44
texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether
the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of
criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court
should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings
as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra [Paramjeet
Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 76] extracted above.
34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong
as also a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is
available may not be a ground to quash criminal
proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no criminal
offence has been made out in the FIR read with the charge-
sheet so far as this appellant is concerned. The other
accused Rajan Kumar has died."
(Emphasis supplied)
If the facts obtaining in the case at hand, the complaint and
summary of the charge sheet are noticed, the complaint is
registered to wreak vengeance against the petitioner in a seemingly
civil dispute, rendering it a colour of crime. In such circumstances,
this Court should step into exercise its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. and obliterate the crime, failing which, it would
become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of
justice.
45
13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceedings in C.C.No.3218 of 2021 pending before I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, arising out of crime in Crime No.60 of 2016 of Cyber Crime Police Station, Bangalore, stand quashed.
(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings against any other accused pending before any other fora.
As a consequence, I.A.No.1/2023 stands disposed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE nvj CT:SS