Punjab-Haryana High Court
Arun Kumar vs State Of Punjab And Another on 25 May, 2023
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301
CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
232 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020
Date of Decision: 25.05.2023
Arun Kumar ......Pe oner
Vs.
State of Punjab and another ......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present: Mr. Puneet Kumar Bansal, Advocate for
Mr. R.S. Parmar, Advocate for the pe oner.
Mr. Virat Rana, AAG, Punjab.
Mr. R.K. Chaudhary, Advocate
for respondent No. 2.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA J.
FIR No. Dated Police Sta-on Sec-ons 144 22.07.2015 Goraya, Jalandhar City, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 IPC District Jalandhar The pe oner, arraigned as accused in the above cap oned FIR, has come up before
this Court under Sec on 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequen al proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved person.
2. During the pendency of the pe on, the accused and the aggrieved person have compromised the ma6er, and its copy is annexed with this pe on as Annexure P-2.
3. A:er that, the pe oner came up before this Court to quash the FIR, and in the quashing pe on, impleading the aggrieved person as respondent.
4. On 10.02.2020, the aggrieved person Santokh Singh (R-2) appeared before the JMIC, Phillaur and stated that there would be no objec on if the court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated 13.02.2020, the par es consented to the quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings without any threat.
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
5. Despite the severe opposi on of the State's counsel to this compromise, the following 1 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 aspects would be relevant to conclude this pe on: -
a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably se6led the ma6er between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court;
b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the se6lement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boyco6s, bribes, or other dubious means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullifica on of criminal proceedings;
d) There is no objec on from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve ma6ers concerning public policy;
f) The rejec on of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society;
i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequen al proceedings is jus fied to secure the ends of jus ce.
6. In the present case the offences under Sec ons 465, 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 are not compoundable under Sec on 320 CrPC. However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecu on qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.
7. In C.B.I., New Delhi v. DuncansAgro Industries Ltd., Calcu6a, 1996(5) SCC 591, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [26]. A:er giving our careful considera on to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the respec ve counsel for the par es, it appears to us that for the purpose of quashing the complaint, it is necessary to consider whether the allega on in the complaint prima facie make out an offence or not. It is not necessary to scru nise whether the allega ons are likely to be upheld in the trial. Any ac on by way of quashing the complaint is an ac on to be taken at the threshold before evidences are led in support of the complaint. For quashing the complaint by way of ac on at the threshold, it is, therefore, necessary to consider whether on the face of the allega ons, a criminal offence is cons tuted or not.
[29]. In the facts of the case, it appears to us that there is enough 2 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 jus fica on for the High Court to hold that the case was basically a ma6er of civil dispute. The Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the concerned Companies. Even if an offence of chea ng is prima faciecons tuted, such offence is a compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits ins tuted by the Banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of chea ng. It is also to be noted that long me has elapsed since the complaint was filed in 1987. It may also be indicated that although such FIRs were filed in 1987 and 1989, the Banks have not chosen to ins tute any case against the alleged erring officials despite allega ons made against them in the FIRs. Considering that the inves ga ons had not been completed ll 1991 even though there was no impediment to complete the inves ga ons and further inves ga ons are s ll pending and also considering the fact that the claims of the Banks have been sa sfied and the suits ins tuted by the Banks have been compromised on receiving payments, we do not think the said complaints should be pursued any further. In our view, proceeding further with the complaints will not be expedient. In the special facts of the case, it appears to us that the decision of the High Court in quashing the complaints does not warrant any interference under Ar cle 136 of the Cons tu on. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals.
8. In Manoj Sharma v. State, 2008(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 827: 2008(16) SCC 1, Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings holding as follows, [8]. In our view, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdic on under Ar cle 226 of the Cons tu on for quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The First Informa on Report, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true that the First Informa on Report was the basis of the inves ga on by the Police authori es, but the dispute between the par es remained one of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the ma6er further, the High Court could have taken a more pragma c view of the ma6er. We do not suggest that while exercising its powers under Ar cle 226 of the Cons tu on the High Court could not have refused to quash the First Informa on Report, but what we do say is that the ma6er could have been considered by the High Court with greater pragma sm in the facts of the case. As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code or Ar cle 226 of the Cons tu on is discre onary to be exercised in the facts of each case.
9. In Nikhil Merchant vs C.B.I. &Anr, Cr.A 1302 of 2008, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [22]. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an offence of chea ng punishable under Sec on 420 IPC, the same has been made compoundable under Sub-sec on (2) of Sec on 320Cr.P.C. with the leave of the Court. Of course, forgery has not been included as one of the compoundable offences, but it is in such cases that the principle 3 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 enunciated in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) becomes relevant. [23]. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facili es beyond the limit to which the Company was en tled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The ques on which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised? [24]. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are sa sfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the con nuance of the same a:er the compromise arrived at between the par es would be a fu le exercise.
10. In JayrajsinhDigvijaysingh Rana v. State of Gujarat, 2012 (12) SCC 401, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [6]. It is also relevant to point out that the averments in the FIR disclosed the offences punishable under Sec ons 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120- B of Indian Penal Code.
[7]. The only ques on for considera on before this Court at this stage is that inasmuch as all those offences are not compoundable offences under Sec on 320 of the Code (except Sec on 420 of Indian Penal Code that too with the permission of the Court before which any prosecu on for such offence is pending), whether it would be possible to quash the FIR by the High Court under Sec on 482 of the Code or by this Court exercising jurisdic on under Ar cle 136 of the Cons tu on of India?
[8]. The above ques on was recently considered by this Court in Shiji @ Pappu&Ors. v. Radhika &Anr., 2011(6) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 210 : 2012(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 9 : (2011)10 SCC 705. The ques on posed in that case was "Whether the criminal proceedings in ques on could be quashed in the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the se6lement that the par es had arrived at." A:er adver ng to Sec on 482 of the Code and various decisions, this Court concluded as under :
"17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Sec on 320 Criminal Procedure Code is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a convic on against the accused and the en re exercise of a trial is des ned to be an exercise in fu lity. There is a subtle dis nc on between compounding of offences by 4 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 the par es before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecu on under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against convic on, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a se6lement arrived at between the par es in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Sec on 320, the High Court may quash the prosecu on even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not for that purpose controlled by Sec on 320 Criminal Procedure Code.
18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and cau on. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that con nuance of the prosecu on would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situa ons in which the exercise of power under Sec on 482 may be jus fied. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jus ce and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be jus fied in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a pe on under Sec on 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked."
[9]. On going through the factual details, earlier decision, various offences under Sec on 320 of the Code and invoca on of Sec on 482 of the Code, we fully concur with the said conclusion. In the case on hand, irrespec ve of the earlier dispute between Respondent No. 2- the complainant and the appellant being Accused No. 3 as well as Accused Nos. 1 and 2 subsequently and a:er geOng all the materials, relevant details etc., the present appellant (Accused No. 3) sworn an affidavit with bona fide inten on securing the right, tle and interest in favour of Respondent No. 2 herein-the Complainant. In such bona fide circumstances, the power under Sec on 482 may be exercised. Further, in view of the se6lement arrived at between Respondent No. 2-the complainant and the appellant (Accused No. 3), there is no chance of recording a convic on insofar as the present appellant is concerned and the en re exercise of trial is des ned to be an exercise in fu lity. Inasmuch as the ma6er has not reached the stage of trial, we are of the view that the High Court, by exercising the inherent power under Sec on 482 of the Code even in offences which are not compoundable under Sec on 320, may quash the prosecu on.
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However, as observed in Shiji (supra), the power under Sec on 482 has to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that con nuance of the prosecu on would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. In other words, the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jus ce and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law.
[10]. In the light of the principles men oned above, inasmuch as Respondent No. 2-the Complainant has filed an affidavit highligh ng the stand taken by the appellant (Accused No. 3) during the pendency of the appeal before this Court and the terms of se6lement as stated in the said affidavit, by applying the same analogy and in order to do complete jus ce under Ar cle 142 of the Cons tu on, we accept the terms of se6lement insofar as the appellant herein (Accused No. 3) is concerned.
[11]. In view of the same, we quash and set aside the impugned FIR No. 45/2011 registered with Sanand Police Sta on, Ahmedabad for offences punishable under Sec ons 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of Indian Penal Code insofar as the appellant (Accused No. 3) is concerned. The appeal is allowed to the extent men oned above.
11. In Central Bureau of Inves ga on v. Jagjit Singh, (2013) 10 SCC 686, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [14]. In the present case, the specific allega on made against the respondent-accused is that he obtained the loan on the basis of forged document with the aid of officers of the Bank. On inves ga on, having found the ingredients of chea ng and dishonestly inducing delivery of property of the bank (Sec on 420 Indian Penal Code) and dishonestly using as genuine a forged document (Sec on 471 Indian Penal Code), charge sheet was submi6ed under Sec ons 420/471 Indian Penal Code against the accused persons.
[15]. The debt which was due to the Bank was recovered by the Bank pursuant to an order passed by Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a compromise between the offender and the vic m. The offences when commi6ed in rela on with Banking ac vi es including offences under Sec ons 420/471 Indian Penal Code have harmful effect on the public and threaten the well being of the society. These offences fall under the category of offences involving moral turpitude commi6ed by public servants while working in that capacity. Prima facie, one may state that the bank as the vic m in such cases but, in fact, the society in general, including customers of the Bank is the sufferer. In the present case, there was neither an allega on regarding any abuse of process of any Court nor anything on record to suggest that the offenders were en tled to secure the order in the ends of jus ce.
12. In Gold Quest Interna onal Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2014) 15 SCC 235, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [3]. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant is an Interna onal Numisma c Company which has opera ons in over sixty countries. It 6 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 is pleaded that it conducts its business with necessary licence. The mul level marke ng through direct selling of products is being adopted by the Company in the interest of the consumers by elimina ng the middleman and rewarding the consumer by reducing the prices. The appellant-company has over sixteen thousand members/consumers in and around the city of Chennai alone. A complaint was made in the year 2003 by Respondent No. 7 against the appellant-company alleging non-compliance of issuance of numisma c gold coin on receipt of L 16,800/- from wife of Respondent No. 7 as per the promise made by the appellant- company. Some other customers also had complaints on the basis of which Respondent No. 4 registered a case under Sec on 420 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec ons 4, 5 & 6 of the Prise Chits and Money Circula on (Banning) Act, 1978. The appellant-company filed a writ pe on being W.P.No. 26784 of 2003 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying therein that the FIR registered against it be quashed. Since all the claimants including the complainant se6led the dispute with the appellant-company and entered into an agreement, learned Single Judge of the High Court by its order dated 19th April, 2005 quashed the FIR, and disposed of the aforesaid writ pe on. However, the State-respondents challenged the said order dated 19th April, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the FIR No. 307 of 2003 was quashed, before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal being W.A.No. 1178 of 2005 filed by the State-respondents and directed Respondent No. 4 to inves gate the crime. Hence, this appeal. [8]. In view of the principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid cases, we are of the view in the disputes which are substan ally matrimonial in nature, or the civil property disputes with criminal facets, if the par es have entered into se6lement, and it has become clear that there are no chances of convic on, there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. read with Ar cle 226 of the Cons tu on. However, the same would not apply where the nature of offence is very serious like rape, murder, robbery, dacoity, cases under Preven on of Corrup on Act, cases under Narco c Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and other similar kind of offences in which punishment of life imprisonment or death can be awarded. A:er considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that learned Single Judge did not commit any error of law in quashing the FIR a:er not only the complainant and the appellant se6led their money dispute but also the other alleged sufferers entered into an agreement with the appellant, and as such, they too se6led their claims.
13. In ParbatbhaiAahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: -
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following proposi ons:
16 (i) Sec on 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of jus ce. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; 16 (ii) The invoca on of the jurisdic on of the High Court to quash a 7 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 First Informa on Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a se6lement has been arrived at between the offender and the vic m is not the same as the invoca on of jurisdic on for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of sec on 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Sec on 482 is a6racted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdic on under Sec on 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of jus ce would jus fy the exercise of the inherent power; 16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of jus ce or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; 16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Informa on Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and vic m have se6led the dispute, revolves ul mately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaus ve elabora on of principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Sec on 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been se6led, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence.
Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the vic m or the family of the vic m have se6led the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to con nue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As dis nguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a dis nct foo ng in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercan le, partnership or similar transac ons with an essen ally civil flavour may in appropriate situa ons fall for quashing where par es have se6led the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a convic on is remote and the con nua on of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16 (x) There is yet an excep on to the principle set out in proposi ons
(viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implica ons which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be jus fied in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an ac vity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
14. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on 29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers 8 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 under Sec on 320 Cr.P.C. Any such a6empt by the court would amount to altera on, addi on and modifica on of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C., which may jus fy its wider interpreta on and include such offences in the docket of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdic on to compound an offence within the framework of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for jus fiable reasons can press Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of jus ce. [12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that par es have amicably se6led their dispute and the vic m has willingly consented to the nullifica on of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non- compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequen al effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and therea:er adopt a pragma c approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not nker with or paralyze the very object of the administra on of criminal jus ce system. [13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non- heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespec ve of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against convic on. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering jus ce. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful excep ons. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post convic on, the High Court ought to exercise such discre on with rec tude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and a:er the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of jus ce. There can be no hard and fast line constric ng the power of the High Court to do substan al jus ce. A restric ve construc on of inherent powers under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious jus ce, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injus ce. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cau ously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15]. [14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve ma6ers concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the poten al to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a 'se6lement' through duress, threats, social boyco6s, bribes or other 9 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided."
15. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [5]. It is on the basis of this compromise that the applica on was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We no ce from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contes ng par es and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allega ons made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in con nuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has, on 11th January 2004, passed away and the possibility of a convic on being recorded has thus to be ruled out. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the ques on involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the ma6er alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecu on is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the me so saved can be u lised in deciding more effec ve and meaningful li ga on. This is a common sense approach to the ma6er based on ground of reali es and benefit of the technicali es of the law.
16. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Jus ce arises propi ously when par es, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
17. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of par es, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objec ves point towards its acceptance.
18. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Associa on v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Pe on (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that ma6er was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Pe ons against the order of the High Court rejec ng their pe on for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ pe on has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automa cally stands vi ated."
19. Considering the en re facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-men oned 10 of 11 ::: Downloaded on - 28-05-2023 08:36:29 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:076301 CRM-M No.3180 of 2020 2023:PHHC:076301 judicial precedents, I believe that con nuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruiWul purpose whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdic on under sec on 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the pe oner(s). The bail bonds of the pe oner are accordingly discharged. All pending applica on(s), if any, stand closed.
Pe--on allowed in the terms men-oned above. All pending applica ons, if any, stand disposed of.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
25.05.2023
Jyo -II
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: No.
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