Delhi High Court
Blue Star Limited vs K.S. Khurana And Ors. on 30 November, 1992
Equivalent citations: 49(1993)DLT329, 1993(25)DRJ162, (1994)IILLJ590DEL
JUDGMENT J.K. Mehra, J.
(1) This petition has been filed by the petitioner feeling aggrieved by the impugned order of the Labour Court whereby the Labour Court instead of concluding the proceedings and making an award in term of settlement or declaring the reference as infructous or making a "No dispute" award in the light of the joint application moved by the parties, had on account of certain subsequent submissions by the workmen proceeded to hold a further inquiry by ordering nearly all the senior executives of the management who were alleged to be connected with the negotiations for settlement as court witnesses even before the -workmen had examined themselves or led any evidence whatsoever to prove their allegations in their application pleading that prior to the written settlement there was an oral agreement with regard to the payment of the back wages.
(2) Briefly staling the facts are as under:-
(3) (I) that the management had taken certain disciplinary action against a number of employees and terminated their services. Two of the employees, namely, S/Shri Vinay Bedi and C.L. Chadha challenged their termination and raised a dispute which was referred to the Respondent No. 1 for adjudication by the Delhi Administration vide order of reference bearing No. F.24(233)/84-LAB dated 10.9. for adjudicition. The terms of reference were as under:- WHETHER;the dismissal of the workmen S/Shri Vinay Bedi and C.L. Chadha from service is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief are they entitled and whit directions are in this respect?"
(4) (II) During the pendency of this dispute before the Labour Court, the matter relating to the said terminations was taken up with the management by the All India Blue star Employees Federation to which "Blue Star Employees Union, Delhi" is affiliated. Various demands were negotiated and one among those was relating to the termination of these two individuals. The term No. 2 (b) of the said settlement reached with the Federation reads as under- "(B)Vinay Bedi, C.L.Chadha and N. S. Yadav" (i) It is agreed that, Vinay Bedi, C.L. Chadha and N.S. yadav on their sub-mitting letters to the company as per Annexure Iii, will be re-employed at Delhi one day after signing of the Operative terms of this settlement. They will be on probation for a period of six months on salary/wages/ allowances last drawn-by them. During probation, they will be paid monthly allowances, normally not payable during probation. No wages/salary/allowances shall be payable from the date of. dismissal to the date of re-employment. (ii) On confirmation, Viney Bedi, C.L. Chadha and N.S. Yadav will be given benefits of past services rendered to dismissal for the purpose of leave retirement benefits, seniority in service and other benefits related to total service."
(5) The letter Annexure-III to the said agreement reads as under:- "1refer to your letter dated dismissing me from the services of the company. - I regret my action/behavior that led to my dismissal and request the Management to review my case sympathetically and take me back in the service of the company. I assure you that in the event of my being taken back in the service of the company, I will not commit any misconducts, will abide by the rules and regulations and will behave in a disciplined manner as long as I am in the employment of the company. I hope you will take lenient view and agree to my request."
(6) This settlement was reached at Bombay on October 18, 1985. Since this matter related to Delhi Branch it was also agreed that the terms of the said settlement will become operative from the date when the Delhi Union and Management sign a settlement in terms of the said agreement before the respective State Conciliation Officer of the State Labour Commissioner's office.
(7) (III) It was further pointed out that following the above settlement with the Federation, the parties even before the execution of the formal settlement with local union proceeded to honour the terms contained in the aforesaid agreement and accordingly the workman thereafter submitted the letter on the lines of the draft aforesaid on 21st October 1985 and got the fresh appointment from 22nd October 1985. One of the conditions contained in the letters of re-employment was "no wages or allowance shall be payable from the date of dismissal to the date of re-employment". The letters of re-employment dated 22.10.85 containing the above clause w;re duty accepted by the Workmen Mr. Vinay Bedi and Mr. C.L. Chadha without any protest or reservation. The formal settlement at Delhi was signed twice, once between the parties themselves which is dated 8.11.85. However, the said settlement with minor variation was again executed on 29th January 1986. The second document dated 29th January 1986 bears the signatures of the Conciliation Officer also and it appears to have been signed in his presence. Mr. Vinay Bedi has also signed these documents in his capacity as General Secretary of the Delhi Union. One of the terms of the said settlement dated 29.1.1986 signed with the Local Union reads as under in consideration of the Union and the workmen agreeing and undertaking to perform the responsibilities and commitments as agreed to hereinbelow. The Company agrees to revise the service conditions of the workmen as follows: DEMANDNO.1 Withdrawal Of Dismissal Orders It has been agreed to take the concerned dismissed employees back in service in terms of the agreement dated 18.10.85 (October 18, 1985) between the All India Blue Star Employees Federation, Bombay -and the Corporate Management at. Bombay. As' such this demand stands settled accordingly." Even the settlement dated 8.11.85, which has been filed by the workmen provides as under:- "g) Dismissed employees a. Vinay Bedi, C.L. Chadha and N.S. Yadav i) It is agreed that Vinay Bedi, C.L. Chadba and N.S. Yadav on their sub-mitting letters to the Company as Annexure Iii will be re-employed at Delhi one day after signing of the Operative terms of this settlement. They will be on probation for a period of six months on salary/wages/allowance last drawn by them. During probation, they will' be paid month yallowances,- normally not payable during probation. No wages/salary/allowances shall be payable from the date of dismissal to the date of re-employment."
(8) It appears that an application with a copy of the settlements immediately after execution was/were not filed in the Labour Court with the usual prayer seeking either a no. dispute award or an award in terms of the settlement. The only reason which appeared from one of the documents filed by the respondents-workmen viz; letter dated 11th June 1986 written by the Union to Vice-President of the company. Clause (8) thereof indicates that a payment of Rs. 5,000.00 to each of the workmen was to be released and apparently because this "payment was delayed a joint application of the parties was not filed immediately after execution of the Delhi Settlements and re-employment of the workmen. The said clause (8) reads as under- (8) Payment of Rs. 5000.00 to each workmen (V.Bedi/CL Chadha/ N.S.Yadav/ D. Dutta/ Ml Khurana) This payment is yet to be released to the concerned workmen by the Delhi Management. The Management representatives stated Mr. Rai of Corporate Management conveys something different to Delhi Management and something different to Federation/Local Union and hence this confusion and non-payment of Rs. 5000.00 " This amount of Rs. 5000.00 appears to have been paid on 18.6.86. The formal covering memo gives the following details. "Towards lumpsum ex-gratia monetary assistance : Rs. 5000.00 "
(9) Following this payment the joint application dated 9.7.1986 was filed with the Predecessor of the present Labour Court, wherein it was stated that "AN agreement has been arrived at between the management and the workmen have been taken from their original post with continuity of service." As a result of an agreement a sum of Rs. 5000/ has also been given to the workmen."
It is further stated in the said application. "THAT in view of the above said agreement between the management and Mr. Vinay Bedi and C.L. Chandha the contiuance of adjudication is infructuous."
In the end it is prayed- "IT is therefore prayed that the reference be decided in terms of the agreement arrived at between the management and its workmen Shri Vinay Bedi and Mr. C.L.Chadha."
(10) This application was filed on 9th July 1986. Right from 9th July 1986 up to 29th August 1988. i.e. for more than two years-the Labour Court instead of passing appropriate order thereon-went on adjourning the case from time to tilde.
(11) The workmen bad filed an application on or about 29th August 1986. Stating that although the workmen have been taken back in service by the management vide settlements dated 8th November 1985 and 29th January 1986 and that a lump sum payment of Rs. 5000.00 (described as part payment) had been received by them and contented that they have not been aid full back wages and other attendant benefits. The allegations in para 2 of the application read as under-
"2..Payment of full back wages and other attendant benefits was an oral agreement reached between the representatives of the Delhi Union and the Delhi Management represented by S/Shri Bal K.Malhotra, Vice-President, Northern Region and K.K. Bajaj, Manager Administration & Personnel before signing the Delhi Agreement"
(12) In fact, as pointed out above, the reemployment of the workmen bad taken place soon after the agreement was reached at Bombay with the Federation of all the unions of the employees of the management at various branches on 18.10.85 even before the formal agreements at Delhi were signed between the management and Delhi Union. The terms of the Bombay Agreement clearly state that no wages/salary/ allowances shall be payable from the date of dismissal to the date of re-employment, and, in the subsequent settlements signed at Delhi on 8.11.85 and 29th January 1986 (hereinafter also referred to as "Delhi Agreement") the said provision is reiterated.
(13) It will be seen that in the three agreements there is absolutely no distinction or doubt about the parties having agreed that no wages/salary/allowances shall be payable from the date of dismissal to the date of re-employment. The-application of the workmen which is in terms of the draft agreed upon vide settlement dated 18.10.85 with the Federation, and issuance of the letter of the re-employment and acceptance thereof show that the settlement bad not only been signed but bad been accepted and acted upon/implemented.
(14) The only question that remained to be examined was as to why the parties delayed till 9.7.1986 filing of application to put an end to the pending dispute to the Respondent No. 1. The only document which throws any light on this question is the letter dated 11.6.1986 of the Delhi Union written to the management wherein they have talked only of payment of Rs. 5000.00 and the said payment was released as "lump sum ex-gratia monetary assistance" and this amount was duty received by the workmen without any demur or protest or reservation. In fact, following this payment the joint application dated 9.7.86 referred to above was moved wherein the parties had jointly submitted that "the continuation of adjudication is infructuous". The terms of reference as quoted above deal with the question of justification or otherwise of dismissal and relief that the workmen would be entitled to. Following this reference and during the pendency of the adjudication there were mutual settlements, terms whereof were specifically agreed to and the workmen were reemployed in terms of the said settlement/s. No challenge to the terms of settlements and consequent re-employment in October 1985 was made until 29th august 1988 when an application was made on behalf of the workmen/Union to permit to summon management's officials as court withesses. It may be pointed out that prior to this application there .was no controversy brought before the court about the terms of settlement nor was any statement recorded-by the labour court wherein any agreement other than the aforesaid settlements and re-employment in terms thereof was questioned nor was this application supported by even an affidavit. Even after the joint application dated 9.7.86 for over two years there was not even a whisper about any agreement regarding back wages, peculiarly enough, this application for the first time pleaded immoral agreement which is alleged to have preceded the signing of the afore- said Delhi agreements. I had sent for the original record of the trial.court and have discovered that this application is signed by only Mr. Vinay Bedi for and on behalf of the workmen/Union. As stated above this application is also not supported by any affidavit in support of the foresaid-allegations. The workmen have also not placed on record any document in the form of letters delivered to the management or any other paper which would give an indication to any other agreement with regard to the payment of back wages which would be contrary to the clauses contained in the three settlements referred to hereinabove.
(15) In reply to this application the management denied the correctness of any such allegation. The management has also pointed out that the workmen not only entered into agreements in the form of settlement but accepted their fresh appointment with specific condition that "no wages or allowances shall be payable to the workmen from the date of dismissal to the date of re-employment". They further point out that no oral agreement which is contrary to the written documents could be pleaded. In rejoinder to all the pleas of the management the workmen have denied that there is any limitation or rule of estoppel applicable to them and that they were entitled to plead oral agreement with regard to payment of back wages. On this the Labour Court heard the parties and passed an order which is under challenge in the present writ petition. Some of the reasons given by the labour court for reaching his decision areas under:- "NOW,there is no dispute of the fact that the settlement have reached between the parties in which Sh. Vinay Bedi, workman concerned was also one of the signatory. There was also no dispute of the fact that consequent upon the said settlement, both the workmen were reemployed. It is also no dispute of the fact that in the appointment letter it was also made clear that no wages or allowances shall be payable to both the workmen from the date of dismissal to the date of re-employment. In fact both the workmen have received the appointment letter and had signed the copy of the same in token of having read the terms and conditions of appointment letter. It is also manifest from the records that a joint application have been moved by the workmen Vinay Bedi as well as on behalf of the management on 9.7.86 for passing an award in terms of agreements. But the real question which both the workmen were agitating is that the management was deny them back wages which they had agreed to pay by means of oral agreement which they had entered with the Union/workmen at the time of entering into the settlement.
(16) After observing this the Labour Court had proceeded without considering the pleas of management and without calling upon the workmen to lead any evidence in support of their allegations, to direct S/Shri B.K. Malhotra, Vice-President, Neither Region, W.S. Jolly, Manager (Admn & Personnel) along with Mr. A.L. Chadda, Manager (Coord.) and P.K. Arora, Manager to be summoned as court witnesses. In other words the Court had taken upon itself the task of proving what was alleged by the workmen without requiring them to place any material evidence on record in support of the said allegations.
(17) The said order has been challenged by the Management on various grounds. The main grounds urged at the time of hearing are as under:- (I)The Labour Court has failed to appreciate the principal that a mutual settlement between the parties must be respected and as such he has committed a serious error of law in ignoring it and in not-making an award in terms of the settlement. (ii) Once the parties had reached a settlement which provided for re-employment as also non-payment of back wages and an application was jointly moved by parties, the labour could not, after a lapse Of over two years of the implementation of the settlement, unsettle any part of the settlement. (iii) Labour Court who under Section 11(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act has the same powers as a civil court under Code of Civil Procedure in respect of enforcing attendance of any person and examining them on oath has violated all rules contained in Order 16 Rule 19 of Code of Civil Procedure for calling any one as court witnesses. (iv) The impugned order violates the principals and rules of evidence contained in Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.
(18) It was contended that the Labour Court had fallen into error inasmuch as on one hand it accepted the fact of settlements and also the letters of re-employment which were accepted by the workmen concerned and that each of these documents provided that no wages or salary or allowances shall be payable from the. .date of dismissal to the date of re-employment and on the other band holding that:- ".......BUT,the real question which both the workmen were agitating is that the management was denying them back wages which they had agreed to pay by means of oral agreement which they bad entered with the Union/Workmen at the time of entering into the settlement."
(19) The Labour Court was apparently, swayed by the fact that on a number of dates even after the filing of the joint application, the copy of the settlement was not filed in the Labour Court and adjournments were being sought and that the management had paid a sum of Rs.5000.00 which was not provided for in any of the said settlements.
(20) The first mistake committed by the Labour Court is in recording that the Union had pleaded that an agreement to pay back wages has been entered into at the time of entering into the settlement. This factual mistake appears to have caused the misunderstanding because I find from the application that the workmen have themselves pleaded that such an agreement was reached before signing the Delhi agreement. The Labour Court has further overlooked the fact that the payment of Rs. 5000.00 was duly mentioned in joint application dated 9.7.86 without any mention about back wages and wherein parties bad jointly stated that the continuance of the adjudication had become infructuous. The court has further committed a grave and serious error in observing: "HOWEVER,the representative of the settlement, the workmen have been reinstated and when no dispute exists, the application of the workmen should be dismissed. But, I am not convinced with the said argument of the Ld. rep. for management in view of the fact that although both the workmen have been reinstated but, the question of back wages has to be decided by this Court being the incidental question of the main relief and in accordance with the terms of reference the court has to give finding as to what relief the workmen are entitled and the question of back wages also become part of the main relief being incidental question. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that in the interest of justice and with a view of deciding the whole controversy regarding the back wages, it will be better if the management produces its own witness with a view to clarify the whole position,"
(21) Apparently the Labour Court was under the impression that notwithstanding a mutual settlement between the parties resolving the dispute amicably, be still had to adjudicate upon not only the terms of reference, but also on the questions incidental thereto even though no party has complained of the settlement being not fair or being the result of an unfair Labour practice.
(22) Lengthy arguments were addressed by both the sides. The petitioner relied on the law laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case Sirsilk Ltd vs. state of A.P. . It was contended by the petitioners that once both the parties had filed that application placing on record the fact that the workmen had been re-employed pursuant to a settlement and further placing on record that the adjudication bad become infructuous, the Labour Court should not have proceeded further with the adujdication, as the dispute award since the dispute had ceased to exist, and should have concluded the proceedings by either 'making a no dispute stood re-employed or it could have made an award in terms of the settlement. Dr. Anand Prakash also placed reliance on the cases of State of Bihar vs. D. N. Ganguly and others , and Sirsilk case (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in , had inter alia observed:- "IT would be unreasonable to assume that the tribunal would insist upon dealing with the dispute on merits even after it is informed that the dispute has been amicable settled between the parties."
(23) In , the Tribunal had forwarded the award to the Government, but before the publication of the award the parties reached a settlement. The government in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act declined to withhold the publication of the Award inspite of the settlement. The matter came before the Supreme Court when Hon'ble Supreme Court had held in such special situation and to avoid any conflict between settlement under sections 18(1) and the Award under Section 18(3) directed the appropriate Government to withhold publication of the award and further held that though the settlement arrived at between the parties was not in the course of conciliation proceedings it was a settlement under Section 2(p) and Section 18(1) which was binding on the parties to the settlement. Thus even where an Award had already been made, a settlement though reached after the Award was preferred by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
(24) Dr. Anand Parkash farther submitted that in the impugned order the Labour Court has proceeded to hold that inspite of the settlement which is admittedly binding under Sections 2(p) and 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the joint application of the parties to the Labour Court it will still adjudicate on the question of back wages. He contended that such understanding of the Labour Court was contrary to law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments. Dr. Anand Parkash contends that the matter relating to back wages and allowances stood finally concluded vide the settlements. It was argued on behalf of the management that after the 'signing of the settlement between Delhi Union of which both the workmen are members' and in fact, Mr. Vinay Bedi happened to be a signatory being General Secretary thereof and a joint application is filed before the Court the matters stood finally concluded and there was no scope for passing any order like the impugned order. Dr. Anand Parkash further contends that even the mode in which the Labour Court has proceeded to record evidence pursuant to the impugned order is such which forced the management to institute another petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is also pending consideration along with this writ petition being C.M. (M) 197/92.
(25) Mr. Shetye in reply contended that the Labour Court had proceeded on a certain understanding of facts and on the basis that there had been an oral agreement apart from the settlement and stated that on such understanding two views could be possible. If that is so, this court Cannot interfere with the impugned order. If two views were possible in law in the facts of this case, there may have been some force in this argument. But in the light of facts of this case. Law on the subject and what is stated herein I am unable to accept that two views could be possible in the facts of this case.
(26) The submissions of the management were very forcefully countered by Mr. Shetya, who inter alia, pointed out that the said settlements whether at Bombay or at Delhi could not be described as settlements in the course of conciliation proceedings. Mere signatures of the Conciliation Officer on the settlement dated 29.1.86 would not ipso facto be treated as settlement in the course of conciliation proceedings and has relied upon the case of Ram Nagar Cane & gar Co. Ltd. Vs. Jotin Chakravorty and others Air 1980 Sc 1012=1963 Scr 968-1961(2) Llj 244. The ruling cited by Mr. Shetya is dealing with the question of settlement being binding on all the parties including those who are not a party to the settlement. The Settlements reached in the course of concilliation proceedings would be covered by Section 18(3) of the I.O.Act. In the present case the settlements were not in the course of concilliation proceedigns. As such I need not go to into this question. If a document is a settlement in terms of Section 2(p) and Section 18(1) of the industrial Disputes Act it will remain binding on all persons who are parties to that settlement. In this case, I find that not only was the settlement between the Delhi Union and the management following an agreement with the Federation, but one of the signatories to the settlement was Mr. Vinay Bedi himself who is one of the dismissed employees who were being re-employed. No letter of protest or document has been placed on record protesting against the settlement reached between the management and the workmen. In fact the question before the court is as to whether the settlement even though not in the course of concilliation proceedings would be binding on the parties to the settlement the object of Section 2(p) and Section 18(1) was to put an end to the controversy and to achieve Industrial peace by mutual settlements and not, to prolong the agony of the parties by keeping them in the Court despite the settlements. I need not dwell on this aspect any further as Mr. Shety conceded that (he Delhi Settlements are binding on both M/s Vinay Bedi and C.L. Chadha.
(27) Mr. Sliety thereafter, relied upon the ruling of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.P. Maheshwari 1963-(4) Scc 293 to contend that the impugned order is in the nature of an interlocutory order and that this Court should not interfere with it. On a perusal I find that in this case the Supreme Court was feeling concerned bout the piece-meal trial by hearing preliminary objections and resultant delay in disposal of the disputes. I feel that this case does not Apply to the facts of the present case where the contention is that the reference itself had become infructuous after settlement had been implemented by re-employing the workmen and there was a specific agreement on the question of back wages. In fact the impugned order of Labour Court has caused prolongation of the dispute.
(28) Dr. Anand Parkash has further pointed out that for recording the evidence the Labour Court has all the powers available to civil court under the Code of Civil . Procedure including those under Order 16 Rule 14 Civil Procedure Code and the procedure laid down therein. The Labour Court has proceeded to order summoning of all the witnesses as court witnesses without there being any evidence on record or issues or any affidavit or statement of workman and without there existing any material for its satisfaction as is required under Rule 14 of Order 16 Civil Procedure Code which reads as under:- 14.Subject to. the provisions of this Code as to attendance and appearance and to any law for the time being in force, where the court any time think it necessary to examine any person, including a party to the suit. and not called as a witness by a party to the suit, the Court may, of its own motion, cause such person to be summoned as a witness to give evidence, or to produce any document in his possession, on a day to be appointed, and may examine him as a witness or require him to produce such document."
Dr. Anand Parkash has relied upon the case of Biswath Rai Vs. Sachhidanand Singh in contending that the court should not have exercised its discretion in the manner it did in the present case.
(29) Dr. Anand Parkash submits on delay and adjournments that the adjournments were caused by the workmen and inaction of the Labour Court. This submission of the management is not borne out from the record. It appears that both sides have been responsible for avoidable adjournments.
(30) Dr. Anand Parkash next placed reliance on the provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act to support his contention that when the term of any contract or agreement have been reduced into writing no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument for the purpose of contradicting, varying or adding to or subtracting from the term thereof. In reply to this plea under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, Mr. Setya has pointed out that strict roles of Evidence Act are not applicable to Industrial adjudication. The law on this question is well settled that notwithstanding the fact that strict roles of Evidence Act are not always applicable to industrial adjudication but the principles including those contained in Section 92 of the said Act nevertheless are attracted and that the exclusion of oral evidence in the face of documentary evidence to the contrary is a sound principle of law which applied to all quasi judicial bodies including the Labour Courts. The oral prior agreement pleaded in the application of the workmen is wholly inconsistent with the written settlement. The payment of Rs. 5000.00 by way of exgratia lump sum payment is also in writing. Both in the letter of the Union dated 11.6.86 and the documents evidencing the exgratia lump sum payment are there. None of these documents even throw a vague hint regarding existence of any oral agreement regarding payment of. back wages. Mr. Shetye referred to provision 4 to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act to support his argument that even if the principles of the Indian Evidence Act applied, evidence could be adduced under the said provison. He has urged that the bar of Section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is not absolute and in certain circumstances provided under provision 4 to Section 92 of the said Act oral evidence could be led as it was not inconsistent with the settlement in writing and is supported by payment of Rs. 5000.00 . I am afraid the contention of Mr. Shetye is wholly untenable. The agreement for payment of back wages is totally inconsistent with the express terms of the settlements and consequent re-employment and unconditional acceptance thereof. Even proviso (4) to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with only the cases of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any contract/agreement in writing. According to workmen's own application the alleged oral agreement was not subsequent to the settlements and terms of re-employment, but is clearly alleged to be prior to the signing of the Delhi agreements dated 8.11.85 and 29.1.86. Therefore, in my view the bar contained in Section 92 of the said Act is attracted and the present case is not covered by proviso (4) to the said Section and no evidence would be permissible to establish any such prior oral agreement/contract.
(31) Mr. Shetye next contended that the back wages is an incidental question which the Labour Court would be considering. I am afraid even this contention cannot be accepted in the light of the specific agreement between the parties which has already been acted upon leaving nothing to be determined by the Labour Court. As regards the payment of Rs. 5000.00 , the documents produced on record clearly show the nature of the-payment, which do not even suggest that this was a part payment towards back wages.
(32) Mr. Shetye further submitted that the joint application dated 9.7.1987 contained a prayer that the reference be disposed of in terms of the settlement arrived between the management and the workmen M/s. Bedi and Chadha and tried to contend that this implied that there was a separate settlement apart from the three settlements referred to above. I am unable to agree with this suggestion also as even the workmen have not stated such a thing in the application in question nor has any such document been produced to suggest that there was a settlement between the management and the workmen other than the aforesaid settlements/agreements. I am afraid even this contention of Mr. Shetye cannot be accepted.
(33) There is also no explanation offered by Mr. Shetye for the delay of over two years in making the application by the workmen, during which period the workmen continued to be employed in terms of the settlements. For this reason also, I am of the opinion that the workmen had acquiesced into a promise of their reemployment and after such a long delay are estopped from raising any dispute or challenging any of the term of the settlements. The Labourt.Court has failed to take note of this aspect also. In the light of this, the impugned order cannot be sustained.
(34) It is not disputed before me that the settlements are binding on all the parties in terms of Section 2(p) and Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this view of the matter and in the light of the above discussion, I hold that the Labour Court had committed a grave and serious error apparent on the face of the record in passing the impugned order dated 18.10.89 and it was not open to the Labour Court to proceed to decide the questions which stood settled including the ones relating to the payment of back wages. Once a settlement is reached between the partics and this fact is brought before the Labour Court it is expected to respect the will of the parties and it cannot go into any question covered by the settlement except for a special reason for that would amount to reopening the settlement or undoing what bad already been achieved by the parties. Such an approach of the Labour Court can have the consequence of inter alia disturbing the industrial peace by unduly prolonging the industrial dispute despite settlement between the parties. Such consequence would be contrary to the very object of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, the settlement including the agreement between the management and Federation stood fully implemented in .1985 and after the parties had Jointly brought to the notice of the Labour Court on 9.7.1986 the fact that the adjudication had become infructuous it was neither proper nor open to the Labour Court to proceed in the manner he did by passing the impugned order in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(35) In the light of above discussion I allow the civil writ petition and quash the impugned order and remand the matter to the Labour Court with the direction to make an award in terms of the settlements brought on record. The parties are left to bear their own costs.