Delhi High Court
Panchayati Akhara Naya Udaseen vs Union Of India & Ors. on 8 December, 2015
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
Bench: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 8th December, 2015.
+ W.P.(C) No. 3333/2004
PANCHAYATI AKHARA NAYA UDASEEN ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pradeep K. Bakshi and Mr. Rajat
Navet, Advs.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Suparna Srivastava with Mr.
Manudev Sharma and Ms. Anushka
Arora, Advs. for UOI.
Mr. Rajiv Bansal, Adv. for DDA.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel
with Ms. Jyoti Tyagi, Adv. with Mr.
N.T. Mr. Satish Kr. in person..
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The petitioner, claiming to a religious sect, has filed this petition (i) for setting aside of the acquisition if any made in the papers of the Government; and, (ii) to restrain the respondents i.e. Union of India (UOI), Lt. Governor, Delhi, Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and Collector, Acquisition (West) from taking possession of the land measuring 2 bighas 19 biswas (2975 sq. yds.) comprising in Khasra No.3146/923 (1 bigha and W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 1 of 24 17 biswas) and Khasra No.3075/922 (1 bigha and 2 biswas) situated in village Bassai Dara Pur (Now Kirti Nagar Industrial Area), New Delhi.
2. Notice of the petition was issued and vide ad interim order dated 8th March, 2004 status quo was ordered to be maintained in respect of the land and building in question.
3. Counter affidavit has been filed by the DDA and by the UOI and a rejoinder has been filed to the counter affidavit of the DDA. Vide order dated 9th September, 2004 the ad interim order was confirmed and the writ petition directed to be listed in the category of regular matters. The petition, on 3rd May, 2013 was dismissed in default of appearance of the petitioner but was vide subsequent order dated 13th May, 2013 restored to its original position.
4. The matter came up before this Court on 6th July, 2015 when the following order was made:-
"1. The petitioner seeks to restrain the respondent no.1 Union of India (UOI) and the respondent no.3 Delhi Development Authority (DDA) from taking possession of 2 bighas 19 biswas (equal to 2975 sq. yds.) of land in Khasra No.3146/923 (1 bigha 17 biswas) and Khasra No.3075/922 (1 bigha 2 biswas) situated in village Bassai Dara Pur (now Kirti Nagar Industrial Area), New Delhi. W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 2 of 24
2. It is the case of the respondents that the said land was acquired and possession thereof taken and that the petitioner is in unauthorized encroachment thereof.
3. The counsel for the respondent no.1 UOI on enquiry seeks time to produce before this Court the Notification vide which the land was acquired as well as the record of the proceedings undertaken for taking possession of the said land.
4. List on 6th August, 2015.
5. The Land Acquisition Collector (West) to remain present in Court in person on the next date of hearing."
5. Thereafter on 10th September, 2015 the following order was made:-
"1. This order is in continuation of the order dated 6 th July, 2015.
2. The counsel for the respondent No.1 Union of India (UOI) states that though on 6th August, 2015, pursuant to the directions in the order dated 6th July, 2015, the concerned official had appeared but is not present in the Court today. She has however handed over photocopies of some documents but from which no clarity in the matter appears.
3. The counsel for the respondent No.3 Delhi Development Authority (DDA) states that the respondent No.1 UOI had put the DDA into possession of the land on 2nd September, 1982.
4. From the documents handed over by the counsel for the respondent No.1 UOI it appears that there was a Notification dated 1st January, 1949 of acquisition of the subject land under Section 3 of the Re-settlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948. W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 3 of 24
However, there is a doubt whether the land was subsequently de-notified.
5. Upon the title of the petitioner being enquired into, the counsel for the petitioner states that the subject land is recorded in the name of the petitioner in the revenue records of the year 1948. The petitioner has however not filed any document of title of the property thereafter. Though counsel for the petitioner states that house tax was levied and electricity connection provided in the name of the petitioner on the said land, but the same cannot be said to be documents of title.
6. On enquiry, as to whether the land in the revenue records after 1949 is shown in the name of the petitioners or in the name of "Sarkar Daulat Madar", the counsel for the petitioner states that he has not examined the said revenue records.
7. The petitioner to also produce whatsoever documents in his custody or possession of his title to the land on the date of filing of the petition i.e. of the year 2004 or of shortly prior thereto.
8. The Land Acquisition Collector (West) to remain present in person on the next date of hearing with all records relating to the subject land.
9. List on 1st October, 2015."
6. On 2nd November, 2015 the following order was made:-
"1. This order is in continuation of the earlier orders dated 6th July, 2015 and 10th September, 2015.
2. In compliance of the directions contained therein Mr. M.T. Kom, Land Acquisition Collector (LAC)/ Adm. (West) and Mr. Satish, Kanoongo, LAC (Branch) along W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 4 of 24 with the record of acquisition of the subject land are present in person. Though their Advocate Mr. Yeeshu Jain is not available but Mr. Rajiv Bansal, Advocate for the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) states that he has examined the documents / records and therefrom it transpires that the acquisition was under the provisions of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 under which no Award was required to be made / published and the compensation was to be determined either by negotiation or by arbitration. He further states that the name of the petitioner appears as one of the persons with whom compensation was to be negotiated.
3. It is deemed expedient that the said officer files an affidavit detailing the position, Mr. Bansal though appearing for the respondent DDA is requested to assist in the preparation and filing of the affidavit along with the concerned documents as annexures thereto. The said affidavit be filed on or before 16th November, 2015 with advance copy to the counsel for the petitioner who may file response thereto.
4. The counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is not to file any further documents in terms of the earlier orders.
5. List on 26th November, 2015.
6. The said officers to remain present in Court on the date."
7. And thereafter on 26th November, 2015 the following order was made:-
W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 5 of 24
"1. The counsel for the petitioner states that the respondent No.3 Delhi Development Authority (DDA) has filed the affidavit on 16th November, 2015 and he needs time to go through the same.
2. List on 8th December, 2015."
8. It is the case of the petitioner:-
(i) that a religious Gurudwara/temple is established on the land in question for the last over 57 years;
(ii) that before partition of the year 1947, one Shri Kishan Singh was the owner of the land aforesaid and gave that land to one Shri Lohari Mal Sadhu, who was an Udaseen Sadhu; a temple with murti of Baba Srichand Ji was constructed on the land and in that temple Guru Granth Sahib was displayed every day and ceremonies of Gurudwara performed; for this reason, there "is a complete temple in the sense managed by the petitioner";
(iii) that in the wake of partition, the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 was enacted to expeditiously rehabilitate displaced persons on a permanent basis as the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 entailing much delay were not considered suitable therefor; W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 6 of 24
(iv) that respondent DDA has no right to take possession of any portion of the aforesaid land and the construction thereon has been raised either by the petitioner or the tenants of the petitioner;
(v) that Notification under Section 3 of the 1948 Act, unlike the Notification under the 1894 Act, is a composite one;
(vi) that mere publication of the Notification did not divest the owners of the ownership in the land because Section 4 of the 1948 Act provides that after the publication of the Notification under Section 3, the Competent Authority was required to serve by registered post on the owner of the land and the occupier a notice stating the particulars under Section 3(1) of the Act;
(vii) that the land aforesaid was being managed by the Akhara Udaseen Panchayati and therefore no doubt is left that this place is being used for Gurudwara/temple;
(viii) by virtue of a Will, the said Shri Lohari Mal Sandhu gave the land to the petitioner;
(ix) that since whole of the area was in possession of the petitioner for religious worship, it could not have been the subject matter W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 7 of 24 of Notification of acquisition under Section 3 of the Act aforesaid;
(x) that respondent DDA from February, 2004 had started demolishing the land around the land in question and threatened to demolish the construction raised on the subject land also;
(xi) that the land of the petitioner was never acquired or taken possession of by the Ministry of Rehabilitation as is evident from the fact that the land containing the Gurudwara and other construction around it is being used by the tenants of the petitioner who are in existence for the last over 50 years.
(xii) the petitioner has been paying House Tax of the premises;
(xiii) that as no notice of acquisition of the land was issued neither under Section 3 nor under Section 4, the question of filing any objection under Section 6(1) did not arise;
(xiv) that the Ministry of Rehabilitation vide letter dated 13 th January, 1955 has stated that further acquisition of land for re-settlement of displaced persons may not be undertaken as sufficient land had already been acquired;
W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 8 of 24
(xv) for this reason also the subject land could not be taken possession of by the respondent DDA in the year 2004; and, (xvi) that there was a threat of demolition of construction on the subject land and hence this petition.
9. The respondent DDA in its counter affidavit has stated that, (i) the land in question was transferred to the respondent DDA from the Ministry of Rehabilitation under package deal vide letter dated 2nd September, 1982; (ii) physical possession was taken over vide letter dated 12 th November, 1984; and, (iii) the site was vacant then and there was only a Shiv Mandir encroaching over an area of 126 sq. yds. It is thus stated that the land belongs to the respondent DDA and the Gurudwara/temple is unauthorised encroachment on the respondent DDA land and the respondent DDA is within its right to remove the said encroachment. Documents in support thereof are filed with the counter affidavit.
10. The petitioner in its rejoinder to the counter affidavit of the respondent DDA has pleaded that besides the Gurudwara/temple over 126 sq. yds., certain other structures were raised to house some of the devotees of the Gurudwara who were paying rent and therefore the property was assessed to House tax.
W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 9 of 24
11. The respondent UOI in its counter affidavit has stated that (i) in 1967 the Government approved the proposal of the then Ministry of Works and Housing in regard to large scale acquisition and development and disposal of land in Delhi which inter alia provided that the unutilised lands with the Department of Rehabilitation within the urbanisable limits of Delhi should be transferred to DDA; (ii) that the Ministry of Supply & Rehabilitation (Department of Rehabilitation) vide letter dated 2nd September, 1982 transferred the unutilised lands to the respondent DDA on payment of Rs.30 crores by the respondent DDA; and, (iii) that in 1984 the Ministry of Rehabilitation handed over physical possession of the said land including the subject land to the respondent DDA.
12. The Land Acquisition Collector, in response to the order dated 2nd November, 2015 aforesaid in this proceeding has deposed, (i) that the records reveal that a Notification under Section 3 of the 1948 Act was issued sometime in late December, 1948 or early January, 1949 for the lands falling in village Basai Darapur; the said Notification also included the land subject matter of the present writ petition; (ii) that the appropriate Government took the actual, vacant and physical possession of the aforesaid notified land on 11th March, 1949 and Award/Offer No.1304 was passed subsequently; in the W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 10 of 24 absence of the last page/s of the said Award/Offer, the exact date on which the said Award/Offer was made is not available; however from the documents/letters written by some of the affected persons of the said acquisition, it is borne out that the date of the Award/Offer was 13 th March, 1962; the subject land is also included in the said Award/Offer; (iii) the said Award/Offer records that the possession of the main portion of the land was taken on 11th March, 1949; however despite best efforts, the possession proceedings could not be traced out in the records; (iv) that records reveal that after passing of the Award, one of the persons affected by the acquisition proceedings wrote a letter dated 19th March, 1971 to the Secretary, Land & Building Department seeking to take advantage of some de-notification proceedings on the pretext that there was already a construction on his land; the said letter also mentions the date of Award as 13th March, 1962 and the date of Notification as 1st January, 1949; (v) another letter dated 7th December, 1972 on the file also confirms that the possession of the land was taken on 11th March, 1949; (vi) that there is on record another undated report submitted by the Patwari sometime in the year 1979 who had inspected the site on 2nd February, 1979 and had found built up houses on the subject land; and, (vii) that some of the persons affected by W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 11 of 24 the acquisition proceedings tried to take the advantage of some de- notification proceedings on the basis of their land being built up at the time of Notification and thereafter; that the subject land was never de-notified. The documents in support of the averments in the affidavit are filed therewith.
13. The petitioner has filed a response to the aforesaid additional affidavit but no reference thereto is made in the hearing; moreover the averments therein are legal.
14. According to the Re-settlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, the State Government, whenever deems necessary or expedient to acquire speedily any land for the resettlement of displaced persons, is to (i) issue a Notification to that effect in the official Gazette stating the area and the boundaries of the land proposed to be acquired and the date on which such acquisition will be made and a Public Notice is to be issued in that regard; (ii) thereafter serve a notice under Section 4 on the owner and occupier of the land; (iii) the land vests absolutely in the State Government upon notice under Section 4 being served/published and the State Government/competent authority is free to proceed to take possession thereof; (iv) Section 6 enables the person interested in any land which has so W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 12 of 24 become vested in the State Government to file his objections if any to the acquisition within one month from the vesting of the land and requires a decision on the said objection to be taken by the competent authority; and,
(v) compensation is to be determined in accordance with Section 7 of the Act and to be paid under Section 8 of the Act.
15. The counsel for the petitioner has argued (a) that the respondents have not produced before this Court any Notification under Section 3 of the Act;
(b) that the respondents have also not produced before this Court any notice issued or published under Section 4 of the Act or any proceeding to show possession was taken; (c) similarly no proof of payment of any compensation has been shown; (d) that admittedly the land has not been put to the use for which it was acquired and thus the acquisition is bad; and, (e) that since there existed a temple/Gurudwara on the subject land, the same was exempted from acquisition in accordance with sub Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act.
16. Per contra, the counsels for the respondents Collector, Acquisition (West) and DDA have contended that the scheme of acquisition under the said Act is different from that under the Land Acquisition Act and under the said Act the land vests in the State Government immediately after issuing of W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 13 of 24 the Notification and the vesting of the said land is not dependent upon the payment of compensation.
17. I have considered the rival contentions. Though undoubtedly the respondents have not produced the documents as highlighted by the counsel for the petitioner and in fact whatever has been produced has also been produced only in pursuance to the orders dated 6 th July and 10th September, 2015 but it cannot be lost sight of that the said issues have been raised for the first time in the year 2004. The respondents, after nearly 60 years of the acquisition, could not be expected to be retaining all the records. Attention of the counsel for the petitioner has been invited to Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that the Court may presume that official acts have been regularly performed. In the said context it can be recorded that the copy of the Award which has been placed on record mentions that a Notification under Section 3 was issued and the possession had been taken.
18. The counsel for the petitioner has responded by drawing attention to the judgment dated 19th December, 1980 of the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.259/1972 titled M/s. Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram & Company Ltd. Vs. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi and has contended that the occasion for the petitioner to raise all the said disputes arose only when the W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 14 of 24 possession was sought to be taken and thus the petitioner cannot be said to be guilty of laches, acquiescence or waiver. It is further contended that without Notification under Section 4 being produced and/or the Gazette in which the Notification under Section 3 was published and without showing the possession taken proceedings, no presumption of the said procedure and/or of the acquisition having been completed can be drawn. Attention is further invited to illustration of Section 114 supra which provides that the Court shall have regard to the fact that judicial act, the regularity of which is in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances in drawing the presumption under illustration (e). It is thus contended that no case for drawing presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act also is made out.
19. I have considered the rival contentions.
20. I am unable to agree with the counsel for the petitioner that Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act would have no application to the matter. Reference to the illustration of Section 114(e) is misconceived. While Section 114(e) provides "that Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed", the illustration providing "but the Court shall have regard to the fact that a judicial act, the regularity of which W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 15 of 24 is in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances" is in relation to a judicial act only and not with respect to the official act. Moreover, even if it were to be applicable to official act, all that it provides is that if the „act‟ is performed under exceptional circumstances then the same would also be considered while drawing the presumption under Section 114(e). It is not the case of the petitioner or of the respondents that the acquisition concerned was under exceptional circumstances.
21. Else, the question whether illustration (e) to Section 114 supra is applicable to acquisition proceedings or not is not res integra. Supreme Court in Ajay Krishan Shinghal Vs. Union Of India AIR (1996) 10 SCC 721 held that it is not the law and could not and would not be the law that publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification (under Land Acquisition Act, 1894) in the locality should be established beyond shadow of doubt and benefit should be extended to the owner or interested person of the land. It was held that presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act can be raised that official acts have been properly done unless proved otherwise. After satisfying itself on the basis of material on record, the Supreme Court expressed satisfaction that the notifications must have been published in the locality.
W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 16 of 24
22. A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana headed by Justice J.S. Khehar in Mehar Singh Rathi Vs. Union of India MANU/PH/0741/2006, upon finding that the objections of the land owners filed under Section 5A (again of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) along with the recommendations of the Land Acquisition Collector were sent to the Government, drew a presumption that they were duly considered by the Government and held that the fact that decision of the said consideration was not communicated to the petitioners could not dislodge the presumption of due consideration of the objections.
23. The High Court of Kerala in Susanna Vs. State of Kerala MANU/KE/0493/1997, on a reading of the affidavits as well as copies of the notification, drew a presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act that local publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was made.
24. A Division Bench of the High Court Bombay in Sharnappa V. Patrika Vs. State of Maharashtra MANU/MH/0475/1983 also appears to have accepted the contention of the Advocate General that from the records of the Land Acquisition Officer, a presumption would arise under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.
W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 17 of 24
25. Mention may lastly be made of a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in Hakim Fazal Mohammad Vs. State of West Bengal MANU/WB/0270/1968 holding that giving of the substance of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act being an official act, must be presumed to have been properly done unless the contrary is proved. Finding the plaintiff in that case to have not given any positive evidence to the contrary it was concluded, drawing the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, that the notices as required under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were duly published.
26. I, on the basis of the material on record and the pleadings and the affidavits filed, am satisfied that a case for drawing the presumption of the subject land having been notified for acquisition under the provisions of the 1948 Act and having been acquired is made out. The petitioner, rather than producing any positive evidence to prevent this Court from drawing the said presumption has rather, in the petition itself, admitted to the acquisition and are now, after eleven years of the filing of the petition, attempting to change its stand. The petitioner in the petition itself has referred to the acquisition proceedings under the 1948 Act and if there had been no acquisition proceedings, the question of the petitioner challenging the same would not W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 18 of 24 have arisen. The counsel for the petitioner of course contends that the petitioner pleaded so on the basis of information received by the petitioner from the respondent DDA just prior to the filing of the petition. However, that is not how the case is pleaded in the petition. Not only so, even if it were to be presumed that the petitioner learnt from the respondent DDA, there was still nothing in the letter dated 12th February, 1984 of the Ministry of Rehabilitation to the respondent DDA from which the petitioner could have made pleadings with respect to the happenings in 1949-50.
27. Not only so, the petitioner has been unable to dislodge the recording of the land in the revenue records in the name of "Sarkar Daulatmadar" i.e. the Government. Had the land not been acquired, the petitioners would have insisted upon mutation of the land in the revenue record in its own name and would not have been satisfied with the land being recorded in the revenue records in the name of the Government. I have in this regard perused the records produced by the Land Acquisition Collect in the Court and which show that pursuant to the award/offer, the land was transferred from the name of the petitioner to the name of the Ministry of Rehabilitation. Even today the counsel for the petitioner is not able to state whether after 1 st September, 1952 the petitioner bothered to have the land mutated in its name W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 19 of 24 and/or objected to the same being recorded in the name of Ministry of Rehabilitation.
28. As far as the aspect of taking over of possession in pursuance to acquisition is concerned, Supreme Court in Banda Development Authority, Banda Vs. Moti Lal Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394 held that no hard and fast Rule can be laid down as to what would constitute taking possession of acquired land. It was further held that if the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document.
29. In the present case, as aforesaid the petition has been filed after long delay. Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Industrial Development and Investment Company (P) Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC 501 held that when there is an inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notification. Similar view was expressed in C.Padma Vs. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu (1997) 2 W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 20 of 24 SCC 627, Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698, Municipal Council, Ahmednagar Vs. Shah Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48 and M/s. Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC
695.
30. Mention in this regard may also be made of a recent judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan in Rajendra Prasad Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/RH/1656/2014 where, from revenue records it was held to have been established that the possession was taken and it was held that therefrom it could not be said that the appellants were never dispossessed. It was further held that the petitioners having not challenged the same could not after long delay challenge the acquisition. An exhaustive discussion in this regard is also to be found in another judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan in Ajay Pal Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/RH/1488/2015.
31. Mention may also be made of the judgments of this Court in Nagin Chand Godha Vs. Union of India MANU/DE/0995/2003 and Dr. Rajbir Solanki Vs. Union of India 148 (2008) DLT 363 to the effect that the Collector need not prove actual physical possession being taken over so long as the record indicates possession is taken over.
W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 21 of 24
32. Qua the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner of challenge to the acquisition on the ground of the land being used exclusively for the purpose of religious worship, the counsel for the petitioner fairly admits that there is nothing on record to show that any gurudwara or temple existed on the subject land prior to notifications aforesaid. In the absence thereof, no such challenge can be sustained.
33. I am therefore of the opinion that the subject land was acquired by the Ministry of Rehabilitation under the Rehabilitation Act supra. The question of the petitioner today, in writ jurisdiction saving their possession thereof, does not arise. The petitioner, if had any objection to the acquisition ought to have raised the same at the contemporaneous time. The petitioner has clearly encroached upon the acquired land and cannot now protect its unauthorised possession.
34. There is thus no merit in the petition. The petition is dismissed and the interim order is vacated.
35. Supreme Court in Abhimanyoo Ram Vs. Stte of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 17 SCC 73 has held that the Court after vacating the interim order has a duty to balance the equities. The petitioners herein have enjoyed the interim order W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 22 of 24 in these proceedings for the last nearly 11 years and the case set up by the petitioner in the petition has been found to be false. The petitioner is thus liable to compensate the respondents for unauthorised occupation of the land from 8th March, 2004 till the date of dispossession and the mesne profits need to be determined by the Estate Officer of the respondent DDA.
36. The counsel for the petitioner states that the petition has been filed by a Society. However, the petition is found to have been filed not on behalf of the Society but by Mahant Dwarka Dass and the last affidavit has been filed by Mahant Dhuni Dass. The Estate Officer, DDA to determine the said compensation under Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and in the said inquiry also determine who would be liable for payment of the said compensation.
37. The petitioner / its Mahant to appear before the Estate Officer of the respondent DDA in this regard on 22nd January, 2016.
38. It is clarified that these proceedings are only for determination of compensation and hence the possession of the petitioner being unauthorised, the respondents are at liberty to take all measures available in law for W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 23 of 24 removal of the petitioner and others who are in possession through the petitioner from the subject land.
No costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
DECEMBER 08, 2015 „pp‟..
(corrected & released on 24th December, 2015) W.P.(C) No.3333/2004 Page 24 of 24