Allahabad High Court
Razi Hasan And Another vs State Of Up And 2 Others on 18 April, 2024
Author: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi
Bench: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No.-2024:AHC:68016-DB A.F.R. Reserved on 28.02.2024 Delivered on 18.04.2024 Court No. - 42 Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 1280 of 2024 Petitioner :- Razi Hasan And Another Respondent :- State Of Up And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Vikas Srivastava Counsel for Respondent :- G.A. Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.
Hon'ble Gajendra Kumar,J.
(Delivered by Hon. Gajendra Kumar,J.)
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned AGA for the State-respondents.
2. Present writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India is preferred praying for following reliefs:-
"(1) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned proceeding being held by the respondent nos.2 & 3 in terms of provisions of Section 14(1) of U.P. Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 against the petitioner no.1 and quash the impugned order dated 07.12.2023 passed by respondent no.2 under Section 14(1) of U.P. Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, P.S. Hazarat Nagar Garhi, District Sambhal attaching the double story house of the petitioner no.1 on the pretext that it has been built by the money collected in illegal way by the gangster Rehbar Hasan (petitioner no.2).
(2) To issue a writ order, or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent nos.2 & 3 to release the house of the petitioner no.1, which is built on the plot no.1618, area around 0.3480 hectare, which is situated at village Sirsi in favour of the petitioner no.1 (3) To issue any other or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
3. Brief facts of the case are that on the basis of gang chart prepared and approved, first information report bearing Case Crime No.142 of 2022, under Section 3(1) of U.P. Gangster and Anti Social (Activities) Act, 1986 (in short 'Act 1986') was filed by the S.H.O. Ramveer Singh, Police Station Hazrat Nagar, Garhi, District Sambhal with the allegation that Rehbar S/o Razi Hasan, R/o Mohalla Sharki Kasba Sirsi, P.S. Hazrat Nagar Garhi, District Sambhal is the gang leader of the gang and Rajeev S/o Badam Singh and Ballu @ Nawab Haidar S/o Fakare are the active members of the said gang. They are engaging in gambling activities for the temporal and pecuniary gains of the family, even they intimidate the people and extract money from them. There is a fear and terror prevalent among the people that is why no one dares to stand witness against them. They are continuously engaging in crime and it is not safe to keep them free. FIRs in case Crime no.117 of 2022 under Section ¾ Public Gambling Act and Case Crime No.121 of 2022, under Section 384/387/506 IPC are lodged with the local police, in which, charge sheets have been filed respectively, charge sheet no.113 of 2022 dated 20.06.2022 and 116 of 2022 dated 22.06.2022 have been submitted to the Court and the cases are pending therein.
4. On the basis of police report filed by the S.H.O. Hazarat Nagar Garhi, District Sambhal dated 05.10.2023, proceeding under Section 14(1) of U.P. Gangster and Anti Social (Activities) Act, 1986,was initiated and order of attachment was passed by the District Magistrate concerned on 03.03.2023. Against which, objection/representation dated 20.04.2023 was filed by the petitioner no.1 with the averment that the attached property belongs to petitioner no.1, he is owner and in possession of the same and it is his ancestral property and the house has been built thereupon by the petitioner no.1 with proceeds of sale of some portion of his land and with financial help, rendered by his son, who is in service. The petitioner no.2 has nothing to do with the alleged land and house and the same has been seized and attached illegally and the said objection/representation was dismissed by the District Magistrate, Sambhal vide order dated 07.12.2023. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners are challenging the legality and propriety of on-going proceeding related to the contemplated action of attachment under Section 14(1) of U.P. Gangsters and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, which has been sponsored by the respondent nos.2 & 3, against them.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioner no.1 has claimed to be the owner and in possession of the land and house under attachment as the land is his ancestral one and the house thereon has been built by the petitioner no.1 with the money obtained by selling out some portion of land and financial help received from his sons except for the petitioner no.2. As per the report (police/tehsil), house is built on the land belonging to petitioner no.1. No material/evidence has been obtained by the District Magistrate as to how the house was built by the money acquired by committing the offences triable under the Act. The impugned order per se is arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice as no adequate opportunity has been accorded to the petitioner no.1 to remove the doubt/suspicion if there has been regarding the character of the money. Action taken by the District Magistrate is an administrative action entailing civil/evil consequences. As the land on which impugned house is built is admittedly ancestral property belonging to petitioner no.1. The money involved in the building on the land involved factual aspects, which cannot be decided and determined without giving opportunity to the petitioner for adducing the evidence/material. No such opportunity has been accorded to the petitioner no.1, which shows that the order has been passed in arbitrary manner without adhering to the principles of natural justice, which are imperative to be followed while exercising administrative power. The impugned order has been passed without recording the satisfaction as to the effect that case of the petitioner no.1 is not genuine one. Subjective satisfaction has to be based on some relevant material furnished in support of that report is also missing in this case. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that as per the impugned first information report as well as gang chart, it is clear that the petitioner no.1 does not have any concern in any manner whatsoever with the aforesaid matter and, therefore, the order for attachment of the property of petitioner no.1 is wholly illegal and without application of judicial mind. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance upon the judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Comptroller and Auditor General India, Gian Prakash New Delhi and another Vs. K.S. Jagannathan and another (1986) 2 SCC 679, Sahara india (Firm) Lucknow Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and another, (2008) 14 SCC 151 and Vikas Yadav Vs. State of U.P. 2022 SCC OnLine All 1162.
6. On the other hand, learned AGA has opposed the prayer and submitted that the impugned order has been passed by the learned District Magistrate after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the representation of the petitioner was rejected for want of evidence in support of his claim as to the building of the house on the land. As per report by the police, the land belongs to the petitioner but as per tehsil report, the house was built by Rehber petitioner no.2. No material in support of the case that house was built by the petitioner no.1 with his money has been produced and adduced. It is also submitted that the petitioner has still opportunity to contest his case at the stage of reference being made to the court concerned and during the factual inquiry to be carried out by the court, he will be given ample opportunity for adducing and producing material/evidence in support of his claim. Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indian is not maintainable in the aforesaid circumstances. There is no illegality and impropriety in the impugned order and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
7. We have heard the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone though the entire record.
8. A Larger Bench of the Apex court in the Case of Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi and another Vs. K.S. Jagannathan and another, (1986) 2 SCC 679, it is observed that:-
"18. The first contention urged by learned Counsel for the Appellants was that the Division Bench of the High Court could not issue a writ of mandamus to direct a public authority to exercise its discretion in a particular manner. There is a basic fallacy underlying this submission both with respect to the order of the Division Bench and the purpose and scope of the writ of mandamus. The High Court had not issued a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus. was the relief prayed for by the Respondents in their writ petition. What the Division Bench did was to issue directions to the Appellants in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, every High Court has the power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, directions, orders, or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose. In Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family v. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur, and another, [1965] 3 S.C.R. 536, 540 this Court pointed out that Article 226 is designedly couched in a wide language in order not to confine the power conferred by it only to the power to issue prerogative writs as understood in England, such wide language being used to enable the High Courts "to reach injustice wherever it is found" and "to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country." In Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa & Ors., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 667, 676 this Court held that the powers of the courts in England as regards the control which the Judiciary has over the Executive indicate the minimum limit to which the courts in this country would be prepared to go in considering the validity of orders passed by the Government or its officers.
20. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion."
9. Another Larger Bench of the Apex court in the Case of Sahara India (Firm) Lucknow Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and another, (2008) 14 SCC 151, it is observed that:-
15. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly, i.e. fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K. Kraipak and others Vs. Union of India and others, the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. (Also see: Income Tax Officer & Ors. Vs. M/s Madnani Engineering Works Ltd., Calcutta ).
16. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India , R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of "natural justice"
"Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise."
17. Initially, it was the general view that the rules of natural justice would apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to an administrative action. However, in State of Orrisa Vs. Binapani Dei & Ors, the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions was perceptively mitigated and it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. Since then the concept of natural justice has made great strides and is invariably read into administrative actions involving civil consequences, unless the statute, conferring power, excludes its application by express language.
18. Recently, in Canara Bank Vs. V.K. Awasthy, the concept, scope, history of development and significance of principles of natural justice have been discussed in extenso, with reference to earlier cases on the subject. Inter alia, observing that the principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi- judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights, the Court said:-
"Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame- work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil 'liberties, material deprivations, and non- pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life."
19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the Court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial.
20. We may, however, hasten to add that no general rule of universal application can be laid down as to the applicability of the principle audi alteram partem, in addition to the language of the provision. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. Therefore, we refrain from giving an exhaustive catalogue of the cases where the said principle should be applied. The question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined.
21. In Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., explaining as to what is meant by expression 'civil consequence', Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the majority said:-
"'Civil Consequences' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence."
(emphasis supplied)
22. The question in regard to the requirement of opportunity of being heard in a particular case, even in the absence of provision for such hearing, has been considered by this Court on a number of occasions. In Olga Tellis & Ors. Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. while dealing with the provisions of Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which confers discretion on the Commissioner to get any encroachment removed with or without notice, a Constitution Bench of this Court observed as follows:-
"It must further be presumed that, while vesting in the Commissioner the power to act without notice, the Legislature intended that the power should be exercised sparingly and in cases of urgency which brook no delay. In all other cases, no departure from the audi alteram partem rule ('Hear the other side') could be presumed to have been intended. Section 314 is so designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way of exemption and not as a general rule. There are situations which demand the exclusion of the rules of natural justice by reason of diverse factors like time, place the apprehended danger and so on. The ordinary rule which regulates all procedure is that persons who are likely to be affected by the proposed action must be afforded an opportunity of being heard as to why that action should not be taken. The hearing may be given individually or collectively, depending upon the facts of each situation. A departure from this fundamental rule of natural justice may be presumed to have been intended by the Legislature only in circumstances which warrant it. Such circumstances must be shown to exist, when so required, the burden being upon those who affirm their existence."
29. In Rajesh Kumar (supra), it has been held that in view of Section 136 of the Act, proceedings before an Assessing Officer are deemed to be judicial proceedings. Section 136 of the Act, stipulates that any proceeding before an Income Tax Authority shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and also for the purpose of Section 196 of I.P.C. and every Income Tax Authority is a court for the purpose of Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Though having regard to the language of the provision, we have some reservations on the said view expressed in Rajesh Kumar's case (supra), but having held that when civil consequences ensue, no distinction between quasi judicial and administrative order survives, we deem it unnecessary to dilate on the scope of Section 136 of the Act. It is the civil consequence which obliterates the distinction between quasi judicial and administrative function. Moreover, with the growth of the administrative law, the old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Therefore, it hardly needs reiteration that even a purely administrative order which entails civil consequences, must be consistent with the rules of natural justice.
30. As already noted above, the expression "civil consequences" encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non pecuniary damages. Anything which affects a citizen in his civil life comes under its wide umbrella. Accordingly, we reject the argument and hold that since an order under Section 142 (2A) does entail civil consequences, the rule audi alteram partem is required to be observed."
10. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vikash Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2022 SCC OnLine All 1162 has observed that:-
"11. The question, in our opinion, is not with regard to ouster of jurisdiction of writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it has already been held that judicial review therein is a basic feature of Constitution of India and, the constitutional remedy, in that regard, cannot be ousted under a statute (See:- L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, AIR (1997) 3 SCC 261).
20. The other judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of Afzal Begum (supra) was delivered in an criminal appeal under Section 18 of the Act of 1986 arising from an order passed by the Court under Section 17 of the Act of 1986. We are in agreement with the reasoning assigned in para -14 of the judgment in Afzal Begum (supra), which is reproduced hereinafter:-
"14. The power of the Court to hold an inquiry under section 16 on the reference made by the District Magistrate is not an empty formality, which has a purpose behind it. The object behind providing the power of judicial scrutiny under section 16 of the Code is to check arbitrary exercise of the power by the District Magistrate in depriving a person of his properties and to restore the rule of law, therefore, a heavy duty lies on the court to hold a thorough inquiry to find out the truth with regard to the question, whether the property was acquired by or as a result of the commission of an offence triable under the Act. The order to be passed under section 17 of the Act must disclose reasons and the evidence in support of the finding of the court. The Court is not expected to act as a post office or mouthpiece of the State or the District Magistrate. If a person has no criminal history during the period the property was acquired by him, how the property can be held to be a property acquired by or as a result of commission of an offence triable under the Act is a pivotal question which has to be answered by the Court. Besides the aforesaid question, the other important question to be considered by the Court is whether the property which was acquired prior to the registration of the case against the accused under the Act or prior to the registration of the first case of the gang chart, can be attached by the District Magistrate under section 14 of the Act."
Above judgment also, in no way, supports the petitioner's contention with regard to entertainment of writ petition, at this stage, against the order of the District Magistrate.
21. For the reasons enumerated above we decline to entertain the present writ petition, at this stage, while leaving it open for the petitioner to raise all legal and factual issues during course of inquiry under Section 17 of the Act of 1986. Writ petition, accordingly, is summarily rejected without any order passed as to costs."
11. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kahkashan Parveen and others Vs. State of U.P. and others 1999 (2) ACR 1762 has observed that:-
"7. An analysis of the different words used in Section 14 suggests that it is within the authority of the District Magistrate upon his satisfaction that any property in possession of any person has been acquired by a gangster as a result of the commission of an offence triable under the Act, to direct attachment of the property notwithstanding the question of absence of cognizance by any Court. The provision requires that there must be a reason to believe on the part of the District Magistrate that the conditions for an action under Section 14 of the Act did exist and the conditions are that certain property in possession of any person must have been acquired by a gangster and that too by commission of an offence under the Act. Thus, the satisfaction portion should not only indicate that property sought to be attached was acquired by a gangster but it should also indicate that such acquisition has been made by commission of an offence under the Act. This satisfaction of the District Magistrate is not open to be challenged in any appeal. Only a representation is provided for before the District Magistrate himself under Section 15 and in case he refuses to release the property on such representation, he is to make a reference to the Court having jurisdiction to try an offence under the Act. Thus, so far as the District Magistrate is concerned, the satisfaction must not be arbitrary and must be based on the legal conditions indicated in Section 14 of the Act.
8. In the attachment order recorded in W.P. No. the attachment indicates that certain police reports were received and perused by the District Magistrate and he was satisfied, as per the words used in the order, that the properties sought to be attached were acquired by Suhaib Ahmad illegally by anti-social activities and by commission of offences of murder, loot, assault, cheating, etc. and he had also seen the criminal history of Suhaib Ahmad. There is no mention in the order that he was satisfied that Suhaib Ahmad was a gangster and the properties sought to be attached were acquired by commission of offences triable under the Act, This, in our view, is certainly a major defect in the action of the District Magistrate as Section 14 gives him a power of attachment only under certain conditions and unless the order indicates the existence of these conditions he could not have recorded an attachment order. The order dated 30.6.1999, attaching the properties indicated in the order which is subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 3983 of 1999, is thus not tenable in law and is quashed."
12. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Krishna Murari Agrawal Vs. District Magistrate, Jhansi and others 2001 (42) ACC 107 has observed that:-
"4. The question whether the property attached has been acquired by a gangster as a result of the commission of an offence under U.P. Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities Prevention Act, 1986 is a pure question of fact. The claim of the petitioner that the property has not been acquired by commission of an offence or that it is an ancestral property can only be established by appraisal of the evidence. It will be open to the petitioner to lead oral and documentary evidence in support of his claim before the Special Judge (Gangsters Act) where the matter has been referred. Such appraisal of evidence is not possible in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Act provides a complete machinery as against the decision of the Court an Appeal lies under section 18 of the act."
13. A Single Bench of this Court in the case of Badan Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2001 (43) ACC 1133 has observed that:-
"6. I shall first deal with the legality, propriety and correctness of the order of attachment passed by the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Act. If it is ultimately held that the said order smacks of arbitrariness and has been passed in absence of any material to believe that Badan Singh is a gangster and as a result of commission of any offence under the Act has acquired the properties, then the order of attachment per-se being illegal has to be set at naught. In the event such a conclusion is arrived at, then the discussion on the question of correctness or otherwise of the order of the Special Judge will be academic.
9 So keeping in mind the meaning of the words "reason to believe" in Section 14 of the Act coupled with the effect of order of attachment which makes one homeless and pauper, it is to be seen whether in the present case there were sufficient materials before the District Magistrate, Meerut for his believe that petitioner Badan Singh is a gangster and that he has acquired the properties as a result of commission of any offence triable under the Act.
11. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid two definitions what appears is that for taking action under Section 14 against a person, there must be materials for objective determination of the District Magistrate that he either as a member, leader or organizer of a gang acquired any property as a result of commission of any offence under the Act. There must be nexus between his criminal act and the property acquired by him. His mere involvement in any offence is not sufficient to attach his property. In other words, what is necessary to find is whether his acquisition of property was as a result of commission of any offence enumerated in the Act being a member, leader or organizer of a gang. One might have committed several offences, but if the property acquired by him was with the aid of his earning from legal source, no action under Section 14 of the Act can be taken against him.
13. Section 14 of the Act is a harsh provision that affects one's right to property which is a fundamental right under the Constitution. Therefore, initial burden was upon the State to satisfy the District Magistrate with necessary materials that petitioner Badan Singh being a gangster acquired the properties as a result of commission of any offence. That was however, not done. So complaining the attachment order to be illegal, a move was made by the petitioners by filing a representation for release of the properties. The said prayer was rejected with the observation that the petitioners could not establish the source of income to build the house and acquire the movables. This approach of the District Magistrate, in my opinion, has no sanction under law. The Act does not provide that aggrieved person seeking release of the properties from attachment must prove the source of income for acquisition thereof. So, on a conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Act, I am of the considered opinion that the order of attachment passed by the District Magistrate, Meerut is illegal, arbitrary and m against the weight of the materials on record."
14. We have also come across a judgment passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.14259 of 2011 (Balveer Singh @ Sintoo Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another) decided on 03.10.2018, wherein learned Single Judge of this Court had considered relevant provisions of the Act, 1988. In order to appreciate the controversy in hand, it is relevant to extract the relevant paragraph nos. 14, 15 & 16 of the said judgement, which are follows:-
14. Attachment of property. - (1) If the District Magistrate has reason to believe that any property, whether movable or immovable, in possession of any person has been acquired by a gangster as a result of the commission of an offence triable under this Act, he may order attachment of such property whether or not cognizance of such offence has been taken by any Court.
(2) The provisions of the Code shall, mutatis mutandis apply to every such attachment.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Code the District Magistrate may appoint an Administrator of any property attached under subsection (1) and the Administrator shall have all the powers to administer such property in the best interest thereof.
(4) The District Magistrate may provide police help to the Administrator for proper and effective administration of such property.
15. Release of property. - (1) Where any property is attached under Section 14, the claimant thereof may within three months from the date of knowledge of such attachment make a representation to the District Magistrate showing the circumstances in and the sources by which such property was acquired by him.
(2) If the District Magistrate is satisfied about the genuineness of the claim made under sub-section (1) he shall forthwith release the property from attachment and thereupon such property shall be made over to the claimant.
16. Inquiry into the character of acquisition of property by Court. - (1) Where no representation is made within the period specified in sub-section (1) of Section 15 or the District Magistrate does not release the property under sub-section (2) of Section 15 he shall refer the matter with his report to the Court having jurisdiction to try an offence under this Act.
(2) Where the District Magistrate has refused to attach any property under sub-section (1) of Section 14 or has ordered for release of any property under sub-section (2) of Section 15, the State Government or any person aggrieved by such refusal or release may make an application to the Court referred to in sub-section (1) for inquiry as to whether the property was acquired by or as a result of the commission of an offence triable under this Act. Such Court may, if it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of justice so to do, order attachment of such property.
(3)(a) On receipt of the reference under sub-section (1) or an application under sub-section (2), the Court shall fix a date for inquiry and give notices thereof to the person making the application under subsection (2) or, as the case may be, to the person making the representation under Section 15 and to the State Government, and also to any other person whose interest appears to be involved in the case.
(b) On the date so fixed or any subsequent date to which the inquiry may be adjourned, the Court shall hear the parties, receive evidence produced by them, take such further evidence as it considers necessary, decide whether the property was acquired by a gangster as a result of the commission of an offence triable under this Act and shall pass such order under Section 17 as may be just and necessary in the circumstances of the case.
(4) For the purpose of inquiry under sub-section (3) the Court, shall have the power of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. 5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely :-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any Court or office;
(e) issuing commission for examination of witness or documents;
(f) dismissing a reference for default or deciding it ex parte
(g) setting aside an order of dismissal for default or ex parte decision.
(5) In any proceedings under this section, the burden of proving that the property in question or any part thereof was not acquired by a gangster as a result of the commission of any offence triable under this Act, shall be on the person claiming the property, anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act No. 1 of 1872), notwithstanding.
From perusal of the sections 14 of the Act 1986, it is clear that an order can be passed by the District Magistrate only if he has reason to believe that any property, whether movable or immovable, in possession of any person has been acquired by a gangster as a result of the commission of an offence triable under this Act and in that case he may order attachment of such property whether or not cognizance of such offence has been taken by the court. In Prem Narayan Prasad (Supra) this court has further held:-
"Sub clause 3 of Section 14 of the Act 1986, permits the District Magistrate to appoint an Administrator of any property attached under Sub Section 1 (1) and the Administrator shall have all the powers to administer such property in the best interest thereof.
Sub Clause (1) of Section 14 of the Act, lays down the following conditions for exercising such power;
There must be reason to believe for the District Magistrate i.e. he should reasonably believe that any property whether movable or immovable, in possession of any person (i) has been acquired by a Gangster, that too (ii) as a result of commission of an offence triable under the Act.
If either of the conditions aforesaid are missing, the recourse can not be taken to Section 14 of the Act.
The term 'reason to believe' has been the subject matter of consideration under various enactments.
The term 'reason to believe' has also been defined in Section 26 of the I.P.C. According to the said definition if a person has 'reason to believe' it is not the same thing as "suspicion" or "doubt" and mere seeing also can not be equated to believing as "Reason to believe" is a higher level State of mind. Similar words "reason to believe" as appearing in this Act are also there in the Income Tax Act. The Apex Court while interpreting the said expression in the case of Ganga Saran & Sons Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta Vs. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1981 SC 1363, observed that words "has reason to believe" is stronger than the words "is satisfied". The belief entertained by the authority must not be arbitrary.
In the case of Badan Singh alias Baddo Vs. State of U.P. & others 2002 Crl. L.J. 1392, a learned Single Judge of this Court while considering the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court and the definition of Section 26 I.P.C., observed that the belief entertained by the authority must not be arbitrary or irrational. It must be reasonable or in other words, it must be based on reasons which are relevant and material. The Court, of course, cannot investigate into the adequacy or sufficiency of the reasons which weighed with the authority in coming to the belief, but the Court can certainly examine whether the reasons are relevant and have a bearing in the matter in regard to which it is required to entertain the belief.
In the case of The Income Tax Officer, I Ward, District VI, Calcutta and others Vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) 3 Supreme Court Cases 757. the Apex Court held. ".....the reasons for the formation of the belief must have a rational connection with or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. Rational connection postulates that there must be a direct nexus or live link between the material coming to the notice of the Income-tax Officer and the formation of his belief that there has been escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment in the particular year because of his failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. It is no doubt true that the court cannot go into the sufficiency or adequacy of the material and substitute its own opinion for that of the Income-tax Officer on the point as to whether action should be initiated for reopening assessment. At the same time we have to bear in mind that it is not any and every material, howsoever vague and indefinite or distant, remote and farfetched, which would warrant the formation of the belief relating to escapement of the income of the assessee from assessment."
In the case of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Private Limited, (2008) 14 Supreme Court Cases 208, the Supreme Court held, " Section 147 authorises and permits the assessing officer to assess or reassess income chargeable to tax if he has reason to believe that income for any assessment year has escaped assessment. The word "reason" in the phrase "reason to believe" would mean cause or justification. If the assessing officer has cause or justification to know or suppose that income had escaped assessment, it can be said to have reason to believe that an income had escaped assessment. The expression cannot be read to mean that the assessing officer should have finally ascertained the fact by legal evidence or conclusion. The function of the assessing officer is to administer the statute with solicitude for the public exchequer with an inbuilt idea of fairness to taxpayers."
The Apex Court in the case of Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel and others Vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 144, while considering the case of Barium Chemicals Ltd. Versus Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295, made the following observations:
"30. This Court while expressly referring to the expressions such as "reason to believe", "in the opinion of" observed: (AIR p. 324, para 63) "63. ......... Therefore, the words, "reason to believe' or 'in the opinion of' do not always lead to the construction that the process of entertaining 'reason to believe' or 'the opinion' is an altogether subjective process not lending itself even to a limited scrutiny by the court that such 'a reason to believe' or 'opinion' was not formed on relevant facts or within the limits or as Lord Radcliffe and Lord Reid called the restraints of the statute as an alternative safeguard to rules of natural justice where the function is administrative."
Thereafter, the Apex Court further held as under:
"33. The court is entitled to examine whether there has been any material available with the State Government and the reasons recorded, if any, in the formation of opinion and whether they have any rational connection with or relevant bearing on the formation of the opinion The court is entitled particularly, in the event, when the formation of the opinion is challenged to determine whether the formation of opinion is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is always open to the court to examine the question whether reasons for formation of opinion have rational connection or relevant bearing to the formation of such opinion and are not extraneous to the purposes of the statute."
The expression "reason to believe" used in Section 14 of the Act, therefore, would mean that the reasons recorded by the District Magistrate, if any, in the formation of his opinion have a rational connection with or relevant bearing on the formation of the opinion. It is always open to the court to examine the question whether reasons for formation of opinion have rational connection or relevant bearing to the formation of such opinion and are not extraneous to the purposes of the statute. In other words, the District Magistrate has to satisfy himself on the basis of the material produced or enquiry made, if any, that the person is a gangster and that he has acquired properties from his illegally earned money by the commission of offences triable under the Act, which property may or may not be in his own name but in the absence of any such material or basis for formation of such an opinion, the order of attachment cannot be passed. There has to be a 'cause' or 'justification' for belief.
A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Kahkashan Parveen and another Vs. State of U.P., 1999 (39) ACC 719, held that provisions of Section 14 of the Act require that there must be a reason to believe on the part of the District Magistrate that the conditions for an action under Section 14 of the Act did exist and the conditions are that certain property in possession of any person must have been acquired by a gangster and that too by commission of an offence under the Act. Thus, the satisfaction portion should not only indicate that the property sought to be attached was acquired by a Gangster but it should also indicate that such acquisition has been made by commission of an offence under the Act. This satisfaction of the District Magistrate is not open to be challenged in any appeal. Only a representation is provided for before the District Magistrate himself under Section 15 and in case he refuses to release the property on such representation, he is to make a reference to the court having jurisdiction to try an offence under the Act. Thus, so far as the District Magistrate is concerned, the satisfaction must not be arbitrary and must be based on the legal conditions in Section 14 of the Act.
In the aforesaid case, the attachment order indicated that certain police reports were received and perused by the District Magistrate and he was satisfied that the properties sought to be attached were acquired by Suhaib Ahmad illegally by anti-social activities and by commission of offences of murder, loot, assault, cheating etc. and he had also seen the criminal history of Suhaib Ahmad. The Division Bench observed that there was no mention in the order that the District Magistrate was satisfied that Suhaib Ahmad was a gangster and the properties sought to be attached were acquired by commission of offences triable under the Act. This was found to be a major defect in the action of the District Magistrate and the order of attachment was quashed.
Judging from the aforesaid point of view, the Court, while testing the order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Act, has to see, whether the discretion so exercised can be said to have been exercised in the manner as provided under Section 14 of the Act 1986 or whether it is an order which has been passed without taking recourse to the conditions mentioned therein or without application of own mind by the District Magistrate, rendering the order to be arbitrary, not based on legal conditions."
15. A Single Bench of this Court in the case of Waseem Khan Vs. State of U.P. Through Prin. Secy, Nyay Lko and another, 2023 AHC Lko 33213 has observed that:-
"20. A coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Maina Devi versus State of U.P. 2013(83) ACC 902 in paras-9 and 10 has been pleased to held as under:-
"9. In light of above mentioned provisions of the Gangster Act the District Magistrate is empowered to attach movable or immovable properties in possession of any person acquired by a gangster as a result of the commission of an offence triable under this Act. But for exercising such powers there must be the reason to believe to the District Magistrate that such property was acquired by a gangster as a result of the commission of an offence triable under this Act. The words reason to believe are stronger than the word "satisfied", it must be passed on reasons which are relevant and material. In the present case, from the perusal of the lower Court record it appears that only on the basis of the police report submitted by the officer incharge of P.S. Sarai Lak-hansi, District Mau, the District Magistrate, Mau has attached two houses of the appellant, no material was supplied to the District Magistrate to have a reason to believe that the property in question was acquired by the gangster Raj Bahadur Singh as a result of commission of an offence triable under this Act. It vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate also. The learned District Magistrate was having no material in support of the police report that both the houses of the appellant were acquired by his son Raj Bahadur Singh. The learned District Magistrate rejected the application under section 15 of the Gangsters Act moved by the appellant for releasing the attached houses. The application was moved well within the time, the application was a representation to the District Magistrate, Mau, it was having all the details disclosing the sources by which both the houses were acquired by the appellant. But learned District Magistrate did not consider the sources disclosed by the appellant and rejected the application vide order dated 29.12.2008. The explanation of all the sources by which the appellant acquired the houses has not been properly considered. Therefore, impugned order dated 29.12.2008 has become illegal. The learned Special Judge (Gangsters Act), Azamgarh rejected the application moved by the appellant under section 17 of the Gangsters Act without considering the provisions of the section 14 of the Gangsters Act and the 'relevancy of the reasons' recorded by the District Magistrate to believe that both the attached houses were acquired by a gangster Raj Bahadur Singh son of the appellant as a result of commission of an offence triable under this Act. The order dated 17.3.2009 passed by learned Special Judge (Gangsters Act)/Additional Sessions Judge, Azamgarh in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2 of 2009 is also illegal.
10. In view of the above discussion, the order passed by District Magistrate, Mau under section 14(1) of the Gangsters Act attaching two houses of the appellant the order dated 29.12.2008 passed by District Magistrate, Mau by which the application under section 15(1)(2) of the Gangster Act has been rejected and the order dated 17.3.2009 passed by learned Special Judge (Gangster Act), Additional Sessions Judge, Azamgarh in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2 of 2009 are illegal, the same are hereby set aside and the District Magistrate, Mau is hereby directed to release both the houses No. 204-D/8 and 205-D/9 situated in Mohalla Chandmari, Imiliyan, P.S. Sarai Lak-hansi, District Mau in favour of the appellant forthwith."
21. Further, another Single Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Shanti Devi wife of Sri Ram versus State of U.P. 2007(2) ALJ 483 (All) in paras-9, 10 and 11 has been pleased to held as under:-
"9. The conjoint reading of these sections shows that first it has to be proved that gangster or any person on his behalf is or has been in possession of the property, and such property has been acquired by the commission of any offence triable under this Act, only then the District Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and to attach the property. Only when the initial burden is discharged, the onus shifts to the gangster or such person, to account for the same satisfactorily. But if it is found that the concerned person was not a gangster and did not acquire the property in commission of any offence triable under this Act, it has to be released as provided in Section 17. In other words the initial burden is on the prosecution to show that the concerned person is a gangster and has acquired property on account of his criminal activity as triable under the Act.
10. Therefore, in order to proceed under section 14 there must be materials for objective determination of the District Magistrate that the person is either a member, leader or organiser of a gang and has acquired any property in commission of any offence under the Act. There must be a nexus between his criminal acts as enumerated therein and the property acquired by him. His mere involvement in any offence is not sufficient to attach his property. In other words what is necessary to find is whether, his acquisition of property was a result of commission of any offence enumerated in the Act being a member, leader or organiser of a gang. One might have committed several offences but if the property acquired by him was with the aid of his earning from legal resources no action under Section 14 of the Act can be taken against him.
11. In the case of Badan Singh alias Baddo v. State of U.P., 2002 Cri LJ 1392 : 2001 All LJ 2852 it has been held by this Court that Section 14 of the Act is a harsh provision that affects one's right to property, which is a fundamental right under the Constitution. Therefore, initial burden was upon the State to satisfy the District Magistrate with necessary materials that a gangster acquired the properties as a result of commission of any offence. It has also been held in this case that the Act does not provide that the aggrived person seeking release of the properties from attachment must prove the source of income for acquisition thereof."
22. Further, another Single Bench of this Court in the case of Rajbir Singh Tyagi Vs State of U.P. and Others 2018 SCC Online AII 5986 in paras 16 and 18 has been pleased to held as under:-
" 16. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid two definitions what appears is that for taking action under Section 14 against a person, there must be materials for objective determination of the District Magistrate that he either as a member, leader or organizer of a gang acquired any property as a result of commission of any offence under the Act. There must be nexus between his criminal act and the property acquired by him. His mere involvement in any offence is not sufficient to attach his property. In other words, what is necessary to find is whether his acquisition of property was as a result of commission of any offence enumerated in the Act being a member, leader or organizer of a gang. One might have committed several offences, but if the property acquired by him was with the aid of his earning from legal source, no action under Section 14 of the Act can be taken against him.
18. Section 14 of the Act is a harsh provision that affects one's right to property which is a constitutional right under the Constitution. Therefore, initial burden was upon the State to satisfy the District Magistrate with necessary materials that petitioner Rajbir Singh Tyagi being a gangster acquired the properties as a result of commission of any offence. That was however, not done. So, complaining the attachment order to be illegal, a move was made by the petitioners by filing a representation for release of the properties. The said prayer was rejected with the observation that the petitioners could not establish the source of income to build the house and acquire the movables. This approach of the District Magistrate, in my opinion, has no sanction under law. The Act does not provide that-aggrieved person seeking release of the properties from attachment must prove the source of income for acquisition thereof. So, on a conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Act, I am of the considered opinion that the order of attachment passed by the District Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar is illegal, arbitrary and against the weight of the materials on record."
16. It is pertinent to mention here that in the case of Kahkashan Parveen (supra), the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has already decided the issue and held that the element of satisfaction in the order should not only indicate that the property sought to be attached was acquired by a gangster but it should also indicate that acquisition of the property has been made by committing the offences falling under the Act. This satisfaction of the District Magistrate is not open to be challenged in any appeal. Only representation is provided for before the District Magistrate itself under Section 15 and in case he refuses to release the property on such representation he has to make a reference to the Court having jurisdiction to try an offence under the Act. Thus, so far as the District magistrate is concerned, the satisfaction must not be arbitrary and must be based on the legal condition indicated in Section 14 of the Act. There is no mention in the impugned order that he was satisfied that Suhaib Ahmad was a gangster and the property sought to be attached was acquired by commission of offences triable under the Act. Resultantly the impugned orders were quashed and the writ petition was allowed. Meaning thereby as per the ratio decidendi a criminal misc. writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against the order passed arbitrary under Section 14(1) and 15(1) of U.P. Gangster Act but another Coordinate Bench of this Court in Vikash Yadav (supra) case, has held that a writ otherwise would not be entertained against the order passed under Section 15 of the Act 1986 by the District Magistrate as an appeal lie under Section 18 of the said Act. Against the order or judgement passed by the Court after inquiry under Section 17 of the Act. From the perusal of both the judgments, it is apparent that the judgment of Kahkasha Parveen (supra) is former in time and which has not been considered while passing the judgment in the case of Vikas Yadav (supra), which is later in time and as such it is per incurium qua the maintainability of the writ petition.
17. In the case of Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India & Others [2024] 1 S.C.R. 743 passed by Hon'ble Apex Court, it has been held that:-
Precedents - Rule of precedents - Exception to rule of precedents: Held: Although it is the ratio decidendi which is a precedent and not the final order in the judgment, however, there are certain exceptions to the rule of precedents which are expressed by the doctrines of per incurium and sub silentio - A decision rendered by ignorance of a previous binding decision of its own or of a court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law is per incurium - A decision per incurium is not binding - A decision is passed sub-silentio when the particular point of law in a decision is not perceived by the court or not present to its mind or is not consciously determined by the court and it does not form part of the ratio decidendi it is not binding - On facts, the submission that since this Court in the order dated 13.05.2022 had directed that the State of Gujarat was the appropriate Government, the same was binding on the parties even though it may be contrary to the earlier decisions of this Court, cannot be accepted inasmuch as when a judgment has been delivered per incuriam or passed sub silentio, the same cannot bind either the parties to the judgment or be a binding precedent for the future even between the same parties. [Paras 44.1, 44.2, 45] Per incuriam - Meaning of: Held: Incuria legally means carelessness and per incurium may be equated with per ignorantium - If a judgment is rendered in ignorantium of a statute or a binding authority, it becomes a decision per incurium - Thus, a decision rendered by ignorance of a previous binding decision of its own or of a court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction or in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of law is per incurium - Such a per incurium decision would not have a precedential value - If a decision has been rendered per incurium, it cannot be said that it lays down good law, even if it has not been expressly overruled - Thus, a decision per incurium is not binding. [Para 44.1]
18. From the conjoint reading of the sections of the Act as well as the case laws laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court, the legal position in this respect is settled that in order to fulfill the objective of the Act, the District Magistrate has been conferred with the power to attach the property under certain conditions which have to be fulfilled before attaching the property by invoking the power under Section 14(1) of the Act with the property should have been acquired by the gangster by committing the offences triable under the Act and the District Magistrate must record such satisfaction so reached, in case, the representation/objection is made by the gangster or any other person interested in the property. The said objection/representation should be heard and decided after giving an opportunity of hearing keeping in view the principles of natural justice and the satisfaction should have been recorded with regard to the material/evidence produced and adduced by such applicant/petitioner. It is apparent that the satisfaction with regard to the attachment is not subject to review by the Court but if such attachment is made by arbitrary order, in such a case, the writ can certainly be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the same.
19. In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner no.1 is not the gangster and from the impugned order it is apparent that the property is not acquired by the gangster but it belongs to the petitioner no.1, who is father of the alleged gangster. The impugned order has been passed on the basis of reports furnished by the Tehsil authorities and the police. No opportunity of hearing with regard to the adducing and producing of evidence/material in case of suspicion regarding the character of the property has been given to the petitioner no.1. Moreover, no reason to believe has been given in the order passed under Section 14(1)a of the Act and after deciding the objection and representation, the matter has not been referred to the court for factual inquiry under Section 16 of the Act.
20. In view of the above discussion and deliberation, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of attachment has been passed without assigning the reasons to believe and also in the teeth of violation of principles of natural justice, which are imperative to be followed by the District Magistrate while passing the attachment order as well as deciding the objection/representation against the order of attachment which entails civil/evil consequences, the objection/representation should have been decided only after giving an opportunity of adducing and producing the evidence/material regarding the building of the house by the petitioner and recording the satisfaction thereto.
21. Keeping in view the aforesaid settled proposition of law and the judgments rendered by this Court, this Court is of the prima facie view that the property, which was attached, was acquired by the appellant with the aid of his earning from legal resources and not by commission of any offence triable under the Act as it is settled law that the properties being made subject matter of attachment under Section 14(1) of the Act must have been acquired by a gangster and that too by commission of an offence triable under the Act and also the impugned order was not passed on adequate reasons which are relevant and material. In the present case from the perusal of the impugned order dated 07.12.2023 and record it is evident that only on the basis of the police report, the District Magistrate has attached the property in question, no material was supplied to the District Magistrate to have reasons to believe that the property in question was acquired by the gangster, the present appellant as a result of commission of any offence triable under this Act. It vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate and also from the record, it is reflected that the District Magistrate has no material in support of the police report that the property in question was acquired by the present appellant being gangster even though the proceedings were not followed as per the provisions of the Act. It appears that the impugned order of attachment was passed in a mechanical manner without application of mind and as such it is arbitrary.Thus, the impugned order dated 07.12.2023 passed by the District Magistrate, Sambhal (respondent no.2) is illegal and the same is liable to be quashed.
22. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 07.12.2023 passed by the District Magistrate, Sambhal (respondent no.2) is quashed. The matter is remitted back to the authority concerned for deciding the matter afresh in accordance with law.
Order Date :-18.4.2024 Sanjeet