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Allahabad High Court

Arun Kumar Singh @ Munna And Others vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home ... on 21 August, 2023





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:55165
 
AFR
 
Judgment reserved on:  30.05.2023
 
Judgment delivered on :  21.08.2023
 

 
Court No. - 16 
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 5520 of 2023 
 

 
Applicant :- Arun Kumar Singh @ Munna And Others 
 
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Deptt., Govt. Of U.P. And Others 
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Meenakshi Singh Parihar,Abhiuday Pratap Singh,Chetna Singh 
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. 
 

 
Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi J. 
 

1. Heard Sri H.G.S. Parihar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. Meenakshi Singh Parihar, for the applicant, Sri Manish Kumar Pandey, learned A.G.A.-1 and Sri Rajendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 3.

2. By means of the instant application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicant have challenged validity of the order dated 12.05.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (M.P., M.L.A.) / Additional Session Judge, Court No. 5, Pratapgarh in Criminal Revision No. 129 of 2022 and the cognizance and summoning order dated 18.08.2022 and the entire proceedings of Case No. 129 of 2015 in the Court of Special Judge M.P. M.L.A. / Civil Judge (S.D.) / F.T.C. II, Pratapgarh, which arose out of F.I.R. No. 61 of 2015 lodged by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kunda, Pratapgarh on 21.03.2015 in Police Station Kunda, District Pratapgarh, against two officials of the revenue department - an Ahalmad and a Registrar Kanoongo, and unnamed beneficiaries of the offence, in compliance of an order dated 15.09.2014 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 7611 of 2014 - Kamlesh Singh versus State of U. P. and others.

3. F.I.R. No. 61 of 2015 was lodged by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kunda, Pratapgarh on 21.03.2015 under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 I.P.C. against two officials of the revenue department - an Ahalmad and a Registrar Kanoongo, and unnamed beneficiaries of the offence, in compliance of an order dated 15.09.2014 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 7611 of 2014 - Kamesh Singh versus State of U. P. and others. The F.I.R. states that a forged paper-book of Case no. 301 of 2000 in the Court of the S.D.M. Kunda and an order dated 15.05.2001 were prepared and mutation was carried out in furtherance of the aforesaid order in the Khatauni on 08.05.2012. When irregularities committed in the aforesaid proceedings came to light, the District Magistrate got an enquiry conducted by the S.D.M., who submitted an enquiry report dated 06.02.2015 against the two named accused officials and the beneficiaries of the offence.

4. The enquiry report dated 06.02.2015 submitted by the S.D.M. Sadar, Pratapgarh stated that paper book of Case No. 301 under Section 229 B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, titled "Arun Kumar Singh alias Munna and others versus Kamlesh Kumar Singh", decided on 15.05.2001, was prepared by committing forgery and fabrication, as in the case institution register, case title "Samai versus Gram Sabha, Gram Malava Chhajaipur" is recorded against Case No. 301 under Section 229 B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The entire order-sheet of the paper-book is in one hand-writing and it mentions that the submissions of both the parties were heard, whereas the defendant Kamlesh Kumar Singh had not put in appearance in the case. Moreover, Arun Kumar Singh filed a caveat in the Court of the Divisional Commissioner 11 years after passing of the order, which also establishes that the paper-book has been fabricated.

5. Initially the Investigating Officer submitted a Final Report dated 27.03.2016 stating that previously the investigation was carried out by Sub-Inspectors Sir. Kedar Singh and Sri. Ghanshyam Nishad and after their transfer, the investigation was handed over to Senior Sub-Inspector Kripa Shankar Rai. The then S.D.M. had died and for this reason, no concrete evidence could be collected on the basis whereof any person can be charged of commission of any offence.

6. The opposite party no. 3 Kamlesh Kumar Singh filed objections against the Final Report stating that his valuable land had been grabbed by the accused persons under a criminal conspiracy. The previous Investigating Officer had recorded statements of several witnesses from which commission of the offences is clearly established but the subsequent Investigating Officer has submitted the Final Report without looking into the material available on the Case Diary, after taking undue advantage from the accused persons.

7. By means of an order dated 01.07.2017, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kunda, Pratapgarh rejected the Final Report and took cognizance of commission of offences under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 474 I.P.C. by the accused persons Arun Kumar Singh alias Munna, Kiran Kumar Singh, Satish Kumar Singh, Dinesh Kumar Singh, Satish Kumar Tripathi, Ramakant Dwivedi and Pratap Bahadur Singh.

8. The applicants challenged the aforesaid order dated 01.07.2017 by filing Criminal Revision No. 171/2017 which was allowed by means of an order dated 02.06.2018 passed by the Additional Session Judge, Pratapgarh on the ground that the trial Court had not discussed the prima facie evidence before summoning the accused persons. The order dated 01.07.2017 was set aside by the Revisional Court and the matter was remanded for being decided afresh.

9. After remand, the trial court passed an order dated 18.08.2022, again rejecting the objections filed by the applicants against the charge sheet. The trial Court took cognizance of the offences against the applicants and one Satish Kumar Tripathi and summoned them to face the trial.

10. The applicants challenged the order dated 18.08.2022 by filing Criminal Revision No. 129 of 2022, which has been rejected by the learned Special Judge M.P./M.L.A. / Additional Session, Judge Court No. 5, Pratapgarh.

11. The main ground of revision was that the F.I.R. was lodged by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate and he did not file any objection against the Final Report. The person who had filed the objections was not the informant and he had no locus standi to file objection against the Final Report.

12. The revisional was dismissed by means of a judgment dated 12.05.2023 holding that the F.I.R. was lodged in furtherance of the order dated 15.09.2014 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 7611 of 2014, which had been filed by Kamlesh Kumar Singh. The revisionists have themselves stated in paragraph 8 of the memo of Revision that a sale deed of the land in dispute had been executed in favour of Kamlesh Kumar Singh. In his enquiry report, the Sub-District Magistrate has recorded that paper book of Case No. 301 under Section 229 B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, titled "Arun Kumar Singh alias Munna and others versus Kamlesh Kumar Singh", decided on 15.05.2001, was prepared by forgery and fabrication, as in the case institution register, case title "Samai versus Gram Sabha, Gram Malava Chhajaipur" is registered against Case No. 301 under Section 229 B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The order-sheet mentions that the submissions of both the parties were heard, whereas the defendant Kamlesh Kumar Singh had not put in appearance in the case. Therefore Kamlesh Kumar Singh is not a stranger to the dispute.

13. The learned revisional Court further held that the statement of the Enquiry Officer Sri. J. P. Mishra was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The Final Report was filed on the ground that the then S.D.M. had died. The revisional Court held that investigation could not be nullified on this ground as the informant was a Government Officer and his signatures can easily be proved even after his death.

14. Assailing the aforesaid cognizance and summoning order dated 18.05.2022 and the revisional order dated 12.05.2023, Sri. H. G. S. Parihar Senior Advocate, the learned Counsel for the applicants has submitted that Section 195 Cr.P.C. provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. He has submitted that although the F.I.R. giving rise to the present case was lodged by the S.D.M., the informant S.D.M. did not challenge the final report. The objections filed by the opposite party no. 3 Kamlesh Kumar Singh are in the nature of a complaint and the same are barred by Section 195 Cr.P.C. In support of this submission, Sri. Parihar has relied upon the decisions of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

15. The second submission of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that there is no allegation that any of the applicants had committed forgery and, therefore, the offences under Sections 415, 420, 463, 464, 468 and 471 I.P.C. are not made out against the applicants. He has relied upon the judgments in the cases of Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, (2018) 7 SCC 581, Mir Naqvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643 and Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751.

16. The third submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the applicants is that the dispute is purely of civil nature and the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence in a mechanical manner without there being sufficient material, only on the protest application filed by a private person. He has submitted that the cognizance and summoning of the applicants amounts to an abuse of the process of law.

17. While replying to the aforesaid submissions, Sri. Rajendra Pratap Singh, the learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 3 - Kamlesh Kumar Singh, has submitted that the opposite party no. 3 is the victim of the offence committed and the F.I.R. was lodged in furtherance of a Writ Petition filed by the opposite party no. 3 and, therefore, the opposite party no. 3 is not a stranger to the proceedings and he has the right to challenge the Final Report. He has placed judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 and Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537.

18. Having recorded the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, I proceed to discuss the points involved in the matter.

19. The relevant part of Section 195 Cr.P.C., which puts a bar against the Courts taking cognizance of certain offences in certain conditions, is being reproduced below: -

"195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.--(1) No Court shall take cognizance--
(a)...;
(b) (i) ...,
(ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.

* * * (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section."

20. In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

10. ... The offences mentioned in this clause clearly relate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making a false declaration in any judicial proceeding or before a court of justice or before a public servant who is bound or authorised by law to receive such declaration, and also to some other offences which have a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice (Sections 205 and 211 IPC). This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195 viz. that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 Cr.P.C.. This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any court.
11. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing to the court for taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in clauses (b)(i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341 Cr.P.C. which occur in Chapter XXVI give the procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith. The heading of this Chapter is -- "Provisions as to Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice". Though, as a general rule, the language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words of the section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning, but they are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked to explain its enactments, but as affording a better key to the constructions of the sections which follow them than might be afforded by a mere preamble. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn., pp. 207, 209.) The fact that the procedure for filing a complaint by court has been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such type which directly affects the administration of justice viz. which is committed after the document is produced or given in evidence in court. Any offence committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or giving in evidence in court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an offence affecting the administration of justice.

* * *

25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse"...

21. The allegation in the present case is not that the applicants fabricated any document in proceedings pending in the Court. The allegation is that without any proceedings having been initiated and conducted in the Court, the applicants fabricated a fake order purportedly passed by the Court. In these circumstances, in view of the law laid explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (Supra), the bar contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. would not apply in the facts of the present case.

22. The submission of the learned Counsel for the applicant is that after a Final Report was submitted after investigation conducted in furtherance of the F.I.R., the same provision will apply to filing of the objections against the Final Report and the objections could only be filed by the Court, and not by the opposite party no. 2.

23. The words used in Section 195 Cr.P.C. are that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. This provision imposes a restriction against taking cognizance of certain offences except upon a complaint made by the Court. The F.I.R. regarding commission of the offences in the present case was made by the Court. The F.I.R. in the present case was lodged by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, in whose Court the alleged forged document was filed. Therefore, even if the bar of Section 195 Cr.P.C. would apply to the present case, the condition contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C., that the Court can take cognizance of certain offences only upon the complaint made by the Court, stands satisfied.

24. In Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "The injured person or any relative of the deceased, though not entitled to notice from the Magistrate, has locus to appear before the Magistrate at the time of consideration of the report, if he otherwise comes to know that the report is going to be considered by the Magistrate and if he wants to make his submissions in regard to the report, the Magistrate is bound to hear him".

25. The opposite party no. 3 being the victim of the offence and he having suffered a legal injury due to commission of the offence, had every right to file protest petition against the Final Report and the Court has rightly accepted his protest petition and rejected the Final Report.

26. The words used Section 195 Cr.P.C. are plain and unambiguous and are not open to be interpreted differently. It is one of the basic principles of interpretation of Statutes that while interpreting Statutes, neither any words should be added nor should the same be subtracted. The words used regarding lodging of a complaint, cannot be interpreted in a vast manner so as to include a restriction regarding filing of a protest petition against a Final report so as to defeat the rights of the victims of offences.

27. The recent trend in law indicates increasing recognition of the rights of the victims of the offences, and their right to participate in the proceeding is acknowledged, even if they themselves are not the informants.

28. In Sudha Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 4 SCC 781, the Hon'ble Supreme Court entertained an Appeal filed by the wife of a deceased victim of a predicate offence under Section 302 I.P.C., against an order passed by the High Court granting bail to a person accused of committing an offence under Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Gangsters and Anti Social Activities Prevention Act, although neither she, nor her deceased husband was the informant in the case under the Gangsters Act.

29. In Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321, while discussing the development of law regarding the rights of the victims of offences, the Hon'ble Supreme Court enunciated the following principles: -

"15. Until recently, criminal law had been viewed on a dimensional plane wherein the courts were required to adjudicate between the accused and the State. The "victim"--the de facto sufferer of a crime had no participation in the adjudicatory process and was made to sit outside the Court as a mute spectator. However, with the recognition that the ethos of criminal justice dispensation to prevent and punish "crime" had surreptitiously turned its back on the "victim", the jurisprudence with respect to the rights of victims to be heard and to participate in criminal proceedings began to positively evolve.
* * *
20. It is pertinent to mention that the legislature has thoughtfully given a wide and expansive meaning to the expression "victim" which "means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression "victim" includes his or her guardian or legal heir".

21. This Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka (2019) 2 SCC 752, while dealing with questions regarding a victim's right to file an appeal under Section 372 CrPC, observed that there was need to give adequate representation to victims in criminal proceedings. The Court therein affirmed the victim's right to file an appeal against an order of acquittal. In Mallikarjun Kodagali [Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, though the Court was primarily concerned with a different legal issue, it will be fruitful in the present context to take note of some of the observations made therein :

"3. What follows in a trial is often secondary victimisation through repeated appearances in court in a hostile or a semi-hostile environment in the courtroom. Till sometime back, secondary victimisation was in the form of aggressive and intimidating cross-examination, but a more humane interpretation of the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 has made the trial a little less uncomfortable for the victim of an offence, particularly the victim of a sexual crime. In this regard, the judiciary has been proactive in ensuring that the rights of victims are addressed, but a lot more needs to be done. Today, the rights of an accused far outweigh the rights of the victim of an offence in many respects. There needs to be some balancing of the concerns and equalising their rights so that the criminal proceedings are fair to both.
***
8. The rights of victims, and indeed victimology, is an evolving jurisprudence and it is more than appropriate to move forward in a positive direction, rather than stand still or worse, take a step backward. A voice has been given to victims of crime by Parliament and the judiciary and that voice needs to be heard, and if not already heard, it needs to be raised to a higher decibel so that it is clearly heard."

22. It cannot be gainsaid that the rights of a victim under the amended CrPC are substantive, enforceable, and are another facet of human rights. The victim's right, therefore, cannot be termed or construed restrictively like a brutum fulmen [Ed. : The literal translation from the Latin approximates to "meaningless thunderbolt or lightning", and is used to convey the idea of an "empty threat" or something which is ineffective.] . We reiterate that these rights are totally independent, incomparable, and are not accessory or auxiliary to those of the State under the CrPC. The presence of "State" in the proceedings, therefore, does not tantamount to according a hearing to a "victim" of the crime.

23. A "victim" within the meaning of CrPC cannot be asked to await the commencement of trial for asserting his/her right to participate in the proceedings. He/She has a legally vested right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of an offence. Such a "victim" has unbridled participatory rights from the stage of investigation till the culmination of the proceedings in an appeal or revision. We may hasten to clarify that "victim" and "complainant/informant" are two distinct connotations in criminal jurisprudence. It is not always necessary that the complainant/informant is also a "victim", for even a stranger to the act of crime can be an "informant", and similarly, a "victim" need not be the complainant or informant of a felony.

24. The abovestated enunciations are not to be conflated with certain statutory provisions, such as those present in the Special Acts like the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, where there is a legal obligation to hear the victim at the time of granting bail. Instead, what must be taken note of is that:

24.1.First, the Indian jurisprudence is constantly evolving, whereby, the right of victims to be heard, especially in cases involving heinous crimes, is increasingly being acknowledged.
24.2.Second, where the victims themselves have come forward to participate in a criminal proceeding, they must be accorded with an opportunity of a fair and effective hearing. If the right to file an appeal against acquittal, is not accompanied with the right to be heard at the time of deciding a bail application, the same may result in grave miscarriage of justice. Victims certainly cannot be expected to be sitting on the fence and watching the proceedings from afar, especially when they may have legitimate grievances. It is the solemn duty of a court to deliver justice before the memory of an injustice eclipses.

(Emphasis supplied)

30. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the victim of the offence had the right to file a protest petition against the Final Report and the trial Court has not committed any error in entertaining the protest petition and rejecting the Final Report.

31. The learned Counsel for the applicant has relied upon the judgment in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"8. ...in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld."

32. Since I have already held that the F.I.R. for all the offences was lodged by the Court and not by the victim and the offences alleged were not committed regarding any documents that had been filed in the Court, but the offence was committed by forging the entire proceedings of the Court without any proceeding having actually been initiated in the Court, the bar of Section 195 is not attracted to the present case and the victim had rightly filed a protest petition against the Final report submitted after investigation, I am of the view that the aforesaid principle of law is not attracted to the facts of the present case.

33. The learned Counsel for the applicant next submitted that the offence of forgery is made out only against the maker of the false document and there is no allegation that the applicants had forged any document themselves. In support of this submission, he has relied upon the decision in the case of Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj, (2018) 7 SCC 581, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "a charge of forgery cannot be imposed on a person who is not the maker of the same".

34. In the present case, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kunda, Pratapgarh had rejected the Final Report and took cognizance of commission of offences under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 474 I.P.C. by the accused persons Arun Kumar Singh alias Munna, Kiran Kumar Singh, Satish Kumar Singh, Dinesh Kumar Singh, Satish Kumar Tripathi, Ramakant Dwivedi and Pratap Bahadur Singh by means of an order dated 01.07.2017. The applicants had challenged the aforesaid order dated 01.07.2017 by filing Criminal Revision No. 171/2017 which was allowed by means of an order dated 02.06.2018 passed by the Additional Session Judge, Pratapgarh on the ground that the trial Court had not discussed the prima facie evidence before summoning the accused persons. The order dated 01.07.2017 was set aside by the Revisional Court and the matter was remanded for being decided afresh. After remand, the trial court passed an order dated 18.08.2022, again rejecting the objections filed by the applicants against the charge sheet. The trial Court took cognizance of the offences under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 474 I.P.C. against the applicants and one Satish Kumar Tripathi and summoned them to face the trial. The trial Court has noted in its order that the employee Satish Kumar Tripathi has been held guilty of committing forgery in the records and he has been punished in departmental proceedings by reverting him to the original post of Junior Assistant in the lowest of pay scale. The trial Court has further held that the employee had committed the offence under a criminal conspiracy with the applicants, who are the beneficiaries of the offence.

35. For being charged with commission of the offence of criminal conspiracy alongwith the commission of the substantive offences committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, it is not necessary that the accused person should himself have committed the substantive offences also. Therefore, I am unable to accept the second submission of the learned Counsel for the applicant.

36. The learned Counsel for the applicants has lastly submitted that the dispute between the parties is purely a civil dispute and the criminal proceedings initiated for the same is an abuse of process of Court. He has relied upon the judgment in the case of Mitesh Kumar J. Sha versus State of Karnataka, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 976, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that "this Court has at innumerable instances expressed its disapproval for imparting criminal color to a civil dispute, made merely to take advantage of a relatively quick relief granted in a criminal case in contrast to a civil dispute. Such an exercise is nothing but an abuse of the process of law which must be discouraged in its entirety."

37. Similarly, in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626 the Hon'ble Supreme Court again held that: -

33. ... It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so far as the appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this appellant is involved in any criminal offence and the charge-sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra [Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 76] extracted above."

38. However, in the present case the F.I.R. was lodged after the S.D.M. Sadar, Pratapgarh found in an enquiry that paper book of Case No. 301 had been prepared by committing forgery and fabrication. The applicants are the beneficiaries of the commission of forgery and fabrication of the Court's records. This allegation clearly makes out commission of an offence and it is not at all a dispute of a civil nature. Therefore, the proceedings cannot be quashed on this ground also.

39. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had given the following categories of cases by way of illustration, wherein the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice: -

"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

40. I am of the considered view that the present case does not fall in any of the aforesaid categories. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had added a note of caution in Bhajan Lal (Supra) in the following words:

"103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

41. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the applicants. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

42. Before parting with the case, I deem it appropriate to observe that the date mentioned by the Presiding Officer of the Revisional Court in the revisional order is 12.05.2022 whereas the date printed on the order is 12.05.2023. The entries made by the copying official on the certified copy filed with the application shows the application for obtaining a certified copy of the order was filed on 15.05.2023 but the Head Copyist has signed the certified copy on 12.05.2023, i.e. three days prior to filing of the application for obtaining a certified copy of the order. This order should be communicated to the District Judge, Pratapgarh so that he may look into by the matter and take appropriate steps to avoid recurrence of such mistakes.

(Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.) Order Date - 21.08.2023 Pradeep/-