Delhi High Court
Ram Kishan vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors on 5 August, 2022
Author: Satish Chandra Sharma
Bench: Chief Justice, Subramonium Prasad
$~R-525.
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Date of Decision: 05.08.2022.
% W.P.(C) 6822/2011
RAM KISHAN ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shanker Raju, Mr. Nilansh Gaur,
Mr. Rajesh Sachdeva, Advocates
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Satyakam, ASC for the State with
Mr. Alok Raj, Advocate and SI
Surender Singh, Parvi Officer, New
Delhi District
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ. (ORAL)
1. The present Petition is arising out of an order dated 27.01.2011 passed
in Original Application No. 147/2008 by the Central Administrative
Tribunal (CAT) dismissing the Original Application which was preferred
against the dismissal order dated 06.06.2007 and the order rejecting the plea
dated 07.12.2007.
2. The facts of the case reveal that the Petitioner before this Court who
was serving on the Post of Constable in the Delhi Police establishment
allegedly on 30.04.2006 while posted at PS Parliamentary Street, stopped a
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vehicle and demanded bribe from the vehicle owner. However, at the same
time Inspector Satya Pal Singh, SHO Tilak Marg, reached the spot and the
Petitioner immediately permitted the driver of the Maruti Van to leave the
place and he also fled away from the spot on his Government Motorcycle.
3. The driver finally lodged a report in the matter with the Police and a
preliminary enquiry took place. In the preliminary enquiry, the Enquiry
Officer found the Petitioner guilty on 05.10.2006, and in those
circumstances, the competent Disciplinary Authority took a decision on
22.12.2006 to hold a regular Departmental Enquiry keeping in view Delhi
Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980.
4. A charge-sheet was issued to the Petitioner, and the Petitioner did
submit a reply to the charges levelled against him
5. In the Departmental Enquiry, the driver of the vehicle to whom
demand was made, was examined in detail as PW-5. The Station House
Officer who was also present at the spot was examined as PW-6, and other
witnesses were also examined. Not only this, the defense witnesses were
also examined in the matter, and the Enquiry Officer has held the Petitioner
guilty of the misconduct.
6. The findings of the Enquiry Officer are reproduced as under:
"DISCUSSION OF EVIDENCE
All the depositions made by the PW/DWs defence
statement given by Const. Ram Kishan No. 1200/ND and other
evidence adduced during the enquiry were examined carefully.
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According to the statements of PWs, PW -I proved that const.
Ram Kishan had stopped a Maruti Van on 30.04.06 in the
morning and on seeing SHO/Tilak Marg he ran away on Govt.
motorcycle. The driver of the Maruti Van told that this Const.
Ram Kishan is teasing them. PW-2 proved that Const. Ram
Kishan had demanded Rs. 50/- from him and PW -2 was ready
to give Rs. 50/- but on seeing SHO/Tilak Marg he ran away on
yellow motorcycle. PW-3 has proved that a PE under rule 15(ii)
Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules 1980 was conducted
by her and final report sent to senior officer which is exhibited
as PW -3/A. In the report PW-3 has proved the demand of Rs.
50/- from the Maruti van driver Chander Pal by Const. Ram
Kishan o. 1200/ND. PW -4 has proved the patrolling duty of
Const. Ram Kishan on motorcycle No. DL -1SN -0813 on
Ferozshah Road and Ashok Road on 30.04.06. He was called
by SHO/Tilak Marg and departure was made vide DD No. 8-B
dated 30.04.06 exhibited as Ex.PW-4/A and copy of duty roster
exhibited as Ex. PW 4/B. PW -5 has proved that as per orders
of SHO/Tilak Marg he enquired the matter and Const. Ram
Kishan had admitted his fault in writing and during enquiry the
driver of the Maruti Van No. DL-CC-816, Chander Pal proved
that Const. Ram Kishan has demanded Rs. 50/- as bribe in lieu
of loaded small goats. In this connection a enquiry report was
sent to senior officer which is exhibited as Ex. PW -6/A. PW -6
proved that Const. Ram Kishan stopped the Maruti Van driver
Chander Pal and demanded Rs. 50/- from him. Const. Ram
Kishan was using yellow colour motorcycle No. DL-ICC-8316
by loading small goats.
I have also considered the defence produced by the
defaulter Const. Ram Kishan. DW-1 and DW -2 both are the
Constables of Delhi Police force and were produced by him in
his defence and both have stated in their statements that SI
Rajender Prashad PW -5 during conducting formal enquiries
put pressure on the Const. Ram Kishan to admit his fault as per
SHO's directions seems to be fabricated one as per the situation
which was seen by SHO himself on 30.04.06 when Const. Ram
Kishan stopped the Maruti Van for taking money as bribe from
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the driver Chander Pal. Hence the contentions made by both
the DWs are not worth reliance. The other contention made in
his defence statements from Sl. No. 1 to 6 is not sufficient to
prove that Const. Ram Kishan has not demanded any-money
from Chander Pal.
Taking into consideration the totality of facts and
circumstances and evidence on record it is clearly established
that Const. Ram Kishan No. 1200/ND while posted at PS Pt.
Street on 30.04.06 stopped Maruti Van No. DL -1CC-8316 at
9.00 AM while plying Govt. motorcycle No. DL-1SN-0813 with
malafide intention and demanded Rs. 50/- as illegal
gratification in lieu of four small goats which were loaded in
(he said Maruti Van at Copernicus Marg near Baroda House.
Inspr. Sat Pal Singh the then SHO/Tilak Marg noticed the
whole incident and as soon as Inspr. Sat Pal Singh reached
there to verify the facts Const. Ram Kishan No. 1200/ND fled
away from the spot. The driver of Maruti Van Chander Pal was
ready to pay Rs. 50/- to Const. Ram Kishan who was
threatening him with one pretext or other but on seeing the
SHO/Tilak Marg the defaulter Const. Ram Kishan could not be
able to accept the demanded money of Rs. 50/- from Maruti
Van driver Chander Pal. Hence the defaulter Const. Ram
Kishan misuse his official power on 30.04.06 when he stopped
Maruti Van at 9.00 AM with ulterior motives. In view of this the
probability of the demand of Rs. 50/- from the Maruti. Van
driver Chander Pal has been confirmed from the statements of
PWs/DWs. Const.Ram Kishan is found guilty of engaging in
corruption by demanding Rs. 50/- from the driver of Maruti
Van and not found performing his duty properly as public
servant. Such type of activities demoralize the position of the
police force in the eyes of the public. As per the evidence on
record the preponderance of probability of guilt can not be
ruled out.
CONCLUSION
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From the evidence on record, the charge against Const.
Ram Kishan No 1200/D for demanding Rs. 50/- from the driver
of Marti Van Chander Pal stands proved beyond any doubt."
7. The report of the Enquiry Officer was served to the Petitioner, and he
did submit a representation in respect of the findings arrived at by the
Enquiry Officer, and the Disciplinary Authority by an order dated
06.06.2007 after minutely scanning the entire evidence has inflicted
punishment of dismissal from service, against which, an Appeal was
preferred and the Appellant Authority has affirmed the order of punishment
by dismissing the Appeal on 07.01.2007.
8. The Petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellant Authority had approached the
CAT by filing an Original Application, and the CAT has dismissed the
Original Application. Paragraphs 11 to 18 of the order passed by CAT reads
as under:
"11. It is a well settled legal position that the authority lower
than the Appointing Authority cannot take any decision in the
matter of disciplinary action. But there is no prohibition in law
that the higher authority should not take decision or impose the
penalty as the primary authority in the matter of disciplinary
action. Only because the name of the Joint Commissioner was
not mentioned in the Rule keeping in view the fact that the Joint
Commissioner had been exercising all the powers and functions
of the Additional Commissioner of Police, the statutory function
exercised by him cannot be said to be non-est in the eye of law.
12. In a batch of OAs (OA No.577/2007; OA No.1426/2006;
OA No.2282/2006; OA N0.655/2007; and OA No.1634/2008) a
Full Bench of this Tribunal was constituted to consider the
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issue "Whether obtaining of prior approval of the joint
Commissioner of Police concerned instead of the Additional
Commissioner of Police, would meet the requirement of Rule
15(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980"
and after detailed consideration of the law on the subject
decided the controversy in the orders dated 26th May, 2010 as
follows:
"13. In this view of the matter, it is also significant to
note that the Constitution of India is the supreme law in
the country. Article 311(1) affords protection against
dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to the
appointing authority and reads as under:-
Article 311. (1) No person who is a member of a civil
service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil
service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or
a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed."
If the Joint Commissioner of Police is stated to be equal if not
higher in rank to the Additional Commissioner of Police, he can
exercise disciplinary powers with respect to the Constitutional
guarantee provided in Article 311, it cannot be said that he
should be held incompetent to take a decision in terms of Rule
15(2) of the Rules, which carries no Constitutional guarantee
and is only one of the Rules of procedure forming part of a
disciplinary proceedings and in the nature of a guideline to
prevent likelihood of harassment and for enforcement of
supervision against possible misuse sometimes by officers at
lower levels. In this situation, it would not be of assistance to
rely upon the law that action must be taken within the four
corners of the statute, as contended on behalf of the Applicant.
The reference made by the Division Bench was therefore
decided by the Full Bench as follows:-
"Obtaining of prior approval of the Joint Commissioner
of Police concerned instead of the Additional
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Commissioner of Police would meet the requirement of
Rule 15(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal)
Rules, 1980."
13. We perused the judgments relied on by Shri Singal on the
above issue and note that Full Bench decision as stated above
is the latest and final law laid by this Tribunal. Hence,
considering the above legally settled position, we conclude the
main issue that the Joint Commissioner of Police is competent
to accord prior approval for initiating DE against the
Applicant.
14. Now we advert to other contentions raised by Shri Singal.
He pointed out that Defence Statement of the Applicant was not
considered by the Disciplinary Authority. We have taken the
extract of the relevant paragraph of the penalty order at
Paragraph 2 above which clearly manifests that the
Disciplinary Authority has considered Applicant's defence
statement on the E's Report.
15. Another issue raised in the OA relates to the EO's finding
not weighing the evidence advanced by 2 DWs. It is seen from
the EO's report that he has considered DWS evidence but has
accepted the evidence which the EO found just and proper. We
do not find any infirmity on this issue in the EO's report.
16. Regarding non-examination of Mahesh Kumar who was
accompanying the Driver Chander Pal, the Applicant if felt him
to be relevant and material witness to come to his defence, he
should have called him as DW. But he did not do so. Just for
the purpose of corroboration of evidence tendered by the
Driver Chander Pal, the Respondent considered it not
necessary to take Mahesh Kumar as a PW Our perusal of the
enquiry proceeding gives us the understanding that all PW have
supported the charge against the Applicant. We do not
subscribe to the Applicant's ground that the SHO Inspector
Satya Pal has fabricated and concocted the case. What
malafide intention the SHO could possibly have against the
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Applicant? There is not even whisper of malafide or ill will
against the SHO. The only point raised against the SHO is that
he has not challenged the Driver and has not impounded the
Vehicle, Respondents have defended in stating that carrying 4
small goats in a private Maruti Van is not a cognizable offence.
Even all these contentions, the Applicant fails to convince us.
17. The learned Counsel relied on many judgments in support
of the contentions raised. We have gone through these
judgments. We are not analyzing each of them. But we must
indicate that in our above analysis we did not find any support
from those judgments.
18. Having carefully considered the facts and circumstances of
the case and guided by the judicial precedents, we come to the
considered conclusion that the Applicant has failed miserably
to establish his case. Resultantly, the Original Application
being devoid of merits is dismissed. There is no order as to
costs."
9. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has vehemently argued before this
Court that the present case is a case of no evidence, and the driver of the
vehicle at no point of time has made a statement against him in the
Departmental Enquiry. It has also been argued that the statement of the
driver - which was recorded during the preliminary enquiry, has been made
to be the basis of the establishment of the misconduct.
10. It is a well settled position of law that the High Court cannot re-
appreciate the evidence, and interference can be done only if there is a
procedural irregularity or that principles of natural justice and fair-play have
been violated.
11. In the present case, as it was argued that it is a case of no evidence
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and the driver i.e. PW-5, has not stated against the Petitioner.
12. The record of the Departmental Enquiry was summoned and the
Statement of the driver, namely Chander Pal, has been looked into. He has
categorically stated that a demand of Rs. 50 was made by the Petitioner who
was serving as a Police Constable. Not only this, the other corroborative
evidence of other independent witnesses also establishes the demand made
by the Petitioner, and, therefore, the present case is not a case of no
evidence.
13. The present case is also not a case where the authority lower than the
appointing authority has inflicted a punishment. The present case is not a
case where Department has not followed the prescribed procedure, nor the
present case is a case where principles of natural justice and fair-play have
been violated.
14. The misconduct of demand regarding the illegal gratification is a very
serious misconduct, and the same was proved based upon the statement
made by the witnesses before the Enquiry Officer.
15. In the considered opinion of this Court, the question of interference in
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case does not arise.
16. The scope of judicial interference, in case of a Departmental Enquiry
is quite limited (See - Apparel Export Promotion Council V. A. K. Chopra,
(1999) 1 SCC 759, State of A. P. V. S. Sree Rama Rao, (1964) 3 SCR 25,
Union of India V. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, State of Karnataka
V. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423, Director General of Police, Railway
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Protection Force and Others V. Rajendra Kumar Dubey, 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 954, Superintendent of Police, Keonjhar & Ors V. Judhistira
nail and Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine ORI 318, Sher Singh V. Union of India
and Others, 2016 SCC OnLine HP 471).
17. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as High Courts
in the aforesaid cases that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible, and
interference can be done with the conclusion of the enquiry, in case, the
same has not been conducted in accordance with law or there is a violation
of principles of natural justice and fair-play.
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of State
of Bank of India and Another Vs. K. S. Vishwanath has taken a similar
view and has held in Paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 has under:
"27. Recently in the case of Nand Kishore Prasad (Supra)
after considering other decisions of this Court on judicial
review and the power of the High Court in a departmental
enquiry and interference with the findings recorded in the
departmental enquiry, it is observed and held that the High
Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. It is further observed and held that the High Court
is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. It is further observed that if
there is some evidence, that the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence
may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the
High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
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Constitution of India to review/reappreciate the evidence
and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. In
paragraphs 9 to 14, this Court had considered other
decisions on the power of the High Court on judicial review
on the decisions taken by the Disciplinary Authority as
under:
"9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of
A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723], a
three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the
High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision
of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant. It is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent
in that behalf, and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. The Court held as
under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant : it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which
the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of
the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article
226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence."
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC
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749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], again a three-Judge
Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial
review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of
judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual
receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the
conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in
its power of judicial review does not act as an
appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and
to arrive at its own independent findings on the
evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60,
paras 12-13)
"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is
made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that
the individual receives fair treatment and not to
ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches
is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an
inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
determine whether the inquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of natural justice
are complied with. Whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has
jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on
some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the
Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as
defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding.
When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the
disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not
act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence
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and to arrive at its own independent findings on the
evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of statutory rules
prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have
ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with
the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so
as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence
and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot
be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C.
Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR
718 : AIR 1964 SC 364], this Court held at p. 728 that
if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence
reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could
be issued."
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S.
Patil [High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S.
Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144], this
Court held that interference with the decision of
departmental authorities is permitted if such authority
had held proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations
prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising
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jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It
was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16)
"16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High
Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000)
1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have
approached the case as though it was an appeal
against the order of the administrative/disciplinary
authority of the High Court. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities can be permitted,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in
violation of the principles of natural justice or in
violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode
of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is
vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by
the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary
or capricious that no reasonable person could have
arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar
to the above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary
Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the
facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The
settled legal position is that if there is some legal
evidence on which the findings can be based, then
adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a
matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution."
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya [State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi
Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : (2011) 1 SCC
(L&S) 721], this Court held that the courts will not act
as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in
the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view is possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
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findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be ground for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as
under : (SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10)
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as
an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view is possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts
will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in
departmental enquiries, except where such findings
are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have
arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material
on record. The courts will however interfere with the
findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of
natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6
SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham [Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S)
1806] and Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana [Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
1036], High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S.
Patil [High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S.
Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144].)
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***
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently
acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of
doubt, will not in any way render a completed
disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity
of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment.
The standard of proof required in criminal
proceedings being different from the standard of proof
required in departmental enquiries, the same charges
and evidence may lead to different results in the two
proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental
proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of
doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so
when the departmental proceedings are more
proximate to the incident, in point of time, when
compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by
the criminal court will have no effect on previously
concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows
the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the
disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-
challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the
decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal
court has acquitted him."
13. In another judgment reported as Union of
India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC
(L&S) 554], this Court held that while reappreciating
evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate
authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court
held the parameters as to when the High Court shall
not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p.
617, para 13)
"13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
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(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in
case the same has been conducted in accordance with
law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v)
interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless
it shocks its conscience."
14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the
respondent relies upon the judgment reported
as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan
Tewari [Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan
Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S)
335], wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary
authority records a finding that is not supported by
any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is
unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere
with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We
do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the
Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the
findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is
not the case of no evidence or that the findings are
perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of
misconduct has been interfered with only on the
ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of
the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence
will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry
officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a
finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct."
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28. That thereafter this Court has observed and held in
paragraph 7, 8 and 15 as under:
"7. The disciplinary authority has taken into
consideration the evidence led before the IO to return
a finding that the charges levelled against the
respondent stand proved.
8. We find that the interference in the order of
punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High
Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial
review is confined to the decision-making process. The
power of judicial review conferred on the
constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of
an appellate authority.
xxx xxx xxx
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings
of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of
punishment. An appeal before the State Government
was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been
accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of
power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High
Court could not interfere with the findings of facts
recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts
are the appellate authority. We may notice that the
said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench
judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S.
Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] and B.C.
Chaturvedi [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995)
6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] as mentioned
above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal
and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and
thus cannot be sustained in law."
29. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the
opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in
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interfering with the order passed by the disciplinary
authority dismissing the respondent - delinquent officer from
service. The High Court has erred in reappreciating the
entire evidence on record and thereafter interfering with the
findings of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer and
accepted by the disciplinary authority. By interfering with
the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer which as such
were on appreciation of evidence on record, the order
passed by the High Court suffers from patent illegality.
From the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer recorded
hereinabove, it cannot be said that there was no evidence at
all which may reasonably support the conclusion that the
Delinquent officer is guilty of the charge."
19. In the light of the aforesaid, the question of interference in respect of
the order of dismissal which is based upon a Departmental Enquiry, does not
arise.
20. The present case not a case of no evidence, nor the findings arrived at
by the Enquiry Officer can be said to be perverse findings. There is no
procedural irregularities in the matter.
21. Learned Counsel has lastly argued before this Court that the
punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct. In the
considered opinion of this Court, the charge of demanding bribe/ illegal
gratification itself is a very serious charge. He demanded bribe from the
owner of the vehicle and the same fact has been established in the
Departmental Enquiry. It is a matter of chance that he fled from the spot
after he noticed the SHO - who had also reached the spot, and, therefore, as
the misconduct relates to demand of bribe, the punishment of dismissal is
not certainly shockingly disproportionate to the guilt of the charged official.
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22. This Court does not find reason to interfere with the order passed by
the Central Administrative Tribunal, and the Writ Petition is, accordingly,
dismissed.
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
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