Madhya Pradesh High Court
R. S. Nebatiya vs Anil Pratap Singh Parihar Died Thr State ... on 1 December, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31073
1 MCRC-7362-2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 1 st OF DECEMBER, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 7362 of 2019
R. S. NEBATIYA AND OTHERS
Versus
ANIL PRATAP SINGH PARIHAR DIED THR STATE OF MP THR. ANIL
PRATAP SINGH PARIHAR
Appearance:
Shri Rakesh Kumar Sharma - Senior Advocate with Shri Sourabh Agrwal-
Advocate for the petitioners.
Ms Anjali Gyanani - Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the petitioners praying for the following relief :-
"It is, therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the complaint against the petitioner in R.C.T. No.895/2013, pending in court of Shri G.B.S. Rajput, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Guna, Distt. Guna (M.P) for offence under section 26, 27 read with section 59 of Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006, in the interest of justice."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, as per the prosecution case itself, the product in question--Parle Festo Orange Flavoured Cream Biscuits
--was manufactured by Parle Biscuits Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioners are merely Directors of the said company. It is contended that in the entire complaint there is no specific averment attributing any overt act to the petitioners. There is not even an allegation that, at the relevant time, the petitioners were in charge of or responsible for the conduct Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 12/3/2025 10:43:28 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31073 2 MCRC-7362-2019 of the business of the company. In the absence of such allegations, no criminal liability can be said to attach to the petitioners.
3. It is further submitted that under Section 66 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, only such person is deemed to be guilty of an offence who, at the time of commission of the offence, was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Mere designation as a Director, by itself, does not attract vicarious criminal liability unless the statutory requirements are specifically pleaded and satisfied.
4. It is further submitted that in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Vs. Neeta Bhalla and another, (2005) 8 SCC 89 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that-
"There is almost unanimous judicial opinion that necessary averments ought to be contained in a complaint before a person can be subjected to criminal process. A liability under Section 141 of the NI Act is sought to be fastened vicariously on a person connected with a company, the principal accused being the company itself. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious liability. A clear case should be spelled out in the complaint against the person sought to be made liable.
Under Section 141 what is required is that the persons who are sought to be made criminally liable should be, at the time the offence was committed, in-charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. Every person connected with the company shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. It is only those persons who were in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of an offence, who will be liable for criminal action. The liability arises on account of conduct, act or omission on the part of a person and not merely on account of holding an office or a position in a company. Therefore, in order to bring a case within Section 141 of the Act, the complaint must disclose the necessary facts which make a person liable. It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in-charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in the complaint, the requirement of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied."
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which was under Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 12/3/2025 10:43:28 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31073 3 MCRC-7362-2019 consideration in the aforesaid decision which is pari materia with Section 66 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, therefore, the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. In the absence of the mandatory and specific averments required under law, the prosecution of the petitioners is unsustainable.
5. It is further submitted that there is no legal presumption that every Director of a company is automatically in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, and in the present case, the complaint fails to disclose any material to justify invocation of vicarious liability against the petitioners.
6. Counsel for the petitioners submits that in the present case, the sample in question was taken by the Food Safety Officer on 10.01.2012. The sample was earlier declared misbranded by the Food Analyst, Bhopal on 21.01.2012, and subsequently, the Director, Referral Food Laboratory, Mysore declared the portion of the sample to be unsafe on 14.05.2012. The Designated Officer granted sanction for prosecution on 08.04.2013 and the complaint was eventually filed before the trial Court on 17.05.2013.
7. Drawing the attention of this Court to the aforesaid chronology, learned counsel contends that the complaint filed on 17.05.2013 is clearly beyond the prescribed period of one year from the date on which the offence came to be disclosed either on the date when Food Analyst declared the sample to be misbranded or when the certificate was issued by the Director, Referral Food Laboratory, Mysore on 14.05.2012. It is submitted that as per Section 77 of the Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006 cognizance can be taken only within a period of one year from the date of commission or disclosure of the offence. Though the proviso to Section 77 empowers the Commissioner of Food Safety, for reasons to Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 12/3/2025 10:43:28 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31073 4 MCRC-7362-2019 be recorded in writing, to approve prosecution within an extended period of up to three years, no such reasons were recorded in the present case.
8. Learned counsel further submits that while granting sanction on 08.04.2013, the Commissioner of Food Safety did not exercise or even advert to his statutory power to extend the period for filing of the complaint beyond one year by recording reasons in writing. In the absence of such extension, the prosecution cannot derive any benefit from the proviso to Section 77 of the Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006 so as to overcome the clear statutory bar. Consequently, the filing of the complaint beyond one year suffers from a legal infirmity, and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guna committed an error in taking cognizance, in violation of the bar engrafted under Section 77 of the Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006.
9. Counsel for the State opposed the prayer.
10. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
11. Before adverting to the merits of the matter, this Court deems it appropriate to address the issue of limitation as it would go to the very root.
12. To appreciate the controversy, it is apposite to refer Section 77 of the Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006which reads as under :-
"Section 77. Time limit for prosecution :-
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no court shall take cognizance of an offfence under this Act after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of commission of an offence: Provided that the Commissioner of Food Safety may, for reasons to be recorded in writing approve prosecution within an extended period up to three years."
13. The aforesaid provision mandates that the period of limitation is to be computed from the date of commission of the offence, and not from the date of Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 12/3/2025 10:43:28 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31073 5 MCRC-7362-2019 receipt of the Food Analyst's report or from the date of grant of sanction for prosecution. All such procedural formalities are required to be completed within a period of one year from the date of commission of the offence, so as to ensure that the accused is not prejudiced on account of inordinate delay.
14. The object behind prescribing a period of limitation has been succinctly explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054, wherein it has been held that the bar of limitation on prosecutions has been enacted to prevent parties from initiating criminal proceedings after an undue lapse of time, by which material evidence may disappear, and also to curb abuse of the process of law by launching vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the alleged offence. It has further been emphasized that it is of paramount importance that any prosecution, whether initiated by the State or by a private complainant, strictly adheres to the mandate of law, failing which the prosecution runs the risk of being rejected on the ground of limitation.
15. In the present case, it is evident that the alleged date of commission of the offence would be either 24.01.2012 or 14.05.2012 when the Food Analyst declared the sample to be misbranded or the Director, Referral Laboratory, Mysore declared it to be unsafe, whereas the complaint was filed on 17.05.2013, i.e., after the expiry of the prescribed period of one year. The prosecution is, therefore, ex facie barred by limitation. Despite this clear statutory embargo, the learned court below has failed to appreciate the mandatory nature of the limitation prescribed under Section 77 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. The order dated 17.05.2013 having been passed in derogation of the statutory mandate, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, as their continuance would amount to a miscarriage of justice.
16. In view of the finding that the prosecution is barred by limitation under Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 12/3/2025 10:43:28 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:31073 6 MCRC-7362-2019 Section 77 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, this Court refrains from examining the matter on merits.
17. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The complaint filed against the petitioners in R.C.T. No. 895/2013, pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Guna, District Guna (M.P.), for offences punishable under Sections 26 and 27 read with Section 59 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, is hereby quashed. Resultantly, the order dated 17.05.2013 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guna, whereby cognizance was taken against the petitioners, is hereby set aside. The petitioners are discharged from the charges levelled against them.
18. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned court for necessary compliance.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE) JUDGE ojha Signature Not Verified Signed by: YOGENDRA OJHA Signing time: 12/3/2025 10:43:28 AM