Bombay High Court
Liladhar (Baba) @ Lucky S/O Dharamdeo ... vs State Of Maharashtra, Through The ... on 25 September, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:9885
26 WP 400.25.odt
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 400/2025
Liladhar (baba) @ Lucky S/o Dharamdeo
Kumare, Aged 30 yrs., Occ. Labour,
R/o. Burad Mohalla, Itwara Bazar Wardha,
Tah. & Dist. Wardha, presently residing at
Athwadi Bazar, Badnera, P.S. Badnera,
Dist. Amravati.
...PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. State of Maharashtra,
through Superintendent of Police, Wardha,
Office at S.P. Office, Wardha, Tah. &
Dist. Wardha.
2. The Police Station Officer,
Police Station, Ram Nagar,
Wardha, Tah. & Dist. Wardha.
3. The Sub Divisional Police Officer,
Sub Division, Wardha.
4. The Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur
Division, Nagpur.
...RESPONDENTS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Venkat Subramaniam, Advocate h/f Mr. N.S. Khandewale,
Advocate for petitioner.
Mrs. S. V. Kolhe, Addl. Public Prosecutor for respondents/State.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
26 WP 400.25.odt
2
CORAM : M. M. NERLIKAR, J.
DATE : 25.09.2025
ORAL JUDGMENT :
Heard.
2. Issue Rule, returnable forthwith. Mrs. S.V. Kolhe, learned APP waives service for respondents. With consent of learned counsel for the parties, the petitions is taken up for final hearing.
3. By the present criminal writ petition, filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the order of externment dated 29.07.2024 passed by respondent No.1-Superintendent of Police, Wardha whereby the petitioner was externed from Wardha District for two years. Being aggrieved by this, an appeal under Section 60 of the Maharashtra Police Act ("the Police Act") was preferred by the petitioner and the same was dismissed by respondent No.4- Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur vide order 26 WP 400.25.odt 3 dated 10.03.2025, thereby confirming the order of the externment. Both these orders are under challenge.
4. The petitioner was externed under Section 55 of the Police Act on the basis of five crimes registered at Ramnagar Police Station, Wardha and two in-camera statements.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly challenged the impugned order on the ground of delay in passing of the order. He submits that the last crime is shown to have been committed by the petitioner on 26.06.2023, whereas the order of externment was passed on 29.07.2024 i.e. almost after one year. If this gap is considered then there is no live-link between the order of the externment as well as the last crime committed. Therefore, he submits that the very object of externment is frustrated.
6. His second submission is that while conducting inquiry under Section 59 of the Police Act, petitioner was served with notice dated 24.01.2024, wherein he was asked to remain present on 20.01.2024 i.e. on ante-date which was impossible 26 WP 400.25.odt 4 for him to remain present and therefore, notice itself issued was without application of mind by the concerned Sub Divisional Police Officer ("SDPO"). He further submits that as the notice is faulty, the same amounts to non-issuance of notice and therefore, the right of hearing before the SDPO is violated. For that purpose, he has relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bharat Shatrughana Bhosale Vs. The Divisional Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati & ors. (Criminal Writ Petition No.517/2025, decided on 15.09.2025). Further, he has also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2023) 14 SCC 707. Therefore, he has preferred an appeal against the order of externment, however the Appellate Court has not considered the grounds which are raised and has mechanically passed the order.
7. Per contra, the learned APP submits that the last crime committed by the petitioner dated 26.06.2023 is not in dispute, however she submits that the proposal was immediately moved on 18.08.2023. She further submits that as soon as the 26 WP 400.25.odt 5 petitioner was released on 03.01.2024, the notice dated 17.01.2024 was tried to be served on him. However, again on 24.01.2024, the notice was issued and it was duly served on him. She further submits that the report by the SDPO under Section 59 of the Police Act was sent to the Superintendent of Police on 28.03.2024 and therefore, the petitioner had ample of opportunity to present his case before the SDPO. She further submits that though the original record shows that again notice was issued on 07.02.2024, however it was not served on the petitioner. She therefore submits that there is no delay in passing the order and so, it cannot be said that there is no live link. If the contents of FIR, which are registered against the present petitioner in Crime Nos. 566/2023 as well as 568/2023, are taken into consideration then the seriousness of the crime could be gathered. As the petitioner is a Gang Leader and has played active role in those crimes along with his associates therefore, both the authorities have rightly considered the material and only after subjective satisfaction, the said orders were passed.
26 WP 400.25.odt 6
8. Upon hearing both the counsel at length, it appears that the petitioner has committed last offence on 26.06.2023. The proposal was moved on 18.08.2023. The SDPO, while conducting the inquiry under Section 59 of the Police Act, has issued the first notice on 17.01.2024, however it is not clear whether that notice was served or not. Again in the same notice dated 17.01.2024, date was changed to 24.01.2024. This notice dated 24.01.2024 was served on the petitioner on 24.01.2024 itself. Thereafter, on 28.03.2024, the report was submitted to the Superintendent of Police by the SDPO, Wardha Division, Wardha. As contended by the learned APP that the notice dated 03.05.2024 was also issued by the externing authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police, Wardha and accordingly the petitioner appeared before the said authority and submitted his reply, therefore, a fair opportunity was granted to the petitioner to place everything before the Superintendent of Police, Wardha. From these admitted facts, it could be gathered that last crime committed by the petitioner was on 26.06.2023, whereas the order of externment was passed on 29.07.2024. It is a matter of 26 WP 400.25.odt 7 record that, admittedly almost after one year of the date of last committed crime, the order of externment was passed. As contended by the learned APP that the proposal was immediately moved, is of no consequence as admittedly on 29.07.2024 the order of externment was passed. It is further to be noted that though the proposal was moved on 18.08.2023, however the SDPO after eight months forwarded the report to the Superintendent of Police, Wardha under Section 59 of the Police Act. This is fatal in the cases of externment, if the inquiry is conducted after such a long time then the very object of the externment frustrated. There should be proximity between the last crime committed and the order for the externment. Unless there is proximity, it cannot be said that the live link still exist. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the live link has snapped in the present case.
9. So far as the next ground is concerned, that there is violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was not given an opportunity to appear before the SDPO in the inquiry conducted under Section 59 of the Act. As noticed 26 WP 400.25.odt 8 earlier that, the notice was issued on 24.01.2024, whereas in the said notice, date of appearance was 20.01.2024. It itself indicates non-application of mind while conducting inquiry under Section 59 of the Police Act. Further, the notice dated 07.02.2024 appears to be issued, however, that notice was not served on the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner was unable to furnish any reply in the inquiry. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph Nos. 8 and 9 which read as under:-
"8. As observed earlier, Section 56 makes serious inroads on the personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India. In Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar v. Dy. Commr. of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 372, in paragraph 9, this Court has held that the reasons which necessitate or justify the passing of an extraordinary order of externment arise out of extraordinary circumstances. In the same decision, this Court held that care must be taken to ensure that the requirement of giving a hearing under Section 59 of the 1951 Act is strictly complied with. This Court also held 26 WP 400.25.odt 9 that the requirements of Section 56 must be strictly complied with.
9. There cannot be any manner of doubt that an order of externment is an extraordinary measure. The effect of the order of externment is of depriving a citizen of his fundamental right of free movement throughout the territory of India. In practical terms, such an order prevents the person even from staying in his own house along with his family members during the period for which this order is in subsistence. In a given case, such order may deprive the person of his livelihood. It thus follows that recourse should be taken to Section 56 very sparingly keeping in mind that it is an extraordinary measure. For invoking clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 56, there must be objective material on record on the basis of which the competent authority must record its subjective satisfaction that the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property. For passing an order under clause (b), there must be objective material on the basis of which the competent authority must record subjective satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or offences punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII of the IPC. Offences under Chapter XII are relating to Coin and Government Stamps. Offences under Chapter XVI are offences affecting the human body and offences under Chapter XVII are offences relating to the property. In a 26 WP 400.25.odt 10 given case, even if multiple offences have been registered which are referred in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 56 against an individual, that by itself is not sufficient to pass an order of externment under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 56. Moreover, when clause
(b) is sought to be invoked, on the basis of material on record, the competent authority must be satisfied that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence against the person proposed to be externed by reason of apprehension on their part as regards their safety or their property. The recording of such subjective satisfaction by the competent authority is sine qua non for passing a valid order of externment under clause (b)."
Further, learned counsel also relies on the judgment of this Court in case of Bharat Shatrughana Bhosale Vs. The Divisional Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati & ors. (supra), wherein this Court has observed in paragraph Nos. 7, 11 and 13 as under:-
"7. Considering the fact that Section 59 of the Act is the heart and soul of the proceeding pertaining to externment, therefore, it cannot be bye-passed. It is the only proceed- ing wherein in detail the Sub Divisional Police Officer or the Assistant Commissioner of Police will have to consider the truthfulness of the allegations made in the proposal. Not only that, a duty has been cast upon them to consider the entire material. Secondly, they have to verify the confi-
26 WP 400.25.odt 11 dential statements. Further they have to call explanation from the externee, however, they will have to call explana- tion from the externee by issuing a notice under Section 59 of the Act, which contemplates a gist of allegations against the externee. Further, the general nature of material alle- gations against him.
It would be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in case of Aniuddin Shamsuddin Solanki .vs. Super- intendent of Police and others (2020 SCC OnLine Bom
945). (paragraph nos. 11 to 14) "11. In Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar v.
Commr. of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 372 the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the provisions of Sections 56 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, held as under :
"10. It is true that the provisions of Section 56 make a serious inroad on personal liberty but such restraints have to be suffered in the larger interests of society. This Court in Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay [1952 SCR 737 : AIR 1952 SC 221 :
1952 SCJ 279] had upheld the validity of Section 27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902, which corresponds to Section 56 of the Act. Following that decision, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 56 was repelled in Bhagubhai v. Dulldbhabhai Bhandari v. District Magistrate, Thana. We will only add that care must be taken to ensure that the terms of Sections 56and 59 are strictly complied with and that the slender safeguards which those provisions offer are made available to the proposed externee."
(emphasis supplied)
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 26 WP 400.25.odt 12 2 SCC 121 while considering Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, has held as under :
"14. Where hearing is obligated by a statute which affects the fundamental right of a citi- zen, the duty to give the hearing sounds in constitutional requirement and failure to com- ply with such a duty is fatal. Maybe that in or- dinary legislation or at common law a tribunal, having jurisdiction and failing to hear the par- ties, may commit an illegality which may ren- der the proceedings voidable when a direct at- tack is made thereon by way of appeal, revi- sion or review, but nullity is the consequence of unconstitutionality and so without going into the larger issue and its plural divisions, we may roundly conclude that the order of an adminis- trative authority charged with the duty of com- plying with natural justice in the exercise of power before restricting the fundamental right of a citizen is void and ab initio of no legal effi- cacy. The duty to hear manacles his jurisdic- tional exercise and any act is, in its inception, void except when performed in accordance with the conditions laid down in regard to hearing. Maybe, this is a radical approach, but the alternative is a traversty of constitutional guarantees, which leads to the conclusion of post legitimated disobedience of initially un- constitutional orders. On the other hand law and order will be in jeopardy if the doctrine of discretion to disobey invalid orders were to prevail."
(emphasis supplied)
13. The position that the mandate of Section 59 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 (earlier Bombay Police Act, 1951), has to 26 WP 400.25.odt 13 be strictly followed and any violation thereof would vitiate the entire matter, is thus clear and explicit, from the above two judgments.
14. Considering the factual position, in light of the language of Section 59 of the Maharashtra Police Act 1951, and the law as laid down by the hon'ble Apex Court in Nawabkhan Abbaskhan and Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar it is clearly apparent, that the impugned order of externment passed by the respondent no.2, suffers from an abject violation of the mandate of Section 59 of the Maharashtra Police Act 1951."
11. Upon considering the above observations, it is crystal clear that the right to be heard is known as a right to fair hearing or audi alteram partem is considered as a funda- mental principles of natural justice and is implicit recog- nized as a fundamental right. Though this right to be heard was not explicitly listed as a fundamental right, Con- stitutional Courts have consistently held that it must be conferred in a proceeding that adversely affects the right or interest of an individual. The right to be heard is a core component of natural justice. Right to move freely granted under Article 19[d] of the Constitution can only be cur- tailed by following due process of law.
When the procedure is laid down under Section 59 of the Act, that the officer concerned shall inform a person in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him, and can meet the reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. Therefore, the purport of Section 59 mandates the officer concern to 26 WP 400.25.odt 14 mandatorily issue a notice in writing of the general nature of material allegations against the externee and call upon him to give explanation. Violation of such mandatory provision amounts to violation of Article 19[d] of the Constitution, as well as principles of audi alteram partem.
13. When there is a question of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, it is the duty of all concern, who are dealing with the matters to be sensitive before passing of the order. It seems from the record, that when the enquiry was conducted under Section 59 of the Act, the Sub Divisional Police Officer, though has issued notice, but, failed to consider that whether the notice was served on the externee. Therefore, there is gross violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner. "To be heard" in the proceeding like externment is of paramount consideration and violation of such amounts to violation of Constitutional values enshrined in the Constitution of India."
10. Considering the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court, it is crystal clear that Section 59 of the Police Act is an important stage of inquiry so far as opportunity of hearing is concerned. It is at this stage, the petitioner is required to answer to the notice which is issued by the SDPO or any other officer contemplated under 26 WP 400.25.odt 15 Section 59 of the Police Act. If this procedure is not followed and the opportunity of hearing is not provided, under such circumstances, the entire proceedings provided in the scheme of externment would be vitiated. For the reasons stated supra, the Superintendent of Police as well as the Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur ought to have considered above aspect of the matter. However both the authorities have failed to consider this fact. No doubt, the petitioner has committed serious offences in the year 2023 which was registered at Ramnagar Police Station, Wardha in Crime No. 566/2023 for the offence punishable under Sections 395, 384, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 427 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 4, 25 of the Arms Act and in Crime No. 568/2023 for the offence punishable under Sections 395, 384, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 427 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4, 25 of the Arms Act, however if the procedure laid down under Section 59 is not followed, then the entire proceedings would be nullity.
11. In view of above, petition is allowed. This Court hereby quashes and set aside the order dated 29.07.2024 26 WP 400.25.odt 16 passed by respondent No.1-Superintendent of Police, Wardha and the order dated 10.03.2025 passed by respondent No.4- Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur.
12. Rule is made absolute in above terms.
( M. M. NERLIKAR , J.) Gohane Signed by: Mr. J. B. Gohane Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 29/09/2025 14:31:17