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[Cites 8, Cited by 5]

Madras High Court

The State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr. vs A. Mohammed Yousuf And Ors. on 29 March, 1990

Equivalent citations: (1990)2MLJ149

Author: A.S. Anand

Bench: A.S. Anand

JUDGMENT
 

A.S. Anand, C.J.
 

1. The notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1984) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) proposing to acquire some land including an extent of 11 grounds and 1202 sq. feet forming part of R.S. No. 543/3 Nungambakkam Village, Nungambakkam taluk, Madras belonging to the respondent herein was challenged by the respondents in W.P. No. 8548 of 1983. The notification reads as follows:

Acquisition of Lands.
(G.O. Ms. No.847, Housing and Urban Development, 31st May 1983) No. II (2)/HOU/3364/83 Whereas it appears to the Government of Tamilnadu that the lands specified below and situated in Nungambakkam Village, Egmore Nungambakkam taluk, Madras District are needed for a public purpose, to wit, for development of the area by construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, notice to that effect is hereby given to all whom it may concern in accordance with the provision of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894):
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby authorises the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Tamil Nadu Housing Board Schemes, Ashok Nagar, Madras-83, his staff and workmen to exercise the powers conferred by the said Sub-section, and under Clause (c) of Section 3 of the said Act, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby appoints the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Tamil Nadu Housing Board Schemes, Ashok Nagar, Madras-83 to perform the functions of a Collector under Section 5-A of the said Act.
The challenge to the notification was on the grounds (1) that the notification was vague and (2) that there was no indication that it was for a public purpose.

2. Before the learned single Judge, the writ petition was resisted, and apart from filing objections on merits, it was contended that no writ petition challenging a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was maintainable. The writ petition was allowed by the learned single Judge by judgment dated 2.9.1988, and the respondents to the writ petition have come up in appeal.

3. The learned Government Pleader relied upon the judgment Of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in N. Krishnappa Mudaliar and Anr. v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. 1977 I MLJ 406 and submitted that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act being purely preliminary in nature, it could not be questioned through a writ petition. This objection had been raised before the learned single Judge also; but negatived.

4. Indeed, a learned single Judge of this Court in the decision cited supra has held as follows:

More than above this, the writ petition is to quash the notification under Section 4(1). It is well-settled law that Section 4(1) notification is purely preliminary in nature and is administrative in character, and no writ will lie to quash such a notification.
We find that the proposition stated by the learned single judge is not only too broad and general, but also, in our opinion, does not lay down the correct law. the question is no longer res Integra either.

5. In Munshi Singh v. Union of India their Lordships of the Supreme Court interfered with the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on the ground that it was vague and indefinite, and on account of those defects the persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired did not have a proper opportunity to file objections. It was held that such a defective notification, which formed the basis of subsequent proceedings, could not be sustained. In view of the legal position as settled by the Supreme Court, it is thus open to a party to question a notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. Of course, the Court would interfere only in case it finds that the said notification suffers from the vice of vagueness, indefiniteness and the like grounds, which prevent the parties from making effective objections in the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. We accordingly hold that the abstract proposition of law laid down in N. Krishnappa Mudalliar and Anr. v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. 1977 1 M.LJ. 406 is no longer good law and a writ petition calling in question a notification under Section 4(1) is maintainable where the notification suffers from the vice of vagueness, indefiniteness or similar grounds. The maintainability pf the writ petition would depend upon the nature of the challenge to the validity of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act.

6. The learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition found that the purpose mentioned in the notification did not appear to be genuine and that the notification issued for the purported purpose was outside the power of eminent domain and did not also indicate the public purpose clearly.

7. We agree with the learned Counsel for the respondents that if Section 5-A enquiry had to serve any purpose, then it must be given full effect and that can be done only if the persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired have an opportunity to submit their objections. Those objections, according to the learned Counsel, could only be submitted if the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act while mentioning the public purpose gives some definite indication or particulars of the said purpose which would enable the persons concerned to object effectively, if so desired. In Munshi Singh v. Union of India the apex Court has held that in the absence of a specific or particular purpose being stated, the objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under Section 5-A which he has a right to do under that provisions, and his inability to file such objection owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act would render the notification bad particularly in the absence of any proof that the owner of the land was either aware of or shown the scheme which was sought to be put into operation after the acquisition of the land.

8. That apart, the expression 'public purpose' viz. "for development of the area by construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board" is most indefinite and vague. It is now well-settled that in a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, it is the obligation on the part of the acquiring authority to state the 'public purpose' with sufficient particulars and clarity. The mere mention in the notification that the land was being acquired for development of the area by construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, is wholly insufficient and conveys no ideas as to the specific purpose for which the site was to be utilised. Even in the counter affidavit filed to the writ petition, the public purpose was not spelt out with any clarity or particularity. No other material was also placed on record to show the exact purpose for which the land was to be acquired. A bare statement that houses were proposed to be constructed on the site by the Housing Board, without indicating either the class of pcrsons for whom they were to be costructed or the necessity for the same, is not sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. Reliance placed by the learned Government Pleader on the object for which the Housing Board has been constructed to justify the existence of 'public purpose' cannot advance the case because we find that there is no whisper in the counter as regards the requirements of Sections 40 and 41 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961.

9. In view of the settled law by the Supreme Court, we find that the respondents herein have definitely been prejudiced by not being able to make proper objections due to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. We also find that neither in the counter nor through any other material have the appellants been able to satisfy the Court that the scheme had at all been formulated in accordance with Section 41 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961, and published to enable the respondents to know the existence of any public purpose for the acquisition. Since the notification, in our opinion, suffers from vagueness and indefiniteness, we find that the judgment of the learned single Judge does not call for interference. We, therefore, uphold the Judgment and dismiss the writ appeal. No costs.