Delhi District Court
State vs . Virender @ Chintu on 26 April, 2023
IN THE COURT OF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE-02,
NORTH EAST DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS,
DELHI
PRESIDED BY: SH. VIPUL SANDWAR
JUDGMENT
State Vs. Virender @ Chintu FIR NO. : 33/2012, U/s 451/323 IPC PS : NEW USMANPUR A. CIS No. of the Case : 463168/2015 B. FIR No. : 33/2012 C. Date of Institution : 19.04.2012 D. Date of Commission of Offence : 06.02.2012 E. Name of the complainant : Anita Kumari D/o Kunwar Pal Singh, R/o X-212, Gali No.6, Brahampuri, Delhi.
F. Name of the Accused, his : Virender @ Chintu S/o Parentage & Addresses Gherauram Gupta, R/o X-
255/13, Gali No.6,
Brahampuri, Delhi.
G. Offence complained of : U/s 323/452 IPC
H. Plea of the Accused : Pleaded not guilty and
claimed trial.
I. Representation on behalf of : Ms. Shivani Joshi, Ld. APP.
State
J. Order reserved on : 10.02.2023
K. Date of Order : 26.04.2023
L. Final Order : Acquitted
FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.1 of 17 Brief Statement of Reasons for Decision of the Case
1. The present FIR is based on DD No.11A dated 06.02.2012 regarding quarrel at H. No.X-255/13, Gali no.6, Brahampuri, Delhi. On enquiry it was found that the complainant Anita D/o Kunwar Pal Singh is a B. A. final year student is harassed by the accused Virender @ Chintu living in the same gali by sending SMS against her wishes and on being asked to not do the same, he trespassed in her house and slapped her.
2. FIR was registered and has been investigated by the officials of Police Station New Usmanpur and IO/SI Jai Prakash filed the charge sheet against the accused upon which cognizance was taken by the Court on 19.04.2012.
3. Accused appeared before the Court and copy of chargesheet along with other documents under Section 207 Cr.P.C. was supplied to him.
4. Charge was framed vide order dated 12.09.2012 for the offence punishable Under Section 451/323 IPC against accused by Ld. Predecessor of this Court to which accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. Thereafter, matter was listed for Prosecution Evidence. The Prosecution has examined 07 witnesses in support of its case. In nutshell, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses is as follows :-
(i) PW1 Kunwar Pal Singh is the father of the complainant and has deposed that his daughter Anita is student of B. A. final year.
FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.2 of 17 He has deposed that six months prior to the incident his daughter told him that Virender @ Chintu who reside in the same gali used to send her obscene SMS on her mobile. He went to the house of the accused and father of the accused Hira Lal Gupta scolded his son Virender @ Chintu. After returning home, he pacified his daughter Anita. One day prior to the incident he went to the house of the accused Virender @ Chintu and told his father that he should control his son otherwise he would report the matter to the police. On 06.02.2012, the incident took place, however, he was not present in the house. His son was also not present in the house only his wife and daughter Anita were present in the home. On that day at about 08:40 am accused Virender @ Chintu trespassed his house and started abusing her daughter with filthy language. He also slapped her daughter. His wife was in the bathroom and when she heard the noise of abusing she came out of the bathroom and the accused after seeing her ran away. He was informed about the incident on phone and immediately rushed to the house. His daughter and wife narrated the whole incident to him and he took his daughter to the PS where statement of daughter was recorded by the police. The said witness was not cross examined by accused despite giving an opportunity.
(ii) PW2 Anita Kumari is the complainant and has deposed that she is residing at X-212, Gali No.6, Brahampuri, Delhi since her birth. She deposed that accused Virender resides on her neighbourhood and known to her. She has also stated that accused used to talk her and sought help regarding studies as they were living in same locality. The accused started sending SMS to her and she complaint to her father and was agreed between her FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.3 of 17 father and the family of the accused that the accused would not bother her in any way and would not talk to her. Thereafter, she went to her uncle maternal place. Accused again sent SMS to her and she complaint to her father this regard. On 05.02.2012, her father went to the house of the accused and informed the father of accused in this regard, on which father of accused scolded the accused and the matter was sorted out. The accused annoyed from the same, and on 06.02.2012 at about 08:40 am when she was alone at her home, accused forcibly entered in her house and started using filthy language against her and when she objected the accused slapped her. When she raised an alarm her mother came out from the bathroom and accused ran away. She went to the PS alongwith her father and lodged a complaint Ex. PW2/A. The witness was cross examined at length by Ld. counsel for accused. During her cross-examination she has stated that at the time of incident she and her mother were present in the house. She has also stated that she and accused were exchanging study material for six months prior to the incident. She has expressed her inability to produce the recording or record of SMSs sent by the accused. She denied the suggestion that her brother and father were present at the time of incident. She has conceded to the fact that she did not receive any injury in the said incident. She has also stated that both her and accused pursuing B. A. (English). She has also deposed that she has not mentioned the mobile number of the accused which was being used for sending the SMSs. She has deposed that IO had not collected her phone on which she used to receive messages from the accused. She has also deposed that IO had not recorded statement of her mother at the time of incident.
FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.4 of 17
(iii) PW3 Sachin Tomar is the neighbour of both the accused Virender @ Chintu and complainant Anita. He has deposed that on 06.02.2012 at 08:30 am accused Virender entered in the house of Anita and slapped her. He has also deposed that accused used to sent filthy SMS to Anita. He heard the hue and cry from the house of Anita and noticed accused Virender @ Chintu running from the spot. The said witness was cross examined by Ld. counsel for accused. In his cross examination he stated that he came to know from Anita that accused Chintu had slapped her and misbehaved with her. He conceded the fact that he had not seen the accused entering the house of victim Anita or accused slapping victim Anita.
(iv) PW4 Shekhar has deposed that on 06.02.2012 he saw accused Chintu alongwith other boys near house of Anita. He also noticed quarrel between accused Chintu and associates and family members of Anita. The witness did not support the case of the prosecution and was cross examined by Ld. APP for the State after seeking permission of the Court. During the cross- examination he stated that he saw accused Virender at the mid of distance of house between house of victim and accused.
(v) PW5 SI Om Prakash was the DO on 06.02.2012. On receiving rukka at about 05:25 pm he made endorsement on the rukka Ex. PW5/A and registered the FIR Ex. PW5/B and handed over the copy of FIR and original rukka to SI Jai Prakash. The said witness was not cross examined by Ld. counsel for accused despite giving an opportunity.
(vi) PW6 Ram Naresh received a call at about 08:45 am regarding a quarrel at Gali no.6, Brahampuri, Delhi. He alongwith SI Jai Prakash went to the spot where complainant FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.5 of 17 Anita told SI Jai Prakash that a boy Virender came into her house, slapped her and ran away. SI Jai Prakash recorded statements of two neighbour Sachin and Shekhar and complainant Anita under section 164 Cr. PC. The witness was not cross examined by accused despite giving an opportunity.
(vii) PW7 SI Jai Prakash is the IO in present case. On receiving DD NO.11A regarding quarrel. He alongwith Ct. Ram Naresh went to the spot and met Anita who told him that one person Virender @ Chintu had abused and gave her beatings. At about 05:00 pm complainant alongwith her father came to the PS and got her statement recorded. He prepared tehrir and gave it to the DO for registration of FIR and at the instance of complainant he prepared site plan. He arrested the accused vide memo Ex. PW2/B, conducted his personal search vide personal search memo Ex. PW2/C. He completed the investigation and filed the chargesheet. During his cross-examination he received the DD entry at 08:50 am and reached the spot at about 09:00 am. He remained at the spot at about 15-20 minutes. Site plan was prepared at about 05:00-06:00 pm. He has stated that there is no eye witness regarding the accused slapping the complainant. He had also stated that he had not collected any documents regarding the chatting between the complainant and accused on their mobile phones. He has stated that he had not seized the mobile phone of the accused from which SMSs prior to the incident were sent to the complainant.
6. PE was closed on 05.12.2022 and on 03.01.2023, statement of accused under Section 313 Cr. PC readwith section 281 Cr. PC was recorded and thereafter, matter was fixed for FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.6 of 17 DE. The accused did not wish to examine in DE and the matter was fixed for final arguments.
7. Final arguments heard. Case record perused meticulously.
8. This Court has thoughtfully considered the material on record and arguments advanced with due circumspection.
9. In the present case, the prosecution has argued that the accused has committed offence punishable under S. 451 IPC. The offence under S. 451 IPC, the section reads as follows:
"451. House-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment.--Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if the offence intended to be committed is theft, the term of the imprisonment may be extended to seven years.
The genus can be found in S. 441 IPC which defines the term house trespass. The succeeding sections are the variations of the criminal trespass defined in s. 441 and are punished as per the requirements of the sections.
Section 441 IPC defines criminal trespass and is as under:
"441. Criminal trespass.--Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit 'criminal trespass'."
FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.7 of 17
10. In Rajinder v. State of Haryana [(1995) 5 SCC 187 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 852], hon'ble Supreme Court Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 198-99, paras 21-22) "21. It is evident from the above provision that unauthorised entry into or upon property in the possession of another or unlawfully remaining there after lawful entry can answer the definition of criminal trespass if, and only if, such entry or unlawful remaining is with the intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession of the property. In other words, unless any of the intentions referred in Section 441 is proved no offence of criminal trespass can be said to have been committed. Needless to say, such an intention has to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of a given case."
11. Dealing with the issue of trespass, hon'ble Supreme Court in Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Dundayya Gurushiddaiah Hiremath, (1991) 2 SCC 141 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 315 at page 147 has observed that:
"It is significant that when entry into or upon property in possession of another is lawful then unlawfully remaining upon such property with the object of intimidating, insulting or annoying the person in possession of the property would be criminal trespass. The offence would be continuing so long as the trespass is not lifted or vacated and intimidation, insult or annoyance of the person legally in possession of the property is not stopped. The authors of the Code had the following words to say:
"We have given the name of trespass to every usurpation, however slight, of dominion over property. We do not propose to make trespass, as such, an offence, except when it is committed in order to the commission of some offence injurious to some person interested in the property on which the trespass is committed, or for the purpose of causing annoyance to such a person. Even then we propose to visit it with a light punishment, unless it be attended with aggravating circumstances. These aggravating circumstances are of two sorts. Criminal trespass may be aggravated by the way FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.8 of 17 in which it is committed. It may also be aggravated by the end for which it is committed."
12. In Matiullah Sheikh v. State of W.B., (1964) 6 SCR 978 :
AIR 1965 SC 132 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 126, it has been observed that:
"5. It is worth noticing also that house trespass, apart from anything else is made punishable under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code the punishment prescribed being imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or both.
6. Higher punishment is prescribed where house trespass is committed "in order to" the commission of other offences. An examination of Sections 449, 450, 451, 454 and 457 show that the penalty prescribed has been graded according to the nature of the offence "in order to" the commission of which house trespass is committed. It is quite clear that these punishments for house trespass are prescribed quite independent of the question whether the offence "in order to" the commission of which the house trespass was committed has been actually committed or not. In our opinion, there can be no doubt that the words "in order to" have been used to mean "with the purpose of". If the purpose in committing the house trespass is the commission of an offence punishable with death the house trespass becomes punishable under Section 449 of the Indian Penal Code. If the purpose in committing the house trespass is the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life the house trespass is punishable under Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, Sections 451, 454 and 457 will apply the house trespass or lurking house trespass, or lurking house trespass by night or house breaking by night are committed for the purpose of the offence indicated in those sections. Whether or not the purpose was actually accomplished is quite irrelevant in these cases.
13. From the above discussion, it can be stated that every trespass does not amount to criminal trespass within the meaning of Section 441 IPC. In order to satisfy the conditions of Section FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.9 of 17 441 it must be established that the appellant entered in possession over the premises with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property.
14. In Rash Behari Chatterjee v. Fagu Shaw, (1969) 2 SCC 216, it was observed that:
"The correct position in law may, in our opinion, be stated thus: In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the person entering; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequences would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability or something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being the dominant intention which prompted the entry."
15. In the present case, PW1, father of PW2 has stated that on 06.02.2012 when the incident took place he was out of his house. He has stated that only his wife and daughter PW2 were present in the house. PW2 is the prime witness and has deposed that she is residing at the address X-212, Gali no.6, Brahampuri, Delhi since her birth. She has deposed that on 06.02.2012 at about 08:40 am when she was alone at her home accused forcibly entered into her house and started using filthy language to which FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.10 of 17 she objected and the accused slapped her. She raised an alarm, her mother came out from the bathroom and thereafter, accused ran away from her home. It has also come in the deposition of PW2 that the accused used to talk to her and sought help regarding studies as they were living in the same locality. PW2 has deposed that accused started sending SMSs to her and she complaint to her father. PW2 has stated that on 05.02.2018 her father went to the house of the accused and inform father of the accused about the accused sending SMSs to PW2 on which father of the accused scolded him. During her cross-examination dated 25.03.2014 she has stated that she was exchanging study material for the past six months prior to the alleged incident. PW3 Sachin Tomar has stated that complainant Anita and accused Virender are his neighbours and he saw accused Chintu entering the house of Anita and slapping her on 06.02.2012 at about 08:30 am. Later in his deposition he has stated that he heard the hue and cry from the house of Anita and noticed accused Chintu running away from the spot. In his cross- examination dated 07.10.2013 PW3 has conceded that he had not seen the accused enter the house of victim Anita or the accused slapping victim Anita. PW4 Shekhar has stated that he had witnessed a crowd gather near the house of Anita where accused Chintu was also present. Other PWs are formal in nature.
16. The testimony of the star witness of prosecution i.e. PW2 is not corroborated by any other witnesses. Though PW2 has deposed that other persons had gathered at the spot on 06.02.2012 including PW3 and PW4, however, they are of not much help to the prosecution. PW3 Sachin in his examination in FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.11 of 17 chief initially states that accused Chintu entered into the house of Anita and slapped her on 06.02.2012 at about 08:30 am. Later he states that he heard hue and cry from the house of Anita and noticed accused Chintu running away from the spot. The same has not been mentioned in his statement given to the police under section 161 Cr. PC Ex. PW3/A. In his cross-examination he has conceded that he neither saw the accused entered into the house of victim Anita nor he had seen the accused slapping victim Anita. Therefore, the testimony of PW3 is shaky and he has been unsettled in his cross-examination which affects the credibility. PW4 arrived at the spot and witnessed crowd gather near the house of victim Anita and he stated that accused Chintu was also present there. Though in his statement given to the police under section 161 Cr. PC Ex. PW4/A he has stated that accused Chintu forcibly entered the house of Anita and slapped her, he did not state the same while deposing before the Court.
17. As discussed above for proving the offence defined under section 441 IPC, it is mandatory for the prosecution to prove the intention of the accused. In the present case the fact that the accused was well known to the complainant prior to the incident is well established and has been stated by PW2 herself. Moreover, a day prior to the incident the accused was told off by his father regarding sending of SMSs to the victim Anita, as a result of which the accused came to the house of victim Anita. The testimony of PW2 Anita is uncorroborated. The deposition of PW3 and PW4 is not of much use to the prosecution. Nothing has been brought on record by the prosecution to show that at the time of incident, PW2 was in physical possession of the property FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.12 of 17 though she has stated that she was residing at X-212, Gali no.6, Brahampuri since her birth. No documentary proof of possession viz. Electricity bill etc by PW2 has been brought on record. In the circumstances, prosecution has failed to establish the possession of the complainant at X-212, Gali no.6, Brahampuri, Delhi at the time of incident or its trespass as envisaged under section 441 IPC. Accordingly, no offence under S. 451 IPC is made out.
18. The prosecution has also charged accused Virender @ Chintu with offence punishable under S. 323 IPC. S. 323 deals with punishment for voluntarily causing hurt and reads as:
"Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. S 319 defines Hurt as--Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt."
19. In Hanif Usmanbhai Kalva v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Misc. Application No. 3120 of 2014, Hon'ble Gujarat High Court has held that for the prosecution to prove an offence under Section 323, three essential ingredients has to be proved:
(i) Accused has caused hurt to the victim. (ii) The hurt caused was voluntary in nature.
(iii) The same offence is not covered under Section 334 of the IPC.
20. In the present case PW1 has stated that accused Chintu slapped her daughter PW2 but he has also deposed that he was FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.13 of 17 not present in the house at the time when the incident took place. Therefore, the deposition of PW1 is hearsay in nature and cannot be relied. PW2 victim herself has stated that she was slapped by accused Virender @ Chintu when she objected him for using filthy language against her. She raised an alarm her mother came out from the bathroom and accused Chintu ran away from her home. PW3 only came to the spot when he heard hue and cry from the house of Anita and saw accused Chintu running away from the spot. PW3 has deposed that he enquired from Anita and came to know that accused Chintu @ Virender had slapped her. The said witness in his cross-examination has conceded that he has neither seen accused Chintu entering the house of the victim nor has seen accused Chintu slapping the victim Anita. PW4 only saw crowd gathering outside the house of the victim Anita where accused Chintu was also present.
21. The testimony of the sole prosecution witness PW2 has not been corroborated by any other prosecution witnesses. No MLC or any injury is also available on record. The past relationship between the victim and the accused has also been brought on record by PW2 herself wherein she has stated that she knew accused Chintu for almost six months prior to the incident and used to exchange study material. Accordingly, the prosecution has not been able to prove that accused Chintu has caused hurt to victim Anita.
22. In a criminal trial, the burden on the prosecution is beyond reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt is a rule of caution laid down by the Courts of Law in respect of assessing the evidence FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.14 of 17 in criminal cases. In Awadhi Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1971) 3 SCC 116 at page 117, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that:
"Before a person can be convicted on the strength of circumstantial evidence, the circum- stances in question must be satisfactorily estab- lished and the proved circumstances must bring home the offence to the accused beyond reason- able doubt. If those circumstances or some of them can be explained by any other reasonable hypothesis then the accused must have the benefit of that hypothesis. But in assessing the evidence imaginary possibilities have no place. What is to be considered are ordinary human probabilities."
23. In Bhagirath (supra) at page 99 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that:
"But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs ex- clusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a consci- entious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is nearly im- possible in any criminal trial to prove all the ele- ments with a scientific precision. A criminal court could be convinced of the guilt only beyond the range of a reasonable doubt. Of course, the ex- pression "reasonable doubt" is incapable of defi- nition. Modern thinking is in favour of the view that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords moral certainty to the Judge."
24. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on criminal law in the United States has quoted from judicial pronouncements in his book Wharton's Criminal Evidence (at p. 31, Vol. 1 of the 12th FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.15 of 17 Edn.) as follows:
"It is difficult to define the phrase 'reasonable doubt'. However, in all criminal cases a careful explanation of the term ought to be given. A definition often quoted or followed is that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the Webster case. He says:
'It is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that consideration that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge."
25. In the treatise The Law of Criminal Evidence authored by H.C. Underhill it is stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th Edn.) thus:
"The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as an honest, sensible and fair-minded man might, with reason, entertain consistent with a conscientious desire to ascertain the truth. An honestly entertained doubt of guilt is a reasonable doubt. A vague conjecture or an inference of the possibility of the innocence of the accused is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one which arises from a consideration of all the evidence in a fair and reasonable way. There must be a candid consideration of all the evidence and if, after this candid consideration is had by the jurors, there remains in the minds a conviction of the guilt of the accused, then there is no room for a reasonable doubt."
26. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : (1974) 1 SCR 489 Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned that:
"the dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence demand special emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.16 of 17 beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt."
27. The evidence brought on record by the prosecution, is not sufficient to link the accused to the commission of the crime. As discussed above, the prosecution has failed to prove any document or anything to show her possession at the time of incident required for offence punishable under S. 451 IPC. The requisite intention of section 441 IPC has not been proved by the prosecution. The version of the prosecution that the accused caused hurt to the victim by slapping her cannot be established on the sole testimony of victim PW2 without any corroboration from other witnesses or documents.
28. Thus, in view of the above discussion, the Prosecution has not been able to discharge its burden beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, accused Virender @ Chintu is found not guilty in the present case and resultantly, stands acquitted in the present case.
29. Accused is directed to furnish bonds in the sum of Rs.10,000/- each with a surety of like amount u/s 437A Cr.P.C and is directed to be present before the Ld. Appellate Court as and when directed.
Digitally signed by VIPUL VIPUL SANDWAR
SANDWAR Date:
2023.04.26
15:57:59 +0530
Announced in the open (VIPUL SANDWAR)
Court on 26th April, 2023 MM-02/NE/KKD COURTS
FIR No.33/12 State vs. Virender @ Chintu PS New Usmanpur Page No.17 of 17