Karnataka High Court
Sri M P Kavisha vs Smt Vasanthamala Dattatri on 3 September, 2014
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.5894/2013 (CPC)
BETWEEN:
SRI M.P. KAVISHA
S/O M.B. PANCHAKSHARAIAH
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
BUSINESS,
R/O VIJAYAPURA EXTENSION
CHIKMAGALUR- 577 101. ... APPELLANT
(BY SRI.S KALYAN BASAVARAJ, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. VASANTHAMALA DATTATRI,
W/O LATE DATTATRI
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
HOUSEWIFE
2. DR. SRINIVAS
S/O LATE DATTATRI
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
DOCTOR BY PROFESSION.
3. MR. SRIKANTH
S/O LATE DATTATRI
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS
EMPLOYEE IN BANK
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
BASAVANAHALLI MAIN ROAD
CHIKMAGALUR-577 101.
2
4. THE COMMISSIONER
CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
CHIKMAGALUR-577 101. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. P.N. MANMOHAN, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 AND R-2;
NOTICE TO R-4 SERVED;
NOTICE TO R-3 DISPENSED WITH V/O DATED
19.11.2013)
THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER ORDER 43 RULE 1(r)
OF CPC PRAYING AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 15.06.2013
PASSED ON I.A.NO.III IN O.S.NO.118/2012 ON THE FILE
OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, AND JMFC,
CHIKMAGALUR, DISMISSING I.A.NO.III FILED U/O 39
RULE 1& 2 OF CPC, FOR T.I.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS
DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Unsuccessful plaintiff being aggrieved by order of rejection of an application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC is before this Court questioning correctness and legality of said order dated 15.06.2013 passed by Addl.Civil Judge (Sr.Dn) & JMFC, Chickmagalur in O.S.No.118/2012.
2. I have heard the arguments of Sri Kalyan Basavaraj, learned Advocate appearing for appellant and Sri P.N.Manmohan, learned Advocate appearing for respondents
- 1 and 2. Notice to respondent-3 has been dispensed with. Respondent-4 is served and unrepresented. Though matter 3 is listed for admission by consent of learned advocates appearing for the parties, it is taken up for final hearing.
3. Parties are referred to as per their rank in the trial Court.
4. Plaintiff has filed a suit for declaration to declare that he is the absolute owner in possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property measuring 39' x 75' morefully described in the plaint schedule and for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with his alleged possession of suit schedule property contending interalia that Sy.No.18 of Basavanahalli village, Chickmagaluru District originally belonged to one Smt.Tayamma @ Mookambikamma which had been purchased by her from Sri Belur R. Soorappa and out of total extent of 1.22 acres purchased by her, she gifted an extent of 18 guntas in favour of Sringeri Mutt and remaining extent was 1.04 acres was retained by her. It is also contended that said Smt.Tayamma obtained permission from Deputy Commissioner, Chickmagaluru to convert the land to non-agricultural purposes. After obtaining permission, she formed sites each measuring 50 gaja x 13 gaja which according to plaintiff 4 measures around 39 ft. x 150 ft. It is also contended that she conveyed one such site to Smt.Meenakshamma under a registered sale deed dated 01.10.1995, for which sale deed her children had also affixed signatures as witnesses and said Smt.Tayamma is none other than first defendant's husband's mother and grandmother of defendants 2 and 3. It is also contended that they were self acquired properties of Smt.Tayamma. Plaintiff further contend that after forming sites she sold all the sites except one site which was retained by her and one such site which was purchased by Smt.Meenakshamma inturn sold property in favour of Ganesh Saw Mill represented by its partner Khimji Ramji Jolapara under registered sale deed dated 22.12.1969 and legal heirs of Khimji Ramji Jolapara inturn executed a power of attorney in favour of D.K.Jolapara who inturn sold a portion of the property in favour of plaintiff as well as father of plaintiff under separate sale deeds. It is also contended that under the partition effected between the family members of plaintiff, schedule property came to be allotted to the share of plaintiff and since then he was in enjoyment of the same and he has also contended that first defendant is attempting to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of 5 property by plaintiff under the guise of an order of eviction passed in HRC No.6/1992. Plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking an order of temporary injunction against defendants from interfering with his possession.
5. Defendants after service of suit summons, have appeared and filed their written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and contended that suit itself was not maintainable amongst other grounds urged in the written statement. Trial Court after considering rival contentions, has found that there is no primafacie case in favour of plaintiff and balance of convenience does not lie in favour of plaintiff and held if a order of temporary injunction is granted, defendant would be put to irreparable loss and injury and as such it dismissed the application by order dated 15.06.2013 which is under challenge in this petition.
6. It is the contention of Sri Kalyan Basavaraj, learned counsel appearing for appellant-plaintiff that trial Court committed a serious error in rejecting the application on the ground that in respect of suit schedule property plaintiff had filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 6 CPC in Execution petition No.98/2002 and same had been rejected and also on the ground that suit in question is not maintainable in view of Order 21 Rule 101 CPC by ignoring Order 21 Rule 104 CPC. It is also contended by him that every order made under Rule 101 or 103 of Order 21 CPC would be subject to result of any suit that may be pending on the date of commencement of the proceedings and in the instant case, plaintiff had already filed a suit O.S.No.209/2008 in the year 2008 and this aspect had been lost sight of by trial Court. He would elaborate his submission by contending that trial Court had failed to consider that issue before the Executing Court was limited to the extent of resisting possession of plaintiff's lawful possession over suit schedule property and adjudication of claim made by the plaintiff before the Executing Court on an application filed under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and dismissing of the same would not take away the right of the applicant viz., plaintiff to file present suit in respect of suit schedule property. He would also contend that plaintiff was in lawful possession of suit schedule property and in the event of temporary order of injunction is refused, he would be dispossessed from his lawful possession and particularly 7 when a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction is pending and as such trial Court ought to have held there is primafacie case in favour of plaintiff. Hence, he contends that order passed by trial Court is liable to be set aside and prays for allowing the application.
In support of his submissions, he has relied upon following judgments:
(1) ILR 1991 KAR. 254 MESSRS.PARAMOUND INDUSTRIES vs C.M.MALLIGA.
(2) AIR 1998 KAR 186 V.K.RAMA SETTY vs. A.GOPINATH
7. Per contra, Sri P.N. Manmohan, learned Advocate appearing for respondent-1 would support the order passed by the trial Court and contends that despite decree holders having obtained an order of eviction in the year 1996 in HRC No.6/1992 till date, they have not been able to enjoy the fruits of said decree and plaintiff having filed an application on same set of facts as pleaded in the present suit, by filing an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC in Execution petition No.98/2002 and having suffered an order of rejection of said application which has been confirmed by this Court cannot be heard to contend that he 8 has got his right, title and interest in respect of the property, which is the subject matter of decree passed in HRC No.6/1992 and said decree cannot be stalled by granting an order of temporary injunction in the present suit. Hence, he contends that there is neither primafacie case nor balance of convenience in favour of appellant - plaintiff and if order of temporary injunction is granted, defendants would be put to irreparable loss and injury and as such, trial Court has rightly rejected the application for temporary injunction and as such he prays for dismissal of the appeal.
8. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for parties and on perusal of order in question as also pleadings and documents filed by both parties having been made available by the respective learned Advocates appearing for parties during the course of their arguments, I am of the considered view that following points would arise for my consideration:
(1) Whether order passed by the trial Court dismissing I.A.III filed by plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC deserves to be set aside, confirmed or modified?
(2) What order?9
9. Before delving upon rival contentions raised and adjudicated upon by trial Court, it would be necessary for this Court to briefly state the facts or history of the present case which has led to filing of the present appeal and same can be crystallised as under:
First Defendant in the present suit initiated eviction proceedings under Section 21(1)(f) &(h) of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 against one Sri Dheeru Bai in HRC No.6/1992 which petition came to be allowed and same was challenged before Addl.District Judge, Chickmagalur in Rev.(Rent) 35/1996 and said revision also came to be dismissed. Being Being aggrieved by the said order, further revision in HRRP No.394/2000 was filed before this Court which also ended in dismissal and while examining the plea of tenant for grant of time, this Court after considering contentions of learned Advocates appearing for the parties, granted one year time to vacate on the condition that revision petitioner - tenant therein filing an undertaking to the said effect. Order passed by co-ordinate Bench of this Court while dismissing the Revision Petition filed by tenant reads as under:10
"3. A broad consensus has been arrived at as to how much time the petitioner should be given for vacating the premises. In the facts and circumstances of the case, one year time from this day is granted to vacate the premises on condition that the petitioner files an undertaking to the effect that she will withdraw all contentions made in the petition and will hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respondent without compelling the respondent to file an execution petition, she will not induct any tenant, she will pay the rent regularly every month. The said undertaking shall be filed by the tenant-petitioner within four weeks from today. If such an undertaking is not filed, the respondent is at liberty to execute the order of eviction forthwith."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. However, tenant did not file an undertaking affidavit nor he vacated the premises. As such, an Execution Petition No. 98/2004 came to be filed by decree holder to enforce the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. In the said execution proceedings, brother of the plaintiff an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. Said application 11 came to be rejected. Same was confirmed by the District Court in Regular Appeal and also confirmed in Second Appeal by this Court. During the pendency of the said application, present plaintiff filed a suit O.S.No.209/2008 for the relief of permanent injunction before the Civil Court which plaint came to be ordered to be returned for being presented before the jurisdictional Court in view of further relief of declaration sought for by the plaintiff and pecuniary jurisdiction being vested in a different Court. Thereafter, during the pendency of said suit and after dismissal of the application filed by his brother, plaintiff filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC claiming title to the said property which was the subject matter of Execution Proceedings 98/2002, and said application came to be rejected. In the said application, it was contended that decree holder is attempting to execute the decree in respect of portion of the property belonging to the obstructor which was not the subject matter of execution proceedings. Said contention came to be negatived and application came to be rejected by the Executing Court. Said order was also confirmed by lower appellate Court and affirmed by co- ordinate Bench of this Court. For the purpose of 12 convenience, dates on which above proceedings came to be disposed of or dismissed/allowed is tabulated herein below:
06.01.1996 HRC 6/1992 allowed 05.07.2000 RRP 35/1996 dismissed 03.09.2001 HRRP 394/2000 dismissed 03.10.2002 Date of Filing of Execution Petition No.98/2002 29.05.2008 Date of filing suit in O.S.No.118/2012 ( old No. 209/2008) for want of pecuniary jurisdiction plaint-returned 27.11.2007 Order dismissing the application filed under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC filed by plaintiff's brother 02.01.2009 Order of dismissal passed in RA No.11/2008 23.07.2010 Judgment in RSA 795/2009 dismissing the appeal 24.02.2012 Order dismissing the application filed under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC by plaintiff
11.10.2012 Order dismissing RA 30/2012 affirming the order of Executing Court 03.7.2013 Judgment in RSA 2051/2012 Appellants father claims to have purchased property under two sale deeds dated 3.7.2000 and 10.07.2000
11. This Court while disposing of the second appeal filed by the present plaintiff in RSA No.2051/2012 has made an observation to the following effect:
"9. However, the contention regarding the measurement of property belonging to Vasanthamal Datatri as in revenue records is erroneous is open for him to challenge in the original suit initiated by him and pending for consideration. It is open for appellant to 13 establish his title to the property purchased by his father from Dhirubai as the property belonging to him, in the said proceedings."
It is this liberty which according to plaintiff which has been given, would entitle him to prosecute pending suit namely, O.S.No.118/2012 (old No.209/2008) and as such, trial Court could not have opined that suit itself was not maintainable.
12. Facts narrated herein above relating to proceedings and their culmination by different orders are undisputed factual aspects.
RE: POINT NO.1:
13. It is the plaintiff who is attempting to scuttle the decree which has been passed by competent jurisdictional Court from being executed namely, decree that has been passed in HRC No.6/1992 on 06.01.1996 contending interalia that description of the property in the execution proceedings is different from the one which the plaintiff owns and decree holder should not be permitted to execute the said decree and obtain possession of property belonging to plaintiff. Undisputedly, in the said HRC proceedings tenant had appeared before this Court and had sought for time and 14 after considering contentions raised by the respective learned Advocates, this Court held that "A Broad consenses has been arrived at as to how much time the petitioner should be given for vacating the premises."
14. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to notice the claim made by the present plaintiff. Present plaintiff claims to have purchased suit schedule property and other remaining half (½) portion of property is said to have been purchased by his father under registered sale deeds dated 03.07.2000 and 10.07.2000 respectively from legal heirs of Khimji Ramji Jolapara whose father was respondent / judgment debtor in HRC No.6/1992 / Execution Petition No.98/2002. It was further claimed that under a partition effected between the family members, suit schedule property came to be allotted in favour of plaintiff and as such he is in possession and enjoyment of the same. Hence, it is contended that plaintiff having an independent title to suit schedule property, dismissal of an application filed by him under Order 21 Rule 97 and dismissal of said application would be of no consequence. Said contention cannot be accepted for reasons more than one. Firstly, plaintiff's father had purchased said properties under these 15 two sale deeds. Nothing contained in Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21 CPC would apply to resistance by way of obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom judgment debtor has transferred the property after institution of the suit in which decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person vide Rule 102 of Order 21 CPC. In other words, any transfer which takes place during the pendency of proceedings would be hit by the principles of 'transferee pendente lite'. In the instant case eviction proceedings was initiated on 1992 and eviction petition came to be allowed on 06.01.1996 and both the revision petitions filed by respondent therein came to be dismissed on 05.03.2000 and 03.09.2001 respectively. Since respondent therein did not vacate the schedule premises an execution petition in E.P.No.98/2002 was filed. Plaintiff claims to have purchased suit schedule property under a sale deed dated 3.3.2000 i.e., after RRP No.35/1996 came to be dismissed on 5.7.2000. On this short question itself, application filed under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC should have been dismissed.
15. Be that as it may. Executing Court had embarked upon conducting an enquiry by affording 16 opportunity to respective parties to tender evidence exhaustively. Trial was conducted. Oral and documentary evidence was tendered by the parties. After adjudication of the application filed by plaintiff order came to be dismissed, dismissing the application. This order has partaken the character of a decree and as such, obstructor namely, plaintiff herein after dismissal of the application filed by him under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC on 24.02.2012 filed an appeal in R.A.No.30/2012 which also came to be dismissed on 11.10.2012. Being aggrieved by said order, Regular Second Appeal No.2051/2012 was filed and said appeal also came to be dismissed on 03.07.2013. It would be appropriate to note the observations made by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court while disposing of RSA No.2051/2012, whereunder it has been recorded as under:
"6. In the said proceedings, he has tried to rely upon several documents to demonstrate that the said properties are separate and distinct. Further he has tried to produce the Sale Deeds under which the appellant's father has purchased the property, which has now come to his share.
However, such contention may not be relevant at this juncture for the reason that the vendor of appellant's father, 17 namely Dhirubai never objected to the measurement stated in the eviction proceedings initiated by Smt. Vasanthamala Datatri. Therefore, now it is not open for the appellant herein to say that there is an error on the part of the landlady, Vasanthamala Datatri to claim the extent of land that does not belong to her and to include the property of tenant while executing the decree for eviction.
(Emphasis supplied) This Court has categorically held that it is not open for the appellant (plaintiff herein) to say that there is error on the part of respondent No.1 herein to claim that extent of land that does not belong to her (land lady in HRC proceedings who is first defendant herein) has been included as property of her tenant while executing the decree for eviction on the ground that appellant's (plaintiff's) father's vendor Sri Dhirubhai Jolapar never objected to the measurements taken in the eviction proceedings. As such, plaintiff cannot be heard to contend that there is overlapping of the measurements shown in the description in the schedule to 18 the Execution Petition to that of present suit schedule property.
16. Though Mr Kalyan Basavaraj, learned Advocate appearing for appellant - plaintiff would vehemently contend that in view of plaint schedule property being separate, distinct and independent property from that of property described in the schedule to execution petition and also contends that it was this precise ground which came to be urged before this Court in RSA No.2051/2012 and considering same liberty came to be granted to plaintiff to pursue his grievance in the pending suit namely, present suit of the plaintiff which was for comprehensive relief namely, declaration and injunction and plaintiff having been able to demonstrate that he had acquired title to the suit schedule property under a partition, trial Court could not have held that suit itself was not maintainable. He would rely upon Rule 104 of Order 21 CPC to buttress his argument regarding maintainability of the suit.
17. In that view of the matter, it is appropriate to extract said provision for the purpose of considering his contention. Rule 104 of Order 21 CPC reads as under:19
"104. Order under rule 101 or rule 103 to be subject to the result of pending suit.- Every order made under rule 101 or rule 103 shall be subject to the result of any suit that may be pending on the date of commencement of the proceeding in which such order is made, if in such suit the party against whom the order under rule 101 or rule 103 is made has sought to establish a right which he claims to the present possession of the property."
Rule 104 to Rule 106 of Order 21 CPC was inserted by 1976 Amendment. Prior to amendment, Rule 103 empowered the aggrieved party to file a suit irrespective of the finding recorded in the proceeding adjudicating the application filed under Order 21 Rule 97 to 100 CPC. This right has been taken away by the 1976 amendment and what has been provided under Rule 104 is that if on the date of commencement of proceedings in which order is made, a suit has already been filed it would not preclude such party to prosecute the said suit despite dismissal of an application filed by him under Order 21 Rule 97, 98 or 100 CPC.
18. In fact, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of NOORDUDDIN vs. Dr.K.L.ANAND reported in 1995(1) SCC 20 242 = 1994 AIR SCW 5093 has held that determination of rights under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC would be conclusive between the parties and the order passed thereon would be deemed to be decreed subject to right of appeal and would not be a matter to be adjudicated by a separate suit. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court to the following effect:
"8. Thus, the scheme of the Code clearly adumbrates that when an application has been made under Order 21, Rule 97, the Court is enjoined to adjudicate upon the right, title and interest claimed in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding or between the decree holder and the person claiming independent right, title or interest in the immovable property and an order in that behalf be made. The determination shall be conclusive between the parties as if it was a decree subject to right of appeal and not a matter to be agitated by a separate suit. In other words, no other proceedings were allowed to be taken. It has to be remembered that preceding Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1976, right of suit under Order 21, Rule 103 of 1908 Code was available which has been now taken away. By necessary implication, the legislature relegated the 21 parties to an adjudication right, title or interest in the immovable property under execution and finality has been accorded to it. Thus, the scheme of the Code appears to be to put an end to the protraction of the execution and to shorten the litigation between the parties or persons claiming right, title and interest in the immovable property in execution."
19. At the cost of repetition, it requires to be noticed that if the suit by the obstructor had been filed even prior to the commencement of execution proceedings, it does not bar obstructor from prosecuting said suit, even in the event of application filed by him under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC in execution proceedings is dismissed. This is the tenor of Rule 104 of Order 21 CPC. Any other meaning if sought to be given would frustrate the very intent and purpose of Rule 104 or it would be otiose. In the instant case, admittedly, execution proceedings was commenced in the year 2002 i.e., in execution petition No.98/2002 by the first defendant and plaintiff herein had presented the plaint by filing a suit for perpetual injunction in O.S.No. 209/2008 on 29.05.2008 which came to be re-numbered as O.S.No. 118/2012. In other words, present suit came to be filed after a period of 22 six years from the date of commencement of execution proceedings. Hence, plaintiff cannot be heard to contend that despite dismissal of his application filed under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC, present suit would still maintainable. It is because of this precise reason, trial Court has held that present suit would not be maintainable vide paragraph 15 of the order under appeal. Said finding does not suffer from any infirmity calling for interference at the hands of this Court.
20. As rightly contended by Sri Manmohan, learned Advocate appearing for respondent-1 that a decree obtained by first defendant from a competent Court which has been confirmed by first revisional Court and also by this Court has not got fructified itself on account of persistent and consistent blocks put forwarded by present plaintiff and his brother which can be said by way of joint venture. This I say so because at the first instance, present plaintiff had filed a suit in O.S.NO.209/2008 on 29.05.2008 and was prosecuting the said suit. No material is placed before this Court to establish that plaintiff had any benefit of temporary injunction in the said suit. Be that as it may. 23 When the execution petition was filed by first defendant to execute the decree passed in HRC case by filing in execution No.98/2002 brother of plaintiff filed an application for obstruction which came to be dismissed on 27.11.2007 confirmed by the lower appellate Court on 02.01.2009 and confirmed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in RSA on 23.07.2010. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court while dismissing the said appeal has made following observation:
"The objector has made this
application only to willfully defeat the
judgment and decree in favour of the
respondent. The HRC proceedings were filed in the year 1992. Even after almost 20 years the litigation still continues. There is no legal right of the appellant that has been infringed which requires adjudication. It is a ploy to defeat a lawfully obtained decree".
21. Present plaintiff's brother did not pursue his grievance further. Plaintiff in the instant case not only claims to have purchased a portion of suit schedule property in the year 2000 but also claims that in a family partition suit schedule property was allotted to his share (details not furnished) in the plaint. He was waiting in the wings to jump into fray only after application filed by his brother came to be 24 dismissed. He cannot pleaded ignorance for the simple reason, he had already filed a suit in the year 2008 i.e., in O.S.No.209/2008 on the file of Principle Civil Judge & JMFC, Chikmagalur and as such he was fully aware of the judgment and decree passed in HRC proceedings which had been confirmed by two revisional Courts. Only, in the year 2012, he filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC which came to be dismissed on 24.02.2012 and confirmed by lower appellate Court on 11.10.2012 and affirmed by co- ordinate Bench of this Court on 03.07.2013. This would only indicate the conduct and modus operandi adopted by the plaintiff and his brother to scuttle the decree passed by the competent Court which cannot be countenanced by this Court and as such, plaintiff deserves to be saddled with exemplary costs. It also requires to be noticed by this Court at the cost of repetition that plaintiff is claiming title to suit schedule property under a partition deed and also contends that suit property was purchased by his father along with other adjacent and abutting property under two registered sale deeds dated 03.07.2000 and 10.07.2000 from Mr.Jolapura which was during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court i.e., during the pendency of 25 litigation. As such, Rule 102 of Order 21 CPC would be attracted to the facts of the present case and claim of plaintiff would stem through judgment debtor and though it is contended that they have an independent title by virtue of partition deed, ultimately when tracing of title relating to suit schedule property is carried out, it relates back to judgment debtor himself or in other words, plaintiff is claiming his right to suit schedule property under judgment debtor. For this reason also this Court is of the considered view that order passed by trial Court holding that there is no primafacie case in favour of plaintiff and suit itself may not be maintainable requires to be affirmed. Hence, point No.1 is answered in the affirmative namely, holding that order passed by trial Court does not suffer from any infirmity and trial Court has not committed any irregularity or illegality in passing the order under challenge and dismissing the application for temporary injunction.
RE: POINT NO.2.
22. For the reasons aforestated, I proceed to pass the following:
JUDGMENT (1) Appeal is hereby dismissed with costs.26
(2) Order passed on I.A.No.III by Addl.Sr.Civil Judge & JMFC, Chikmagalur dated 15.06.2013 in O.S.No.118/2012 is hereby confirmed.
(3) Appellant - plaintiff to pay costs of
Rs.10,000/- to respondents-1 to 3.
Sd/-
JUDGE
*sp