Punjab-Haryana High Court
Haryana Power Generation Corporation ... vs Ved Singh Malik And Another on 11 November, 2013
Author: Ajay Kumar Mittal
Bench: Ajay Kumar Mittal, Mehinder Singh Sullar
LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
C.M. No. 4771-LPA of 2013 and
LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 11.11.2013
Haryana Power Generation Corporation Ltd. and another
....Appellants.
Versus
Ved Singh Malik and another
...Respondents.
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR.
PRESENT: Mr. Pardeep Singh Poonia, Advocate for the appellants.
AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J.
1. This order shall dispose of LPA Nos. 1871 and 1879 of 2013 as according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the facts involved therein are similar and the grounds seeking condonation of delay in both the appeals are identical. In both the appeals, there is an inordinate delay of 794 days in filing the appeals. For brevity, the facts are being taken from LPA No. 1871 of 2013.
2. This appeal has been filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent against the judgment dated 19.7.2011 and order dated 3.9.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 15262 of 2010 whereby the writ petition filed by the respondents was allowed and the review petition filed by the appellants was dismissed.
3. Put shortly, the relevant facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal as mentioned therein are that respondent No.1 was Singh Gurbachan 2013.12.19 15:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court Chandigarh LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M) -2- initially appointed as T/mate on work charge basis on 1.12.1978 in the erstwhile Haryana State Electricity Board now Haryana Power Generation Corporation Ltd. (HPGCL) and was regularized on 13.2.1992. He was promoted on 16.6.2008 as Helper Grade-II and thereafter promoted as Helper Grade-I on 22.7.2008. Respondent No.2- Maha Singh also joined the services as Work Charge T/mate on 1.12.1978 and was promoted as Helper Grade-I. He was given deemed date of promotion as Helper Grade-I w.e.f. 5.9.1991 on 25.3.2006 whereas the claim of respondent No.1 was not considered. Respondent No.1 made repeated requests to the authorities to grant him the promotion to the post of Helper Grade-I w.e.f. 5.9.1991 when respondent No.2 was promoted and release all consequential benefits but to no effect. On 10.3.2009, the deemed date of promotion to the post of Helper Grade-I was granted to other similarly situated employees but the case of respondent No.1 was not considered. When the case of respondent No.1 for grant of deemed date of promotion to the post of Helper Grade-I w.e.f. 5.9.1991 at par with respondent No.2 along with all consequential benefits was not being considered, he sent a legal notice dated 12.2.2010. When no action was taken on the legal notice, respondent No.1 filed a writ petition bearing CWP No. 9337 of 2010 which was disposed of by this Court on 20.5.2010. However, on 2.8.2010, the claim of respondent No.1 was rejected. The writ petition filed by respondent No.1 was contested by the appellants by filing reply. The averments made in the writ petition were controverted and a prayer for dismissal of the writ petition was made. The learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 19.7.2011 allowed the writ petition directing the appellants to grant the benefit to respondent No.1 also in terms of Singh Gurbachan 2013.12.19 15:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court Chandigarh LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M) -3- the order dated 25.3.2006 (Annexure P-3) vide which his juniors including respondent No.2 were regularized w.e.f. 5.9.1991. Thereafter, the appellants filed a review petition which was belated by 734 days along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the review application. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 3.9.2013 dismissed the review petition as well as the application for condonation of delay in filing the review application. Hence, the present Letters Patent Appeal.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants.
5. The solitary question that arises for consideration in these appeals is whether there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeals and the review petition which were belated?
6. Examining the legal position relating to condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, the "1963 Act") it may be observed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 laying down the broad principles for adjudicating the issue of condonation of delay, in paras 14 & 15 observed as under:-
"14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the Singh Gurbachan 2013.12.19 15:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court Chandigarh LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M) -4- law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.
15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate-Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil."
7. It was further noticed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari 2009(1) RCR (Civil) 892 as under:-
".....It is not necessary at this stage to discuss each and every judgment cited before us for the simple reason that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The test of "sufficient cause" is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can Singh Gurbachan 2013.12.19 15:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court Chandigarh LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M) -5- be treated alike. The statute of limitation has left the concept of "sufficient cause" delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the Court a well-intentioned discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such."
It was also recorded that:-
"For the aforestated reasons, we hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special leave petition stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition...."
8. From the above, it emerges that the law of limitation has been enacted which is based on public policy so as to prescribe time limit for availing legal remedy for redressal of the injury caused. The purpose behind enacting law of limitation is not to destroy the rights of the parties but to see that the uncertainty should not prevail for unlimited period. Under Section 5 of the 1963 Act, the courts are empowered to condone the delay where a party approaching the court belatedly shows sufficient cause for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period. The meaning to be assigned to the expression "sufficient cause"
occurring in Section 5 of the 1963 Act should be such so as to do Singh Gurbachan 2013.12.19 15:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court Chandigarh LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M) -6- substantial justice between the parties. The existence of sufficient cause depends upon facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be applied in deciding such cases.
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. and R.B. Ramlingam's cases (supra) noticed that the courts should adopt liberal approach where delay is of short period whereas the proof required should be strict where the delay is inordinate. Further, it was also observed that judgments dealing with the condonation of delay may not lay down any standard or objective test but is purely an individualistic test. The court is required to examine while adjudicating the matter relating to condonation of delay on exercising judicial discretion on individual facts involved therein. There does not exist any exhaustive list constituting sufficient cause. The applicant/petitioner is required to establish that inspite of acting with due care and caution, the delay had occurred due to circumstances beyond his control and was inevitable.
10. Adverting to the factual matrix in this case, we do not find any ground to condone the colossal delay in filing the appeal and the review application. The question regarding whether there is sufficient cause or not depends upon each case and primarily is a question of fact to be considered taking into totality of events which had taken place in a particular case. The reason given for seeking condonation of delay is that the learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition filed by the writ-petitioners vide order dated 19.7.2011. Respondent No.1 thereafter filed COCP No. 3096 of 2011 which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 24.5.2012 and the order stood implemented. The appellants thereafter forwarded the papers to the Legal Remembrancer Singh Gurbachan 2013.12.19 15:13 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document High Court Chandigarh LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M) -7- and filing of review was sanctioned on 5.8.2013. The appellants filed review petition after a delay of 734 days which was dismissed on 3.9.2013. Hence, there has been an inordinate delay of 794 days in filing the appeal. In the present case after appreciating the matter it cannot be said that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Such a general plea and callous approach on the part of the State cannot be accepted. The appellant was required to act with care and due diligence in pursuing litigation which is absent in the present case.
11. In view of the above, the appeals are highly belated and no ground for condonation of delay is made out. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. Consequently, the appeals are also dismissed as barred by time.
(AJAY KUMAR MITTAL)
JUDGE
November 11, 2013 (MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR)
gbs JUDGE
Singh Gurbachan
2013.12.19 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
High Court Chandigarh
LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (O&M) -8-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH C.M. No. 4785-LPA of 2013 and LPA No. 1879 of 2013 (O&M) Date of Decision: 11.11.2013 Haryana Power Generation Corporation Ltd. and another ....Appellants.
Versus Randhir Singh and another ...Respondents.
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR.
PRESENT: Mr. Pardeep Singh Poonia, Advocate for the appellants. AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J.
For orders, see LPA No. 1871 of 2013 (Haryana Power Generation Corporation Ltd. and another v. Ved Singh Malik and another).
(AJAY KUMAR MITTAL)
JUDGE
November 11, 2013 (MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR)
gbs JUDGE
Singh Gurbachan
2013.12.19 15:13
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
High Court Chandigarh