Madras High Court
The Joint Director Of School Education vs B.Ravindran on 22 April, 2016
Bench: S.Manikumar, G.Chockalingam
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Dated: 22.04.2016
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR
and
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.CHOCKALINGAM
Writ Appeal(MD)No.1009 of 2014
and
M.P.(MD)No.2 of 2014
1.The Joint Director of School Education,
Office of the Director of School Education,
College Road,
Chennai-6.
2.The Chief Educational Officer,
Office of the Chief Educational Officer,
Tallakulam,
Madurai-2. .... Appellants/
Respondents 1 to 3
vs.
B.Ravindran .... Respondent/
Petitioner
Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, against the order made
in W.P(MD)No.14413 of 2010, dated 06.12.2013.
!For Appellants : Mr.V.R.Shanmuganathan,
Spl.Govt.Pleader.
^For Respondent : Mr.N.Sundaresan
:JUDGMENT
(Delivered by Mr.Justice S.MANIKUMAR) Writ appeal is preferred against the order, dated 06.12.2013, passed in W.P.(MD)No.14413 of 2010, by which, Charge Memo, issued by the 1st appellant in Na.Ka.No.54251/A 3/B3/2010, dated 10.11.2010, has been quashed.
2.The case of the respondent before the writ court was that he joined in the education Department as a Junior Assistant on 05.08.1981 and after rendering 29 years of unblemished service, he was due to retire from service on 31.12.2010, on account of superannuation, as an Assistant. While so, when he was working as an Assistant in the Office of the 2nd appellant, on 21.06.2010, the respondent was placed under suspension on the ground that an enquiry into grave charges against him was contemplated. Thereafter, the 1st appellant issued the impugned charge memo, dated 10.11.2010, containing as many as three charges against the respondent. The charges are as follow:
?(i) While working at the Elementary Education Office, Sivagangai, he had failed to obtain prior permission from the competent authority for the purchase of Ambassador car bearing Registration No.TN-63-B-1135 in the name of his wife Tmt.Kannammal during July and September 1998 respectively on getting finance from Annamalai Finance Limited, Coimbatore. Thereby he has violated the Government servant conduct Rules.
(ii) The petitioner had failed to obtain prior permission from the competent authority for the purchase of Ambassador car bearing Registration No.TN-63-B-1818 in the name of his wife Tmt.Jannammal during July and September 1998 respectively on getting finance from Annamalai Finance Limited, Coimbatore. Thereby he has violated the Government servant conduct Rules.
(iii) The petitioner had neither obtained permission nor intimated to the competent authority for the purchase of Hero Honda two wheeler bearing Registration No.TN-63-C-3303 in his name during June 2001 on getting loan from Centurion Bank Limited, Madurai. Thereby he has violated the Government servant conduct Rules.?
3.Challenging the said charge memorandum, the respondent filed W.P.(MD)no.14413 of 2010, contending inter alia
(i)that the alleged occurrences relate to the year 1998 and 2001 but, charges have been framed after a lapse more than 12 years and 9 years, respectively, and the inordinate delay in framing charges remain unexplained;
(ii) that the delay of 12 years has caused serious prejudice to the respondent;
(iii)that the impugned charge memo has been issued just 32 days prior to the date of superannuation, while the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as well as High Courts have deprecated initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an employee at the fag end of his service; and
(iv)that prior to the framing of the impugned charge memo, no show cause notice was issued, which amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and hence it is vitiated.
4.The 2nd appellant has filed counter affidavit, denying the averments contained in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and prayed for dismissal of the same.
5.Considering the pleadings on either side and after hearing the counsel for the parties, th writ court passed the following order:
"3.The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the charges are too flimsy and frivolous having been issued just 32 days prior to date of superannuation of the petitioner. The petitioner had put in nearly 29 years of unblemished service. The alleged occurrences were on 1998-2001 respectively. Insofar as charge No.3 is concerned, the petitioner has admittedly obtained loan and purchased a Hero Honda two wheeler. Therefore, he submitted that considering the same, the impugned order is liable to be quashed.
4.Per contra, the learned Government Advocate on instructions submitted that as the petitioner has not obtained prior permission, the charges have been framed against him. The petitioner is duty bound to reply to the charge memo instead of approaching this writ petition and hence, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
5.The law is well settled while dealing with the quashing of charges framed by the authorities concerned. The power of judicial review is rather limited. However, when the charges appear on the face of it, too vague, flimsy, frivolous and without any basis, then a delinquent officer can be made to undergo an ordeal of enquiry. Admittedly, the petitioner has completed 29 years of service. The suspension order followed by the charge memo have been issued just prior to his date of superannuation. In sofaras charges 1 and 2 are concerned, they are pertaining to the occurrences said to have been happened in the year 1998. Therefore, after a period of more than 12 years, the charges have been framed for the reasons best known to the respondents. There is no explanation for the belated framing of charges. They are also very flimsy in nature. Insofar as charge No.3 is concerned, admittedly, the petitioner has obtained loan and purchased the vehicle-Hero Honda two wheeler in the year 2001. Therefore, the said charge also not sustainable in the eye of law.
6. Considering the above said facts, this Court is inclined to quash the order impugned. Consequently, this Writ Petition is allowed as prayed for. The respondents are directed to pay all the retiral benefits to the petitioner, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs."
6.Aggrieved by the same, the present writ appeal by the appellants, raising the following grounds.
(i)Gravity of charge is immaterial, once there is violation of Government Servants Conduct Rules. In this case, the respondent has acquired movable properties, without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority.
(ii)The writ court ought to have considered the fact that disciplinary proceedings against the respondent were pending before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, Madurai, on the ground that he had accumulated wealth to the tune of more than 20 lakhs, disproportionate to the known source of income.
(iii)There is no time limit for initiating disciplinary proceedings, as it depends upon the nature of allegations levelled against the employee concerned.
(iv)Without verifying the service particulars of the respondent, the writ Court has issued positive directions to release all the retiral benefits.
7.At the time of hearing of the appeal, learned Special Government Pleader submitted that though the respondent was due to retire on 31.12.2010, he was not allowed to retire and kept under extension of service. He further submitted that the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, after enquiry, held that the charges levelled against the respondent were proved and submitted its Report to the Director of School Education on 28.04.2014 and pursuant to that, the Director of School Education has issued proceedings, dated 28.04.2015, directing the respondent to submit his explanation on the proposed punishment.
8.Apart from the ground of inordinate delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings, on which the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and quashed the charge memo., by way of reply, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as per Explanations to Rule 7(1)(a) and Rule 7(3) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1973, charges 1 and 2 are not sustainable. In respect of Charge No.3, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Rule 7(2) of the Rules does not state that in case of exchange, prior or post permission has to be obtained and in any case, such a mistake would not amount to grave misconduct, warranting a charge under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the order of the learned Single Judge in quashing the impugned charge memo does not require any interference by this Court.
9.Regarding the submission of the learned Special Government Pleader as to the enquiry before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and the further contention that charges impugned in this writ petition form an integral part of the disciplinary proceedings pending before the Tribunal, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent has submitted his explanation to the show cause notice issued by the Director of School Education on the question of punishment, pursuant to the report of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings.
10.Rule 7(1)(a), with Explanation, reads as under:
"7(1)(a).No Government servant shall except after notice to the prescribed authority, acquire or dispose of any immovable property by lease, mortgage, purchase, sale, gift, exchange or otherwise either in his own name or in the name of any member of his family.
Such a notice will be necessary even where any immovable property is acquired by any member of the family of the Government servant out of the resources of the Government servant:
Provided that the previous sanction of the prescribed authority shall be obtained if any such transaction is with a person having official dealings with the Government servant;
Provided further that the previous sanction of the prescribed authority shall not be necessary for the acquisition of immovable property in respect of house-site assigned by the Government to the Government servant.
Explanation.--A Government servant is not required to give notice to the prescribed authority or seek prior permission from the prescribed authority for acquisition or disposal of immovable properties by the members of his family under clause (a), if the immovable property in question is not acquired from the resources of the Government servant concerned."
11.Rule 7(2), prior to amendment in 2010, reads as follows:
"7(2)A Government servant who enters into any transaction concerning any movable property exceeding Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand Only) in value, whether by way of purchase or sale shall report to the prescribed authority within one month from the date of every such transaction.
.......
.......
Explanation I.--For the purpose of this sub-rule, the expression "movable property" includes the following property, namely: --
(a)Jewellery, Insurance Policies, Shares, Securities and Debentures;
(b) [***]
(c)Motor cars, Motor cycles, Horses or any other means of conveyance; and
(d)Refrigerators, Colour Television, Video-Cassette Recorder."
Rule 7(3) and Explanation attached thereto read as under:
"7(3)Every Government servant shall submit a return of his assets and liabilities as on 31st December 1980 in Forms I to V in Schedule I appended to these rules on or before 31st March 1981 and thereafter at an interval of five years on or before the 31st day of March of the Year immediately following the year to which the return relates, giving the full particulars regarding: --
.........
Explanation.--In all returns the value of item of movable property worth less than Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) may be added and shown as a lump sum. the value of articles of daily use such as clothes, utensils, crockery, books, etc. need not be included in such return. The movable or immovable properties acquired by the members of the family of a Government servant solely with their own resources need not be included in such returns."
12.On the aspect of the delay in framing charges, this Court deems it fit to consider the following decisions.
(i)In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, the Supreme Court had come down heavily against the laches on the part of the employer in conducting departmental enquiry and after finding out that there was no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, held that it would be unfair to order departmental enquiry to proceed further.
(ii)In State of Punjab and others Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, reported in 1995 (2) SCC 570, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"9.Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing... "
(iii)In M.Balakrishnan and 7 others Vs. The Corporation of Madurai and another, reported in 1995 (II) CTC 589, for certain improper acts on the part of the petitioners therein, departmental proceedings were initiated after 14 years. While quashing the said proceedings, a learned single Judge has observed that such proceedings after a long period would result in great prejudice and amount to violation of the principles of natural justice.
(iv)In Commissioner, Sankarapuram Panchayat Union etc. Vs. S.A.Abdul Wahab and others, reported in 1996 W.L.R.677, a Division Bench of this Court held that if there is unnecessary, unexplained and unjustifiably long delay in initiating departmental proceedings, it would result in causing great prejudice to the person against whom such a proceeding is initiated and it will be a ground for quashing the proceedings.
(v)In B.Loganathan Vs. The Union of India, rep.by the Secretary to Government of Union Territory of Pondicherry, Department of Local Administration, Pondicherry and another, reported in 2000 (III) CTC 351, for the allegations relating to the period of the year 1982, based on a vigilance report, a charge memo was issued in 1997 and the said proceedings were put to challenge. While quashing the charge memo on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay, this Court has observed that the delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings constitutes denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself and that the same, violates principles of natural justice. At Paragraph 12 has held as follows:
"12.Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent by relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan , 1996 (3) S.C.C. 15 would contend that the scope of judicial review is very limited and sought to distinguish the above referred decisions. No doubt, in the said decision. Their Lordships have observed that it would not be open to the Tribunal or the court to quash the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. The perusal of the judgment does not show the details such as when the incident had taken place and when the Government have initiated action etc. In Union of India v. Ashok Kacker , 1995 Supp (1) S.C.C. 180, no doubt, Their Lordships have observed that it is open to the delinquent to file his reply to charge-sheet and raise all objections and also invite the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. In this case also, no other details have been furnished such the date of occurrence, steps taken by the Government etc. In such circumstances, I am of the view that both the decisions relied on by the Government Pleader are not helpful to their case. I have already stated that even according to the 2nd respondent, the alleged irregularities had taken place in the year 1982 and even after receipt of the report from the Vigilance and Anti- Corruption, Pondicherry Government in the year 1993 the impugned charge memo was issued only on 5.11.97. The inordinate and unexplained delay vitiates the impugned charge memo and the same is liable to be quashed. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 (2) S.C.C. 570, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated after a lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. Here, in our case, the petitioner has raised a plea that the delay is likely to cause prejudice to him in defending himself. If such plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. I have already stated that the first charge states that the petitioner did not disburse cash from January, 1982 and, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, not even the period is mentioned clearly and like-wise, the statement that cash book was not maintained properly is a bald statement. Further, the nature of the charges relate to day-to-day activities of disbursement of cash and maintenance of registers, which are routine affairs, hence the unexplained delay of 15 years cannot be accepted. It would be impossible for the petitioner to remember the identity of witnesses whom he could summon to appear before the enquiring authority to support his case. Even If he could summon their presence, it would be a doubtful proposition whether they would be in a position to remember that happened more than 15 years back and help him in his defence. Further more, the petitioner may not be in a position to effectively cross- examine the witnesses to be examined on the side of the second respondent in support of the charges. Practically, it would be a doubtful proposition that either the prosecution witnesses or the defence witnesses would be in a position to remember the facts of the case and advance the case of either the department or the petitioner. Under these circumstances and on the facts and circumstances disclosed, I hold that the un-explained inordinate delay will constitute denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself that it would amount to violation of principles of natural justice and as such, the impugned charge memo must be struck down on this ground alone. By weighing all the factors both for and against the petitioner/delinquent officer quashing the charge memo is just and proper in the circumstances".
(vi)In C.P.Harish Vs. The Central Warehousing, represented by its Managing Director, 4/1, Siri Institutional Area, New Delhi, reported in 2000 (IV) CTC 517, for the alleged lapses of the year 1982-1983, charge memos were issued on 20.06.1995 and 14.07.1998 respectively, nearly after 15 years. By observing that disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time, which would give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power and that it would be impossible for the delinquent to remember and identify the witnesses, this Court has held that delay constitutes denial of reasonable opportunity to defend herself and it also violates the principles of natural justice and quashed the charges impugned in the above writ petition.
(vii)In A.Obaidullah Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by the Secretary to Government, Home Department, Secretariat, Chennai and another reported in 2005(5) CTC 380, a Division Bench of this Court, after considering the decisions in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. N.Radhakishan reported in 1998 (4) SCC 154 and P.V.Mahadevean Vs. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005(4) CTC 403:2005 SCC (L&S) 861, quashed a disciplinary proceeding which was initiated after 12 years, holding that inordinate and unexplained delay defeats justice.
(viii)In Union of India v. Central Administrative Tribunal reported in 2005 (2) CTC 169 (DB), this Court held that, "The delay remains totally unexplained. Therefore, we have no hesitation at all in concluding that the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the departmental enquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the way of the Govt., to continue with the enquiry any further.............."
(ix)In P.V.Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403, this Court after referring to various decisions, held that, "The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore be avoided not only in the interest of the government employee but in public interests and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.
15. We therefore, have no hesitation to quash the charge issued against the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The appellant will be entitled to all the retiral benefits in accordance with law. The retiral benefits shall be disbursed within three months from this date. No cost."
(x)In the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk v. N.Sivasamy, reported in 2005 (5) CTC 451, the Division Bench of this Court held as follows:
"Though the alleged lapse occurred in the year 1995 and certain charges related to the period 1993-94, the charge memo was issued on 15.07.1997 and served on 23.07.1997, just 7 days before the date of retirement. The contention of the appellant that only with a view to cause hardship, agony and anguish, the charge memo was issued cannot be ignored.................. We have already pointed out that though the applicant filed Original Application No.6284/97, challenging the charge memo, dated 15.07.1997, admittedly, no stay was granted. Despite the above fact that the department had not proceeded with the disciplinary proceedings, there is an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the department. According to the applicant, he is 67 years of age as on the date and had rendered 38 years of service in the department. He had undergone sufferings from mental worry, agony, anguish and hardship for all these years. We are satisfied that there is no need to pursue the charge memo, dated 15.07.1997."
(xi)In yet another decision in R.Tirupathy and others v. the District Collector, Madurai District and others reported in 2006 (2) CTC 574, this Court was pleased to quash the charge memo, dated 02.02.2005 on the ground that the charges relate to purchase of uniforms during the year 1994- 95 and 1995-96 and the inordinate delay on the part of the department in issuing a charge memo was not properly explained.
(xii)The Supreme Court in M.V.Bijlani v. Union of India and other reported in 2006 (5) SCC 88, quashed the order of removal from service, confirmed by the appellate authority on various grounds particularly, on the ground that initiation of disciplinary proceedings after six years and continuance thereof, for a period of seven years prejudiced the delinquent officer.
(xiii)In M.Elangovan v. The Trichy District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., reported in 2006 (2) CTC 635, this Court, while quashing the second show cause notice on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating and completing the disciplinary proceedings, allowed the Writ Petitions holding that the petitioners therein were entitled to all the benefits in accordance with law. The same view has been expressed by this Court in yet another decision in Parameswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2006 (1) CTC 476.
(xiv)In G.Anand Vs. The Principal Commissioner and Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chepauk, Chennai-5 and others reported in 2006(5) CTC 723, the alleged lapses on the part of the petitioner therein was of the year 1994. Disciplinary action was initiated in the year 2005. Finding that the charge memo had been issued with an inordinate delay, this Court set aside the charge memo impugned in the said writ petition.
(xv)In A.Bommusamy Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 2007 (3) CTC 518, a Division Bench of this Court has considered a case where disciplinary proceedings was initiated on the verge of retirement. The petitioner was to retire on 31.03.1987. By proceedings dated, 27.02.1987, disciplinary proceedings were initiated under Rule 17-a of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules for imposing minor penalty. On receipt of the petitioner's explanation, a revised charge memo dated 13.03.1987, involving a procedure for imposing major penalty was issued, just 17 days before retirement. Though, an enquiry was initiated as early as on 10.08.1987, the passing of an order of punishment was kept pending for about five years and finally a punishment was imposed on 21.01.1993. Having regard to the ratio decidendi of the Courts in the matter, where no reasonable explanation is offered, the Division Bench, at paragraph 13 observed as follows:
"13. Further, there was inordinate delay in passing the order of punishment. Though the enquiry was initiated as early as on 10.8.1987, the passing of the order of punishment was kept pending for about five years and finally the punishment was imposed on 21.1.1993. There is no explanation for such an inordinate delay in passing the final order. Time and again, the Supreme Court and this Court has deprecated the initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings against an employee or the fag end of his retirement and keeping the matter pending for a long time by keeping the matter pending for a long time by keeping the employee under suspension. Further when the petitioner had pleaded that there was official prejudice and enmity between him and the third respondent in the matter of use and maintenance of the official vehicle, the Tribunal has failed to consider this aspect of the case in proper perspective while dismissing the Original Applications. The Disciplinary Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner when there was hardly fifteen days left for his retirement. More over, when his date of retirement is on 11.3.1987 and the order of suspension was passed on 25.3.1987 by invoking G.O. No. 173. Therefore, when once the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation on 11.3.1987, the placing the petitioner under suspension after his date of superannuation is without authority and that when the relationship of master-servant ceased to exist, no Disciplinary Proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner. On this ground also, the impugned order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside."
(xvi)In K.Kumaran Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu by Secretary to Government, Agricultural Department, Chennai and another reported in 2007(3) CTC 763, the alleged lapses relate to the period 1987-1988. A charge memo was issued on 08.05.2004, after nearly 16 years. By observing that delay causes prejudice to the charged officer, unless it can be shown that he was to be blamed for the delay or when there was proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings, this Court quashed the charges, issued belatedly.
(xvii)In Ranjeet Singh Vs. State of Haryana & others reported in 2008 (3) CTC 781, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the correctness of a judgment made in a second appeal, dismissing the plea that there was no substantial question of law in interfering with the judgment and decree made by the District Court, which reversed a decree passed in a suit for declaration, declaring a show cause notice issued after a delay of 7 years after concluding the departmental enquiry, as illegal. There was also a delay of 9 years in initiating disciplinary proceedings. In the above reported case, for an allegation of the year 1974, a charge memo was issued in 1983, after 9 years. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 01.01.1985. After a delay of nearly 7 years, the department issued a show cause notice with a copy of the report, proposing to impose a penalty. After submission of the explanation, the Government servant preferred a suit to declare a show cause notice proposing to impose a punishment as invalid. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the action of the employer imposing punishment as illegal. The State preferred an appeal to the District Court. The first appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the Government servant filed a second appeal to the High Court. The decision made by the District Court was confirmed. Testing the correctness of the judgment and decree and following the decision in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs.N.Radhakrishnan reported in AIR 1998 SCC 1833 : 1998 (4) SCC 154 and P.V.Mahadevan V.Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 9 has held as follows:
"We have extracted the charges against the appellant. These charges did not require any detailed investigation. In view of the unexplained delay of nine years the Trial Court was justified in holding that the entire enquiry was vitiated and in declaring that the order of punishment to be null and void. The Appellate Court did not have any justifiable reason to interfere with the said finding. In the circumstance, we are of the view that the High Court ought to have interfered in the matter as the Appeal involved a substantial question of law, i.e whether issue of charge sheet after nine years when there are no special circumstance to explain the delay vitiated the enquiry. As the matter is old and as we have already found that the delay vitiated the enquiry, no purpose will be served by remitting the matter. We propose to dispose of the Appeal on merits".
The Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed the judgment and decree of the High Court and the first appellate Court and consequently, restored the judgment of the decree of the trial Court, setting aside the penalty.
(xviii)In S.Rathinavelu Vs. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board, 31, Chepauk, Chennai-5 and another reported in 2009(2) CTC 513, for certain incidents alleged to have occurred in 1988-1989, disciplinary proceedings were initiated, after 10 years. After considering a catena of decisions, this Court set aside the punishment on the ground of inordinate delay of 10 years in initiating the disciplinary proceedings.
(xix)In Kootha Pillai Vs. Commissioner, Municipal Administration, Chennai and others reported in 2009(1) MLJ 761, this Court has quashed the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of inordinate delay.
(xx)Following the ratio decidendi in N.Radhakrishnan's case cited supra, a recent judgment reported in S.Sekar Vs. Commissioner of Social Welfare, Ezhilagam, Chennai reported in 2010 (1) MLJ 708, a learned Judge at paragraph 11 has observed as follows:
"11.Also, it is a settled proposition that while considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings, the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path, he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules; but then, delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officers unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations". In the above reported case, there was a delay of 12 years in concluding the disciplinary proceedings and that there was no explanation for such delay.
13.Grounds raised in the appeal do not merit any consideration. Pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings and further orders to be passed thereon are independent. If the proceedings before the Tribunal form an integral part of the charges, then the departmental proceedings under Rule 17(b) of TNCS (D&A) Rules ought not to have been initiated.
14.In the light of the above discussion and decisions, writ appeal deserves to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.
To
1.The Joint Director of School Education, Office of the Director of School Education, College Road, Chennai-6.
2.The Chief Educational Officer, Office of the Chief Educational Officer, Tallakulam, Madurai-2..