Telangana High Court
Velugupudi Anitha vs Bandarupalli Checha Rao 3 Others on 24 March, 2022
Author: G. Sri Devi
Bench: G. Sri Devi
HONOURABLE JUSTICE G. SRI DEVI
M.A.C.M.A.No.202 of 2015
JUDGMENT:
This appeal is filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, aggrieved by the award and decree, dated 29.09.2014 passed in M.V.O.P.No.1013 of 2010 on the file of the Principal Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Warangal (for short "the Tribunal").
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as arrayed before the Tribunal.
3. The facts, in issue, are as under:
4. The claimant filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation of Rs.21,00,000/- for the death of one Velugapudi Sridhar Rao (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased"), who died in a motor vehicle accident. It is stated that on 20.03.2010, the deceased, along with his sister, were returning to Warangal after seeing the son of his sister in Greenwood School at Yerragattu Gutta of Hanamkonda, on Bajaj Motorcycle bearing No.AP 31 R 7572 and when they reached near Swarna Palace on 2 GSD, J Macma_202_2015 Narsampet Road, one DCM Van bearing No.AP 36 V 8617, driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner at high speed and dashed the scooter, as a result of which, the deceased and his sister fell down and sustained grievous injuries. The deceased was succumbed to injuries while undergoing treatment in NIMS Hospital, Hyderabad. Since the accident occurred only due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the DCM, respondents 1 and 2, who are the owner and insurer of the said DCM Van are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation. Respondents 3 and 4 are the parents of the deceased.
5. Before the Tribunal, the 1st respondent filed written statement, denying the averments made in the claim-petition and also stated that the vehicle was insured with the 2nd respondent and the policy was in force as on the date of the accident, as such, the 2nd respondent alone is liable to pay the compensation.
6. The 2nd respondent filed written statement denying the manner in which the accident took place including the age, avocation and income of the deceased. It is also stated that 3 GSD, J Macma_202_2015 the accident occurred only due to the negligence of the deceased and that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the DCM Van, as such, the 2nd respondent is not liable to pay the compensation. It is also contended that the quantum of compensation claimed is excessive and baseless and prayed to dismiss the petition.
7. Respondents 3 and 4 filed their counter stating that the deceased was looking after their welfare and they sought to apportion the compensation, if any granted, along with the claimant.
8. Basing on the above pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following issues:-
1. Whether the motor vehicle accident, dated 20.03.2010 arose on account of negligence of the driver of Eicher DCM Van bearing registration No.AP 36 V 8617?
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation? If so, to what amount and from whom?
3. To what relief?4
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9. On behalf of the claimants, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A7 and Exs.X1 and X2 were marked. On behalf of the respondents, R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B1 and B2 were marked.
10. After considering the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the Tribunal held that the accident was occurred due to the negligent driving of the driver of the DCM Van and accordingly awarded an amount of Rs.15,53,232/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization to be paid by the respondents 1 and 2 jointly and severally. Out of the said compensation, only Rs.3,00,000/- was apportioned to the claimant towards her share and the remaining amount was apportioned to the 4th respondent, who is the mother of the deceased. Being not satisfied with the said apportionment the claimant filed the present appeal.
11. Heard and perused the record.
12. A perusal of the impugned judgment would show that the Tribunal has framed Issue No.1 as to whether the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the DCM Van by its 5 GSD, J Macma_202_2015 driver, to which the Tribunal after considering the evidence of P.W.3 coupled with the documentary evidence, has categorically observed that the accident has occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the DCM Van and has answered in favour of the claimant and against the respondents 1 and 2. Therefore, I see no reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of DCM Van.
13. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the claimant that as per the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh and others1 the claimant is entitled an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- towards consortium, but the Tribunal failed to award any amount under the head of consortium. It is also the contention of the learned Counsel for the claimant that the Tribunal erred in apportioning only meager amount of Rs.3,00,000/- towards the share of the claimant.
14. Insofar as the apportionment and consortium is concerned, a perusal of the impugned award would show that the Tribunal has vividly discussed in para Nos.34 to 41 and 44 1 (2013) 9 SCC 54 6 GSD, J Macma_202_2015 and came to a conclusion that the petitioner is getting employment on compassionate grounds and remarriage as such she is entitled to Rs.3,00,000/- only. The findings of the Tribunal in paragraph Nos.34 to 41 of the impugned award are necessary to be reproduced herein for better appreciation of the matter.
"34. According to respondents 2 to 4, the petitioner is also married. When suggested on behalf of the 1st respondent in the course of cross-examination, P.W.1 denied it. However, in the course of arguments, on her behalf, a memo was filed stating that she got married in February, 2013. It is seriously disputed, on behalf of respondents 2 to 4.
35. It is in the evidence of R.W.1 that the petitioner got remarried on 10.03.2012 and Ex.B1/marriage invitation card was produced at the trial. Ex.B1 is to the effect that one Venkateshwar Rao and Anitha got married on 10.03.2012 and it was celebrated in the Marriage Hall, "Chamber of Commerce" at Thorrur. In proof of it, R.W.2, Manager of Chamber of Commerce Function Hall at Thorrur, was examined at the trial. He confirmed that such marriage took place on 10.03.2012, in their Function Hall. But, in cross-examination, he stated that he did not know the nature of function, for which, their function hall was booked on 10.03.2012, as 7 GSD, J Macma_202_2015 per Ex.B1, while stating that a function, as stated in Ex.B1 was celebrated, in their Function Hall. He produced Ex.X2, a copy of receipt book of this Function Hall that it was booked on 10.03.2012, for this celebration.
36. If the marriage of the petitioner was celebrated on 10.03.2012 itself, when, she deposed in this Court, filing her affidavit in examination in chief on 14.05.2012 and was cross-examined on 16.10.2012, on behalf of the contesting respondents, she was already married by then. But, in further cross-examination on 18.12.2012, as P.W.1, she denied such remarriage. Such denial is highly interested and it is obvious that she came out with false version, in this regard, to claim a major portion of compensation, to be awarded, in this case.
37. Her version that she got married in February, 2013 is not at all substantiated. If it is true, she could have produced any record, at the trial, to prove such fact or could have examined her present husband or any of her relations, to prove such fact. Therefore, when, there is deliberate falsehood brought out by her, in the evidence, in respect of her remarriage, the contention of the respondents 2 to 4 that she got married on 10.03.2012 should be accepted. There is no effective rebuttal, on her part, either orally or by means of documentary evidence, to the proof offered by respondents 2 to 4, in this contest.8
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38. It is one of the major factors to be taken into consideration, while apportioning the compensation, between the petitioner and the 4th respondent. It cannot be denied that both of them are entitled for the compensation, together, being the dependants on the deceased. However, such dependency, in case of the petitioner should be restricted only for the period of her remaining unmarried, as rightly contended, on behalf of the 2nd respondent. Reliance is placed, in this respect, on behalf of the 2nd respondent, in case of United India Insurance Company Limited, Kurnool v. Eda Anjanamma and others {(2004) 1 T.A.C. 688 (A.P.)}.
39. In the light of the above observation, what all, the petitioner can claim towards compensation is, for the period she remained widow of the deceased and till she remained unmarried. By 10.03.2012, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased was about two years nine months old.
40. However, it cannot be stated that on account of her remarriage, she could not have claimed any compensation. xxxx
41. Therefore, being remarried, the petitioner is entitled only for the period she remained the widow of the deceased. It certainly affects her claim for compensation, as set out in this petition.
44. Coming to the apportionment of the compensation, as already stated, the 3rd respondent cannot be deemed 9 GSD, J Macma_202_2015 a dependant on the deceased. The marriage of the petitioner and the deceased was of short duration. Having regard to other factors, relating to her gainful employment on compassionate grounds and remarriage, if Rs.3,00,000/- is awarded to her, including loss of consortium, it appears to be just and appropriate."
15. Thus, while apportioning Rs.3,00,000/- to the claimant, the learned Tribunal gave cogent reasons, based on evaluation of oral and documentary evidence brought on record by both the parties. Absolutely, no ground is made out by the learned counsel for the claimant to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the learned Tribunal. Hence, the M.A.C.M.A. is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed.
16. Accordingly, the M.A.C.M.A. is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
17. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.
__________________ JUSTICE G. SRI DEVI 24.03.2022 gkv