Himachal Pradesh High Court
Satya Devi Sharma And Ors. vs Megh Pal And Anr. on 23 April, 2002
Equivalent citations: I(2003)ACC477, 2002ACJ2104, (2003)ILLJ265HP
Author: Arun Kumar Goel
Bench: Arun Kumar Goel
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.
1. This appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 has been filed by the claimants-appellants against the award of Collector Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, Sub Division, Shimla (Rural), District Shimla, H.P. By means of impugned order dated September 24, 2001 passed in case No. 6 of 1998 while allowing compensation in the sum of Rs. 2,12,307, it was ordered to be deposited within one month of the date of the said decision. Insurance Company was held liable for payment of compensation of this amount with interest at the rate of 12% p. a. for every day of delay thereafter. Besides the aforesaid amount of compensation, both the respondents have been held liable to pay Rs. 5,000 each by way of penalty.
2. When the appeal was filed following two substantial questions of law were framed on behalf of the appellants: -
1. Whether the appellants are entitled to Rs. 3,500 p.m. as salary for the purpose of multiplier in view of amendment made in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 w. e.f. December 8, 2000?
Whether the appellants are entitled to interest at the rate of 12% p. a. from the date of accident as envisaged under Section 4-A sub-section 3(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923?
Notice was issued to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 did not choose to appear after due service as is evident from the office record. Dr. Lalit Sharma appeared on behalf of respondent No. 2.
3. Though Mr. Chauhan, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that his clients are entitled to the benefit of amended provision of Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') he was unable to persuade the Court as to on what principle of law much less a rule of interpretation this plea has been raised. Only argument addressed was that being a beneficent legislation it needs to be liberally construed so as to advance the object with which it was enacted and amended from time to time, including such amendments which are carried out while the case is pending either before the Commissioner or at the appellate stage as the case may be.
4. This plea was controverted by Dr. Lalit Sharma on behalf of respondent-Insurance Company. He submitted that relevant date for determining the amount of compensation is the date of accident. Per him any subsequent change in law will not entitle claimants like appellants to ask for the benefit of other amended provisions he however, hastened to say that unless such provision is made retrospectively applicable to pending cases also.
5. Admittedly, this is not the situation in the present case as the amending Act No. 46 of 2000 whereby in Section 4(b) Explanation 2 "Rs. 4,000" was substituted for earlier existing Rs. 2,000 came into force with effect from December 8, 2000. Amending Act does not make it applicable to the pending cases, like the present one. While putting up the case of respondent No. 2 Dr. Sharma also submitted that the learned Commissioner below has gravely erred in holding his client responsible for payment of penalty while imposing the same alongwith respondent No. 1. This according to him is not only illegal and unwarranted but is also contrary to the mandate of Supreme Court of India in case of Ved Parkash Garg v. Premi Devi and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3854 : 1997 (8) SCC 1 : 1998-I-LLJ-363. He however, fairly stated that in terms of this decision his client is only liable to pay compensation alongwith interest in accordance with the provisions of law governing the same.
6. So far plea urged on behalf of the appellants that compensation is. to be assessed as per amended provision of Section 4 vide Central Act 20 of 1994 (supra) is concerned, it has been raised simply to be rejected for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter.
7. So far rights of a party are concerned those are fructified on the date of accident. Reason being that the grant of compensation involves finances, so Unless made applicable retrospectively, such a provision would always be applicable prospectively. This matter is even otherwise no more res Integra, in view of a three judge Bench decision of Supreme Court of India in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Valsala K., AIR 1999 SC 3502 : 1999 (8) SCC 254 : 1999-11-LLJ-1112, wherein it was held as under at p. 1113 of LLJ:
"1. The next question involved in these special leave petitions is whether the amendment of Sections 4 and 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 made by Act No. 30 of 1995 with effect from September 15, 1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and the rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims, in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of employment, took place prior to September 15, 1995?
2. Various High Courts in the country, while dealing with the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of accident.
3. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata, AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 (1) SCC 289 : 1976-1- LLJ-235, speaking through shINGHAL, J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim.
4. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co, Ltd. v. V.K. Neelakandan, Civil Appeal Nos. 16904-16906 of 1996, decided on November 6, 1996, however, took the view that Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 being a special legislation for the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. The two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan's case (supra), however, did not take notice of the judgment of the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo's case, 1976 ACJ 141 (SC), as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Dec's case, the view expressed by the two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan 's case is not correct.
5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co, Ltd. v. Alavi, 1998-II-LLJ-896, wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the above noted judgments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is in accord with the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deov. Shrinivas Sabata, (supra), lays down the correct law and we approve it."
8. To similar effect are the decisions of this Court rendered in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kala Devi and Ors., 1997 ACJ 17, United India Insurance Company v. Sumitra Devi and Ors. FAQ (WCA) No. 250 of 1997. Sumitra Devi and Ors. v. Kinnaur Federation and another, decided on November 27, 2001. While taking this view it also cannot be said that amended provision is procedural in nature so as to make it retrospectively applicable. Accordingly question No. 1 does not arise for determination in this case and the plea urged by Mr. Chauhan in that behalf is rejected.
9. So far plea regarding interest is concerned, in view of the decision in the case of Ved Parkash Garg (supra) respondent No. 2 cannot escape its liability for its payment on the awarded amount of Rs. 1,89,560. Accordingly it is held that from the date of the award i. e. September 24, 2001 it shall be liable to pay interest @ 12% p. a. on it till the amount is either paid or deposited. It may be noted that learned counsel for the parties were not at variance at the time of hearing that the income and factors etc,, have been correctly assessed by the Commissioner below while passing the impugned award.
10. Now coming to the plea of Dr. Sharma that his clients have been wrongly held liable for payment of compensation in the sum of Rs. 5,000. In the face of the decision of the Supreme Court in case Ved Parkash Garg (supra), wherein it was held as under 1998-I-LLJ-363 at p.p. 372 & 373:
"........But so far as the amount of penalty imposed on the insured employer under contingencies contemplated by Section 4-A(3)(b) is concerned as that is on account of personal fault of the insured not backed up by any justifiable cause, the insurance company cannot be made liable to reimburse that part of the penalty amount imposed on the employer. The latter because of his own fault and negligence will have to bear the entire burden of the said penalty amount with proportionate interest thereon if imposed by the Workmen's Commissioner."
This plea deserves to be upheld.
11. Accordingly, it is held that penalty has been wrongly made payable by respondent No. 2. Accident in this case has taken place on April 15, 1998. Claim petition was filed on July 6, 1998 and liability to pay the amount of compensation arose within one month of the accident i. e. by or before May 14, 1998. The amount was not paid within the time allowed under the Act. We, therefore, consider it just and proper for securing the ends of justice that instead of penalty of Rs. 5,000 respondent No. 2 shall pay costs of Rs. 5,000 to the appellants. No other point is urged.
12. Before finally parting with this case, we may observe that it was thought fit to dispose of this case at the admission stage rather than keeping the file alive on the pendency list of this Court because respondent No. 2 Insurance Company as already noted did not dispute its liability for payment of compensation with interest, we may add here that even if it had disputed still in view of the mandate of Supreme Court (supra) it is bound to pay both these amounts. Further, no appeal has been filed by it. So far respondent No. 1 is concerned, he is not aggrieved by the impugned award as he had not filed any appeal. Thus without admitting the appeal we have finally disposed of the same, as no fruitful purpose would have been served except for increasing the pendency of the Court.
13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, while upholding the award of the learned Commissioner below but subject to the above modifications regarding payment of costs and interest, this appeal is hereby finally disposed of with no orders as to costs.