Allahabad High Court
M/S Jagat Theatre,Exhibitors,Llp ... vs Shyam Kumari Bhargava And Ors. on 16 October, 2019
Author: Jaspreet Singh
Bench: Jaspreet Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Court No. - 19 Case :- S.C.C. REVISION No. - 74 of 2018 Revisionist :- M/S Jagat Theatre,Exhibitors,Llp Ltd.Liabiltity Partnership Opposite Party :- Shyam Kumari Bhargava And Ors. Counsel for Revisionist :- Ankit Srivastava Counsel for Opposite Party :- Nirmit Srivastava,Brijesh Kumar Saxena,Shriya Saxena Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J.
1. Heard Sri Ankit Srivastava, learned counsel for the revisionist and Sri Nirmit Srivastava, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 7 and Sri B.K. Saxena, learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no. 19.
2. The instant revision has been preferred being aggrieved against part of the order dated 25.08.2018 in so far as it relates to the disposal of the application moved by the revisionist before the Trial Court seeking its impleadment in terms of Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. (which has been brought on record of this Court as annexure no.3) which has been dismissed by the Court below.
3. Sri Ankit Srivastava, leaned counsel for the revisionist assailing the impugned order has primarily submitted that the applicant/revisionist i.e. M/s Jagat Theatre Exhibitors LLP is a limited liability partnership incorporated under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 and as per Section 3 it has its separate existence. It has been submitted that the aforesaid LLP has purchased the 1/3rd undivided share of the co-owner/landlord of the property in question who were impleaded as the opposite parties no. 3 to 7 before the Court below.
4. Since the LLP had purchased the undivided share of the opposite parties no. 3 to 7, accordingly it moved an application for its impleadment, however, the same has been erroneously rejected by the Trial Court without considering the scope and purpose of Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. also ignoring the effect of Section 3 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act and being aggrieved against the aforesaid, the revisionist has come up before this Court assailing the aforesaid order.
5. In order to appreciate the submissions of the respective parties certain background facts relevant for the adjudicating of the controversy are being noticed hereinafter first:-
6. A SCC Suit bearing No. 119 of 1991 came to be filed by one Sri Kripa Sunder Bhargawa. In the aforesaid suit, it was clearly pleaded that the building known as Jagat Talkies building situate at Amenabad, Lucknow consisted of a cinematograph auditorium and the residential flats out of which the plaintiff i.e. Kripa Shankar Bhargawa and the defendants no. 3 to 14 who were the legal heirs of the original owners and who have been living in a portion of the same at the first floor. It was stated that Sri Prem Sunder Bhargawa, Kripa Shankar Bhargawa, Kailash Sunder Bhargawa and Prakash Singh Bhargawa who were the original owners of the property in question had jointly leased out the property to one Sri VishwaNath Khanna. In paragraph 4, it was clearly mentioned that the monthly rent of Rs. 7,500/- was paid separately to the four brothers namely Sri Prem Sunder Bhargawa, Kripa Shankar Bhargawa, Kailash Chandra Bhargawa and Prakash Singh Bhargawa and each brother was paid a sum of Rs. 1875/- per month. In paragraph 11 of the plaint, it was mentioned that since the defendants no. 3 to 14 could not join as plaintiffs they were made profarma-defendants, however, the relief was also claimed in their favour.
7. During the pendency of the suit, many of the parties died including the plaintiff who was substituted by his heirs who were brought on record while the original tenant Sri VishvaNath Khanna also expired an in his place his son Sri Rajesh Khanna was impleded as defendant no. 2. The basis of the Suit was that the lease which was executed in favour of Sri VishwaNath Khanna had expired on 15.07.1990 and thereafter the suit seeking ejectment of the tenant was instituted on 14.02.1991 apart from that a decree for damages for wrongful use and occupation was also sought. The suit came to be contested by opposite parties no. 3, 4 and 5 who are the legal heirs of Sri Prem Shankar Bhargawa who also filed their written statement. During the pendency of the Suit, Sri Rajesh Khanna had entered in a registered agreement to sell dated 07.10.2016 in respect of 1/3rd undivided share of the property in question with the legal heirs of Sri Prem Shankar Bhargawanamely defendants no. 3 to 7 of the Suit. Later the LLP came to be incorporated under the name and style of M/s Jagat Theatre Exhibitors of which Rajesh Khanna who is the defendant no. 2 in the Suit, is also a partner.
8. Later on 27.07.2017, a sale deed was executed by the defendants no. 3 to 7 of the Suit being the heirs of Prem Shankar Bhargawa in favour of the LLP i.e. M/s Jagat Theatre Exhibitors. It is after purchase of the said property, the said LLP made an application before the Trial Court seeking its impleadment in place of their predecessor i.e. the heirs of PremSunder Bhargawa by means of application dated 16.08.2018. Significantly , Sri Rajesh Khanna had filed his affidavit in capacity of the partner of the LLP while making the application for impleadment for the LLP.
9. The plaintiffs filed their objection to the impleadment application wherein it was contended that Sri Rajesh Khanna was a tenant by means of the registered lease deed dated 04.07.1975 which expired by efflux of time. A suit for ejectment was already pending which was filed by the co-landlord. Since purchasing only a part of a share in the disputed property, the status of Rajesh Khanna would not come to an end and he shall remain as a tenant, therefore, Sri Rajesh Khanna is neither a proper nor a necessary party. The entire premise of the objections filed by the landlord-plaintiff was that Sri Rajesh Khanna who was already a tenant could not be allowed to be impleaded through this LLP. It was also pleaded that all the co-owners of the property had executed a registered lease in favour of father of Sri Rajesh Khanna. The defendant no. 2 i.e. Rajesh Khanna had purchased only 1/4th equal share and out of which late Prakash Sunder Bhargawa had bequeathed his 1/4th share in the property through his last Will in favour of plaintiffs no. 1/5 namely Raju Bhargawa. It was further stated that the application for impleadment in light of the aforesaid objections could not be entertained and accordingly was liable to be dismissed.
10. The Trial Court after considering the submission of the respective parties while dealing with the application bearing Paper No. C-333 found that the application for impleadment was sans merit, inasmuch as, a deliberate attempt was being made to keep the matter pending. The Trial Court while passing the impugned order noticed that the applicant Rajesh Khanna is already a tenant in the aforesaid Suit and he himself on behalf of the LLP has made an application for seeking his impleadment. It referred to the provisions of Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Court's Act to the effect that the SCC Court does not have the power to decide the title of the parties. It also noticed that the suit wherein Sri Rajesh Khanna was already a tenant and he has purchased some part of the share from the some of the co-owners and the deed was executed on 27.07.2017 almost a year prior to the date of making the application for impleadment coupled with the fact that the applicant shall remain as a tenant and hence he is neither a necessary party nor a proper party, as in a Suit for ejectment based on the relationship of landlord and tenant it is only the landlord and the tenant who are necessary parties and since Sri Rajesh Khanna being the tenant is a party and the plaintiff is already prosecuting the Suit, therefore, under the aforesaid circumstances, the application was dismissed.
11. Sri Ankit Srivastava while assailing the order had pointed out that the Trial Court has committed an error, inasmuch as, it has treated the application to have been made by Sri Rajesh Khanna. It has been emphasized that from the reading of the impugned order it would indicate that the Trial Court has referred to the applicant Rajesh Khanna whereas from the perusal of the material on record including the application it would indicate the application for impleadment was moved on behalf of the LLP which in terms of Section 3 of the Limited Liability Partnership Act is a separate entity altogether and the identity could not be merged.
12. Sri Ankit Srivastava has further emphasized that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 are on a different premise than the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. He has sought to differentiate that the Court while considering an application under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. has to consider whether the parties proposing his impleadment would be a necessary or proper party or not. Whereas, the consideration for application under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. is on the footing of assignment of rights.
13. Sri Ankit Srivastava has further submitted that the Trial Court has committed an error in proceeding on the premise that the application was moved by Sri Rajesh Khanna and holding him to be a tenant already impleaded in the Suit, therefore, it has held that his presence is not necessary and it appears that the application has been moved to delay the proceedings. This reasoning and premise of the Trial Court has been assailed and it has been pointed out that the LLP is a separate entity and may be Rajesh Khanna is a partner therein but this LLP should not be confused with a partnership under the Partnership Act of 1932 wherein the partners and the partnership firm are one and the same and the partners do not have a separate identity with that of its firm.
14. Sri Ankit Srivastava has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw Vs. Farid Khatoon reported in AIR 2005 SC 2209, Shardamma Vs. Mohd. Pyarem reported in AIR 2015 SC 3747.
15. Per contra, Sri Nirmit Srivastava, learned counsel for the opposite parties has vehemently opposed the above revision. His contention is that in a suit for the landlord and tenant, who would be the necessary parties has been recognized by the Apex Court in the case of Kanaklata Das Vs. Naba Kumar Das, reported in 2018 (2) SCC 352.
16. It has been submitted by him that in light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kanaklata Das it would be clear that the LLP does not fit the description of a proper and a necessary party and, therefore, the Court below has rightly rejected the application. It has also been srubmitted that Rajesh Khanna who is already a tenant and had entered into a registered agreement to sell with some co-sharer by means of a registered agreement to sale dated 07.10.2016 at that point of time, the LLP was not even conceived. The sale deed by the heirs of Prem Sunder Bhargawa came to be executed on 27.07.2017 whereas the LLP was incorporated on 05.04.2017. The copy of the sale deed has been brought on record and it has been pointed out that the sale consideration in furtherance of the agreement to sell dated 07.10.2016 was paid to the legal heirs of Sri Prem Sunder Bhargawa from 12.02.2016 i.e. even prior to the date of the execution of the registered agreement to sale and large portion thereof had been paid uptill 04.11.2017 and it is only when the sale deed was to be executed a day prior the remaining consideration came to be paid.
17. On the strength of these facts, it has been argued that it was none other than Rajesh Khanna who was the person behind the LLP. It was Sri Rajesh Khanna who had paid the sale consideration to the heirs of Prem Sunder Bhargawa and, therefore, for all practical purposes, it was Rajesh Khanna who had purchased the share of the legal heirs of Prem Sunder Bhargawa and as such once he was already there as a party in the Suit, there was no requirement of bringing on record the LLP as a successor upon whom the rights of the defendants no. 3 to 7 have devolved. Thus, it was argued that the application has rightly been rejected and the Trial Court has rightly found that the identity of Rajesh Khanna was that of LLP and he being a tenant and despite having purchased part of the share of some of the co-owners it would not make any difference in so far as his status of tenant is concerned. Accordingly, the suit being between the landlord and tenant did not require any third party to be impleaded.
18. Sri B.K. Saxena who has appeared on behalf of opposite party no.19 in the revision namely Rajesh Khanna also addressed the Court on the limited issue to indicate that since the Trial Court while considering the application of the LLP has made certain observations as far as Rajesh Khanna is concerned and treating the application to be moved on behalf of Sri Rajesh Khanna, thus, it has been urged that this error committed by the Trial Court has proceeded to move on the premise as if the said application was moved by Sri Rajesh Khanna and with this mistake prevailing in the mind of the Court concerned to what extent it has influenced the impugned order, is difficult to ascertain and accordingly the order stands vitiated.
19. Sri Saxena has also elaborated the argument further which was commenced by the revisionist regarding the difference in the provisions of the Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. and Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. and it has been urged that the consideration for both the provision is different.
20. The Court has considered the rival submissions and also perused the record. The facts as already indicated hereinabove shows that a SCC Suit was instituted in the year 1991 wherein Sri Rajesh Khanna was a party. The fact regarding sale of the undivided share by the heirs of Prem Sunder Bhargawa is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that even assuming Rajesh Khanna purchased some part of the share of the some co-owners, his status as the tenant does not change unless he acquires the entire shareof all the co-owners. This is where this needs to stop. From the perusal of the entire order in so far as it relates to disposal of the application for impleadment bearing Paper No. C-333 is concerned, the Trial Court has considered and proceeded on the premise that the application for impleadment is coming from Rajesh Khanna. The Trial Court has also considered the applicability of Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Court's Act while rejecting the impugned application.
21. The fact whether Rajesh Khanna is a partner of the LLP or not is a separate question altogether and is not to be considered at the time of considering the application under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. At this stage, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw (Supra) would be relevant. The issue before the Apex Court was to the effect whether an application of substitution by a subsequent purchaser be rejected and the subsequent purchaser be non-suited altogether and this was the prime question before the Apex Court. Considering the overall provisions of Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Court, the Apex Court held as under :-
11. The application under Order 22 Rule 10 can be made to the appellate court even though the devolution of interest occurred when the case was pending in the trial court. In the instant case, the suit was decreed in favour of Fakir Mohammad by judgment and decree dated 3-11-1989. The suit was contested by two sets of defendants, one set of defendants was Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey and the other set of defendants was Jagat Mohan Das alone. The appeals were preferred by the parties. Both the appeals were heard and by a common judgment and order dated 25-6-1992, the said appeals were allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif was set aside. By a deed of assignment dated 15-12-1995, the said Birendra Nath Dey assigned his leasehold right in respect of 132-A, Circular Garden Reach Road, presently known as 132-A, Karl Marx Sarani, Kolkata in favour of the appellants. By a deed of sale executed on 15-12-1995, duly registered with the Additional Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta, Kalyani Dey sold the property being No. 132-B of the above address to the other appellant. The second appeals filed by the parties were pending on the file of the High Court at Calcutta. The appellants had no knowledge of the second appeals. Thereafter on verification, the appellants came to know of the pendency of the appeals which necessitated them to file the applications for substitution in the second appeals. In the meanwhile, the appellants filed the applications before the municipal authorities for mutation of their names in respect of the property on 24-12-2002 and the municipal authority informed the appellants that they were not in a position to mutate the names of the appellants of the property in question because of the pendency of the two second appeals before the High Court at Calcutta. Thereafter the appellants engaged an advocate to find out whether any such appeals have been filed by the parties. The advocate so engaged informed the appellants that two appeals being SAs Nos. 631 and 632 of 1993 were filed by Fakir Mohammad, Farida Khatoon and others, respondents herein. It was also informed that the said appeals were admitted by the High Court but the impugned judgment and order was neither prayed for stay nor stayed. Therefore, it was also submitted by the appellants that since the appellants have become the absolute owners of the property, their interest will be highly prejudiced and they will be vitally affected, if any order is passed by the High Court without hearing the appellants in the matter. Therefore, they prayed that the appellants are to be substituted in place and stead of the present respondents, since they have no existing and subsisting right, title or interest in the property.
12. Under Order 22 Rule 10, no detailed inquiry at the stage of granting leave is contemplated. The court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit by or against the person on whom the interest has devolved by assignment or devolution. The question about the existence and validity of the assignment or devolution can be considered at the final hearing of the proceedings. The court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit.
16. The doctrine of lis pendens applies only where the lis is pending before a court. Further pending the suit, the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the suit, though the court has a discretion to make him a party. But the transferee pendente lite can be added as a proper party if his interest in the subject-matter of the suit is substantial and not just peripheral. A transferee pendente lite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lis pendens transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10 an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The court has held that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in immovable property is a representative-in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case.
22. The Apex Court in the case of Shardamma (Supra) has held that as a rule of prudence the initial duty lies upon the plaintiff to apply for leave in case the factum of devolution was within his knowledge or with due diligence could have been known by him. The person upon whom the interest has devolved may also apply for such a leave so that his interest may be properly represented as a original party.
23. One of the ground which has prevailed in the mind of the Trial Court is that the application for impleadment was made almost after a year from the date of execution of the sale deed. This aspect has also been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh Vs. Jaiprakash University and Others reported in AIR 2001 SC 82552 wherein considering the provision of Order 22 Rule 10 the Apex Court held as under:-
" 24. Now we proceed to consider the second question posed, but before doing so, for better appreciation of the point involved, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code which runs thus:-
"10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit.- (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendncy of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.
(2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1)."
25. Plain language of Rule 10 referred to above does not suggest that leave can be sought by that person alone upon whom the interest has devolved. It simply says that the suit may be continued by the person upon whom such an interest has devolved and this applies in a case where the interest of plaintiff has devolved. Likewise, in a case where interest of defendant has devolved, the suit may be continued against such a person upon whom interest has devolved, but in either eventuality, for continuance of the suit against the persons upon whom the interest has devolved during the pendency of the suit, leave of the court has to be obtained. If it is laid down that leave can be obtained by that person alone upon whom interest of party to the suit has devolved during its pendency, then there may be preposterous results as such a party might not be knowing about the litigation and consequently not feasible for him to apply for leave and if a duty is cast upon him then in such an eventuality he would be bound by the decree even in cases of failure to apply for leave. As a rule of prudence, initial duty lies upon the plaintiff to apply for leave in case the factum of devolution was within his knowledge or with due diligence could have been known by him. The person upon whom the interest has devolved may also apply for such a leave so that his interest may be properly represented as the original party, if it ceased to have an interest in the subject matter of dispute by virtue of devolution of interest upon another person, may not take interest therein, in ordinary course, which is but natural, or by colluding with the other side.
24. Thus, applying the propositions as noticed above, it would indicate that the Trial Court has not considered the controversy in the correct perspective, inasmuch as, it has moved on the premise that the application has been moved by Sri Rajesh Khanna though it was moved by LLP and further it has not considered the effect of Section 3 of Limited Liability Partnership Act nor considered the effect of provisions of Order 22 Rule 10. It has generally moved on the understanding that the tenant who is already a party is also making another application for seeking impleadment in another capacity which has given rise to the impugned order.
25. In so far as the decision of Kanaklata Das which has been relied upon by Sri Nirmit Srivastawa is concerned, it would be seen that the said decision relates to consideration of an application under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. where the person concerned was seeking the indulgence of the Court to be allowed to be impleaded as a co-plaintiff. The Apex Court has laid down certain principles which are being reproduced hereinafter for ready reference..............
11. There are some well-settled principles of law on the question involved in this appeal, which need to be taken into consideration while deciding the question which arose in this appeal. These principles are mentioned infra:
11.1. First, in an eviction suit filed by the plaintiff (landlord) against the defendant (tenant) under the State Rent Act, the landlord and tenant are the only necessary parties. In other words, in a tenancy suit, only two persons are necessary parties for the decision of the suit, namely, the landlord and the tenant.
11.2. Second, the landlord (plaintiff) in such suit is required to plead and prove only two things to enable him to claim a decree for eviction against his tenant from the tenanted suit premises. First, there exists a relationship of the landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and second, the ground(s) on which the plaintiff landlord has sought defendant tenant's eviction under the Rent Act exists. When these two things are proved, the eviction suit succeeds.
11.3. Third, the question of title to the suit premises is not germane for the decision of the eviction suit. The reason being, if the landlord fails to prove his title to the suit premises but proves the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises and further proves existence of any ground on which the eviction is sought under the Tenancy Act, the eviction suit succeeds. Conversely, if the landlord proves his title to the suit premises but fails to prove the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises, the eviction suit fails. (See Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal [Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal, (1995) 6 SCC 580] .) 11.4. Fourth, the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the co-plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit. (See Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee [Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee, (2005) 8 SCC 140] .) 11.5. Fifth, a necessary party is one without whom, no order can be made effectively, a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. (See Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue [Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC 786] .) 11.6. Sixth, if there are co-owners or co-landlords of the suit premises then any co-owner or co-landlord can file a suit for eviction against the tenant. In other words, it is not necessary that all the owners/landlords should join in filing the eviction suit against the tenant. (See Kasthuri Radhakrishnan v. M. Chinniyan [Kasthuri Radhakrishnan v. M. Chinniyan, (2016) 3 SCC 296 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 331] .)
12. Keeping in mind the aforementioned well-settled principles of law and on examining the legality of the impugned order, we find that the impugned order is not legally sustainable and hence deserves to be set aside.
13. In our considered opinion, Respondent 1, who claims to be the co-sharer or/and co-owner with the plaintiff-appellants herein of the suit property is neither a necessary and nor a proper party in the eviction suit of the appellants against Respondents 2 to 5. In other words, such eviction suit can be decreed or dismissed on merits even without the impleadment of Respondent 1.
26. This Court is in respectful agreement with the proposition and the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kanaklata Das. However, what needs to be seen is that the facts of the present case are not similar to the one in the case of Kanaklata Das. In the case of Kanaklata Das, the Apex Court was clearly dealing with an application under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. In the aforesaid case, that the person concerned had made an application for being impleaded as a co-plaintiff. It is in view thereof that the principles regarding impleadment in a suit between landlord and tenant was considered and the principles as noticed above were laid by the Apex Court.
27. In the instant case at hand, it would be seen that it is not an application under Order 1 Rule 10 rather it was an application under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. where the devolution of interest has taken place. The defendants no. 3 to 7 of the original suit had sold their share to the LLP. The application on behalf of LLP is to the limited extent that they may be permitted to be impleaded so that their rights may remain protected. In the instant case, moreover in paragraph 11, the plaintiffs had mentioned that the other co-owners had not joined as a party as plaintiff and, therefore, they were impleaded as the defendants no. 3 to 14. However, the relief was claimed in their favour as well.
28. It is in this backdrop that the LLP which had moved the application for impleadment wanted their impleadment alongwith defendant nos. 3 to 7 as they had sold their share to the LLP.
29. In light of the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw (Supra) which deals with the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. as well as in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh (Supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the Trial Court has misdirected itself while considering the application under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C. and has moved on a premise which does not bear from the record also the arguments of the parties raisd before the Court has also not been considered by the Trial Court nor the effect of the relevant provisions of law has been taken note of and considered. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order in so far as it relates to the disposal of the application for impleadment bearing Paper No. C-333 is concerned cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside.
30. The Court concerned shall re-consider the application paper No. C-333 after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties and shall decide the same afresh in light of the relevant provisions, the decision of the Apex Court and in light of the observations made by this Court.
31. Since the matter is of the year 1991, accordingly, an endevour shall be made by the Trial Court to proceed with the matter on day to day basis as far as possible without granting unnecessary and long adjournments to either of the parties including for the LLP. All sides are also directed that they shall cooperate and ensure that the enitre matter is decided at the earliest.
32. In view of the above the order dated 25.08.2018 passed in SCC Suit No. 119 of 1991 is set aside to the extent it decides the application C-333 and the matter is remitted to the Trial Court to decide the application afresh in light of the observations made above.
33. The revision stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Order Date: 16.10.2019 Asheesh