Punjab-Haryana High Court
Amarjit Singh vs U.T. Of Chandigarh on 29 July, 1999
Equivalent citations: (2000)126PLR465
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. LAC No. 27 dated 7.9.1988 titled as Amarjit Singh and Ors. v. U.T, Chandigarh was disposed of by the learned District Judge, Chandigarh vide order dated 24.7.1990 in terms of the judgment/award passed by that Court in LAC No. 25 of 1988 titled as Jaswant Kaur v. Union of India.
2. Jaswant Kaur's case (supra) alongwith 13 other references was answered by the learned District Judge vide judgement dated 24.2.1990. All the present appeals arise from the above judgment passed by the learned District Judge and, thus, it will be appropriate to dispose of all these appeals by a common judgment.
3. Administration of Union Territory of Chandigarh with the intention to acquire 61.64 acres of land from the revenue estate of village Mani Majra for a public purpose i.e. rehabilitation of slum dwellers, issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on 10.12.1986. In furtherance thereto on 25.2.1987 the notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued. The Collector after following the due process awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 85,000 per acre with 30% solatium vide award dated 27.3.1987. The Collector had granted a flat rate of compensation to all claimants in relation to the acquisition of their respective land. The claimants felt dissatisfied with the extent of amount of compensation awarded to them and they preferred references under Section 18 of the Act. According to the claimants they were entitled to get compensation at the rate of Rs. 15 lacs per acre for the reasons and grounds stated therein. The learned District Judge, Chandigarh after permitting the parties to lead evidence, vide his award dated 24.7.1990 (LAC No. 25 of 1988) enhanced the amount of compensation payable to the claimants at the rate of Rs. 2 lacs per acre alongwith solatium and other statutory benefits.
4. Again dissatisfied with the amount of compensation awarded to the claimants, the claimants preferred the regular first appeal against the order dated 24.7.1990 praying for further enhancement. As already noticed, vide this award the learned Judge had answered 13 references which were subsequently followed in other cases arising from the same notification like Amarjit Singh's case (supra). The claimants had examined 2 witnesses and had tendered sale deeds Ex. P.6 and P.7 to support their case for enhancement. In order to show the location and potential of the land acquired, Latha Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 master plan of Chandigarh, were tendered in evidence. Ex.P-3 to P-5 were also proved on record which are the certified copies of the judgments of the High Court. Based on this oral and documentary evidence the claimants prayed for further enhancement and claimed a sum of Rs. 15 Lac per acre, as already noticed. The respondents did not produce any oral evidence. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents before the learned District Judge on 16.1.1990 made a statement that the evidence of the respondent is closed by tendering Ex.R-1 to R-3 in evidence. Exhibits R-1 to R-3 produced by the respondents were the copies of the sale deeds in relation to the sale of the land in village Mani Majra. The learned District Judge had considered it appropriate not to rely upon the sale deeds produced by either of the parties for the reason that they related to small pieces of land and the location of the land, subject matter of the sale deeds, had not been proved on record. It is true that once location of the land subject matter of the sale deed is not proved on record, it would become difficult to assess the market value of the land on the basis of such sale instances. Further location and potential of the land, subject matter of the sale deeds, could be a correct guiding factor only if such sale instances are comparable to the acquired land. Such a comparison would not be possible for the Court if the location was not proved. In addition to the above reasons, these sale instances cannot be looked into in evidence as per the law enunciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the cases of A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad v. P. Venkaiah and Ors., and Special Deputy Collector etc. Kurra Sambasiva Rao and Ors. etc. AIR 1997 S.C. 2600 and 2602 respectively. It is admitted case that neither the parties to the lis had examined vendor or vendees nor any other appropriate official from the concerned department to prove authenticity and genuineness of these sale instances. Consequently, I have no hesitation in affirming the view taken by the learned lower Court that the sale instance Exhibits P-6, P-7 and R-1 to R-3 cannot be taken into consideration.
5. POTENTIAL AND LOCATION OF THE ACQUIRED LAND.
PW.2 Lachman Singh, Patwari, had produced and proved on record Latha Ex.P-1. He stated that the land from the revenue estate of village Mani Majra was earlier acquired for motor market complex and residential plots. According to him there were 3 government schools in Mani Majra and 3 or 4 nurseries. The urban estate of Panchkula was stated to be on either side of Mani Majra. PW-3 and PW-4 also stated the facts which show that the area itself may not be a very developed area but is area which certainly cannot be equated to an area of agricultural land simplicitor. Exhibit P-1 is the Chandigarh Urban Complex Plan. The acquired land has been shown on this map adjacent to the already developed area shown under head 'C' of village Mani Majra itself. It is very close to the roads shown in Ex.P-1 During the pendency of this appeal, the applicant-appellants had filed an application in RFA No. 2689 of 1990 for adducing additional evidence within the purview and scope of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. The prayer for allowing additional evidence related to prove on record the map to show the fact that the land acquired under Ex.P-4 (judgment of the High Court) was located just adjacent and across the road to the acquired land. Vide order dated 22.7.1999, the application was allowed and Daya Kishan Patwari was examined in Courts as AW-1. The Court had considered it appropriate to permit the parties to lead additional evidence before this Court as more than 8 years had already lapsed during which the present appeal had been pending. No fruitful purpose would have been served by remanding the case to the trial Court and giving parties an opportunity to lead evidence all over again and, in any case, because of subsequent pronouncement by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad had already become inadmissible. Thus, in order to do complete justice between the parties without putting them to agony of going through the judicial process afresh for receiving the compensation, the application for additional evidence was allowed. It is also relevant to-mention that the applicant wanted to prove only the location of the land in relation to which a certified copy of the judgment has already been proved on record as Ex. P-4.
6. AW-1 was examined in this Court and was also cross-examined at some length by the learned Counsel appearing for the Union Territory Administration. It will be appropriate to reproduce his entire statement.
"I have brought Aks-Shijra/Latha for village Mani Majra. The acquired land falls in rectangles Nos. 69, 70, 71, 81, 91, 92, 233, 351, 353, 368. The Mani Majra road . joins the Old Ropar Road and passes through the acquired land and a part of the acquired land is abutting that road. The Higher Secondary School falls in rectangle No. 61 which falls opposite to the acquired land. The land was acquired vide notification No. 3278 measuring 01 acre and was acquired for the purpose of the school.
xxxx examination by Mr. Alok Jain, Advocate.
I have given my above statement on the basis of the record brought by me and it has been recorded in the mutation record that the above land was acquired for school. The mutation register was not summoned before the Court. I have brought the mutation register of my own. The school in rectangle No. 61 is upto Mani Majra Road. I have seen the map at Mark 'X'. This has not been prepared by me. I am not in a position to compare it with the original record today and, therefore, cannot affirm or deny its correctness."
As discussed above, there is not much of evidence which requires detailed consideration or appreciation. Some of the evidence produced by the parties, more particularly the sale instances, are inadmissible. Ex. P. 4 is the copy of the judgment in RFA No. 1122 of 1981 titled as Union of India v. Laik etc. In this judgment, the High Court had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 116 per square yard i.e. Rs. 5,61,440 per acre. This substantial piece of evidence was ignored by the learned District Judge for the reasons that the location of the land acquired in Ex. P.4, had not been proved on record vis-a-vis the acquired land in the present case. In other words, non production and depiction of the acquired land of Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.2 resulted in rejection of this evidence by the learned trial Court.
7. In the appeal the location of both lands i.e. the acquired land and the land subject matter of Ex.P.4 has duly been identified. As per the statement of AW1 reproduced above, both the lands are having somewhat similar location, may not be absolutely identical. They fell on either side of the same Mani Majra road. The land under Ex.P.4, was acquired for extension of the school, while the present land has been acquired on the other side of the road for rehabilitation of slum dweller, Ex. P.4, therefore, can easily be treated as a comparable instance and which could be safely relied upon by the Court for the purposes of determining the compensation payable to claimants in the resent case.
8. Ex.P.4 relates to acquisition of land vide notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 3.2.1978 while the present lands was acquired vide notification date 10.12.1986. The oral statements of the witnesses claiming much higher value of the land is of no consequence. There is hardly any evidence to justify the substantial enhancement claimed for by the claimants. Certainly, when the land under Ex.P.4 was acquired, the land under present acquisition would have hardly any potential because it was totally undeveloped, was just adjacent to the village abadi and did not have that much of potential. Ex.P.4 was acquired for the extension of the School in Mani Majra, where the school was already existing and surrounding areas had shops and near the police station etc. The claimants, therefore, cannot be held entitled to award of compensation at par with the rate allowed in Ex.P.4 added with the element of increase for the intervening period between the two notifications. Still Ex.P.4 can be a good indicator of the market value of the acquired land.
9. Prospective use of the land or its future potential and development by itself is not a relevant consideration for the Court while determining the market value of the acquired land [refer Tarlochan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995-2)110 P.L.R. 100.
10. It was for the claimants to prove on record that the land or its surrounding areas had fully developed or what was the extent of development. In the present case, the claimants have failed to discharge the onus placed on them in this regard. The Supreme Court in the case of V.G. Kulkarni v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, JT 1996(4) S.C. 220 clearly stated the proposition that in this regard element of conjecture cannot be made applicable and finding should be based on clear evidence.
11. It is the duty of the Court to maintain balance between diverse interests of the claimants on one side and the State on the other (K.Posayya and Ors. v. Special Tehsildar, (1995) 5 Supreme Court Cases 233. The State acquires land for public purposes and for the interests of larger section of the society, while claimants would be interested in getting maximum compensation. To strike a balance between these two, would be of serious concern for the Court, but it has to be based on the evidence produced by the parties on record. If either party fails to discharge its onus, it cannot claim benefit in that regard. Some element of conjecture would have to be applied keeping in view the oral evidence of the claimants led in the present case. Ex.P.4 being the basis for determining the amount of compensation payable to the claimants it must be noticed at the very outset that on deduction was ordered while awarding the compensation of Rs. 150 per square yard. In catena of judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that deduction would have to be applied invariably to all cases and there being hardly any exception to this principle of deduction. Reference can be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court where the principle of deduction was applied from 20% to 53% or even above, on the market value determined on sale instances or otherwise. (K.S. Shivadevamma v. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer (1966) 2 Supreme Court Cases 62; Ram Piari Land Acquisition Collector, Solan, AIR 1996 Supreme Court 3140; Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1652 Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 943: 1988(1) RRR (S.C) 480; and Hasanali Walimchand (dead) by LRs. v. State of Maharashtra, 1988(1) All India Land Acquisition & Compensation Cases 120).
12. Application of principle of deduction to the facts of the present case would have to be minimized because of the element of increase which the claimants would be entitled to for the intervening period between the two notifications i.e. Ex.P.4 and the present notification. Some amount of deduction would have to be set off against the element of increase which could roughly be computed at the rate of 12% per year on the amount awarded on Ex.P.4 while the other would have to be actually deducted from the amount so determined.
13. Following the above principle and for computation of fair and reasonable market value of the acquired land, it must also be noticed that the potential of the land and its surroundings having not been proved, and cogent evidence produced on record to prevent application of higher rate of deduction. It must also be noticed that even the claimants did not choose to get into the witness box and state with regard to the location, market value and potential of the acquired land. Thus, nobody else but the claimants are responsible for application of higher rate of deduction. Applying certain amount of conjectures, higher rate of deduction and setting off part thereof towards the increase in value of land on the basis of Ex.P.4, I consider it just, fair and reasonable that claimants would be entitled to get compensation at the rate of Rs. 79 per square yard (Rs. 3,82,360 per acre).
14. Consequently, the appeals of the claimants are partly accepted to the extent that they would be entitled to the aforesaid rate of compensation for acquisition of their respective lands with statutory benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act and the appeals filed by the Union Territory Chandigarh and dismissed. All the appeals are accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.