Madhya Pradesh High Court
Union Of India vs Satish Kumar on 13 January, 2026
Author: Anil Verma
Bench: Anand Pathak, Anil Verma
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541
1 WA-2993-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL VERMA
ON THE 13th OF JANUARY, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 2993 of 2025
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Versus
SATISH KUMAR
Appearance:
Shri Paveen Kumar Newaskar - Dy. S.G for the appellants/Union of India.
Shri Niraml Sharma - Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
Per: Justice Anil Verma The appellants have preferred this intra Court appeal under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, being aggrieved by the order dated 16.07.2025 passed in W.P. No.27421/2021, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent/petitioner has been allowed and the matter has been remitted back to the disciplinary authority to conduct fresh inquiry after providing adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent/petitioner was working as Constable (Barber) at 20th Battalion, Indo Tibbat Border Police Force (in short "ITBP') at Guwahati. He proceeded on sanctioned leave for the period from 09.10.2016 to 13.11.2016, however, while he was on leave, he fell ill on account of which, he could not resume his duties. After leave Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAM KUMAR SHARMA Signing time: 1/15/2026 10:49:03 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541 2 WA-2993-2025 period, he preferred an application on 26.11.2016 along with medical certificate and the Pathology report, which has been received in the office of respondents on 28.11.2016. The appellant afforded several opportunities to the respondent/petitioner to join his duties and they waited for long Eight months of his arrival to join the duties, but the respondent/petitioner did not turn, therefore, the appellants conducted inquiry and ultimately, by the impugned order, the respondent/petitioner has been removed from service invoking Rule 17 and 20 of the ITBP Act Rules 1947. Thereafter, he preferred appeal against the said order, which was also dismissed.
3. Against the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, the appellant preferred a writ petition before the writ court challenging both the impugned orders (Annexures P/1 and P/2) and issuing direction to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. After hearing both the parties, the writ Court allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants to conduct fresh inquiry against him after providing him sufficient opportunity of hearing. The appellant raised the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction of this Court before the writ Court but the same was not considered and by the impugned order, the learned Writ Court allowed the writ petition. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, the appellant has preferred instant appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the respondent/petitioner was remained absent from duties for more than 240 days without prior permission of the competent authority, therefore, the Court of inquiry has been instituted against the petitioner by the Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAM KUMAR SHARMA Signing time: 1/15/2026 10:49:03 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541 3 WA-2993-2025 Commandant 20th Bn. ITBP and after giving so cause notice, which has also been published in the newspaper, the petitioner was declared absent and inquiry was instituted against him and after inquiry vide impugned order, the petitioner was removed from service. The petitioner preferred an appeal agaisnt the order dated 14.07.2017 which was also time barred by more than two years and no application for condonation of delay has been filed before the appellate authority therefore, the appellate authority has also dismissed the appeal. The impugned order passed by the learned writ court is against the law and fact. The writ court has failed to consider the fact that the departmental appeal was barred by 815 days and the order in disciplinary inquiry was passed in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, therefore, the writ petition does not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court of M.P., Bench Gwalior and writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of beyond the territorial jurisdiction. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned order be set-aside and the writ appeal be dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction and also being time barred.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent/petitioner opposed the prayer and payed for rejection by supporting the impugned order passed by learned writ court.
6. Heard the counsels for both the parties and perused carefully perused the entire record with due care.
7. In the instant matter, the petitioner was appointed in the ITBI Force on the post of Constable (Barber) by the Ministry of Defence and at the time of conducting departmental inquiry, the petitioner was posted in Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAM KUMAR SHARMA Signing time: 1/15/2026 10:49:03 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541 4 WA-2993-2025 Arunachal Pradesh, which clearly does not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The disciplinary authority who had passed the impugned order (Annexure P/2) was also having its office at Likabali District Lower Siang (Arunachal Pradesh).
8. As per Clause-2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the power conferred by Clause-1 to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. In view of sub- Clause-2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if cause of action wholly or in part arises within territorial jurisdiction, then writ is maintainable before the Court where the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
9. Now, the pivotal question which will decide the aspect of maintainability of this case is whether any cause of action, wholly or in part, arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court? Merely, because order of termination is served at Bhind, can it be said that cause of action in part has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Alchemist Ltd. vs. State Bank of Sikkim reported in 2007 (11) SCC 335 has held that even if a small fraction of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. In para 37, Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAM KUMAR SHARMA Signing time: 1/15/2026 10:49:03 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541 5 WA-2993-2025 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the petitioner/appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than that"
11. For the purpose of deciding the issue in present case whether service of notice/order to the respondent/petitioner at Bhind constitutes a material/essential or integral part of the cause of action. We deem it apposite to rely upon the order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs. M/s Swaika Properties and Another, reported in 1985 (3) SCC 217, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that mere service of notice would not give rise to any cause of action within the territory unless service of notice was an integral part of the cause of action. In the present case the appellant was unauthorizedly absent from service. On account of the same the order of dismissal was passed. There was no other place where the order of dismissal could be served upon him except his native place. Mere service of the said order did not give any rise to any cause of action to the respondent/petitioner because the said service was not an integral part of cause of action as the same has no relevance with the subject matter of the lis.
12. The similar facts came into consideration for adjudication before Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAM KUMAR SHARMA Signing time: 1/15/2026 10:49:03 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541 6 WA-2993-2025 the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of Nakul Deo Singh vs Commandant reported in 1999 SCC Online Ker 366 , wherein while considering an original application filed before the Kerala High Court by a Constable working in the CISF Unit at Bokkaro Steel Plant, decided the issue of the territorial jurisdiction. In the said case, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The applicant claimed that since the order of appellate authority was received within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court, therefore, it will have the jurisdiction to entertain the original application. The Full Bench of Kerala High Court after considering the contention of the parties held as under:-
"29. .......It appears to us that the decisions in Swaika Properties (supra) and the decision of Supreme Court and that of the High Court subsequent thereto clearly establish that the receipt of communication by itself does not constitute a fact in the bundle of facts constitute the cause of action. At best receipt of the order or communication only gives the party a right of action based on the cause of action arising out of the action complained of. When that action complained of takes place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and an appeal therefore is dismissed by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court cause of action wholly arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court and Art. 226(2) of the Constitution cannot be invoked to sustain a Writ Petition in this High Court on the basis that a part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court, merely because the appellate order communicated from the seat of the appellate authority was received while the petitioner was residing or working within the jurisdiction of this court Acceptance of the argument that the situs of the receipt of the order will determine the jurisdiction can lead to a position where a litigant would be in a position to choose his own court for the purpose of redressal of his grievance. All that he need to do is to move Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAM KUMAR SHARMA Signing time: 1/15/2026 10:49:03 AM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541
7 WA-2993-2025 over to a particular place for receiving the communication from the appellate authority and then approach the High Court of that place with a plea that that court had jurisdiction because the order of the appellate authority was served on him while he was residing within the jurisdiction of that High Court No litigant can have a right to choose the court for seeking relief and the mere introduction of clause 2 of Article 226 does not alter that position."
13. It is an admitted fact that the order of dismissal was passed by the authority situated at District Lowar Siang (Arunachal Pradesh). The appellate orders were passed by the authority at Arunachal Pradesh respectively. The said orders were communicated to the respondent/petitioner at Bhind because he was unauthorizedly absent from service. For the appellant authority there was no other place to communicate the said order, therefore, the same was sent to native place of the respondent/petitioner at Bhind. Merely because the orders were served at Bhind, it cannot be said that any part of cause of action arose at Bhind. If the submission made by the counsel for the respondent/petitioner is accepted, then any person while shifting to a place of his choice falling within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular Court may claim that the said Court has a territorial jurisdiction. That cannot be the intention of the legislature. The territorial jurisdiction of a Court is not dependent upon the mercy of the respondent/petitioner, but it is dependent upon the cause of action. The cause of action would mean those disputed issues which are required to be decided while adjudicating the claim of the litigating parties. When the place of residence of litigating party has no relevance with subject-matter of the lis, then the same cannot be said to be an integral part of cause of action.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAM KUMAR SHARMA Signing time: 1/15/2026 10:49:03 AMNEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541 8 WA-2993-2025
14. In the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd vs. Union of India and Another reported in 2004 (6) SCC 254, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court.
15. So far as the contention of petitioner/respondent that he was residing at Bhind and notice was served to him at Bhind being permanent resident at District Bhind. But the fact remains that his services were terminated while he was posting in other State, therefore, the fact that the respondent/petitioner was permanent resident of District Bhind, is not enough to create any part of cause of action within territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, in the instant case, there is nothing available on record to establish that any cause of action regarding close connection with discharge of duties has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Apart from the above, it is also note-worthy that the petitioner was initially terminated vide order dated 14.07.2017 passed by the disciplinary authority. After lapse of two years, he filed debarred appeal which has also been dismissed by the impugned order dated 18.10.2019 (Annexure P/1). The appellant did not file appropriate application for condonation of delay before the appellate authority. Even he has not filed any such application before the writ Court while filing writ petition in the year 2021 after lapse of two years. Therefore, the writ petition also deserves for dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: RAM KUMAR SHARMA Signing time: 1/15/2026 10:49:03 AMNEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1541 9 WA-2993-2025
16. On the basis of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches and lack of territorial jurisdiction but the learned writ Court has not considered all these legal aspects which has already been raised by the appellant/respondents in their return before the writ Court. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the writ Court deserves to be set-side.
17. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this writ appeal is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated 16.07.2025 passed by the writ Court in W.P.No.27421 of 2021 is hereby set-aside.
18. This writ appeal stands allowed and disposed off.
(ANAND PATHAK) (ANIL VERMA)
JUDGE JUDGE
Rks
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RAM KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing time: 1/15/2026
10:49:03 AM