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[Cites 7, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Sri Dillip Kumar Pradhan vs State Of Orissa & Ors. ...... Opp. ... on 5 November, 2019

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 ORI 321

Author: S. Panda

Bench: S. Panda

                                W.P.(C) No. 14405 of 2019




                 Sri Dillip Kumar Pradhan
                 & Ors.                        ......               Petitioners


                                            -Versus-


                 State of Orissa & Ors.        ......               Opp. Parties


05. 05.11.2019           Heard Mr. Samarendra Pattnaik, learned counsel for

                 the petitioners, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate for the State

                 and Mr. Baidhar Sahoo, learned counsel for the opp. party

                 no.3.

                         The petitioners-workmen in this writ petition seek to

                 challenge the award dated 29th June 2013 passed by the

                 learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Sambalpur in I.D.

                 Case No. 9 of 2012 vide Annexure-1 as well as rejection of

                 their representation relating to their absorption by the

                 opposite party no.3 as per order dated 08.02.2019 vide

                 Annexure-5.

                         The following reference was made by the Govt. of

                 Odisha, Labour and ESI Department in exercise of the

                 power conferred by sub-section (5) of section 12 read with

                 clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Industrial

                 Disputes Act, 1947:-
                         2




        "Whether the auction of the management of
        Sambalpur District Co-operative Central Bank
        Limited, Bargarh in terminating the services of
        42 numbers of contingent employees as per
        list with effect from 15.12.2008 is legal and/or
        justified? If not, what relief these workmen are
        entitled to?"

2.      The case of the petitioners who are some of the

second party-workmen in the Court below is that they were

employed by the opp. party no.2- the Management of

Sambalpur District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Bargarh

since    28.07.2008     pursuant   to   the   decision     dated

17.07.2008 of the Appointment Committee of the opp.

party no.2 with a consolidated pay of Rs.4000/- to

Rs.5000/- per month as per their designation and work

allotted. Their appointment was contingent as per the

decision of the Committee for appointment. It is the specific

case of the petitioners that during their functioning, there

was change of management and the Collector -cum-

District Magistrate, Bargarh remained as management in-

charge of the bank since 25.10.2008. He took a decision to

accept the service of one Shri B.C. Sethi, Deputy Registrar
                       3




Co-operative Societies, Sambalpur Division as Secretary in

charge of the bank though his joining report was not

accepted by the Committee of the management. According

to the petitioners, Sri B.C. Sethi, without having any

authority, continued to work as Secretary in-charge of the

bank and he was trying to blame the earlier management.

To satisfy his grudge, he targeted the petitioners and other

workmen by adopting illegal means, disengaged/terminated

them from service         by a   decision   dated 14.12.2008.

According to the petitioners, their termination from service

is illegal, unjustified and contravenes the provisions of

section 25-F and 25-N of the I.D. Act, 1947. It is the case

of the petitioners that the opp. party no.2 retained the

services of some junior workmen violating section 25-G of

the I.D. Act. It is the further case of the petitioners that

they remained unemployed since their date of termination

and leading a miserable life and they prayed to declare

their retrenchment dated 14.12.2008 to be illegal and void

with a further prayer to reinstate them in service and to

direct the opposite party no.2 to pay back wages to them

from the date of the illegal termination of service.
                        4




3.     The opp. party no.2 Management filed its written

statement wherein it is stated that the petitioners were not

the workmen and since no industrial dispute existed

between the parties, the case is not maintainable. It is

further stated that one workmen namely Manjit Pradhan

filed W.P.(C) No.19248 of 2008 before this Court relating to

his termination with a further prayer for regularization of

service. The Management admitted that due to shortage of

staff, the Appointment Committee of the bank engaged the

petitioners and other workmen as Junior Assistant/Assistant

Supervisor and peon/night watchman on contingent basis

with   conditions   that   (i)   their   engagement   is   purely

temporary; (ii) their engagement was with consolidated pay

of Rs.5000/- and Rs.4000/- for Junior Assistant and peon

respectively; (iii) they cannot claim any service right in

future and can be terminated at any time without assigning

any previous notice. It is the case of the opp. party no.2

that engagement of the petitioners was against the OCS

Act, 1962 and the instruction of the Registrar Co-operative

Societies, Orissa, so also the ORV Act. The decision of the
                              5




Appointment Committee dated 14.12.2008 was just and

proper since no selection procedure was adopted and the

provisions of ORV Act was not followed for the engagement

of the petitioners. With such averments, the opp. party

no.2 contended that the petitioners were not entitled to any

relief.

4.        Considering the respective plea of the parties, the

learned Court formulated the following issues:

          (a)   Whether the action of the Management of
                Sambalpur District Co-operative Central Bank
                Ltd., Bargarh in terminating the services of 42
                numbers of contingent employees as per list
                with effect from 15.12.2008 is legal and/or
                justified?
          (b)   If not, to what relief these workmen are
                entitled?


5.        One Dhabaleswar Meher was examined on behalf of

the petitioners and the opposite party no.2 examined only

one witness, who was the Assistant Secretary of the

Management. From the side of the petitioners, several

documents were filed and marked Ext.1 to Ext.4. The

opposite party no.2 also filed volume of documents which
                         6




were marked Ext.A to Ext.P.

6.     Adjudicating the issue no.1, the learned Labour Court

held that there was no disciplinary proceeding against any

of the petitioners and there was no allegation regarding

their inefficiency in the working under the opposite party

no.2 during their period of service for about 4 to 5 months.

It was further held that the appointment/engagement of

the petitioners workmen was not legal and they had no

right to continue in the service particularly when there was

specific mention in their appointment orders that their

services can be terminable at any time without assigning

any reason or previous notice and therefore, no fault can

be found with the decision taken by the opposite party no.2

in terminating their services.

       So far as issue no.2 is concerned, the learned Labour

Court held that since the appointment of the petitioners

was illegal and       the   decision of the     Management in

terminating   their   services   is   legal   and   justified,   the

petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this case.
                       7




       In the conclusion, it was held that the action of the

opposite party no.2 in terminating the services of the

petitioners and other workmen as contingent employees

with effect from 15.12.2008 was held to be legal and

justified.

7.     The learned counsel for the petitioners contended

that since the termination of the petitioners contravenes

the provisions of the I.D. Act, 1947, it is per se illegal and

therefore, the impugned award should be set aside. The

learned counsel for the opposite party no.3 supported the

impugned award.

8.     Before addressing the contentions raised by the

learned counsel for the petitioners, it is necessary to

discuss the scope of interference with the award passed by

the learned Labour Court in the certiorari jurisdiction of this

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

       In    case   of    Syed     Yakoob       -Vrs.-    K.S.

Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477, a

Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as

follows:-
           8




"7. The question about the limits of the
jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a
writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been
frequently considered by this Court and
the true legal position in that behalf is no
longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be
issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals:
these are cases where orders are passed
by inferior Courts or Tribunals without
jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a
result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A
writ can similarly be issued where in
exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the
Court   or    Tribunal   acts   illegally   or
improperly, as for instance, it decides a
question without giving an opportunity to
be heard to the party affected by the
order, or where the procedure adopted in
dealing with the dispute is opposed to
principles of natural justice. There is,
however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory
jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is
not entitled to act as an appellate Court.
This limitation necessarily means that
findings of fact reached by the inferior
            9




Court or Tribunal as a result of the
appreciation      of      evidence     cannot      be
reopened       or       questioned        in     writ
proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be
corrected by a writ, but not an error of
fact, however grave it may appear to be.
In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be
issued if it is shown that in recording the
said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material
evidence, or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible        evidence          which       has
influenced        the      impugned           finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on
no evidence, that would be regarded as
an error of law which can be corrected by
a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this
category of cases, however, we must
always bear in mind that a finding of fact
recorded     by     the    Tribunal    cannot      be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that the relevant
and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to
sustain    the      impugned         finding.     The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on
                          10




           a point and the inference of fact to be
           drawn from the said finding is within the
           exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and
           the said points cannot be agitated before
           a writ Court. It is within these limits that
           the jurisdiction conferred on the High
           Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of
           certiorari can be legitimately exercised
           (vide     Hari       Vishnu        Kamath         -Vrs.-
           Ahmad Ishaque, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 233;
           Nagendra Nath -Vrs.- Commr. of Hills
           Division, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398 and
           Kaushalya            Devi        -Vrs.-    Bachittar
           Singh, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1168)."


      The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sadhu Ram

-Vrs.- Delhi Transport Corporation reported in A.I.R.

1984 S.C. 1467 held as follows:-

           "3.      We    are      afraid    the     High    Court
           misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under
           Article 226 of the Constitution is truly
           wide but, for that very reason, it has to
           be exercised with great circumspection. It
           is not for the High Court to constitute
           itself    into     an     appellate       Court    over
           Tribunals constituted under special
                        11




            legislations to resolve disputes of a kind
            qualitatively different from ordinary civil
            disputes    and       to    re-adjudicate   upon
            questions       of   fact   decided   by    those
            Tribunals. That the questions decided
            pertain to jurisdictional facts does not
            entitle the High Court to interfere with the
            findings on jurisdictional facts which the
            Tribunal is well competent to decide.
            Where the circumstances indicate that the
            Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the
            High Court may be justified in interfering.
            But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction
            only if a reference is made and it is
            therefore impossible ever to say that the
            Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we
            do not think that it was proper for the
            High Court to substitute its judgment for
            that of the Labour Court and hold that the
            workman had raised no demand with the
            management...."


      In view of such settled position of law, under Article

226 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere

with weighing of evidence led before the learned Labour

Court or Tribunal as if a Court of appeal. A finding of fact

cannot be challenged on the ground that relevant materials
                      12




and   evidence   adduced    before   the   Court   below   was

insufficient or inadequate to sustain the findings. The

adequacy or sufficiency of evidence and the inferences to

be drawn from the evidence are the exclusive domain of

the Court below and the same cannot be agitated before

this Court. Even if another view is possible on the evidence

adduced before the learned Court below, this Court would

not be justified to interfere with the findings recorded by

the Court. When the findings recorded by the Court are

perverse or irrational or arrived at by ignoring materials on

record or arbitrary or contrary to the principles of natural

justice, the same can be interfered with by this Court in a

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

9.    After hearing the learned counsel for both the parties

and going through the documents relied upon by petitioners

and the impugned award, we find that the learned Labour

Court has framed the issues correctly and discussed all the

issues elaborately with reference to the materials available

on record. The learned Court has rightly held that the

petitioners were working under the Management for about
                             13




four    to    five    months      and    there   was     no   disciplinary

proceeding against them or any allegation regarding their

inefficiency in the working under the Management. It is also

rightly      held    not   the    appointment/engagement          of    the

petitioners was not legal and in their appointment orders, it

is    specifically     mentioned        that   their   service    can    be

terminated at any time without assigning any reason or

previous notice and therefore, they had no right to continue

in service. The learned Court rightly held that there was no

fault with the Management in terminating the service of the

petitioners. There is no error of law apparent on the face of

the record and it cannot be said that the view taken by the

learned Labour Court is not possible on the evidence

adduced before it. We find no patent illegality for interfering

with the impugned award which appears to be just and

reasonable. In that view of the matter, there is little scope

for    interference        with   the    same    in    exercise   of    writ

jurisdiction.

          Accordingly, the impugned award passed by the

learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Sambalpur in I. D.
                               14




          Case No.9 of 2012 stands confirmed and the writ petition

          being devoid of merits, stands dismissed.



                                                      .......................
                                                       S. Panda, J.

....................... S. K. Sahoo, J.

RKM/Skb