Kerala High Court
Inspector Of Police vs Assistant Director on 8 November, 2019
Author: Sunil Thomas
Bench: Sunil Thomas
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS
FRIDAY, THE 08TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2019 / 17TH KARTHIKA, 1941
Crl.MC.No.2178 OF 2019(B)
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CC 3/2014 OF
SPECIAL COURT(SPE/CBI) -I, ERNAKULAM
PETITIONER/RESPONDENT NO.1:
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
CBI/SCB,
COCHIN REPRESENTED BY THE STANDING COUNSEL FOR C.B.I.
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
BY ADV. SRI.SASTHAMANGALAM S. AJITHKUMAR
RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER/ACCUSED:
1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT(PMLA),
COCHIN ZONE-682001.
2 K.S.SABU,
S/O K.SREEDHARAN NAIR,
SIVASANNIDHI,
KIZHUVILAM P.O.MANNAM,
ATTINGAL,
TRIVANDRUM- 695 104.
R1 BY SRI.SUVIN R.MENON, CGC
R1 BY ADV. SRI.SHAIJAN C.GEORGE
THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24-09-
2019, THE COURT ON 08-11-2019 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.M.C.2178/19 2
'CR'
ORDER
The petitioner herein is the Inspector of Police CBI, Cochin unit, who is the complainant in C.C.No.3 of 2014 of the Special Judge, (SPE/CBI)-I. Ernakulam.
2. The accused is the second respondent in the above case. CBI registered RC7(A)/2012 alleging that the second respondent, being a public servant had amassed wealth disproportionate to his known source of income and invested it in the name of his family members. Pursuant to the crime registered, investigation was conducted and final report was laid. Cognizance was taken by the Special Court and pursuant to the summons issued, accused appeared.
3. In the meanwhile, the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement (PMLA) filed Crl.M.P.No.1106 of 2017 before the special court, invoking section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'Money Laundering Act').
4. It was claimed that the offence involved in the present case was a scheduled offence under the Money Laundering Act and that the Directorate of Enforcement had registered crime ECIR/1/KCZO/15 for offences punishable under sections 3 and 4 of the Money Laundering Act. After completion of investigation, complaint was laid before the designated Court under the Money Laundering Act, which is the Principal Sessions Court, Ernakulam. Cognizance was taken. The matter is now Crl.M.C.2178/19 3 pending as S.C.No.329 of 2017.
5. It was stated in the above application that, as per the scheme of the Money Laundering Act, the Special court has to try the scheduled offences and connected matters under the Money Laundering Act. Hence, it was requested that, C.C.No.3 of 2014 pending before the CBI Court may be committed under section 44(1)(c) of the Act to the designated Court under the Money Laundering Act. Detailed objection and additional objection were filed by the CBI. After hearing both sides, court below, by the impugned order allowed the application, which is under challenge in the proceedings. CBI has challenged the above order contending that the order was passed by the court below on a wrong appreciation of the legal principles involved in the case.
6. Learned Special Prosecutor for the CBI, Mr.Sasthamangalam S Ajith Kumar, invited my attention to the detailed objection filed before the court below raising the legal issues involved. It was contended that, under the Money Laundering Act, prosecution has to be initiated by filing a complaint in writing under section 44(1)(b) r/w 45(1) of the Act. Only a special court designated by the Central Government by notification under the above Act can try the offences committed under that Act. However, trial of offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred as 'PC Act') can be done only by a Special Judge appointed by the Central Government by notification under the provisions of the PC Act. It was further contended that, special court in an offence constituted under Crl.M.C.2178/19 4 the PC Act can hold trial only in accordance with the procedure of trial of a warrant case, by a magistrate. However, under section 46(1) of the Money Laundering Act, Special Court is a Court of session and as such, it has to follow the procedure as applicable to the trial before the sessions court. It was pointed out that, the Sessions Court designated under the Money Laundering Act is not a notified court under section 3 of the PC Act and consequently it cannot conduct trial of an offence under the PC Act. Hence, it was contended that, even if a scheduled offence investigated by the CBI and pending before the Special Court under the PC Act is committed under section 44(1)(c) of the Money Laundering Act, that Court being an incompetent court and not a Court notified under section 3 of the PC Act cannot try the offence. It was pointed out by the learned Special Prosecutor that, a complaint is filed under the Money Laundering Act by the competent authority under the Act. On the other hand, final report under section 173 Cr.P.C is filed by the CBI officer conducting investigation into the offences under the PC Act and cognizance is taken without any committal proceedings, in the light of section 5 of the PC Act.
7. Another contention advanced by the learned Special Prosecutor was that, sections 44 and 71 of the Money Laundering Act do not indicate that the Act overrides the PC Act. Hence, the special court under section 43 of the Money Laundering Act is not competent to try the offences under the PC Act, as the trial of a case involving an offence Crl.M.C.2178/19 5 under the PC Act can be conducted only by a Special Judge appointed under section 3 of the PC Act. Learned counsel contended that the present case cannot be clubbed with the complaint under the Money Laundering Act. The trial of the scheduled offence under the PC Act has to be completed before the Special Judge and that under the Money Laundering Act, before the principal sessions court, simultaneously. It was contended by the learned counsel that, section 44(1)(c) of the Money Laundering Act does not oblige the authority under the Money Laundering Act to seek for committal of the scheduled offence pending before the other court, if that was likely to embarrass the trial of either of the proceedings or if the Special court constituted under the Money Laundering Act was incompetent to try the offences pending before the other Court. It was contended by the learned prosecutor that, incongruous situations may arise wherein, committal of scheduled offence investigated by the CBI or other agencies are sought to be committed for the trial along with proceeding pending before the special court under the Money Laundering Act. Learned counsel further pointed out that, in the additional objections filed before the trial court, it was contended that, under section 4(1) of the PC Act, offence shall be tried by the Special Judge only. Section 3 empowers the Government to appoint the Special Judge under the Act by notification. The Principal Sessions Judge under the Money Laundering Act, constituted in this case, was not a Special Judge under section 3 of the PC Act. There was no impediment in Crl.M.C.2178/19 6 continuing of trial under the PC Act by the Special Court under the Act and holding of the trial under the Money Laundering Act by the Principal Sessions Court, Ernakulam will not offend section 220 Cr.P.C.
8. Essentially, the question that arises in the present case is the scope of section 44 (1)(c) of the Money Laundering Act, read along with section 71 of that Act. Evidently, the case involved in C.C.No.3 of 2014 is a scheduled offence under the Money Laundering Act.
Section 44(1) of the Money Laundering Act reads as follows:
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974),-
(a) an offence punishable under section 4 and any scheduled offence connected to the offence under that section shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed:
Provided that the Special Court, trying a scheduled offence before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to try such scheduled offence; or]
(b) a Special Court may, [***] upon a complaint made by an authority authorized in this behalf under this Act take [cognizance of offence under section 3, without the accused being committed to it for trial].
(c) If the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money laundering under sub-clause (b), it shall, on an application by the authority authorized to file a complaint under this Act, commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court and the Special Court shall, on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the stage at which it is committed.] Crl.M.C.2178/19 7
(d) a Special Court while trying the scheduled offence or the offence of money laundering shall hold trial in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), as it applies to a trial before a Court of Session.]
9. An argument advanced by the Special Prosecutor for the CBI was that, both courts involved being sessions courts, no committal proceeding from one sessions court to another was not legally possible. That was negatived by the court below itself, by the impugned order in the light of section 44(1) which gives an overriding effect over other provisions of Cr.P.C. Further, Section 44(1)(c) specifically provides for an order of committal by one Court to another. Yet another contention of the CBI was that, to attract section 44(1)(c) of the Money Laundering Act, special court under the PC Act has to take cognizance of the complaint of the offence under the Money Laundering Act and since the court below has not taken cognizance of complaint of the offence of Money Laundering, the question of committal under section 44(1)(c) does not arise. This was also rejected by the court below holding that, since the court below has taken cognizance of a scheduled offence under the Money Laundering Act, section 44(1)(c) of the Money Laundering Act applies.
10. The scheme of the Act shows that the definition of Money Laundering as provided under section 2(p) of the Act, which is referable to section 3, casts a criminal liability on any person who directly or Crl.M.C.2178/19 8 indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the "proceeds of crime" and projecting it as untainted property and shall be guilty of offence of money laundering. Section 4 provides the punishment for money laundering. The object of the Act, is to prevent money laundering and to provide for confiscation of property derived from or involved in money laundering and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. "Proceeds of crime" is defined in section 2(u) to mean any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property. Scheduled offence under section 2(y) means the offences specified under part A, B and C of the schedule subject to prescribed monetary limit in case of Part B. The scheme of the Act clearly shows that, Money Laundering, though an offence by itself, is inextricably connected to a scheduled offences (predicate offences). The schedule discloses that the predicate offences cover a variety of statutes.
11. Under the Act, all offences punishable under section 4 of the Act shall be tried by special courts constituted under section 43 of the Act by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. Section 43(2) of the Act provides that, while trying an offence under the Act, a Special Court shall also try an offence, other than an offence referred to in sub-section (1), with which the Crl.M.C.2178/19 9 accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, be charged at the same trial. Identical provision is also available under section 4(3) of the PC Act.
12. Essentially the scheme of the Act indicates that the offence under the Money Laundering Act is to be tried by the special courts constituted under that Act and the predicate offences are to be tried by the Court competent under the Statute, which had made the predicate offence punishable. The offences under the Money Laundering Act are to be investigated by the competent authorities under the concerned statute and tried by the Court competent under that Act. Since the sine quo non for a prosecution of an offence under the Money Laundering Act is the existence of proceeds of a predicate offence, it can be said that, conviction of an offence under the Money Laundering Act depends on the establishment of predicate offence and the generation of proceeds of that crime.
13. Evidently, Money Laundering Act does not contemplate that offence under the Money Laundering Act and the predicate offence shall both be tried by the same Special Court under the Money Laundering Act. There is no specific provision in the Money Laundering Act, which prescribes so. In fact, existence of section 44(1)(c) visualizes the existence of two separate proceedings before two courts, one being the Special Court under the Money Laundering Act. In such a situation, section 44(1)(c) confers an authority on the authorized officer under the Crl.M.C.2178/19 10 Money Laundering Act to make an application requesting the Court to commit the case relating to predicate offence to the Special Court. It clearly shows that, unless such an application is made, the predicate offence shall be continued in the court competent under the Act.
14. The short question that now arises in this case is whether, it is obligatory on the part of the competent officer to seek a committal of the predicate offence in every case and even if such an option is available to the officer and if in exercise of such option, an application is filed, is the Court, as a matter of course, bound to allow it.
15. It is clear that Parliament did not intend to make it obligatory on the authorized officer under the Money Laundering Act to invariably make an application under section 44(1)(c) of the Act. Otherwise, there is no reason as to why the committal under section 44(1)(c) should be dependent on an application by the competent officer under the Money Laundering Act. The Parliament could not have been oblivious of the fact that atleast in some cases, the predicate offences may be triable by special courts authorized for the specific purpose and that the Special Court under the Money Laundering Act may not be competent to try such offences, as has happened in this case.
16. The contention of Mr.Shaijan C.George, the Special Public Prosecutor for the authority under the Money Laundering Act was that, in the light of section 71 of the Act, which confers an overriding effect over all other Statutes and section 44(1) which overrides Code of Criminal Crl.M.C.2178/19 11 Procedure, both provisions have to be read in conjunction and Money Laundering Act will have primacy over all other proceedings. The significant words used in section 44(1) of the Act are, "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure" (emphasis supplied). It is explicit that, the non obstante clause refers to the procedural matters in relation to matters covered by section 44 and not the substantive law. However, section 46 of the Act makes provisions of Cr.P.C applicable to proceedings before the Special Court. Since the non- obstante clause in section 44(1) applies only to the procedural matters, that provision cannot support the contention that section 44(1) overrides the substantive law in relation to Statutes covering the predicate offence.
17. Section 71 of the Money Laundering Act envisages an overriding effect. It reads as follows:
"71 - Act to have overriding effect - The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force."
Section 71 itself clarifies that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. Evidently, the Money Laundering Act has primacy in the field of operation to which the Act extends and within that domain, it will have overriding effect over any other inconsistent provisions in other Statutes. This is the natural and the limited extent of the scope of Section 71 and not an omnibus overriding effect over all other Statutes, as argued by the Crl.M.C.2178/19 12 respondent. This has been consistently laid down by various authorities. The Company Law Appellate Tribunal, in Anil Goel v. Ramanjit, Deputy Director in CP(IB) 70/ALD/2017, resolving the dispute as to whether Money Laundering Act has supremacy over Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code held that both statutes provide two different hierarchies of functionaries to decide the controversies that arise under respective authorities. When such is the case, one authority cannot interfere with the function of the other authority under a different enactment. In Varrsana Ispat Ltd. v. Deputy Director (Company appeal 493/2018), CLAT rejected the contention that provisions of insolvency and Bankruptcy Code override provisions of Money Laundering Act 2002 and held that, as both relate to different field of operation, both can proceed simultaneously and one Act has no overriding effect over the other. This view was reiterated by NCLAT in Rotomac Global Private Ltd. v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (Company Appeal) (AT)(Insolvency No.140/2019).
18. Referring to the main issue involved in section 44(1)(c) of the Act, the learned Special prosecutor referred to the decision of Jharkhand High Court in Anosh Ekka vs. Enforcement Directorate (W.P(Cr.).No.257 of 2012), though the learned Prosecutor did not fully endorse the observations therein. In the above case, crime was registered by the State Vigilance against a former Chief Minister for offences punishable under sections 420, 423, 424, 465 r/w 120B of IPC and other Crl.M.C.2178/19 13 provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In the course of investigation, Enforcement Directorate initiated proceedings under the Money Laundering Act on an allegation that ill-gotten money was used for purchasing land and other assets. The question that came up for consideration before the High Court was whether the prosecution for the scheduled offence should precede the trial of offence under the PMLA.
19. The contention was that an offence under section 3 of the Money Laundering Act was dependent upon the scheduled offences. It was contented that, unless the scheduled offences are not established, one cannot determine the proceeds of crime and therefore, unless proceeds of crime was established by putting the accused on trial, any prosecution of the person under the Money Laundering Act would be premature and would be an exercise in futility as one cannot be convicted for offence under the Money Laundering Act, without there being any conviction of the person for the scheduled offences.
20. The High Court noted that the Act was silent as to whether trial under the scheduled offences must precede the trial of offence under Money Laundering Act or both the offences being tried simultaneously or trial of offence under the Money Laundering Act should precede trial under Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court was of the definite view that the trial of offence under the Money Laundering Act can never precede the trial of schedule offences as the prosecution needs to establish that, one having committed scheduled offences has acquired Crl.M.C.2178/19 14 property through proceeds of crime and unless that is established, any trial which proceeds under the Money Laundering Act would be pre- mature and that, if it proceeds, the Court will have to assume that the accused is guilty for the scheduled offences, which would be against the spirit of the Act and therefore, that option never lies with the Court.
21. The other option available to the special court was to proceed with the trial under the scheduled offences as well as under the Money Laundering Act simoltaneously. As mentioned earlier, the scheme of the Money Laundering Act beyond doubt indicates that, it does not contemplate a trial of predicate offences and the offence under the Money Laundering Act by the special court simultaneously, in every case. Though under section 43(2) of Money Laundering Act, it is clarified that, while trying an offence under the Act, special court shall also try an offence, other than an offence under subsection (1), with which the accused may be charged under the Cr.P.C., the Parliament in its wisdom has not extended it to a trial of scheduled offence, simultaneously by the special court under the Money Laundering Act. On the other hand, section 44(1)(c) stipulates that the committal of the scheduled offence to the special court under Money Laundering Act can be ordered only on an application by the authority under the Money Laundering Act, which is authorized to file a complaint under the Act. Conversely, it implies that in the absence of any such application, both courts can independently proceed with the trials.
Crl.M.C.2178/19 15
22. It is hence evident that, Parliament was conscious of the consequences of stipulating that both predicate offence and the offence under the Money Laundering Act shall be tried by the special court under the Act, though the offences under both Statutes are inextricably interlinked. Otherwise, there is no reason as to why the Act should make the committal, conditional on an application by the prosecutor.
23. The procedural difficulty that might arise in the absence of above statutory provision can easily be visualized. In the case at hand, the special court under the Money Laundering Act was incompetent to try the offence under the prevention of Corruption Act, which can be tried only by the special Judge appointed under section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The above view has been expressed by the Jharkhand High Court in Anosh Ekka's case also. That Court had taken note of the different procedure for investigation under the Money Laundering Act, the procedure for taking cognizance under the Act and the powers of the special court under that court, which is distinct from that under the PC Act. Evidently, the committal under section 44(1)(c) can only be for the simultaneous trial of both cases and not for a joint trial. Definitely, there cannot be a consolidation of the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the offences under the Money Laundering Act. On an evaluation of the law, the Jharkhand High Court in the above case concluded that, special court trying the offence under Money Laundering Act shall wait for the result of the trial relating to scheduled offence. It Crl.M.C.2178/19 16 was held that, this was the practical solution of the matter and that would also expedite the trial.
24. The learned special prosecutor for CBI invited my attention to the decision of the Madras High Court in R.Subramanian v. CBI (Crl.O.P.No.6703 of 2019). In that case, crime was registered against the officials of bank and a company for offences punishable under section 120B r/w 420 IPC and section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After investigation, final report was laid and cognizance was taken by the Additional Metropolitan magistrate as C.C.No.9635 of 2014. In the meanwhile, complaint was laid by Enforcement Directorate under section 43(1) of the Money Laundering Act against the accused as C.C.No.4 of 2018, before the special court. One of the accused approached the Madras High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C with a prayer to adjourn the proceedings in C.C.No.9655 of 2014 of ACJM, till it was transferred to the Special Court constituted under Money Laundering Act.
25. The contention of the petitioner therein was that, proceedings in C.C.No.9635 of 2014 related to a predicate offence of C.C.No.4 of 2019, pending before the special court under Money Laundering Act. It was contended that, in the light of section 44(1)(a) of the Act, the offence under section 4 of the Act and any scheduled offence connected to the said offence shall be triable by the special court, having jurisdiction where Money Laundering offence was committed. It was also argued Crl.M.C.2178/19 17 that, section 71 of the Act also provided that the Act will have overriding effect and as such jurisdiction of Additional Metropolitan Magistrate stood ousted in respect of the connected predicate offence to which the impugned proceedings related.
26. Refuting the above contentions, the High Court held that the main object of constituting a special court under Money Laundering Act was for a speedy trial of offences under the Act. Hence, it was held that, merely because a complaint was filed by the 2 nd respondent before the special court with regard to money laundering, it cannot be stated that the case investigated by CBI with regard to the aforesaid crime also has to be tried by the special court under the Act. Hence, in as much as an offence of money laundering was not charged by CBI, the proceedings before the CBI cannot be transferred on the mere fact that aforesaid offence was the basis of money laundering. If such a view was adopted, all the cases pertaining to predicate offences should be stayed once the complaint under Money Laundering Act is filed in special court, it was held. The court proceeded to hold that, cases pending before other courts than special court under Money Laundering Act relating to scheduled offences, cannot be transferred and it can only commit the cases to special court on filing necessary application by authority concerned under section 44(1)(c) of the Act. Court opined that since the offence of money laundering was inextricably linked to the predicate offence, it will be in the ultimate interest of the prosecution to see that charges for predicate Crl.M.C.2178/19 18 offence are proved, so as to bring the amounts involved in the cases for the predicate offence, within the ambit of definition of "proceeds of crime". That was the reason why the legislature in its wisdom has given the option to the department to seek for a committal, rather than to give the option to the accused, so that delay may not be caused in the trial of offence for the predicate offence, it was held.
27. It is true that, section 44(1)(a) of the PMLA provides that, an offence under section 4 of the Act and scheduled offence connected to the offence under section 4 shall be triable by the special court under the Act. This read with section 71 of the Act which gives an overriding effect over all other law in force, may at first blush, give an impression that, there is substance in the contention that the offences under Money Laundering Act and their scheduled offences shall be tried by the special court constituted under the said Act. As indicated earlier, section 71 of the Act does not create an absolute overriding effect of Money Laundering Act over all other statutes. It applies only in a limited sense that the Act will override to the extend of inconsistency of other statutes over Money Laundering Act. The interpretation given to section 44(1)(a) that, by virtue of it, all the predicate offences and the offences under Money Laundering Act shall be tried by the special court constituted under the Money Laundering Act does neither stand to reason, nor does it gets its support from the scheme of that Act. If such an interpretation is given, section 44(1)(c) which enables the authorized officer under Act to Crl.M.C.2178/19 19 seek a committal of predicate offence pending in another court to the special court under the said Act, will be rendered meaningless and redundant.
28. Section 44(1)(a) of Money Laundering Act has to be read in conjunction with section 43(1) of the same Act, which authorizes a special court under that Act to try also an offence other than an offence punishable under section 4(1) of the Act, with which the accused may be charged at same trial under the provisions of the above Act. If the intention of the legislature was to provide that, all scheduled offences and their connected offences under the Money Laundering Act shall be tried by the special court constituted under the Money Laundering Act, there was no reason for providing in section 44(1)(a) that, it shall be triable only by the special court "constituted for the areas in which the offence has been committed". It may be possible that, when a scheduled offence and the offence under section 4 of the Money Laundering Act are charged under section 43(2) of the Act the scheduled offence may be committed within the jurisdiction of one special court and the offence under section 4 of PMLA may be committed within the jurisdiction of another special court, the question of jurisdiction of the Court which is competent to try the offences arises. Section 44(1)(a) to my mind, addresses it. That precisely is the reason why the Statute use the words "only by the special court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed". (emphasis supplied).
Crl.M.C.2178/19 20The statutory provision refers to two offences. Firstly, the scheduled offence and the other, offence punishable under section 4. In deciding whether the special court within whose jurisdiction the scheduled offence was committed or the Special Court within whose jurisdiction offence under section 4 was committed, section 44(1)(a) provides that, it is the Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed. This seems to be the only reasonable, logical and sensible interpretation to section 44(1)(a).
29. This leads to the interpretation on the scope of section 44(1)
(c), which confers a choice on the authorized officer under PMLA to seek committal of case relating to scheduled offence to special court. It cannot be said that the legislature is oblivious of incongruous and absurd situation that may arise if it is provided that scheduled offences shall simultaneously be tried by the special court under Money Laundering Act. As referred earlier, it may be possible that scheduled offences can be tried only by notified or designated courts, which power, cannot be exercised by the special court under the Money Laundering Act. If such a case is committed to a special court under the PMLA, invoking section 44(1)(c), the special court will be without jurisdiction to try that case. Necessarily the trial has to fail. Consequently, the prosecution under Money Laundering Act should also fail. Statute cannot be interpreted to lead to such incongruous situation. As referred in Anosh Ekka's case, in such situation, the interpretative tool of "reductio absurdness" which Crl.M.C.2178/19 21 means that, whichever procedure under the scheme of Act would appear as absurd is to be discarded and only that procedure which would fulfill the aim and object of the Act is to be adopted. Section 44(1)(c) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Court to commit a case relating to scheduled offence to an incompetent court and thereby defeat the purpose of Act. Section 44(1)(c) also cannot be interpreted to authorize a court to commit a case pending before it to a court which lacks jurisdiction and to confer jurisdiction on a Court which inherently lacks it.
30. Hence, section 44(1)(c) should receive a reasonable interpretation which will augment the purpose of Act. Necessarily, it has to held that, section 44(1)(c) does not imply that, in every case contemplated under that sub-section, the competent authority shall make application for committal of case relating to scheduled offence to a special court under the Money Laundering Act. The authorized officer competent to lay the complaint is vested with a solemn discretion to carefully apply his mind and only in appropriate cases where the committal to special court will not defeat the prosecution and on the other hand, will enable a speedy disposal of case and achieve purpose of Statute should file an application. Likewise the terms "it shall" found in section 44(1)(c) following the words "under sub-clause (b)" does not make it mandatory on Court to allow every application, without due application of mind and dehors the merits of the case. The above words have to be interpreted to mandatorily authorize the court to commit case pending Crl.M.C.2178/19 22 before it to a special court under the Money Laundering Act, if valid grounds are made by the authorized authority.
31. A detailed discussion as above lead to a conclusion that, if the Court which has taken cognizance of scheduled offence is other than the special court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of offence of money laundering, the competent authority under the Money Laundering Act to file a complaint, is given a discretion to make application under section 44(1)(c) in appropriate cases, in the interest of justice and for a speedy trial. The Court also has to duly apply its mind and take a proper decision in accordance with law. In other cases, as held in Anosh Ekka's case (supra), the special court trying offence under the Money Laundering Act will have to wait for the result of trial relating to scheduled offence.
32. In the light of the above, the impugned order is not legally sustainable. Consequently, Crl.M.C is liable to be allowed setting aside the impugned order.
In the result, Crl.M.C is allowed. Impugned order in Crl.M.P.No.1106 of 2017 is set aside. Crl.M.P.No.1106 of 2017 stands dismissed.
Sd/-
SUNIL THOMAS
Sbna JUDGE
Crl.M.C.2178/19 23
APPENDIX
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A A TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION FILED BY THE
1ST RESPONDENT ADDITIONAL DIRECTORATE OF
ENFORCEMENT (PMLA), COCHIN ZONE, BEFORE THE
THE SPECIAL JUDGE (CBI)-1 COURT IN CC NO
3/2014
ANNEXURE B A TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED BY THE
PROSECUTION BEFORE THE SPECIAL JUDGE (CBI)-
1 COURT IN CC NO 3./2014
ANNEXURE C A TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITION OBJECTION FILED
BY THE PROSECUTION BEFORE THE SPECIAL JUDGE
(CBI)-1 COURT IN CC NO 3/2014
ANNEXURE D A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
29.11.2018 PASSED BY THE SPECIAL JUDGE
(CBI)-1 COURT IN CRL.MP NO 1106/2017 IN CC
NO 3/2014