Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Maya Devi Keswani vs The Estate Officer (Addl. District ... on 16 January, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(2)WLC603
JUDGMENT Sharma, J.
1. Proceedings under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964 (for short 1964 Act) were initiated by the Indian Red Cross Society respondent No. 3 (for short IRSC) seeking eviction of the petitioner from the premises situated in the Red Cross Campus outside Sanganeri Gate Jaipur. Learned Estate Officer (Additional District Magistrate Judicial) Jaipur vide judgment/order dated December 9, 1998 declared the petitioner to be the unauthorised occupant of the disputed premises and directed that notice be given to the petitioner for vacating the premises within thirty days. The 1RCS was also asked to file statement showing damages caused to it after Sept. 30, 1997. The petitioner assailed the said order of the Estate Officer by filing an appeal. Learned Additional District Judge No. 6 Jaipur City vide order dated April 13, 1999 dismissed the appeal. The petitioner in the instant writ petition seeks to quash the aforesaid orders of the Estate Officer and the appellate authority as well as notice issued under Section 4(1) of 1964 Act.
2. Contextual facts depict that IRCS let out to the petitioner a premises measuring 119 sq. ft in the Red Cross Campus outside Sanganerit Gate Jaipur for running medical shop on July 2,1987 and the lease deed was executed by the Chairman of the IRCS. After expiry of two years, the IRCS executed another lease deed for a period of 2 years and yearly rent was increased. Again after expiry of two years revised lease deed was executed on October 1, 1991 and the duration of the lease deed was made to be six years and rent was increased to Rs. 33750/- per annum with yearly increase of twelve and half per cent payable quarterly.
3. On August 22, 1997 IRCS issued tender notice in question. The petitioner instituted a civil suit in the Court of Additional Civil Judge Junior Division) East Jaipur City and the learned Civil Court granted order of making status quo in regard to suit premises on September 2, 1997. The IRCS thereafter initiated proceedings before the Estate Officer under 1964 Act against the petitioner.
4. Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently canvassed that the premises in question is not covered under the definition of public premises' as incorporated in section 2(b)(x) of the 1964 Act. It is further contended that provisions contained in Section 4 of 1964 Act which are mandatory in nature have been flouted. No opinion was formed by the Estate Officer before issuance of notice under Section 4 of 1964 Act as no necessary material was placed before the Estate officer to form the opinion. Notice under Section 4 was issued on October 18, 1997 whereas the documents were submitted on January 16,1998. Section 4(2)(b) of 1964 Act requires notice not to be earlier than 10 days, whereas notice was issued on October 18, 1997 for hearing on October 24, 1997. Notice under Section 4 of 1964 Act was vague as grounds were not clearly mentioned. No details of property was given and it was not stated that the premises was public premises. It is further urged that the premises in question will again be given on lease to some other person therefore it is not necessary to evict the petitioner from the said property. The Estate Officer has no jurisdiction over the properly in question, which is a nazul properly. As no eviction was sought by the State Government the, impugned orders of the Estate Officer, and Appellate Authority deserve to be set aside. Reliance is placed on S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation Delhi and Ors. (1), Wire Netting Stores and Anr. v. The Delhi Development Authority and Ors. (2), Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (3), (1981) 1 SCC 664 (4), Mrs. Kulsom Malick v. District Judge Jaipur City (5), Jai Charan Lal v. The State of U.P. (6), Minoo Framroze Balsara v. Union of India and Ors. (7), Radhey Shyam v. Vijai Singh (8), 1999(1) WLC 604 (9) and 1986 RLR 966 (10).
5. Per contra Mr. S.M. Mehta, learned Advocate General contended that the premises in question is covered under the definition of public premises as provided by section 2(b)(x) of the 1964 Act. Refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S.M. Mehta, learned Advocate General urged that notice issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4 was valid. Learned Advocate General further canvassed that 1964 Act gives finality to the orders passed by the appellate authority and this is not a fit case for invoking powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed on Ouseph Mathai and Ors. v. M. Abdul Khadir (11).
6. I have pondered over the rival submissions and carefully scanned the material on record.
7. The Indian Red Cross Society Act, 1920 (Act No. XV of 1920 (in short 1920 Act) is an Act to constitute Indian Red Cross Society. According to section 4A of the 1920 Act, the President of India is the President of the Society and under Section 5(1)(f), the Managing Body with the approval of the President, can exercise the powers in supervising the activities of State Branch Committees. Section 4 of 1920 Act provides that first Members of the Society and all persons who became members, shall constitute a Body corporate under the name of the Indian Red Cross Society, and the said Body shall have perpetual succession and common seal with power to hold and acquire property, movable and immovable and shall sue and be used by the said name. 11 is thus evident that IRCS is a body corporate constituted under 1920 Act and the premises in question belonging to IRCS, is controlled by the State Government. The premises in question therefore is 'public premises' within the purview of section 2(b)(x) of 1964 Act which provides that public premises include any premises belonging to a body corporate established or constituted by a Central Act or a Rajasthan Act and owned and controlled by the State Government.
8. That takes me to the other submissions in regard to notice under Section 4 of the 1964 Act. Sub-section 91) of Section 4 of 1964 Act provides that if the estate officer is of opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, the estate officer shall issue notice in writing upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. The said notice shall be issued to the persons concerned in the manner provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of 1964 Act and it shall specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made and the date specified in the said notice shall be a date not earlier than 10 days from the date of issue thereof. The notice shall be served by having it affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises and if the public premises is in possession of any other person, the copy of the said notice shall be served on such person.
9. In order to appreciate the submissions advanced before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner I have carefully gone through the notice under Section 4 issued to the petitioner (Annexure-5). The said notice was issued on October 15, 1997 and the petitioner was directed to appear before the Estate Officer on October 24, 1997. It was stated in the said notice that as time limit of lease deed expired, the petitioner was the unauthorised occupant. The Estate officer as well as the appellate authority examined the validity of notice under Section 4 of 1964 Act and found it valid. The question that arises for my consideration is whether interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is called for, particularly when section 10 of 1964 Act gives finality to the order of the appellate authority.
10. Section 10 of 1964 Act provides that any order made by the estate officer or appellate under this Act, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or executing proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any powers conferred by or under the Act.
11. The powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution are extra ordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ouseph Mathat and Ors. v. M. Abdul Khadir (supra) indicated that jurisdiction under Article 227 should not be exercised by the High Court unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party.
12. Interpreting the provisions contained in Kerela Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act 1965 their Lordships in Ouseph Mathat v. Abdul Khadir (supra) further observed that Sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the said Act unambiguously provides that the decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, an order of the rent control court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided in Section 20 of the Act. It follows, therefore that the order of eviction, if passed against a tenant shall attain final it after the decision of the appellate authority or at the most after the decision of the revisional authority as contemplated under Section 230 of the Act. Proceedings under Article 227, not being the extension of the proceedings under the Act would not automatically authorise the court to extend the time.
13. The writ petition filed by the petitioner is not an extension of the proceedings under 1964 Act. The impugned order of appellate authority has attained finality in view of section 10 of 1964 Act and the High Court as an appellate authority, can not reopen the decision that has attained finality unless there is dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power on the part of the authorities below.
14. I do not find any wrong referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power in the impugned orders of the appellate authority and the estate officer resulting in grave injustice to the petitioner. The appellate authority and the estate officer have also not crossed the limits ensuring the performance of duties by them in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of 1964 Act. The powers under Article 227 of the Constitution therefore cannot be invoked in the instant case and the impugned order of the appellate authority which has attained finality does not require interference.
15. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath (12), propounded that power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised more sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.
16. In Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and Anr. v. Pralap Singh Mohan Singh Pardeshi (13), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in a dispute regarding eviction of tenant under the Rent Control Act, a special legislation governing land-lord tenant relationship.
17. This legal position was reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Koyilerian Janaki and Ors. v. Rent Controller (Munsiff) Cannanore and others (14). I am unable to pursuade myself to agree with the submissions advanced before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
18. The writ petition being devoid of merit stands dismissed, without any order as to costs.