Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rajaram vs Panchayat And Rural Development ... on 27 June, 2017
Writ Petition No.3615 of 2017
27.06.2017:-
Shri Kuldeep Pathak, learned Counsel for the petitioners.
Shri Rohit Kumar Mangal, learned Government Advocate
for the respondents/State.
Petitioners have filed the present petition seeking direction to the respondents to provide them an alternative site to carry out the activities of Brick making so that they may earn their livelihood.
The petitioners are permanent resident of Gram Panchayat Bavliya Bujurg, Tehsil and District--Indore. They are engaged in the business of Bricks making and other allied materials. The petitioners are in possession of a Government land since last 50 to 60 years. They have installed a furnace for brick makings. The petitioners have engaged more than 150 labours, whose livelihood is also dependent of earning of the petitioners. Their continues possession has not been disturbed by the respondents since so many years. On 1.4.2017 the respondent No.3 issued show cause notice directing them to stop the activities and vacate the Government land. The petitioners submitted representation to the respondent that they may be allotted other piece of land and they are ready to shift their activities. The petitioners made a representation to the Chief Minister, Human Right Commission, Commissioner and Collector, Indore.
That by certificate dated 18.11.2011 the then Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Bavliya Bujurg, Tehsil and District--Indore has certified that the petitioners are engaged in the activities of bricks making over the Government land. He has granted permission to do the same activities for the period of one year. This certificate prima facie established that the petitioners are engaged in brick making activities since last so many years. By notice dated 1.4.2017, the petitioners were directed to submit the permission letter in the Office of Gram Panchayat within three days. Followed by another notice dated 11.4.2017 respondent No.3 have threatened them to take action within seven days. The petitioners submitted a reply to the Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat. The livelihood of the petitioners as well as workers working with them are dependent on the work which they are doing. They are ready to vacate the land provided they be allotted other land as per law, so that they may earn their livelihood.
Apex Court in case of Olga Tellis and Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. reported in (1985) 3 SCC 545 in Paras 32, 33 and 57 has held as under:-
32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners' case, the main plank of their argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force which people their desertion of their hearths and homes in the village s that struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. "Life", as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois, (1877) 94 U.S. 113, means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P.,MANU/SC/00851962 :
1963CriLJ329.
33. Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is a Directive Principle of State Policy, provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Article 41, which is another Directive Principle, provides, inter alia, that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work in cases of unemployment and of undeserved want. Article 37 provides that the Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any court, are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country. The Principles contained in Articles 39 (a) and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights. If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21.
57. To summarise, we hold that no person has the right to encroach, by erecting a structure or otherwise, on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved or ear-
marked for a public purpose like, for example, a garden or a playground; that the provision contained in section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is not unreasonable in the circumstances of the case; and that, the Kamraj Nagar Basti is situated on an accessory road leading to the Western Express Highway. We have referred to the assurances given by the State Government in its pleadings here which, we repeat, must be made good. Stated briefly, pavement dwellers who were censused or who happened to be censused in 1976 should be given, though not as a condition precedent to their removal, alternate pitches at Malavani or at such other convenient place as the Government considers reasonable but not farther away in terms of distance; slum dwellers who were given identity cards and whose dwellings were numbered in the 1976 census must be given alternate sites for their resettlement; slums which have been in existence for a long time, say for twenty years or more, and which have been improved and developed will not be removed unless the land on which they stand or the appurtenant land, is required for a public purposes, in which case, alternate sites or accommodation will be provided to them, the 'Low Income Scheme Shelter Programme' which is proposed to be undertaken with the aid of the World Bank will be pursued earnestly; and, the Slum Upgradation Programme (SUP)' under which basic amenities are to be given to slum dwellers will be implemented without delay. In order to minimise the hardship involved in any eviction, we direct that the slums, wherever situated, will not be removed until one month after the end of the current monsoon season, that is, until October 31,1985 and, thereafter, only in accordance with this judgment. If any slum is required to be removed before that date, parties may apply to this Court. Pavement dwellers, whether censused or uncensused, will not be removed until the same date viz. October 31, 1985.
When the question of livelihood of poor workers is there, it is the duty of the State Government to consider sympathetically within the various policies framed for the benefit of poor section of society.
The petition is finally disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the claim of the petitioners for allotment of alternative place as per law and the policy of the State Government so that they may earn their livelihood. Entire exercise be completed within within three months from production of certified copy of this order. For the period of three months parties are directed to maintain status quo.
Certified copy as per rules.
[ VIVEK RUSIA ] JUDGE pp