Bombay High Court
Kher Nagar Sai Prasad C.H.S. Ltd vs Pittie Antariksh Grl Pvt.Ltd on 25 April, 2025
Author: M. S. Karnik
Bench: M. S. Karnik
2025:BHC-OS:7030
comapl.9061-2024.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (L) NO. 9061 OF 2024
IN
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 27970 OF 2023
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT (L) NO. 27651 OF 2023
Kher Nagar Sai Prasad C.H.S.
Building No.2, M.H.B. Colony,
Kher Nagar, Bandra (East),
Mumbai 400051. ... Appellant
Versus
Pittie Antariksh GRL Pvt. Ltd.
5th Floor, Dheeraj Plaza, 23 Hill Road,
Bandra (West), Mumbai-400050. .... Respondent
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 9359 OF 2024
IN
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (L) NO. 9061 OF 2024
IN
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 27970 OF 2023
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT (L) NO. 27651 OF 2023
Kher Nagar Sai Prasad C.H.S.
Building No.2, M.H.B. Colony,
Kher Nagar, Bandra (East),
Mumbai 400051. ... Applicant
In the matter between :
Kher Nagar Sai Prasad C.H.S.
Building No.2, M.H.B. Colony,
Kher Nagar, Bandra (East),
Mumbai 400051. ... Appellant
Versus
PMB 1
comapl.9061-2024.odt
Pittie Antariksh GRL Pvt. Ltd.
5th Floor, Dheeraj Plaza, 23 Hill Road,
Bandra (West), Mumbai-400050. .... Respondent
****
Mr. Zal Andhyarujina, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Nishant
Shashidharan, Mr. Shrey Sancheti, Ms. Paluck Bengali and
Mr. Shreyas Moharir i/b Ashraf Diamondwala for the Appellant.
Mr. Sharan Jagtiani, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Karl Tamboly,
Ms. Pooja Kane, Ms. Shradha Achliya, Mr. Bharat Jain,
Mr. Anant Ratnaparkhi and Mr. Kavish Arora i/b IC Legal for
the Respondent .
****
CORAM : ALOK ARADHE, CJ &
M. S. KARNIK, J.
RESERVED ON : 9th APRIL, 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 25th APRIL, 2025
JUDGMENT (PER M. S. KARNIK, J.) :
1. The challenge in this Commercial Appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act is to the judgment and order dated 1st February 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the Interim Application seeking reliefs in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) during the pendency of the Commercial Suit filed by the Respondent/original plaintiff - Pittie Antariksh GRL Pvt. Ltd. ('the developer' for short). By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge made the Interim Application absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) which read thus:-
PMB 2
comapl.9061-2024.odt "(a) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass an interim and temporary injunction against the defendant restraining the defendant, its members, representatives, nominees, and assigns/or from entering into any agreement, appointing another developer for redevelopment of the defendant's building and/or creating any third party rights in respect of the Suit property.
(b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay effect and implementation of the defendant's letter dated 24th May 2023 and restrain the defendant and its members from acting in furtherance of the said letter dated 24th May 2023."
2. In the Suit, the Respondent prayed for a declaration that there is a valid, binding and subsisting contract between the Respondent/original plaintiff - developer and the Appellant/original defendant - Kher Nagar Sai Prasad Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. ('society' for short) as recorded in letters dated 30th August 2021 and 23rd October 2021. The relief for a decree of specific performance of agreement as recorded in letters dated 30 th August 2021 and 23rd October 2021 was prayed for. A relief for declaration that letter dated 24th May 2023 is illegal, contrary to law and non-est is prayed for. Then a relief for a mandatory injunction against the society and its representatives from creating third party rights in the suit property; in the alternative for compensation. The Interim Application was filed for reliefs during the pendency of the Suit.
PMB 3
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3. Facts relevant to the decision in the Appeal are thus :-
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority ('MHADA' for short) was the owner of a land admeasuring 1066.94 sq.mtrs. situated at Survey No.341(pt) and CS No.604 (pt) at Khernagar, Bandra (East) ('suit land' for short) alongwith a building (G + 2 storey) ('suit building' for short), the property referred to as 'suit property' for short hereafter.
MHADA executed a Lease Deed in favour of the society for suit land on 4th January 2016. On this date i.e. 4 th January 2016 MHADA also executed Sale Deed in favour of the society for the suit building. The society floated a tender on 29 th March 2021 for redevelopment of the suit property and bids were invited from the interested developers. The bid submitted by the said developer was accepted. A Special General Body Meeting of the society was held on 31 st July 2021 where the Respondent/plaintiff was provisionally selected as the developer by the society. An offer letter was issued by the developer to the society on 4 th August 2021. A comfort letter dated 7th August 2021 was issued to the developer by the society inter alia stating that the final selection and appointment of the plaintiff as a developer shall be done after PMB 4 comapl.9061-2024.odt complying with the procedure laid down under Section 79A of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 ('Societies Act' for short).
4. A revised offer letter dated 30 th August 2021 was issued by the developer to the society. By the said offer letter, the developer inter alia offered (i) additional area of 510 sq.ft. MOFA carpet area to each existing member free of cost and
(ii) Rs.20,00,000/- as lumpsum hardship allowance to each member. An email was addressed by the developer to the society inter alia revising its offer on 20 th October 2021. By the said revised offer letter, the developer inter alia offered (i) additional area of 528 sq.ft. MOFA carpet area to each existing member free of cost and (ii) Rs.16,00,000/- as lumpsum hardship allowance to each member. On 21st October 2021 an email was addressed by the society to the developer inter alia stating that the members of the society were not agreeable to the offer letter dated 20th October 2021 received from the developer and instead the members have requested for
(i) additional area of 540 sq.ft. MOFA alongwith Rs.17,00,000/- as lumpsum hardship allowance to each member or (ii) additional area of 528 sq.ft. MOFA alongwith PMB 5 comapl.9061-2024.odt Rs.18,50,000/- as lumpsum hardship allowance to each member. An email was addressed by the developer to the society inter alia revising its offer on 23rd October 2021 whereby the developer offered (i) additional area of 528 sq.ft. MOFA carpet area to each existing member free of cost and
(ii) Rs.17,51,000/- as lumpsum hardship allowance to each member.
5. A letter was addressed by the Authorised Officer, Co-operative Societies dated 28th October 2021 inter alia stating that the Special General Body Meeting of the society was held on 24th October 2021 where, by more than 75% majority of the society's members, the Respondent-plaintiff was appointed as their developer.
6. On 31st October 2021 a letter was addressed by the society to the developer confirming the appointment of the plaintiff as the developer during the Special General Body Meeting held on 24th October 2021 as per the terms and conditions contained in the offer letters dated 30 th August 2021 read with 23rd October 2021. The developer's advocates forwarded a draft development agreement and power of attorney to the society on 5th January 2022. An email was PMB 6 comapl.9061-2024.odt addressed by the Society's advocates to the developer's advocates stating that as discussed in the meeting held on 10th May 2022 the terms on (i) Time shall be essence of contract and (ii) overall period of completion not to exceed 60 months needs to be incorporated in the draft. Further, it was stated that the termination clause shall be discussed with the Managing Committee. Again a letter was addressed by the society on 11th May 2022 to the developer inter alia stating that the termination clause shall be discussed in the Special General Body Meeting and not in the Managing Committee Meeting.
7. On 25th July 2022 the developer's advocate vide its email forwarded a revised draft of development agreement to the society. The society addressed an email on 26th July 2022 to the developer forwarding the final drafts of development agreement alongwith annexures. The society addressed an email on 30th August 2022 to the developer requesting to incorporate few points given by Pune Municipal Corporation ('PMC' for short) in the development agreement. The society vide its letter dated 13th October 2022 requested the Managing Director of the developer to remain present on 16 th PMB 7 comapl.9061-2024.odt October 2022 for a meeting to discuss certain points regarding the redevelopment. The developer in turn by an email dated 31st October 2022 addressed to the society agreed for the meeting with their advocates on 2nd November 2022. The meeting was postponed. One of the members of the society addressed a whatsapp message dated 8 th November 2022 requesting for clarification on points mentioned therein. The society by its email dated 7th November 2022 informed the developer that they shall be visiting the office of the developer on 8th November 2022 to seek certain clarifications.
8. The developer on 11th November 2022 addressed an email to the society stating that most of the queries of the members of the society had been clarified by the developer and requested the society to expedite the process of finalising the development agreement. The developer forwarded a draft development agreement to the society on 18th November 2022 pursuant to the meeting held between the parties. The society replied to the aforesaid email on 19 th November 2022 and forwarded the finalised draft development agreement to the developer. Then on 25 th November 2022 the PMB 8 comapl.9061-2024.odt society forwarded an email as regards the queries raised by the PMC. The society vide its email dated 26 th December 2022 sought clarification on points mentioned in the said email. On 3rd January 2023 the society requested the developer to visit the society's office on 8th January 2023 to resolve all pending issues regarding redevelopment. The developer confirmed to the society on 4th January 2023 that their top management shall be attending the said meeting on 8 th January 2023. The society vide its email dated 5th January 2023 stated that they had sent the final draft development agreement on 26th December 2022 and awaiting the response of the developer. The society requested that the meeting be held with the lawyers to finalise the development agreement. On 8th January 2023 the society vide its email confirmed that at the meeting held, the developer had positively resolved all the queries of the society and that it was proposed that additional total area of 578 usable carpet area with no additional cost shall be given to each member. The developer by an email dated 13th January 2023 inter alia stated that the new terms being proposed by the society for additional total area of 578 usable carpet area were not acceptable to the PMB 9 comapl.9061-2024.odt developer and such increase in area cannot be without any cost to the members. The developer also stated that if the society insisted upon such terms then the developer would have to relook/revise the agreed hardship compensation, rent, bank guarantee and payment schedule. The society by an email dated 16th January 2023 informed the developer that the members were interested in increasing entitlement area and were agreeable to revision of other commercial terms. The society requested the developer to send the revised terms. The developer by an email dated 23 rd January 2023 called upon the society to finalise the development agreement, which was being delayed by the society. The developer informed the society that other terms shall be revised only upon the development agreement being finalised. The society vide its email dated 27th January 2023 alleged that there was no concluded contract between the parties yet and the negotiations were still ongoing. The society called upon the developer to fix a meeting on 3 rd or 4th February 2023 to discuss the commercial terms. The developer vide its letter dated 9th February 2023 replied to the society stating that there was a concluded contract between them and that PMB 10 comapl.9061-2024.odt based on such contract the developer had already undertaken substantial work. By the said letter, the developer called upon the society to immediately execute and register a development agreement. The society by its communication dated 28th February 2023 requested the developer to fix a meeting to discuss the commercial terms. The meeting was fixed on 13th March 2023. Then on 3 rd April 2023 the society requested the developer to fix a meeting for discussing the letter dated 25th March 2023 received from MHADA regarding redevelopment on the said building. On 4 th May 2023 the developer once again called upon the society to execute and register the development agreement. The society addressed a letter dated 24th May 2023 (Termination Letter) to the developer terminating the plaintiff as its developer inter alia on account of alleged delay by the developer in forwarding the revised terms of redevelopment to the society. The developer addressed a letter to the society on 12th June 2023 inter alia stating that the termination was unlawful, illegal and bad in law and reserved its right to address a detailed letter.
9. The developer sent a detailed letter dated 21 st June 2023 to the society disputing the contents of the purported PMB 11 comapl.9061-2024.odt termination letter and inter alia stated that they are the duly appointed developer of the suit property and have invested substantial costs towards the same. A public notice was issued by the society inviting tenders from developers for redevelopment of the suit property and hence the Suit was filed on 25th September 2023. The Interim Application came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 1st February 2024 which is under challenge in this Appeal.
10. Mr. Andhyarujina, learned Senior Advocate for the society submits that the learned Single Judge committed an error in coming to the conclusion that there was a concluded contract on the basis of the letters dated 30th August 2021 and 23rd October 2021. Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that the sequence of facts and events and the communications on record is demonstrative of the fact that the negotiations were ongoing and this is not a case of a concluded contract. It is submitted that the final development agreement was not signed by the parties. The developer was pressurising the society to execute the final development agreement despite the ongoing negotiations. Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that PMB 12 comapl.9061-2024.odt even the area to which each of the member would be entitled was not finalised and therefore, this is not a case of a concluded contract. Mr. Andhyarujina submits that considering the overall cost of the project, a miniscule amount was expended by the developer for the preliminary negotiations which even the society had expended. According to him, this cannot be regarded to mean the developer incurring substantial cost towards the development of the property. According to Mr. Andhyarujina the members are in possession of their flats and the actual redevelopment work has not even commenced. Mr. Andhyarujina in support of his submissions relied on the decisions in Kalpataru Ltd. Vs. Middle Class Friends Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. 1 and Kalpataru Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Majithia Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.2
11. On the other hand Mr. Jagtiani in support of his submissions invited our attention to the findings of the learned Single Judge. Mr. Jagtiani submits that the findings of the learned Single Judge are unassailable. Mr. Jagtiani submitted that the discretion has been exercised by the 1 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 554 2 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 984 PMB 13 comapl.9061-2024.odt learned Single Judge while granting the injunction on the well established legal principles. Mr. Jagtiani submitted that the contract in question is comprised in the final offer and acceptance as between the parties leading to an appointment of the plaintiff as a developer for carrying out the redevelopment of the suit property. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that there was a concluded contract between the parties as the communications on record indicate that they contain all essential terms both as to commercial terms and other aspects concerning redevelopment of the suit property. The conclusion and agreement as to all essential terms, as per the impugned order rests with the society's letter dated 31st October 2021. By this letter the society appointed the plaintiff as a developer which was after exchange of various other offer letters and negotiations. After the commercial terms were agreed to between the parties, in respect of all essential terms including area of flats, units to be allotted, corpus etc. between January 2022 to January 2023, the parties exchanged several communications in relation to finalisation of development agreement. He submits that the society in its PMB 14 comapl.9061-2024.odt various communications including email and whatsapp messages, sought clarification from the developer on various terms. Specific clauses of the development agreement were also discussed in the course of these communications. The developer answered and addressed each of these clarifications whereafter on 26th December 2022, the society sent final draft of development agreement and requested the developer for a personal meeting on 8th January 2023 to resolve all pending issues. Mr. Jagtiani emphasised on the letter dated 8 th January 2023 of the society addressed to the developer which reads thus :-
"With reference to the captioned subject, we would like to first of all appreciate your presence on such a short notice for meeting on 8-1-2023. We also appreciate most of the queries or points as mailed to you earlier vide our mail dt. 12 th Dec. 2022 have been considered by you and we have got a positive reply from your end on majority of the points. While we have a oral confirmation to the same we request you to kindly arrange to send a formal mail with regards to the same.
Further it was discussed in our SGM with majority of the members considering the offers which has been given in the nearby vicinity by the developer's we are proposing an additional area to be given of 50 sq. ft i.e., total area of 578 (Actual Usable Carpet Area) with no additional cost.
Awaiting a favourabie reply on this point as early as possible."
12. Mr. Jagtiani submits that despite there being a closure on the terms of the development agreement, the society sought PMB 15 comapl.9061-2024.odt to open the commercial negotiations which had resulted into a concluded contract. It is then that there were communications and the parties refuted each other's position. Mr. Jagtiani submitted that the learned Single Judge after fully and completely appreciating the matter from every possible perspective both on facts and law by a reasoned order granted the interim prayers. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge in paragraph 14 of the impugned order noted the question "Whether a finally signed Development Agreement is necessary for presuming a concluded contract, particularly when in its absence, material terms are already finalised amongst the parties." He submits that the learned Single Judge in answering this question has appreciated completely the materials on record in paragraph 24 of the impugned order. A further and detailed appreciation of factual material is undertaken in the context of relevant legal principle in paragraphs 25 to 28 of the impugned order. According to him, the learned Single Judge rightly distinguished on facts, the judgment of this Court in Kalpataru Ltd. Vs. Middle Class Friends Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra). Mr. Jagtiani submitted that the learned Single Judge while recognising the PMB 16 comapl.9061-2024.odt freedom to negotiate rightly held that once the negotiations have crystallised into a contract pursuant to acceptance of offer then one cannot in the guise of negotiation contend that there is no concluded contract. It is submitted that in view of the detailed reasoning and appreciation of factual material by the learned Single judge, this Appeal ought to be rejected as the society is effectively seeking a re-appreciation of the matter, without satisfying the tests applicable to appellate jurisdiction as laid down in Wanders Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India3; Ramakant Ambalal Choksi vs. Harish Ambalal Choksi 4; Mohd. Mehtab Khan vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan 5; Neon Laboratories Ltd. vs. Medical Technologies Ltd.6; Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. vs. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd.7 and World Crest Advisors LLP vs. Catalyst Trusteeship Limited & Ors. 8 Mr. Jagtiani made a fervent plea that this is not a fit case for exercising appellate jurisdiction in respect of a judgment and order which considers all the material facts and the law which is a valid exercise of discretion. Mr. Jagtiani, learned Senior Advocate for the developer pointed out that the developer had 3 1990 Supp SCC 727 4 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3538 5 (2013) 9 SCC 221 6 (2016) 2 SCC 672 7 (2023) 1 SCC 634 8 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1409 PMB 17 comapl.9061-2024.odt already obtained demarcation of the society's plot, Civil Aviation NOC, appointed lawyer, architects, structural consultants and MEP consultants, liasoning consultants, etc. and incurred costs of Rs.1,22,70,600/- towards redevelopment of the said property.
13. We have heard learned Senior Advocates at length. We agree with Mr. Jagtiani that the scope of interference in the appellate jurisdiction that we are exercising is narrow in view of the well established legal principles laid down by the Courts. Wanders Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India (supra) dealt with the law in relation to the scope of an appeal against grant or non-grant of interim injunction was referred to by the Supreme Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the scope of appellate jurisdiction under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC' for short). It is necessary to be mindful of the observations of Their Lordships before forming an opinion whether to interfere or not with the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the exercise of the narrow scope of appellate jurisdiction under Order XLIII of the CPC. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PMB 18 comapl.9061-2024.odt Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (supra) are significant which read thus :-
"20. Order 43 of the CPC specifies the orders against which an appeal lies. Sub-Rule (r) of Rule 1 of the said order provides that an appeal would lie against an order made under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 and 10 of Order 39 of the CPC respectively.
21. The law in relation to the scope of an appeal against grant or non-grant of interim injunction was laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC
727. Antox brought an action of passing off against Wander with respect to the mark Cal-De-Ce. The trial court declined Antox's plea for an interim injunction, however, on appeal the High Court reversed the findings of the trial judge. This Court, upon due consideration of the matter, took notice of two egregious errors said to have been committed by the High Court :
a. First, as regards the scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order; and b. Secondly, the weakness in ratiocination as to the quality of Antox's alleged user of the trademark on which the passing off action is founded.
22. With regards to (a), this Court held thus :
"In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of the first instance and substitute its own discretion, except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely, or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions ... the appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below ... If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion."PMB 19
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23. This Court, while arriving at the above findings, relied on its earlier judgment in Printers (Mysore) v. Pothan Joseph, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 62 where it was held thus :
"[...] as has been observed by Viscount Simon LC in Charles Osenton & Co v. Johnston - the law as to reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his/her discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well-settled principles in an individual case."
24. It is pertinent to note that in Printers (supra) this Court had held that ignoring relevant facts is also a ground for interfering with the discretion exercised by the trial court. Furthermore, Viscount Simon LC in Charles Osenton & Co v. Johnston, [1942] A.C. 130, after stating the above, went on to quote Lord Wright's decision in Evans v. Bartlam, [1973] A.C. 473 :
"It is clear that the court of appeal should not interfere with the discretion of a judge acting within his jurisdiction unless the court is clearly satisfied that he was wrong. But the court is not entitled simply to say that if the judge had jurisdiction and had all the facts before him, the court of appeal cannot review his order unless he is shown to have applied a wrong principle. The court must, if necessary, examine anew the relevant facts and circumstances in order to exercise a discretion by way of review which may reverse or vary the order."
25. In Evans (supra) case, Lord Wright made it clear that while adjudicating upon the discretion exercised by the trial court, the appellate court is obliged to consider the case put forward by the appellant in favour of its argument that the trial court exercised its discretion arbitrarily or incorrectly in the circumstances.
26. What flows from a plain reading of the decisions in Evans (supra) and Charles Osenton (supra) is that an appellate court, even while deciding an appeal against a discretionary order granting an interim injunction, has to:
a. Examine whether the discretion has been properly exercised, i.e. examine whether the discretion exercised is not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the principles of law; and b. In addition to the above, an appellate court may in PMB 20 comapl.9061-2024.odt a given case have to adjudicate on facts even in such discretionary orders.
27. The principles of law explained by this Court in Wander's (supra) have been reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions of this Court. However, over a period of time the test laid down by this Court as regards the scope of interference has been made more stringent. The emphasis is now more on perversity rather than a mere error of fact or law in the order granting injunction pending the final adjudication of the suit.
28. In Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 this Court held that the Appellate Court should not flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the exercise of discretion by a subordinate court unless such exercise is palpably perverse. Perversity can pertain to the understanding of law or the appreciation of pleadings or evidence. In other words, the Court took the view that to interfere against an order granting or declining to grant a temporary injunction, perversity has to be demonstrated in the finding of the trial court.
29. In Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan, (2013) 9 SCC 221 this Court emphasised on the principles laid down in Wander (supra) and observed that while the view taken by the appellate court may be an equally possible view, the mere possibility of taking such a view must not form the basis for setting aside the decision arrived at by the trial court in exercise of its discretion under Order 39 of the CPC. The basis for substituting the view of the trial court should be malafides, capriciousness, arbitrariness or perversity in the order of the trial court. The relevant observations are extracted below:
"20. In a situation where the learned trial court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed with the learned Trial Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view. The Appellate Court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct PMB 21 comapl.9061-2024.odt parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. While we must not be understood to have said that the Appellate Court was wrong in its conclusions what is sought to be emphasized is that as long as the view of the trial court was a possible view the Appellate Court should not have interfered with the same following the virtually settled principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd."
30. This Court in Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 634 observed that the hierarchy of the trial court and the appellate court exists so that the trial court exercises its discretion upon the settled principles of law. An appellate court, after the findings of the trial court are recorded, has an advantage of appreciating the view taken by the trial judge and examining the correctness or otherwise thereof within the limited area available. It further observed that if the appellate court itself decides the matters required to be decided by the trial court, there would be no necessity to have the hierarchy of courts.
31. This Court in Monsanto Technology LLC v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd., (2019) 3 SCC 381, observed that the appellate court should not usurp the jurisdiction of the Single Judge to decide as to whether the tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are made out in the case or not.
32. The appellate court in an appeal from an interlocutory order granting or declining to grant interim injunction is only required to adjudicate the validity of such order applying the well settled principles governing the scope of jurisdiction of appellate court under Order 43 of the CPC which have been reiterated in various other decisions of this Court. The appellate court should not assume unlimited jurisdiction and should guide its powers within the contours laid down in the Wander (supra) case.
35. Any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, 106 NW 814, the Court defined "perverse" as "turned the wrong way"; not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. PMB 22 comapl.9061-2024.odt
36. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
a. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Ed.
Perverse - Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.
b. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition Perverse - Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
c. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition Perverse - Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
d. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse - Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
e. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Ed.
Perverse - A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.
37. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. (See: Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 3 SCC 78)
42. ...The failure of the High Court in pointing out any perversity in the order of the trial court is a glaring reminder of why the High Courts must exercise their appellate jurisdiction against interlocutory orders involving the exercise of discretion of the trial court with great caution and mindfulness. High Courts must not lightly set aside the decision arrived at by the trial court in exercise of its discretion unless the order of the trial court fails to satisfy the parameters as delineated by us in the preceding paragraphs. The failure to engage with these crucial aspects PMB 23 comapl.9061-2024.odt renders the High Court's order deficient, detracting front the objective of rendering substantive and reasoned justice."
14. As observed by Their Lordships in paragraph 26, an Appellate Court, even while deciding an Appeal against the discretionary order granting an interim injunction, has to : (a) Examine whether the discretion has been properly exercised, i.e. examine whether the discretion exercised is not arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the principles of law; and
(b) In addition to the above, an appellate court may in a given case have to adjudicate on facts even in such discretionary orders. In the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court, over a period of time the test laid down by the Supreme Court as regards the scope of interference has been made more stringent. The emphasis is now more on perversity rather than a mere error of fact or law in the order granting injunction pending the final adjudication of the suit. The appellate court should not assume unlimited jurisdiction and should guide its powers within the contours of law laid down in the Wander (supra) case. We should be mindful that in exercise of our appellate jurisdiction against interlocutory orders involving the exercise of discretion of the trial court, the same has to be with great caution and mindfulness. PMB 24
comapl.9061-2024.odt We cannot lightly set aside the decision arrived at by the learned Single Judge in exercise of its discretion unless the order of the court fails to satisfy the parameters as delineated by the Supreme Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (supra). Bearing these well settled principles in mind we proceed to examine whether there is any scope for interference with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge while granting an injunction in favour of the developer.
15. The question before the learned Single Judge was "Whether a finally signed Development Agreement is necessary for presuming a concluded contract, particularly when in its absence, material terms are already finalised amongst the parties." The learned Single Judge undertook the appreciation of the factual materials in the context of the legal principles stated in the impugned order. The learned Single Judge considered and appreciated the following material :-
(I) Revised offer letter dated 30th August 2021 issued by the developer to the society whereby the developer offered (i) additional area of 510 sq.ft. MOFA carpet area to each existing member free of cost and (ii) PMB 25 comapl.9061-2024.odt Rs.20,00,000/- as lumpsum hardship allowance to each member.
(II) Further revised offer dated 23rd October 2021 whereby the developer while revising its offer informed the society that it was willing to offer (i) additional area of 528 sq.ft. MOFA carpet area and (ii) Rs.17,51,000/-
as lumpsum hardship allowance.
(III) Acceptance of offers dated 30th August 2021 and 23rd October 2021 vide appointment letter dated 31 st August 2021 issued by the society to the developer appointing the plaintiff as the developer. (IV) The email dated 8th January 2023 addressed by the society to the developer stating that all issues are resolved.
16. According to the learned Single Judge the society appointed the plaintiff as a developer because there was a consensus on the commercial aspect. The learned Single Judge therefore held that this amounts to a final/concluded contract as the intention of the society and execution of development agreement was just a formality pursuant to PMB 26 comapl.9061-2024.odt contract having come into existence on exchange of the offer and its acceptance as well as the acceptance of the revised offer by the members of the society. Further, in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the impugned order, the learned Single Judge held that the contract between the parties was concluded on material terms and just because some members were of the opinion that they are entitled to some additional area, they cannot wriggle out of the concluded contract. The learned Single Judge then on consideration of the relevant legal principles and the decisions cited by the learned counsel, distinguished on facts the decision of this Court in Kalpataru Ltd. Vs. Middle Class Friends Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra) in paragraph 28, by holding that in Kalpataru Ltd. (supra) there was absence of consensus on the essential requirements of the contract and the form, nature and the precise configuration of the members component. Learned Single Judge contrasted the decision in Kalpataru Ltd. (supra) with the facts of the present case by observing in paragraph 29 that all terms of the development agreement having been agreed upon in the present case, but what remain was only the agreement being inked by the parties. The other PMB 27 comapl.9061-2024.odt distinguishing feature in the case of Kalpataru Ltd. (supra) according to the learned Single Judge was the definition of 'contract' and based on which the Court has held that execution of the development agreement was not a mere formality, but a term of the bargain. In the context of the narrow scope of exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, we need to examine the relevant materials on record.
17. It is significant to note that the tender document issued by the society in April 2021 inviting interested developers to submit their bids contained the points on which an agreement was to be arrived at between the parties for there to be a concluded contract between them. Apart from the commercial terms, these included the following:
(i) approval of the design and specifications of the rehab component by the society [clauses 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.7.8, 3.1.b., 3.1.c. 3.1.e., 3.1.f., 3.2.4., 4.b., 4.d., 4.f., 4.13 and sections-6 to 8],
(ii) no creation of charge, lien or mortgage against the society's property [clause 2.7.3.],
(iii) the non-assignability and non-transferability of the PMB 28 comapl.9061-2024.odt development rights [clauses 3.2.5 and 6.1],
(iv) indemnity to be given by the developer [clauses 3.3 xi), 4.31 and the proforma contained in Section-10],
(v) suspension of work on notice by the society [clauses 3.7 and 4.26],
(vi) cancellation of the agreement [clause 3.8], variation of terms [clause 3.9],
(vii) defect liability period [clauses 3.10 and 5.35],
(viii) consequences of delay in completion [clause 3.14],
(ix) additional carpet area to be provided at a discounted rate [clause 4.5],
(x) submission of a detailed bar chart (which would form part of the development agreement) [clauses 4.27 and 4.33.b.],
(xi) insurance [clause 6.1],
(xii) list of amenities and facilities [Section 9] - this was explicitly made subject to changes and modifications as per negotiation, and
(xiii) submission of performance guarantee [proforma PMB 29 comapl.9061-2024.odt contained in Section-11].
18. It is pertinent to note that the negotiations between the parties was still ongoing. The final development agreement was yet to be signed by the parties. However, the learned single judge has extensively referred to the proposals dated 30th August 2021 and 23rd October 2021 of the developer to the society offering the additional area and the hardship allowance. The learned Single Judge was therefore of the opinion that based on these letters, the society in its special general body meeting having appointed the plaintiff as the developer was an indicator to there being a concluded contract between the parties.
19. We would have otherwise been slow in interfering with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. However, it is not possible for us to overlook the various aspects referred to hereinbefore in the tender documents which were yet to be deliberated and negotiated upon, for it is only then that the final development agreement was to be signed between the parties for there to be a concluded contract. The aforesaid communications referred to by the learned Single Judge are silent on all the above PMB 30 comapl.9061-2024.odt matters. If the developer's case of specific performance is accepted, the society can and will not have any say on the construction details of the rehab component. The appointment of the developer in the facts of the present case cannot partake the character of a concluded contract in the absence of the essential terms still under negotiation. In the present case, whether there is a concluded contract or not cannot be determined merely on the basis of an appointment of the developer by the society based on the proposals and offers prior to the appointment of the developer but in our opinion, with respect, the learned Single Judge committed a fundamental error in not considering the relevant clauses of the tender document and the events post the appointment of the developer which should have formed the basis for coming to the conclusion whether there is a concluded contract or not between the parties. We thus find that there is a complete absence of consideration of the relevant materials, various compliances of the tender document referred to hereinbefore and also in the contextual facts of the present case, the materials post the appointment of the developer and the termination thereof which compels us to agree with the PMB 31 comapl.9061-2024.odt submissions of Mr Andhyarujina, learned Senior Advocate for the society that there is absolutely no warrant in the present case to prima facie find that there is a concluded contract between the parties. It is for this reason that we have narrated the facts in detail in our judgment.
20. Even as on 8th January 2023 there was a meeting between the developer and the society to resolve the issue of the additional total area of 578 sq.ft. usable carpet area and the response of the developer dated 13th January 2023 that the new terms now being proposed by the society for additional total area of 578 usable carpet area were not acceptable to the developer. The developer on 23 rd January 2023 called upon the society to finalise the development agreement which according to the developer was delayed by the society. The developer informed the society that other terms shall be revised only upon the development agreement being finalised. The developer insisted that the there was a concluded contract between the parties and that the society should immediately execute and register the development agreement, which can be seen from the letter dated 9 th February 2023. It was thereafter on 24th May 2023 the PMB 32 comapl.9061-2024.odt plaintiff's appointment as a developer was terminated on account of alleged delay by the developer in forwarding the revised terms of redevelopment to the society.
21. It is also material to note that in the Special General Body Meeting held on 31st July 2021, the members of the society provisionally selected the plaintiff as a developer to carry out redevelopment. By the communication dated 7th August 2021, the society informed the developer that he had been provisionally selected as a developer for the project. It was also mentioned that the final selection of the plaintiff as a developer for the project would be done after following the procedure laid down in the Government Resolution dated 22nd February 2019 issued under Section 79A of the Societies Act. The developer submitted a revised offer letter on 30th August 2021 whereby it offered to provide the society / its members, inter alia, rehab premises admeasuring 510 sq.ft. MOFA carpet area (including fungible area) each; lumpsum hardship allowance of Rs.27,00,000/-; interim compensation of Rs.35,000/- per member until handing over of the new component. By an email dated 21st October 2021, the society informed the developer that the offer of 528 sq.ft. PMB 33
comapl.9061-2024.odt area and hardship compensation of Rs.16,00,000/- was not accepted in the Special General Body Meeting held on 20th October 2021. Therefore, the developer was called upon to submit an enhanced offer. On 23rd October 2021, the developer submitted a revised offer, whereby it offered to provide each existing member 528 sq.ft. MOFA carpet area and lumpsum hardship allowance of Rs.17,51,000/- (the revised offer) . In this letter, the developer recorded that "all other terms and conditions to be discussed mutually between society and us". The developer made this offer final only on "terms and commercial aspects of our offer as confirmed by the Society Managing Committee and all Society Members".
22. Thus, we find that other aspects of redevelopment were yet to be negotiated between the parties. We are of the opinion that such an offer and its acceptance did not constitute a final binding contract in the facts of this case. Further, by revising the offer, it is clearly seen that the developer was aware that the negotiation process on commercial terms was ongoing and tentative considering the offers that were being received by other societies in the PMB 34 comapl.9061-2024.odt neighbourhood. In the Special General Body meeting called on 24th October 2021 for compliance with the guidelines laid down in the Government Resolution, the Society's general body accepted the revised offer and appointed the respondent as its developer. The Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, MHADA by its letter dated 28th October 2021 confirmed the plaintiff's appointment as a developer in the Special General Body Meeting held on 24th October 2021. We are in agreement with the submissions of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Andhyarujina that this can at the highest be a confirmation of plaintiff's appointment as a developer and not of a concluded contract having been arrived between the parties. This letter confirms that the society had complied with one of the stages of redevelopment that is appointment of a developer. However, it is pertinent to note that the G.R. contemplates execution of a development agreement as a separate stage in the redevelopment process. The G.R. does not treat the development agreement as a mere formal written document, whose execution has no effect on the redevelopment process.
23. By the letter dated 31st October 2021, the society PMB 35 comapl.9061-2024.odt recorded that the majority of its members had accepted the terms and conditions of the purported letter agreement and appointed the plaintiff as developer for the redevelopment project on the basis thereof. As per the developer's case, which is accepted by the learned Single Judge, the negotiations between the parties stood culminated on this day when the parties had arrived at a concluded contract. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that further negotiations did not alter this position. Relevant in this context is Clause 4.4 of the tender which provides that the development agreement is one of the sequence of activities prior to commencement of work. The development agreement was to be made in reference to, inter alia, the tender, bank guarantee, indemnity bond, all proposed plans with section and elevations and any other document as may be desired to protect the interest of the society and the members. Further, Clause 5.11 of the tender (General Conditions of Contract) defined 'Project' to mean and include, inter alia, a development agreement. As per Clause 5.17 thereof, the work order would be issued only after, inter alia, the developer has signed the development agreement. Clause 5.19 thereof PMB 36 comapl.9061-2024.odt defined 'contract' as the agreement papers, details of company/firm, all the proformas and the tender documents together with the letter of intent, any other document specifically indicated in the tender and culminating into the formal development agreement.
24. In our opinion, on an overall conspectus of the matter, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the execution of a development agreement was a mere formality, is patently erroneous. In our opinion, there could not be a concluded contract in the facts of the present case in the absence of a formal development agreement. We agree with the submissions of the learned Senior Advocate for the society that it was an inexorable term of bargain between the parties. Even before all the terms and conditions are agreed upon by way of a development agreement, the redevelopment process then cannot be left in the hands of the developer which would virtually have the effect of leaving the members of the society to the mercy of the developer. It is for this precise reason that the only conclusion at this stage on the basis of the materials which can be arrived at in the facts of the present case is that for there to be a concluded contract between the PMB 37 comapl.9061-2024.odt parties, the essential requirement is an execution of a formal development agreement between the parties. But for this, against the order passed by the learned Single Judge, we would have been very slow in interfering with the discretionary orders.
25. Even in the meeting held on 10th May 2022 between the lawyers and representatives of the parties, the draft of the development agreement was discussed. According to the developer, all the terms and conditions of the development agreement were finalised, except three clauses, i.e., (i) Time being of the essence; (ii) period of completion shall not exceed 60 months, subject to force majeure; (iii) termination clause. It is thus clear that the draft of the development agreement was being discussed even as on 10th May 2022. According to the developer the aforesaid clauses are non- essential terms. This is misplaced. Hence, even as on 10 th May 2022 there was no existence of a concluded contract. By the email dated 26th July 2022 the society forwarded what stood as the "final draft of the development agreement" to the developer for discussion. According to the developer, the new members of the Appellant's Managing Committee had PMB 38 comapl.9061-2024.odt changed most of the terms and conditions of the development agreement, which were allegedly discussed and agreed by the parties. Thereafter, meetings were held between the parties and their advocates to discuss the draft of the development agreement.
26. Even as on 17th December 2022, the developer responded to demands raised in the society's email dated 12th December 2022. The developer assured the society that it would consider the rent revision and incorporate the same in the development agreement which was to be intimated in due course. This in our opinion is a vital commercial term, for unless the same is decided upon, the reluctance on the part of the society to execute the development agreement is understandable. On 4th January 2023, the developer confirmed that its top management team will attend the meeting with the society on 8th January 2023 to discuss the pending issues regarding the draft development agreement. On 6th January 2023 the developer forwarded two options of the proposed tentative floor plans showing the members units and floor plan layout for approval of the society. It shows that even the floor plan and layout were not yet finalised. PMB 39
comapl.9061-2024.odt The plans and specifications of the rehab component were not final. In our opinion, with respect, these materials are completely overlooked by the learned Single Judge while coming to the conclusion that there is a concluded contract between the parties and hence we are inclined to interfere. We are in agreement with the learned Senior Advocate for the society that the essential terms of a development agreement would also be the time within which the developer would hand over of the rehabilitation component, the specification of the rehabilitation area such as its position, the floors, etc. and the consequences of delay in furnishing the rehabilitation component. The letter agreements dated 30th August 2021 read with a revised offer letter dated 30 th October 2021 heavily relied upon by the learned Single Judge do not indicate any agreement on inter alia the specifications of the rehabilitation component, the nature and details and specifications of the amenities and/the consequences of default. Each of these letters expressly states that all other terms and conditions are to be discussed mutually between the parties clearly indicating that the issue was not anywhere near to a concluded contract. Even if the revised offer of PMB 40 comapl.9061-2024.odt 23rd October 2021 is perused, it expressly proceeds on the basis that "There won't be any further negotiation on the terms and commercial aspects of our offer as confirmed by the Society Managing Committee and all society members"
which clearly indicates that the offer and the revised offer were only on the commercial terms and conditions and not the other conditions necessary for development. It is evident that a number of terms and conditions remained to be decided between the parties.
27. We find force in the submission of learned Senior Advocate for the society that through the letter dated 31st October 2021 the developer merely stood as the successful tenderer which was the conclusion of the tender process and nothing more. The next stage of the contractual process necessarily involved a development agreement between the society and the developer which admittedly never fructified and was in the process of negotiation. The G.R. dated 22nd February 2019 referred to by us hereinbefore is an indicator which recognises two distinct stages first of selection and the second is of executing a development agreement. The opinion of the learned Single Judge that there PMB 41 comapl.9061-2024.odt is a concluded contract between the parties, with respect, is in the teeth of the tender conditions and the statutory conditions stipulated in the G.R. dated 4th July 2019.
28. Let us analyze the decision in Kalpataru Ltd. Vs. Middle Class Friends Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra) which was distinguished by the learned Single Judge. The relevant paragraphs in Kalpataru Ltd. Vs. Middle Class Friends Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra) read thus :-
"5. The question is in this general background. There is a Lol between the parties. Kalpataru is to redevelop the Society's property. The Lol specifically says there is to be a further agreement, and it says what that further agreement is to contain. The Lol is, however, itself detailed and complex. Kalpataru maintains that even if the further agreement is not finalized -- the parties have not reached a consensus on it -- the Lol itself is sufficiently detailed as to the rights of the parties. It is, on its own, capable of specific performance. While that is certainly for the arbitral tribunal to consider, the fact that the Lol contemplates a further agreement does not ipso facto render the Lol incapable of specific performance. In other words, according to Kalpataru, every agreement that requires a further agreement is not unenforceable only for that reason. The Lol is a 'concluded contract'. The later agreement is a non-essential term of the bargain the parties struck.
45. Projects like these always have two components. The first is the rebuilding of the Society's homes. This is the members' component. They must get their newly constructed flats. These must be to the members' (and their Society's) specifications and liking. The rationale is that the property is, after all, that of the Society. The chosen developer does not get to dictate to members what their flats should be like, how they should live or what kind of parking they must accept. That choice is, and is only, that of the members and the Society. The present contract, as we have seen, envisages precisely this when it says that Kalpataru is to give members a range of options from which to choose. The second PMB 42 comapl.9061-2024.odt component is the free-sale component, Kalpataru's (or any developer's) incentive and profit-centre. Here, the Society may have next to no say. The second component is consideration from the Society for the first. Viewed in reverse, the developer's rights to the second component of free-sale component is the consideration for it providing to members and the Society, free of charge, the first component of members' housing designed to the members' specifications and liking. Consequently, if there is no agreement on the first component -- the layout, the floor plans, the flat dimensioning and layouts, the amenities, the parking -- the project cannot and does not proceed. This is the essence of the DA. In the contract documents other than the DA, this has not been specified. It remained to be done, and this is the reason drafts of the DA were being constantly exchanged and revised.
46. The legal consequence must, therefore, logically be that the DA is an essential requirement. It is not an idle formality. The project cannot proceed without it -- there is simply no agreement on what is to be built for the members' component. If this be so, Kalpataru's case must fail entirely. Add to this the fact that in its petition Kalpataru expresses it willingness to complete the DA on such terms as this Court or the arbitral tribunal may decide and it is clear that the DA is no idle nice-to-have document but is of the very essence. That suggestion, incidentally, is preposterous for it is not for any court or tribunal to step into the agreement-making arena.
47. Most fundamentally, what this tells us is that there is no consensus ad idem on an essential requirement of the contract: the form, nature and precise configuration of the members' component. Kalpataru cannot brush this aside.
60. The DA is not an idle formality. The fullness of the terms of the construction were not agreed. They were to be part of the DA. Even the final terms of 'termination by the Society' are inchoate, and Kalpataru's draft suggestion on that in clause 19 of the draft DA is utterly preposterous, untethered to any rational concept of law and wholly unmoored from every concept of justice or of contracting parties being on an equal footing. The DA is not just required. It is an essential condition of the contract. Indeed, it is a fundamental term of the contract.
(emphasis supplied) PMB 43 comapl.9061-2024.odt
29. The decision in Kalpataru Ltd. Vs. Middle Class Friends Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra) is completely in support of the society. The decision in Kalpataru Ltd. Vs. Middle Class Friends Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra) is applicable to the facts of the present case and not possible to be distinguished.
30. We are therefore of the opinion that the developer has failed to make out a prima facie case for the reasons aforementioned, even the balance of convenience is in favour of the society as the essential terms and conditions apart from several other terms and conditions were being negotiated and had not reached finality. Even so far as the irreparable loss is concerned, no irreparable loss will be caused to the developer as the claim for damages has been made by the developer in the Suit. The developer having incurred expenditure on negotiations, payment of lawyers fees and other miscellaneous expenses, in the absence of the development work having actually commenced, cannot be a factor favouring the developer in getting an injunction against the society.
PMB 44
comapl.9061-2024.odt
31. The Appeal is therefore allowed. The impugned order dated 1st February 2024 of the learned Single Judge is quashed and set aside. Interim Application (L) No.9359 of 2024 is disposed of.
32. Interim Application (L) No.27970 of 2023 in the Suit stands rejected.
(M. S. KARNIK, J.) (CHIEF JUSTICE)
33. At this stage learned counsel for the Respondent requested for staying this order for a period of four weeks.
34. We are not inclined to accede to the said request. The request is rejected.
(M. S. KARNIK, J.) (CHIEF JUSTICE)
Signed by: Pradnya Bhogale
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 25/04/2025 21:51:17 PMB 45