Bombay High Court
Framroz Eduljee Dinshaw vs Mahomed Essa on 30 November, 1925
Equivalent citations: (1926)28BOMLR141, 94IND. CAS.21, AIR 1926 BOMBAY 241
JUDGMENT Norman Macleod, Kt., C.J.
1. The plaintiff filed this suit to recover the sum of Rs. 40,000 with interest at six par cent from March 27, 1922, until judgment, on a promissory note, which was worded as follows :-
March, 27,1922.
On demand we promise to pay in Bombay to Mr. F.E. Dinshaw or order the sum of forty thousand rupees for value received Ludha Ebrahim & Co.
2. Suleman Abdul Wahed, who carried on business in the name of Ludha Ebrahim & Co. with three other partners, having died, the record was altered by substituting as defendants the three surviving partners, the executors of the will of Suleman,
3. At the hearing the defendants did not appear.
4. The learned Judge passed a decree for the principal amount with interest at six per cent only from the date of the filing of the suit, on the ground that no demand had previously been made, following the decision in Best v. Haji Muhammad Saut (1898) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 18
5. The plaintiff has appealed.
6. Under the provisions of Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act when a negotiable instrument is silent with regard to interest, interest is claimable at six percent from the date when the principal amount ought to have been paid. The respondents have not appeared, so we have not had the advantage of hearing any argument in support of the view taken by the learned Judge.
7. Now the liability on a promissory note payable on demand arises from the date of the note and not from the date on which a demand is made for payment, The period of limitation for filing a suit on such a promissory note begins to run from the date of the note, so that no demand is necessary prior to the suit to provide a foundation for its being filed. It is different when the note is payable otherwise then on demand, for in such cases the liability to pay will only arise after the maturity of the note.
8. We think, therefore, that under the provisions of Section 80 of the Act interest in the present case runs from the date of the note, and with due respect we cannot agree with the decision referred to above.
9. The decree of the lower Court must be varied by directing that interest should be allowed from March 27, 1922, instead of from June 17, 1924. The appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeal.