Madras High Court
K. Palaniappan Alias K. Subramanian vs The Government Of Tamil Nadu ... on 22 January, 1991
Equivalent citations: (1992)2MLJ561
Author: Adarsh Sein Anand
Bench: Adarsh Sein Anand
JUDGMENT Adarsh Sein Anand, C.J.
1. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge dismissing W.P. No. 2928 of 1981 vide judgment dated 14.3.1988.
2. The facts are short and not in dispute. An area measuring 3.39 acres in Survey No. 24f in Karahathahalli village, Palacode Taluk, Dharmapuri District, which was Government land, was assigned to one Akkumaran by the Government vide order of assignment dated 31.12.1955. The assignment was subject to certain conditions which have been enumerated in Special Form D of Board Standing Order 15, para 9. The assignment of the land was made out of the land which was reserved for Harijans to Akkumaran who was an Adi Dravida. The land was sold by the assignee, Akkumaran, in favour of one Muthu vide sale deed dated 26.11.1979. Muthu also like the assignee was also a Harijan. Subsequently on 4.6.1977 the appellant purchased the land from Muthu.
3. On account of the violation of the terms of the assignment, a show cause notice was issued by the third respondent on 31.10.1980 calling upon Muthu as well as the appellant to show cause as to why the original assignment made in favour of Akkumaran on 31.12.1955 be not cancelled as the alienation had been made in violation of the conditions of assignment. An explanation was submitted by the appellant on 11.12.1980 after considering which the third respondent cancelled the assignment originally made in favour of Akkumaran principally on the ground thatsale had been made of the assigned land in favour of a caste Hindu, not a Harijan, in violation of the conditions of assignment contained in Clause (9) in Special Form D, Board Standing Order 15, para 9. The order of cancellation was questioned in appeal, but to no avail. The appellant thereafter came to this Court through W.P. No. 2928 of 1981 which, as already stated, was dismissed by the learned single Judge. Hence this appeal.
4. Appearing for the appellant, the learned Counsel submitted that the condition imposed in Clause (9) of the Special Form D. Board Standing Order 15, para 9 was unreasonable as it would be violative of the rights available to a bona fide purchaser under the Transfer of Property Act. The other ground of attack by the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the restriction contained in Clause (9) prohibiting the alienation in favour of a non-Harijan by a Harijan was unconstitutional and therefore liable to be struck down.
5. Both the arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant need not detain us, as the questions are no longer res integra. So far as the submission that the condition of restriction on alienation is violative of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, a Division Bench of this Court in Sisili Ammal v. Sundararaja Nairdu A.I.R. 1946 Mad. 52, while dealing with a condition, similar to the one contained in Clause (9) in this case, in the Crown Grants Act, 1895 held that though such a condition would be invalid if the grant was made by a private individual, the condition was perfectly valid in the case of a Crown grant. It was held by the Bench that the prohibition against alienation was not violative of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court of India also in State of U.P. v. Zahoor Ahmad , considered a similar argument and repelled the contention identical to the one raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The apex court observed as follows:
Section 3 of the Government Grants Act declares the unfettered discretion of the Government to impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general law of the land be. The meaning of Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act is that the scope of that Act is not limited to affecting the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only. The Government has unfettered discretion to impose any conditions, limitations, or restrictions in its grants, and the right, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated according to the terms of the grant, notwithstanding any provisions of any statutory or common law.
Both the aforesaid judgments are the complete answer to the first submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant.
6. Coming not to the second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant, suffice it to say that the classification is both rational and has a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved, that is to prevent alienation by exploitation of the Harijans by persons, other than Harijans. In Sri Manche Gowda v. State of Kamataka , the apex Court was considering the vires of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, which provided for cancellation of alienation in contravention of the conditions relating to the transfer of such assigned land. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants were the purchasers of land which had been originally granted by the State of Karnataka to persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the provisions of law or on the basis of rules or regulations governing such grant. After the coming into force of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of 1979), notices were issued by the appropriate authority to the transferees of such lands to show cause as to why the lands transferred to them in violation of the terms of assignment should not be resumed for being restored to the original grantees or their legal heirs or for distribution other: wise to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The question about the vires of such a condition was raised before the Supreme Court and it was repelled. The apex Court held that the object of the Act was to protect and preserve the economic interests of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to prevent their exploitation. The Supreme Court found that for the purpose of that Act, the classification has a clear nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The Bench expressed the view that special provisions made for the resumption of "granted" lands, originally granted to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and restoration of the same to the original grantees or their heirs and legal representatives and failing them to other members of these communities do not infringe Article 14 of the Constitution. In view of the settlement of law by the Supreme Court which has again been reiterated in Lingappa Pochanna v. State of Maharashtra , the second ground of attack viz., the unconstitutionality of the restrictions contained in Clause (9) of Special Form D, Board Standing Orders 15, paragraph 9 must also fail and holding that Clause (9) is constitutionally valid, we reject the argument raised to the contrary by Mr. Doraiswamy.
7. For what we have discussed above, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge. The writ appeal consequently fails and is dismissed. No costs.