Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Bhima vs State Of Raj on 9 October, 2025
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 729/2000
1. Bhima S/o Hemaji B/c Mooghiya R/o village Pipala, P.S. Rohira
District Sirohi
2. Ukiya S/o Sonaji B/c Mooghiya R/o Mansarowar Palanpur at
present Swaroopganj District Sirohi.
----Appellant
Versus
State Of Raj.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. B.S. Rathore
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajesh Bhari
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI
Judgment
Reportable
Judgment Pronounced On : 09/10/2025
Judgment Reserved On : 30/07/2025
BY THE COURT:-( Per Hon'ble MR. FARJAND ALI, J.)
1. The appellants Bhima and Ukiya have been convicted and sentenced vide the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2000 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Abu Road in Sessions Case No.146/1996 whereby the learned Judge convicted both the appellants as under:-
Name of Offence for Substantive Fine and default the accused which sentence sentence convicted
1. Bhima Section 302 IPC Life Imprisonment Rs.2,000/- and in
2. Ukiya default to further undergo three months' RI Section 201 IPC One year RI Rs.500/- and in default to further undergo one months RI (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:36 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (2 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
2. Being aggrieved of their conviction and the sentences awarded to them, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C.
3. In nutshell, the prosecution story, as unfolded during the course of investigation is that on 31.01.1996, one Kankarji S/o Munshiji R/o Excise Mohalla, Abu Road, appeared before Police Station Swaroopganj and lodged a verbal report. He stated that he was illiterate and his father, Munshi S/o Kishandas had left his residence on the previous afternoon but did not return home until the following morning. Alarmed by his absence, Kankarji, along with his brothers Salim Matamji, Chhotu Matamji, Ghughri, and his cousin Kheemji initiated a search for him. During their inquiry, one Chuniya Jogi of Swarooppganj, residing near the Rohingha Road railway crossing, informed them that on previous evening, at about 6:00 PM, he had seen Munshi consuming liquor at the residence of Tulsi.
4. Thereafter, the family members proceeded to Tulsi's house and questioned him about Munshi's whereabouts, but Tulsi denied having seen him. Dissatisfied and apprehensive, they continued their search and, in due course, discovered Munshi's dead body abandoned in a deserted field near Thori hills. The body bore visible injuries, with bruises on the face, (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:36 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (3 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] chest, and thighs, and blood was oozing from his nose. The body was thereafter shifted to Indira Colony by the complainant and his relatives, who promptly informed the police. It was further disclosed that his family has longstanding enmity with Uttamji, Shravan, Jagdish, and Punamchand, with whom civil litigation was pending, and who had allegedly issued threats to the complainant's mother and grandmother a few days earlier. However, the complainant expressed inability to identify the actual perpetrators of his father's murder. On the basis of this information, a case under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was registered vide FIR No.15/96 registered at Police Station Swaroopganj and investigation was commenced. Accused- appellants were arrested and after conclusion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against them in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Pindwara for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. As the offences under Sections 302 & 201 IPC were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions Judge, Sirohi from where it was transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Abu Road, Sirohi for trial. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. The prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 27 documents to prove its case. The accused were questioned under Section 313 CrPC and were confronted with the circumstances appearing against them in the (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:36 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (4 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] prosecution evidence. They denied the same and claimed to be innocent. No evidence was tendered into evidence by them. After hearing the arguments advanced by the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel and appreciating the evidence available on record, the learned trial Court proceeded to convict and sentence the accused-appellants as above. Hence, this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the prosecution case is wholly fabricated, inconsistent, and unsupported by reliable evidence. It was urged that there is no eyewitness to the occurrence and the alleged "last seen"
witness, Chuniya Jogi, was never examined. The entire prosecution rests on weak circumstantial evidence, doubtful recoveries made months after the incident from open places, and an uncorroborated extra-judicial confession allegedly made by accused Ukiya before PW-7 Gopal, who is an interested relative of the deceased. It is further argued that vital witnesses were withheld, recoveries were not properly proved, and the investigation was biased, ignoring other persons named in the FIR. The prosecution thus failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction rests on conjecture rather than cogent proof. Hence, it was prayed that the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2000 be set aside and the appellants be acquitted.
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7. Conversely, learned Public Prosecutor supported the impugned judgment, asserting that the trial court's findings are based on proper appreciation of circumstantial evidence forming a complete chain pointing towards the appellants' guilt. It was argued that though no eyewitness was examined, the last-seen circumstance, corroborative testimony of PW-5 Kankarji, recovery of articles at the instance of accused Bhima under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, and the extra-judicial confession of accused Ukiya before PW-7 Gopal collectively prove the case beyond doubt. Minor lapses in investigation, it is submitted, do not affect the core of the prosecution story, which is consistent with medical and circumstantial evidence. Hence, dismissal of the appeal and affirmation of the conviction have been sought.
8. We have heard and given thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, have gone through the impugned judgment and have minutely re-appreciated the evidence available on record.
9. Upon a meticulous scrutiny of the record, this Court finds that PW-5 Kankarji, the first informant, is admittedly not an eyewitness to the incident. The report lodged by him, as well as his deposition before the Court, rests entirely upon information conveyed by Chuniya Jogi, and as such, his testimony cannot assume the character of substantive or reliable evidence capable of establishing culpability of the (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:36 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (6 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] appellants. At best, his statement amounts to hearsay, which is inadmissible in the eyes of law and thus cannot be pressed into service to sustain a conviction. Furthermore, a deeper analysis of his testimony discloses that there existed no animosity, prior enmity, or other underlying hostility between the appellants and the deceased. The absence of such motive assumes critical importance, for it undermines the very substratum of the prosecution's case, which sought to predicate guilt upon the existence of motive as a connecting link in the chain of circumstances. It is trite that motive, though relevant, cannot by itself establish guilt unless fortified by cogent, credible, and corroborative evidence; in its absence, the evidentiary foundation of the prosecution's case becomes tenuous and incapable of sustaining a conviction. This dual infirmity the inadmissibility of his hearsay evidence coupled with the absence of motive strikes at the very root of the prosecution's case and renders the testimony of PW-5 Kankarji wholly unreliable for fastening criminal liability upon the appellants. Upon a careful scrutiny of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, this Court proceeds to assess its probative worth and credibility.
10.At this stage, when the evidence of PW-1 Salim, PW-2 Aatmanji and PW-5 Kankarji is scrutinized in depth, it becomes apparent that none of these witnesses had actually seen the deceased in the company of the appellants. Their (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:36 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (7 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] entire version that the deceased was allegedly last seen at Tulsi's house consuming liquor with the accused persons rests solely upon the information allegedly given by one Chuniya Jogi. However, strikingly, Chuniya Jogi himself was never produced before the Court as a witness, thereby depriving the prosecution case of its most vital link. It is a settled principle that discovery of facts already within the knowledge of the investigating agency carries no evidentiary value; only the disclosure of a genuinely new fact lends credence to such discovery. Moreover, under Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, oral evidence must, as a rule, be direct, that is to say, if the fact refers to something seen, it must be proved by the person who saw it; if it refers to something heard, it must be proved by the person who heard it; and if it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which such opinion is held, it must be proved by the person who holds that opinion on those grounds. In other words, hearsay is inadmissible save for the limited statutory exceptions such as dying declarations under Section 32(1) or spontaneous statements forming part of the res gestae under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872. In the present case, the testimonies of PW-1, PW- 2, and PW-5 do not fall within any such exception and remain purely hearsay, resting upon the unexamined account of Chuniya Jogi.
11.The witnesses candidly admitted in cross-examination that they had no enmity or prior hostility with the appellants and (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:36 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (8 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] that their suspicion was generated only because of what Chuniya Jogi had told them. Further, there are glaring contradictions in their depositions for instance, while PW-1 stated that the dead body was recovered on the second day of the disappearance, he elsewhere admitted that it was on the third day that the police came and prepared documents. Similar inconsistencies appear in the testimony of PW-2, who also conceded ignorance regarding the exact residence of Tulsi and other accused persons, thereby casting doubt on the correctness of their assertion that the deceased was seen in their house. PW-5 Kankarji too, in his cross-examination, admitted that his father's death was only a matter of suspicion against the accused, and several material facts which he claimed to have stated were not found recorded in his police statement. These omissions, improvements, and contradictions strike at the root of the credibility of these witnesses. In absence of direct evidence, and in the face of such shaky and hearsay testimonies, it would be highly unsafe to treat their statements as sufficient to conclusively establish the involvement of the appellants in the crime. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of legal proof and, in the absence of credible and consistent evidence, the benefit of doubt must necessarily go to the appellants.
12.PW-3 Ratanlal Agarwal and PW-4 Dhanraj are formal witnesses who merely attested the preparation of certain (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:36 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (9 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] memos, while PW-6 Babu speaks about the post-mortem and recoveries effected after a considerable delay.
13.The evidence of PW-7 Gopal assumes significance. He has deposed regarding an extra-judicial confession allegedly made by accused Ukiya, wherein the latter admitted his involvement in the assault upon the deceased at the behest of co-accused Bhima.
14.At this stage, it becomes necessary to evaluate the evidentiary worth of the extra-judicial confession allegedly made by accused Ukiya before PW-7 Gopal. The statement of this witness under Section 161 CrPC was recorded belatedly on 11.05.1996, i.e., nearly four months after the incident. In his said statement, Gopal stated that two days earlier, while he was at Palanpur near the RTO Naka, accused Ukiya and his elder brother, who belonged to his community, came to meet him. At that time, Ukiya allegedly told him that at the instance of Bhima and Tulsi, he had consumed liquor with Munshi Kaka (the deceased) at Tulsi's house, and that when Bhima insisted on more liquor, a quarrel ensued between Bhima and Munshi. Under the influence of alcohol, Ukiya and Tulsi allegedly supported Bhima and jointly assaulted Munshi, who succumbed to injuries, and thereafter, out of fear, they threw the body into the forest. Ukiya purportedly added that he had committed a mistake and sought help from Gopal, stating that the sons of Munshi were after him.
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15.The Court finds it highly improbable in the ordinary course of human affairs that an accused, who had not disclosed his guilt to anyone for nearly four months after the incident, would suddenly, on the roadside, make a detailed confession before a relative of the deceased without any prior contact or reason, merely upon meeting him by chance. Such conduct is inherently incongruous and inconsistent with the normal behaviour expected of a person facing such grave consequences. It also appears unnatural that the accused, if he were genuinely seeking refuge or assistance, would attempt to approach the witness in such an unplanned and coincidental manner. The fact that they allegedly met suddenly on a roadside in Gujarat raises serious doubts about the spontaneity and credibility of the encounter. This has persuaded the Court to critically examine the testimony of this witness, especially considering that the accused may face punishment as severe as the death penalty or life imprisonment based on such evidence.
16.The very circumstance that the alleged disclosure occurred accidentally, nearly four months after the death, and that too before a person connected with the victim's family, significantly undermines the plausibility of the prosecution version. The prosecution story further loses credibility in view of the admitted fact that until 11.05.1996, accused Ukiya was neither named nor suspected in connection with the crime. The investigating officer did not indicate any material, (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:37 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (11 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] documentary or oral, to suggest that between January and May 1996, there was any effort to apprehend or even suspect the appellant. There was not an iota of evidence prior to 11.05.1996 linking the accused with the offence. If the accused was neither booked nor under suspicion, the suggestion that he was under pressure or being chased by the police or the deceased's family, and therefore sought help from PW-7, is wholly inconsistent with the prosecution case.
17.When viewed in this backdrop, the version of PW-7 becomes doubtful and unconvincing. The sudden, unprompted confession, allegedly made to a relative of the deceased at a public place after a gap of several months, does not inspire confidence. The very setting and timing of the confession appear contrived and artificial, thereby casting a serious shadow on its voluntariness and truthfulness.
18.Further, the credibility of PW-7 Gopal suffers an additional dent due to the subsequent improvement made by him during his deposition before the Court. In his examination, he introduced a new fact, stating that after returning to Abu Road, he narrated the alleged confession of Ukiya to one Kankarji. Interestingly, Kankarji was examined as PW-5 during trial, yet nowhere in his testimony, neither in examination-in-chief nor in cross-examination, does he whisper that Gopal had ever met him or disclosed such a confession. The absence of any corroboration from PW-5 on (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:37 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (12 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] this material aspect exposes the improvement made by PW-7 as an embellishment and renders his statement further doubtful. Such omission by PW-5, when juxtaposed with the belated disclosure by PW-7, gravely undermines the reliability of the alleged confession and suggests that this part of the testimony was a later concoction introduced to lend artificial support to the prosecution story.
19.By its very nature, an extra-judicial confession may be a substantive piece of evidence, but it is also recognised as a weak type of evidence, requiring cautious scrutiny and corroboration from other independent material, particularly when made before a private individual. Judicial prudence dictates that a true and voluntary confession should ideally be recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before a Magistrate. When such confession is made before a private person especially to a relative of the victim, it becomes inherently suspect and must be tested on the touchstone of natural human conduct, inherent probabilities, and supporting evidence.
20.It is improbable that an accused would voluntarily confess his guilt before a person aligned with the opposite side, particularly one related to the victim. The credibility of the witness before whom the confession is alleged to have been made is therefore of paramount importance. A person who is not a witness of fact and merely conveys information (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:37 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (13 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] allegedly supplied to him by the accused cannot by himself provide a safe evidentiary foundation unless the disclosure is independently corroborated. The unexplained delay of nearly four months in recording such an important statement, despite the case being under investigation, further casts serious doubt on its reliability and authenticity.
21.The Court must also examine whether such conduct on the part of both the witness and the accused appears natural and convincing. In this case, the alleged confession made in an accidental roadside meeting, long after the occurrence, without any pretext or established reason for confidence between the two, appears highly implausible and contrary to ordinary human behaviour.
22.Though this Court refrains from making any conclusive pronouncement on the conduct of investigation, lest it prejudices either side, the cautionary principle remains that extra-judicial confessions must be approached with utmost circumspection. Absent contemporaneous disclosure, the element of spontaneity and voluntariness, which alone lend credence to such confessions stands gravely compromised.
23.The governing principles on the subject are well-settled. While a free and voluntary confession, if genuine, deserves the highest credit, an extra-judicial confession is regarded in law as a weak form of evidence. Courts have consistently held that--
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(i) such a confession must be voluntary and truthful;
(ii) it must inspire confidence as to the person before whom and the circumstances in which it is made;
(iii) it gains probative value only when supported by cogent corroboration; and
(iv) it must be free from inherent improbabilities or material inconsistencies. Unless these safeguards are satisfied, an extra-judicial confession cannot safely form the sole basis of conviction.
24.In the present case, the testimony of PW-7 Gopal does not inspire such confidence. The circumstances under which the alleged confession was made appear doubtful, the timing and setting are unnatural, the improvement regarding communication to PW-5 is uncorroborated, and the delay in recording his statement remains unexplained. The version put forth is inconsistent with human probabilities and the overall prosecution narrative, rendering reliance upon it wholly unsafe.
25.The oral evidence of PW-9 Dr. Dau Lal Chauhan, it is revealing that the cause of death of Munshi was shock and hemorrhage when examined in its entirety, does not lend unqualified support to the prosecution. Though in his chief- examination he opined that the death was on account of excessive bleeding due to multiple fractures, the cross- examination discloses several infirmities which seriously (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:37 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (15 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] dilute the certainty of his opinion. The doctor candidly admitted that death did not occur on account of any single injury, but was the cumulative result of multiple injuries, and that even the lung injury alone could have been sufficient to cause death. Significantly, he did not specify the age of injuries, nor did he record crucial details such as the colour of bruises, body temperature, or the condition of rigor mortis in his post-mortem report, omissions which render his findings inconclusive. He further conceded that the injuries were not inconsistent with a fall or accident, though in his opinion a mere fall from a cycle of 4 feet height may not ordinarily cause such damage. The absence of signs of dragging, the omission of nail or viscera examination, and the failure to preserve samples for forensic analysis leave open various hypotheses regarding the manner of death. In such circumstances, the medical evidence cannot be said to conclusively exclude the possibility of accidental or self- sustained injuries, nor does it establish beyond reasonable doubt that the injuries were homicidal in nature. Hence, the medical testimony, far from corroborating the prosecution, introduces serious doubt and thereby ensures to the benefit of the appellants. Even upon liberal construction, it is held that the death was homicidal in nature; still, this finding does not help the case of the prosecution in connecting the appellant to the crime in the absence of corroborative and supportive evidence.
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26.On a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of PW-10 Poonaram and PW-14 Arjun Singh (Investigating Officer), this Court finds that the alleged arrests, disclosures, and consequent recoveries relied upon by the prosecution suffer from serious infirmities which erode their evidentiary worth. PW-10 candidly admitted in cross-examination that the place from where the alleged recovery of the chilli sack was made was an open and accessible spot, with no lock on the premises, and no independent verification of ownership of the house was ever undertaken. The sack itself was of a common jute variety, devoid of any distinctive marking, and such articles are easily available in the market, thereby rendering its alleged identification wholly unreliable. As regards PW-14, the Investigating Officer, the alleged disclosures and subsequent recoveries are riddled with inconsistencies, absence of contemporaneous corroboration, and lack of independent attestation from credible witnesses. The recoveries were made after substantial delay and from places either accessible to others or not proved to be in the exclusive possession of the accused. In such circumstances, the protection of Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot salvage the prosecution, for the twin requirements of voluntariness and exclusive knowledge stand unfulfilled. Cumulatively, these infirmities render the alleged recoveries unsafe to rely upon, and far from strengthening the (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:37 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (17 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] prosecution, they cast a serious cloud of doubt on its case, thereby enuring to the benefit of the accused.
27.At this stage, it also becomes apparent that certain material witnesses such as Chuniya Jogi and Lala, who were alleged to have seen the deceased in the company of the appellants, were never produced before the Court. Their absence assumes significance, as it deprives the prosecution of the very foundation of its case the "last seen" theory. The lapse is compounded by the fact that the investigating officer was admittedly aware that these individuals might have possessed material knowledge regarding the crime and the identity of its perpetrators. The failure to examine such witnesses, despite their evident relevance, reflects not only faulty investigation but also underscores the deficit nature of the evidence adduced. The non-examination of these witnesses is fatal to the prosecution's case, as it leaves a conspicuous gap in the chain of circumstances sought to be established against the appellants.
28.Further, PW-13 Shanta, when examined, did not support the prosecution version and was declared hostile. It is settled law that while the testimony of a hostile witness may be relied upon to the extent it supports the prosecution, in the present case no material portion of her statement advances the case in any meaningful way. The deliberate withholding of the best available evidence and the failure to secure support from a (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:37 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (18 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] witness projected as material constitute serious infirmities which weaken, rather than strengthen, the prosecution's case.
29.Viewed cumulatively, the alleged circumstances pressed into service by the prosecution namely the deceased being allegedly last seen at Tulsi's house, the recovery of the body, the purported extra-judicial confession, the medical evidence, and the recoveries do not form a complete chain. Each link is either missing, unreliable, or rendered doubtful in the course of cross-examination. The last seen theory collapses for want of primary witnesses; the medical evidence, as already discussed, is inconclusive regarding homicidal death; the extra-judicial confession is inherently weak and surrounded by suspicious delay; and the alleged recoveries are tainted with procedural infirmities. In such circumstances, the chain of circumstances falls short of the standard required in a case of circumstantial evidence, where every link must point unerringly towards the guilt of the accused and exclude every other hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the projected accused.
30.It is also well settled that lapses in investigation cannot by themselves be a ground for acquittal; however, when such lapses strike at the very root of the prosecution case and generate reasonable doubt, the benefit must necessarily go to the accused. In the present case, the non-examination of (Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:37 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (19 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] the most material witnesses, the contradictions in depositions, the doubtful recoveries, and the infirmities in medical evidence cumulatively create serious and reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution story. In criminal jurisprudence, where the standard of proof is one of beyond reasonable doubt, such infirmities cannot be brushed aside as minor irregularities. The inevitable consequence is that the evidence falls short of establishing the guilt of the appellants, thereby entitling them to the benefit of doubt.
31.None of these witnesses, however, deposed anything directly connecting the appellants with the commission of the offence. It thus appears that the learned trial Court proceeded to convict the appellant not on the basis of cogent and trustworthy evidence, but rather by adopting a hypothetical and conjectural approach. The findings recorded appear to be rooted more in surmises than in substantive legal evidence.
32.It is a settled rule of criminal jurisprudence that the standard of proof required in a criminal trial is of the highest degree. The age-old maxim that the burden of proving the charge lies squarely upon the prosecution is not an empty formality but a fundamental safeguard in criminal law. The prosecution must prove the charges beyond all reasonable doubt, and any shadow of doubt, however slight, must necessarily enure to the benefit of the accused.
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33.Indisputably, there is no eyewitness account of the incident of murder; the entire prosecution case is premised upon circumstantial evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions, has laid down that in cases solely based on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved individually beyond every shadow of reasonable doubt. Taken cumulatively, the circumstances must lead only to one inference, namely the guilt of the accused, to the exclusion of every other hypothesis. The circumstantial evidence should be like a spider's web, leaving no exit for the accused to escape. However, when the material on record in the present case is subjected to close scrutiny, it becomes evident that the prosecution has failed to discharge this burden. The circumstances put forth do not unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused; rather, they present a perforated web with ample areas of doubt through which the accused may legitimately slip away. On such shaky foundations, a conviction would be wholly unsafe and contrary to the settled principles governing cases based on circumstantial evidence.
34.In the celebrated judgment in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 (Criminal Appeal No.195/1960), Justice K. Subbarao while discussing the misdirections committed by the Sessions Judge, enunciated:
(Uploaded on 14/10/2025 at 03:31:24 PM) (Downloaded on 14/10/2025 at 07:06:37 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:42258-DB] (21 of 23) [CRLA-729/2000] "It is like this, take a word, split it up into letters, the letters may individually mean nothing but when they are combined they will form a word pregnant with meaning. That is the way how you have to consider the circumstantial evidence. You have to take all the circumstances together and judge for yourself whether the prosecution have established their case."
35.Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to reiterate the theory of circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence means evidence not drawn from direct observation of the fact in issue, but inferred from relevant facts. In other words, where there is no direct evidence of the principal fact, but there exist surrounding circumstances which, though not facts in issue, are relevant to it, then from their establishment a safe inference of the principal fact can be drawn. Hence, it is termed as "inferential evidence."
36.Though there is no straitjacket formula for the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the Courts have consistently prescribed certain cardinal tests. These principles, initially propounded in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343, and followed consistently thereafter, may be summarized as follows:
(i) Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established.
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(ii) Those circumstances must unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused and must be conclusive in nature.
(iii) The circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete as to leave no escape from the conclusion that, within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else.
(iv) The circumstances must be wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and must exclude every other possible hypothesis except that of guilt.
37. Keeping these settled principles in mind, if one evaluates the circumstances adduced by the prosecution in the present case, it was alleged that the appellants bore a motive to commit the murder of Munshi. However, the evidence in this regard is tenuous. No substantial proof of such dispute was placed on record, except a bald and vague allegation by a witness. Thus, the prosecution miserably failed to establish the existence of any motive attributable to the appellants.
38.It is a settled proposition of law that there exists a vast distance between "may be true" and "must be true". This gap must be bridged only through unimpeachable and trustworthy evidence. Courts must exercise extreme caution while traversing this distance, especially in cases of grave offences like murder, where the punishment may extend to life imprisonment or even death. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.
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39.In light of the categorical findings delineated above, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge beyond suspicion, even a single incriminating circumstance against the appellants to sustain the conviction. The impugned judgment of conviction, therefore, does not withstand judicial scrutiny.
40.Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Abu Road, in Sessions Case No.146/1996 is hereby set aside. The appellants stand acquitted of the charge under Sections 302 & 201 IPC. As the appellants are already on bail, their bail bonds are discharged.
41.However, in compliance with Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellants are directed to furnish a personal bond of ₹40,000/- along with one surety in the like amount before the trial court. The bond shall remain in force for six months to ensure the appellants presence before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the event a Special Leave Petition is filed against this judgment and notice thereof is received
42.The record be transmitted back forthwith.
(ANUROOP SINGHI),J (FARJAND ALI),J
112-Mamta/-
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