Chattisgarh High Court
Tirathraj Patel vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 February, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:7991-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 243 of 2023
1 - Tirathraj Patel S/o Late Shri Alkhuram Patel, Aged About 35 Years
Occupation Driver, R/o Potiyakla, Abadipara, Adarsh Nagar, Police
Station Pulgaon, District Durg Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s)
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police
Station Pulgaon, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Ms. Aditi Singhvi, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Govt. Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13/02/2026
1. The appellant has preferred this criminal appeal under section 374 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, against the judgment of Digitally signed by ALOK ALOK SHARMA SHARMA Date:
2026.02.19 10:39:52 +0530 2 conviction and sentence dated 03.12.2022, passed by learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, District Durg, in Sessions Case No. 311/2021, whereby the appellant has been convicted Under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him for Life Imprisonment with fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional RI for 01 month.
2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 03.09.2021, the complainant Kemendra Sahu (P.W. 2) lodged a report to the police that at about 06:00 pm, when he came back from his work to his house, the daughter of accused Tirathraj Ram Patel came out from her house in burning condition and ran towards the house of Amrit Bandhe and tried to extinguished fire by water taken from the drum kept there. He and Omprakash Bandhe covered her with a bedsheet and, with the help of other persons, took her to the District Hospital, Durg, by motorcycle. She disclosed at the hospital that her mother and father were quarreling and when she intervened, her father, Tirathraj Ram Patel, poured kerosene oil upon her and set ablazed by match stick. FIR Ex. P/8 was registered against the accused Tirathraj Patel, for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. The deceased was treated by Dr. Shrishti Deshmukh, PW-7, who found 80 % burn injuries on the body of the deceased and after primary treatment, she referred her to higher centre. Her MLC report is Ex.P/19. Her indoor patient admission ticket at District Hospital, Durg is Ex.P/20. At the time when she was admitted at District 3 Hospital, Durg, her dying declaration was recorded by Dr Shrishti Deshmukh, PW-7, which is Ex.P/18. In the dying declaration, she alleged that her father poured kerosene oil upon her and burnt. The deceased was then shifted to Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital and Research Centre, Bhilai, from where she was again shifted to DKS Super Specialty Hospital, Raipur, where she died on 13.09.2021. Merg intimation Ex.P/24 was sent by the doctor of DKS, Super Specialty Hospital, Raipur to Golbazar Police Station, Raipur. Inquest Ex.P/15 of the dead body of the deceased was prepared in the presence of the witnesses and the dead body was sent for its port-mortem to Dr. Amedkar Hospital, Raipur, where PW-10 Dr Nagrendra Singh Sonwani conducted post-mortem of the dead body of the deceased and gave his report Ex.P/25. While conducting the port-mortem the doctor has noticed ante- mortem superficial to deep burn present over the parts of chest, part of abdomen, part of upper and lower limbs and back and burn area involved about 45-50 % of total body surface area and opined that the cause of death is septicemic shock as a result of ante-mortem infection of multiple internal organs subsequent upon ante-mortem infected thermal burn. Involved in about 45 - 50 % of the total body surface area.
3. The merg-intimation was transferred to Police Station Pulgaon, District Durg, where merg-intimation Ex.P/26 was recorded, and the offence of Section 302 of IPC was added. Spot map Ex.P/1 was prepared by the Patwari, and Ex.P-9 was prepared by the 4 Police. Burnt pieces of clothes, burnt match-stick having smell of kerosene oil, burnt pieces of frock and scarf (chunni), have been seized from the house of the appellant, and burnt pieces of clothes have been seized from the courtyard of Amritlal Bandhe vide seizure memo Ex.P/4. The treatment papers have been seized from Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital, Bhilai. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. have been recorded. The accused was arrested on 03.09.2021 and his memorandum statement Ex.P/2 was recorded. Based on his memorandum statement one plastic jerrican having one litre of kerosene oil and one match box having matchsticks have been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/9. The seized articles were sent for its chemical examination to state FSL, Raipur from where report Ex.P/31 was received and contents of kerosene oil were found in the sent articles. After completion of usual investigation charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under section 307, 302 of IPC before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg. The case was committed to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Durg, from where it has been transferred to the learned trial Court.
4. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial.
5. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. Statement of the 5 appellant under Section 313 of CRPC has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appears against him, plead innocence and has submitted that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the offence and he was not present on the spot and had gone to village Purda.
6. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment, hence this appeal.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, and their statements are inconsistent. The appellant, being the father of the deceased, had taken her to the hospital. The case of the prosecution is based on the dying declaration, which is said to have been recorded by the doctor which is marked as Ex.P/18 whereas another dying declaration was recorded by the executive Magistrate on 11.09.2021 which has not been relied upon by the prosecution in which she disclosed that she burnt by an accident that her father pouring kerosene upon himself but kerosene oil was also spread upon her and when her father ignited the matchstick, fire was catch on her hairs. She would also submit that non relying upon the document amounts to suppression of material evidence and the benefit goes to the accused. She would further submit that in 6 the said dying declaration Ex.P/18, the doctor has recorded in his own language and there is certification that she was fit to give statement. Therefore, the dying declaration is full of suspicion and it cannot sufficient to convict the appellant in the offence in question. It is further submitted by her that there is no other evidence that connects the appellant with the alleged offence and the appellant is entitled at least the benefit of doubt. Therefore, by giving the benefit of doubt, the appellant may be acquitted.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. But for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses are fully reliable. The case of the prosecution is based on dying declaration Ex.P/18 which is proved by PW-7 Dr. Shrishti Deshmukh who recorded it. Before recording the dying declaration she certified that the deceased was fit to give statement which has been recorded in the document Ex.P/22. Even otherwise she was being instructed by the investigating officer for recording of her dying declaration through the document Ex.P/23, and she recorded the dying declaration Ex.P/18. She, being the independent witness and the treating doctor, cannot doubt that the recording of the dying declaration by her is suspicious. He further submits that sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to produce defence evidence was provided to the accused but he has not 7 availed his remedy to get another dying declaration exhibited by confronting from the investigating officer of by calling defence witness. Even otherwise, the defence has not been taken by the accused, as has been allegedly stated in the other dying declaration. The dying declaration is fully reliable and the conviction can be made upon it. The accused could not prove his plea of alibi that he was not in the house at the time of the alleged incident. There is burn injuries found on the body of the accused, which gives any presumption that he tried to save the deceased, therefore, considering the entire evidence available in the case, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court is justified and needs no interference.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection.
10. With respect to the unnatural death of the deceased by ante-
mortem burn injuries is concerned, the prosecution has proved the evidence of PW-7 Dr Shrishti Deshmukh, who treated the deceased at District Hospital, Durg and Dr Nagendra Singh Sonwani, who conducted the post-mortem of the dead of the deceased. It is not in dispute that the deceased received burn injuries on 03.09.2021 and she died on 13.09.2021.
11. PW-7, Dr. Shrishti Deshmukh stated in her evidence that the deceased Neelma was admitted in the hospital on 03.09.2021 at 06:55 pm. She narrated that she was burnt by her father at about 06:00 pm, on 03.09.2021 at home. The smell of kerosene oil was 8 present, and she found superficial second degree burn to the extent of 80% on various parts of the body. She referred to the Higher Centre for further treatment and the indoor patient admission ticket is Ex.P/20, and the referral slip is Ex.P/21. From the document Ex.P/24 it transpires that the deceased was being admitted DKS Super Speciality Hospital, Raipur and she died on 13.09.2021 during treatment and merg intimation Ex.P/24 was sent to Golbazar Police, Raipur. The Golbazar Police prepared inquest of the dead body of the deceased and sent it for post- mortem to Dr. Ambedkar Hospital, Raipur.
12. PW-10, Dr. Nagendra Singh Sonwani conducted the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased who found ante-mortem burn injures on her body and opined that the cause of death is septicemic shock as a result of ante-mortem infection of multiple internal organs, subsequent upon ante-mortem infected thermal burn. Involving about 45-50 % of the total body surface area. In his cross-examination, the defence has not challenged the cause of death and mode of death. When ante-mortem burn injuries have been found on the body of the deceased and her death was due to burn injuries, it can be safely held that the death of the deceased in unnatural circumstances by ante-mortem burn injuries.
13. So far as the involvement of the appellant in the offence in question is concerned, we again examine the evidence produced by the prosecution.
9
14. The case of the prosecution is based on the dying declaration recorded by PW-7 Dr Shrishti Deshmukh who was the treating doctor. Before considering the evidence of the doctor who recorded the dying declaration, it is necessary here to consider the relevant provisions of law with respect to the dying declaration. Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act,1872 provides the relevant provisions with respect to the dying declaration which reads as under: -
"32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.--Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence,or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:--
(1) when it relates to cause of death.--When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transac- tion which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.
xxx xxx xxx 10
15. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the"dying declaration" section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to "circumstances of the transaction":
"21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:-
(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide,provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.
(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-
dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical 11 culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.
(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross- examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring.
(4) It may be important to note that Section 32does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide. 12
(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within 10 the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore,admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant."
16. Thereafter, in the matter of Devinder alias Kala Ram and others v. State of Haryana, wherein the deceased, who sustained burn injuries while cooking meals on stove, had made a statement to the doctor, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that statement of the deceased recorded by the doctor is relevant under Section 32of the Evidence Act and observed as under: -
"14. In the facts of the present case, we find that PW 7, the Medical Officer of the Civil Hospital, examined the case of the deceased on 6-8-1992 at 6.30 a.m. and he has clearly stated in his evidence that on examination she was conscious and that there were superficial to deep burns all over the body except some areas on feet,face and perineum and there was smell of kerosene on her body. He also stated in his evidence that the deceased was brought to the hospital by her husband Kala Ram (Appellant 1). He has proved the bed-head ticket pertaining to the deceased in the hospital (Ext. DD) as well as his endorsement at Point 'A' on Ext. DD, from which it is clear that he was told by the patient herself that she sustained burns while cooking meals on a stove. This statement of the deceased recorded by PW 7 is relevant under Section 32 of 13 the Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, are themselves relevant facts when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question."
17. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: -
"21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:-
21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court. 21.2.The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. 21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail.14
21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement.
21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration.
21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement.
21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration."
18. The question for consideration is, whether the statement of the deceased recorded by Dr. Shrishti Deshmukh (PW-7) during the course of treatment is relevant under Section 32 of the Evidence Act or not?
19. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that when a statement, written or verbal, is made by a person as to the cause of her death, or as to any of the circumstances of the 15 transaction which resulted in her death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, such statement is relevant. The Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) clearly held that Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible, the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is homicide or a suicide, provided the 13 statement relates to the cause of death or deals with circumstances leading to the death. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) has further been followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab reviewing the earlier authorities.
20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Irfan @ Naka v. The State of Uttar Pradesh has considered certain parameters to trust whether a dying declaration could be acted upon solely for securing conviction or not. It was observed as under:-
"62.There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a dying declaration should be accepted; the duty of the Court is to decide this question in the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case and be fully convinced of the truthfulness of the same. Certain factors below reproduced can be considered to determine the same, however, they will only affect the weight of the dying declaration and not its admissibility: -
(i) Whether the person making the statement was in expectation of death?16
(ii) Whether the dying declaration was made at theearliest opportunity? "Rule of First Opportunity"
(iii) Whether there is any reasonable suspicion to believe the dying declaration was put in the mouth of the dying person?
(iv) Whether the dying declaration was a product of prompting, tutoring or leading at the instance of police or any interested party?
(v) Whether the statement was not recorded properly?
(vi) Whether, the dying declarant had opportunity to clearly observe the incident?
(vii) Whether, the dying declaration has been consistent throughout?
(viii) Whether, the dying declaration in itself is a manifestation / fiction of the dying person's imagination of what he thinks transpired?
(ix) Whether, the dying declaration was itself voluntary?
(x) In case of multiple dying declarations, whether, the first one inspires truth and consistent with the other dying declaration?
(xi) Whether, as per the injuries, it would have been impossible for the deceased to make a dying declaration?
63. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the charge against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt. The benefit of doubt must always go in favour of the accused. It is true that dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind. It 17 is just not enough for the court to say that the dying declaration is reliable as the accused is named in the dying declaration as the assailant."
21. Reverting to the facts of the present case, PW-7 Dr. Shrishti Deshmukh who admitted the deceased in the hospital on 03.09.2021 at 06:55 pm, she recorded the history that the patient narrated that she was burnt by her father at about 06:00 pm, on 03.09.2021 at home and the smell of kerosene oil was present. During the treatment of the deceased, on 03.09.2021 she was requested by the investigating officer to record the dying declaration of the deceased, and the request letter is Ex.P/23, which she received on the same day at 06:40 pm. Another letter she received with respect to the condition of the patient to give statement or not and then she certified at 06:40 pm, that the patient was able to give a statement which is in the document Ex.P/22 and thereafter, at 06:44 pm, she started recording her dying declaration. It is relevant here to reproduce the contents of the dying declaration Ex.P/18 which is recorded by PW-7 Dr. Shrishti Deshmukh, which reads as under:
प्रश्न उत्तर
01. क्या नाम है आपका Nilima Patel
02. पिता/पति का नाम Tirath Patel
03. आपकी उम्र क्या है 12 ys/F
04. क्या काम करते है Student, 6th Class.
05. घटना का दिनांक 03/09/2021 समय 6:00.pm बजे और
18
स्थान Home
06. घटना कै से घटी As per history, given by patient,
she was burnt by her father by
pouring her kerosene oil @ 6pm
on 03/09/2021
07. किसी से लडाई झगडा तो नहीं Mother (for, not doing household work) हुआ:
08. घटना के समय कौन कौन Mother (Shagni Patel) 2 Sisters (Bhumika, Rashi) उपस्थित थे
09. किसी ने आपको मारा /जलाया/ हाँ जहर पिलाया
10. इस घटना के लिए कौन पिता (तीरथ पटेल) जिम्मेदान है
11. आपको कु छ कहना है:- मुझे मेरा पिता मारना चाहते है।
22. The PW-7, in her cross-examination have stated the deceased was being taken to hospital by her mother at 06:40 pm, she further stated that she was being taken at 06:30 pm. She asked about the incident from the injured because the kerosene smell was coming from her body and then she prepared the prescription Ex.P/21. She mentioned in her own handwriting in the document Ex.P/22 that the injured was fit to give her statement. Since the requisition was in Hindi language, she had written her certification in Hindi language. She clearly denied that she only signed the document Ex.P/22. She further stated in her cross-examination that in the presence of the investigating officer, she recorded her dying declaration. She also explained that she had studied in English medium, therefore, she recorded the dying declaration in 19 English though it has been made in Hindi but as per the convenience, she recorded it in English. She reiterated that she herself has written the contents of the dying declaration. She also stated about the signature of the injured in the dying declaration. From the evidence of this witness, the defence could not elicit any material to disbelieve the evidence of the doctor who recorded the dying declaration. She, being the independent witness, has clearly proved the recording of the dying declaration without any interest, fear or favour.
23. The accused had taken defence in his 313 Cr.P.C. statement that he was not present in the house and had gone to village Purda, however, he is unable to prove the plea of alibi by producing any evidence.
24. In view of the evidence of the doctor PW-7 and the dying declaration Ex.P/18 as also from the contents of the MLC report Ex.P/18, the prosecution is able to prove the dying declaration in which the deceased alleges that her father, i.e. the appellant, poured kerosene oil upon her and set her ablazed.
25. PW-1 Omprakash Bandhe, is the person in whose home the deceased came in buring condition, he stated in his evidence that when he was working in his house in computer, the deceased Leenima Patel came out from her house in burning condition and extinguished fire by the water which was kept in his courtyard and when the fire was completely not extinguished she stated running here and there and then he extinguished her fire till that time other 20 villagers were gathered and they took the deceased to the hospital. Thereafter, this witness has turned hostile and not supported the prosecution's case. From the evidence of this witness, it only comes that the deceased has got ablazed inside her house.
26. PW-2, Kemendra Sahu, who is the lodger of the FIR have turned hostile and not supported the prosecution case.
27. PW-4 Smt. Sagni Patel, is the mother of the deceased and wife of the appellant. She stated in her evidence that on the date of the incident, she scolded her daughter and slapped her. Her husband had gone to village of Purda in a funeral of his relative, and he came back from there after the incident. Her daughter was being taken to the hospital by Kemendra Sahu and Bhojram Bharti on their scooty, and she and her husband came to the hospital later on. After about 08 days her daughter died. She too has turned hostile and not supported the prosecution case. Though she has stated that her husband had gone to village Purda but the defence could not prove the plead of alibi under its requirement by examining any witness of village Purda that the appellant had gone there on that day to attend the funeral of his relative. The simple suggestion of alibi does not meet its requirement to prove, particularly when the deceased, from very beginning, stated that she was being burnt by her father.
28. From the entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as the law relating to the dying declaration, we are of the considered 21 opinion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant and the learned trial court has rightly convicted and sentenced him for the alleged offence.
29. As a fallout, the appeal filed by the appellant fails and hereby dismissed. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 04.09.2021. He shall undergo the entire sentence awarded by the learned trial Court.
30. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
31. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Alok