Patna High Court
Ashwini Kumar Sinha vs Kameshwar Deo And Anr. on 2 January, 1962
Equivalent citations: 1963CRILJ573
ORDER Ramratna Singh, J.
1. This application In revision is directed against an order of the District Magistrate of Muzaffarpur directing the cDtnplalnant (petitioner In this Court) to obtain sanction from the State Government under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for prosecuting Shri Kameshwar Deo and Shri Upendra Prasad, Sub-divisional Officer and Deputy Superintendent of Police, respectively, of Sltaramrni.
2. The occurrence, which formed the subject-matter of the complaint, is said to have taken place from 8 a.m, to 4.30 p.m. oh the 21st February, 1962, and the offences. said to have been committed are those under Sections 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 342 (wrongfully confining any person), 500 (defamation) and 504 (insult intended to provoke a breach of the peace) of the Penal Code and. Section 129 (Returning Officer persuading, dissuading or influencing the voting) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The petition of complaint purports to have been presented on the 25th February, 1962, though it-seems to have been actually received by the District Magistrate on the next day, when he examined the complainant on solemn affirmation. The statement on solemn affirmation is substantially the same as the allegation' contained in the petition of complaint; and in order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, the relevant portion of the statement on solemn affirmation is reproduced below:
... On 21-2-62 at about 8 a.m. I was near Peta Tajpur booth. I was issuing identity slips on behalf of Sri Triveni Singh. ., . Subsequently the S.D.O. came on a jeep with the D.S.P. following by a pick-up van. As soon as the jeep stopped, the S.D.O. came out of it with the D.S.P. and ashed me "Why have you come here?" in a loud voice. I replied that I had come from Muzaffarpur he asked me why I had come and 'caught hold of my collar. He assaulted me with baton on my right elbow. The D.S.P. also struck ma on the left hand with baton. The S.D.O. gave me another blow on the right side of the chest above the abdomen. He also abused me' and then asked me to sit in the pick-up. 'He also' asked the others who were there to sit in the pick-up, and 'snatched away the identity slips and said 'sale as turn to Sitamarhi subdivision Ka election dikha den.' He then chased away some of the voters-and made me sit in the jeep. 'Re then' went to the booth and said to those present there 'Dekho un salon Ko pakar ker rakhe huwe hain.' He was shouting near the booth swinging the baton. I saw some persons running away from the booth. He then came back to the jeep. I askea the guard to take me to the S.D.O. I told the S.D.O. that since he knew me he shouldn't have treated me in this manner. 'The S.D.O. and D.S.P. asked me to shut up calling me 'Behuda' I was then taken in the jeep. The pick-up followed ... We then went to some school where there-was a booth. 1 was asked to get down from the jeep and the S.D.O. told the voters assembled there 'Dekho in behudon ko. Tumara bi yahi halat hogi". I was then taken to Runisaidpur P. Section and locked up In the hajat ... At about 4 p.m. we were tied with a tight rope in the presence of the D.S.P. and the S.D.O. and dragged to the pickup. We asked for a longer rope so that we could move freely. We were put on a truck. We could enter the truck with difficulty. We were taken in an open truck before several persons to Sitamarhi and remanded in custody in the sub-jail, 'I asked the Jailor to get the Jail Doctor to examine me. The Jailor refused to get my injuries examined in the absence of any paper from the S.D.O. We were in jail till 2 p.m. on 24-2-62. While leaving the jail, I asked the Jail Doctor in the presence of the II Officer to examine my injuries. The Jail Doctor examined me. He told me that he couldn't examine me earlier in the absence of any direction from the officer who escorted us to the jail, returned to Muzaffarpur and got myself examined by the Civil Asst. Surgeon whose certificate Is filed herewith, am a respectable person of the city and pay income-tax. 1 have been defamed as a result of this incident and my reputation has been damaged in the eyes of the public.
To Court When the District Magistrate and the S. P. interviewed me in the Thana Hajat, I did not tell them that I had been assaulted as their stay was too snort. None from Muzaffrrpur accompanied me to Pota village. (I have underlined (herd in '') the portions on which learned Advocate for the petitioner laid stress for the purpose or deciding the question whether sanction under Section 197 or the Code of Criminal Procedure was necessary or not.)
3. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no Court shall take cognizance, without we sanction of the State Government, of any offence which a public servant removable by or with the sanction of that Government is alleged to have committed "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The meaning of the expression quoted in the last sentence is now well settled by a series of decisions.
4. In Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor 1939 FCR 159 : AIR 1939 FC 43 it was observed by Varadachariar, j. that the question whether or not the act complained of is one purporting to be done in execution of his duty as a public servant is substantially one of fact, to be determined with reference to the act complained of and the attendant circumstances; it seems neither useful nor desirable to paraphrase the language of the section in attempting to lay down hard and fast tests.
His Lordship then placed the earlier decisions in three groups. In the first group he placed those cases in which "it is insisted that there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it"; and this was stated by his Lordship to be the correct view.
In this connection, his Lordship referred particularly to a decision of the Madras High Court in Ganapathy Goundan v. Emperor AIR 1932 Mad 214 as instructive since, though two acts were complained of, the Court held that one of the acts was an official act, but not the other, notwithstanding the apparent connection between the acts in the sense of relation in time or opportunity. In that case, a village Magistrate held in confinement certain persons who were suspected to have committed a murder, and also tortured them in order to extort a confession from them. He was charged for committing offences under Sections 330, 343 and 348 of the Indian Penal Code. Wallace, J. held that sanction to prosecute him under Sections 343 and 348 was required under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but not for prosecuting him under Section 330. The reason for the view taken in respect of Section 330, was stated by Wallace, J. thus:
It cannot be contended that his official duty permits him to do anything of the nature of causing hurt or applying torture to persons confined by him lawfully or Under pretext of law. I would therefore be prepared to hold that in the matter of the alleged offence under Section 330 no sanction is required.
In Gill v. The King, 75 IInd App 41 : AIR 1948 PC 128, the Judicial Committee approved the view of Varadachariar, J. and observed:
A public servant can only be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge. of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. Thus, a Judge neither acts nor purports to act as a Judge in receiving a bribe, though the judgment which he delivers may be such an act: nor does a Government medical officer act or purport to act as a public servant In picking the pocket of a patient whom he is examining, though the examination, itself may be such an act. The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that what he does, he does in virtue of his office." In Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu , their Lordships of the Supreme Court. referred with approval the views of the Judicial Committee and that of Varadachariar, J., and summed up the result of the authorities' thus:
It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1). Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of me office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in tact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution ... If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under Section 197(1) would be necessary; but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required.
Their Lordships also referred to the decision in Shree Kantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay (S) AIR 1955 SC 28, which had approved the observations of Varadachariar, J.. and those of the Privy Council. In Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari , almost all the previous decisions were again reviewed and their Lordships approved the aforesaid observations. Their Lordships also added:
No question of sanction can arise under Section 19/, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds "what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits." And the result of the discussions was summarised tnus:
There must be a reasonable confection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful, claim that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty The present case has to be considered in the light of this summary.
5. From the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation reproduced earlier, it will appear that Sri Deo caught hold of the collar of the complainant and assaulted him with baton on his right elbow, and then Sri Prasad also struck him on the left hand with bafon; thereafter Sri Deo gave him another blow on the right side of the chesr above the abdomen and abused him. After snatching away the identity slips, Sri Deo abused him and told him in Hindi that he would show the election of Sitamarh) sub-divislon to him.
When the two accused officers brought the complainant to a school where there was a booth Sri Deo showed the complainant to the people assembled there calling him 'behuda' and saying that they would also meet the same fate. The arrest of the complainant and then his being carried by the officers to the than and his being taken away tied with a tight rope on a truck to Sitamarhi in the evening may, in certain circumstances, be said to be acts connected with the official duties of the two officers.
But the other acts could have no reasonable connection with the official duties of these officers; and the pretended or fanciful claim that they committed these acts in the course of performance of their official duties cannot be entertained. Their official duties did not authorise them to assault or abuse the complainant, when there is nothing on the record so far to show that there was any obstruction or resistance by the complainant.
6. Learned Standing Counsel, who appeared for the opposite parties, referred to paragraph 2 of the petition of complaint, which reads thus:
That Shri Vivekananda Giri on the verge of election engaged lathials and undesirable persons to organise his election compaign and in consequence of that a serious breach of peace was apprehended by the Congress workers on account of wrongful overt acts perpetrated by the workers of Shri Giri who were openly holding out threats to the Congress workers not to work for the Congress candidate. An information to that effect was given to the S. I. of police Runisaidpur by Chedi Thakur and others on 19-2-1962 about apprehension of breach of peace at Manikchauk booths On the basis of these statements, he argued that the officers were justified even in using force on account of the tense situation. But he missed the fact that these statements related to some incident which happened on or before the 19th February, 1962 and in respect of the same an information had been given to the police at Runisaidpur police station by Chedi Thakur and others. Further, this paragraph relates to apprehension of a breach of the peace at Manikchauk booths, while the incidents of the 2lst February, 1962, to which the complaint relates, occurred at Pota Tajpur booths and on the way from Pota Tajpur to the Runisaidpur thana and from there to Sitamarhi.
7. In this connection, learned Standing Counsel relied on the decision in the case in Matajog Dobey, (S) AIR I955 SC 44. The facts of that case are summarised by their Lordships thus:
(4)... In connection with certain proceedings pending before the Income-tax Investigation Commission it was found necessary to search two premises --17. Kalakar Street and 36, Armenian Street -- to inspect, take copies and secure possession of certain books, papers and documents believed to be in them. A warrant was issued by the Commission for this purpose in favour of persons, namely, H. C.BIiari, A. D, De, K. Bose and P. Mukherjee, to carry out the search.
5. The authorised officials went to the Kalakar street premises, third floor, on the morning of (7) December 1950, Matajog pobey (Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 5/), the darwan of Kashiram Agarwala, says that when he found them forcibly breaking open the entrance door of the flat he challenged them and requested them to desist. They paid no heed to him, broke open the door, went inside and interfered with some boxes and drawers of tables.
They tied him with a rope and assaulted him causing injuries. On these facts, he filed a complaint on 27-12-1950 against H. C. Bhari and three others (names unknown) under Sections 323, 341, 342 and 109, Penal Code.
6. The four officials and some policeman raided the Armenian street premises on the evening of 26-12-1950. Nandram Agarwala (father of Kashiram Agarwala) came to the place and found that they had forcibly opened the lock of the door of the room in which there were several books and papers, which they were collecting and packing into bundles for removal. He protested, pointed out that their actions were illegal and oppressive, and he wanted a proper search list to be prepared and proper receipts to be given to him for the books and documents sought to be seized and removed.
Thereupon, two policemen held him down and he was assaulted mercilessly, kicked, dragged downstairs, put in a police van, and taken to the Burra Bazar thana, where he was assaulted again before being sent to the Hospital. He was brought back and kept in the lock up till midnight when he was released on bail. Setting out these facts he lodged a complaint against the four officials, other subordinates and police officers whose names he did not then know but could supply later.
The contents of the search warrant are reproduced in paragraph 12 of the report; and it is sufficient to say that the warrant authorised police assistance at the search. Their Lordships then observed:
If in the exercise of the power or the performance of the official duty, improper or unlawful obstruction or resistance is encountered, there must be the right to use reasonable means to remove the obstruction or overcome the resistance. This accords with commonsense and does not seem contrary to any principle of law. . . Still, it can be urged that the accused could claim that what they did was in the discharge of their official duty.
The belief that they had a right to get rid of the obstruction then and there by binding down the complainants or removing them from the place might be mistaken, out, surely, it could not be said that their act was necessarily mala fide and so entirely divorced from or unconnected with the discharge of their duty that it was an independent act maliciously done or perpetrated. They could reasonably claim that what they did was by virtue of their official duty, whether the claim is found ultimately to be well-founded or not.
Reading the complaints alone in these two cases, even without the details of facts as narrated by the witnesses at the judicial inquiries, it is fairly clear that the assault and use of criminal force etc. alleged against the accused are definitely related to the performance of their official duties. But taken along with them, it seems to us to be an obvious case for sanction.
The injuries a couple of abrasions and a swelling on Nandram Agarwala and two ecchymosis on Matajog indicate nothing more than a scuffle which is likely to have ensued when there were angry protests against the search and a pushing aside of the protestors so that the search may go on unimpeded.
It will be noticed that that was a case of a search and unlawful obstruction or resistance by the complainants to the searches; and their Lordships thought that injures on the complainants indicated nothing more than a scuttle which was likely to have ensued when there were angry protests and pushing aside of the protestors. In the present case, however, there is nothing to record to Indicate that there was any angry protest or resistance or obstruction by or on behalf of the complainant.
8. In the same case, , their Lord-ships said that It Is not always necessary that the need for sanction under Section 197 is to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged with the allegations therein contained. "The complaint may not disclose that the ac1 constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case.
9. In the present case, the only materials on the record are those contained in the petition of complaint and the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation, because the District Magistrate did not send the case for inquiry to anybody nor did he make any enquiry himself in accordance with law. On the 26th February, 1962, after examining the complainant on solemn affirmation, the District Magistrate said that he would himself inquire into the matter and the date and place for inquiry would be intimated to the complainant in due course. On the 20 in March, 1962, he passed an order that he would hold me inquiry at Runisaidpur police station on the 4th April, 1962. and directed that the complainant as well as the accused persons may be informed about the date and place for inequity. On the 4th April, 1962, a petition was moved on behalf of the complainant that the District Magistrate should not proceed with the inquiry, since he had some personal knowledge of the case which he might import into the inquiry. On this, the learned District Magistrate ordered:
My intention in deciding to hold a personal enquiry into this complaint was mainly to find out whether sanction Under Section 197 Cr.P.C. would be necessary or not, and not to hold a full fledged judicial enquiry under Section 202 Cr, P. C. The apprehension of the complainant that I would import my personal knowledge into the inquiry is therefore -somewhat premature and does not arise at this stage. . . the petition is rejected.
Immediately thereafter, another petition was filed on behalf not the complainant requesting the District Magistrate to postpone the inquiry, as the complainant proposed to move the High Court for transfer of the case. By the same order the District Magistrate rejected this petition after observing; "I do not see any reason why enquiry on the preliminary point whether sanction is necessary or not should (be postponed at this stage." the last portion of this order of the 4th April, I962 speaks of certain decisions cited on behalf of the complainant in support of the view that no sanction was necessary, and the learned District Magistrate added further.
They have no other point to make and do not want that either the complainant or any witness should be examined at this stage. Put up on 6/4 for orders on the point whether sanction is necessary or not." "When the District Magistrate passed the impugned order on the 6th April, 1962, he said:
I have ascertained from the accused persons the circumstances under which the complainant was arrested. It appears that there was tension at Pota polling booth on the date of poll. The complainant admittedly was an outsider who was neither an election agent nor a polling agent nor a voter in the Constituency. He had also taken a few persons with him, who were also outsiders. The Subdivisional Officer and the Dy. Superintendent of Police were satisfied that the presence of these outsiders near the polling booth during the hours of poll was likely to lead to a serious breach of the peace and they had, therefore, to make some preventive arrests. It is, therefore, clear that the offences alleged to have been committed related to the discharge of official duty. 'A reading of the complaint petition and the statement of the complainant on S. A. cleany shows that the assault, use of criminal force etc. alleged against the accused are definitely related to the performance of their official duties.' There is thus an obvious case for sanction under Section 197 Cr. P. C." (The underlining (here into ') has been done by me.) The action of the District Magistrate in ascertaining from the two accused officers certain facts in private was, to say the least, most unwarranted, particularly when he did so in the absence of the complainant. He was not at all justified in accepting the verbal statements of the two accused officers on their face value without giving any opportunity to the complainant to meet the explanations offered by these officers for their apparently undesirable acts. After the District Magistrate had examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and fixed the date for inquiry, he was acting purely in a judicial capacity, and, therefore, this act of his was absolutely unjustified. He had no right to import what he learnt privately from the accused officers and then come to a decision on that information.
Ordinarily, the accused has no locus stand, in an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; but even if the District Magistrate wanted to give these officers an opportunity to offer their version of the occurrence, he ought to have done so in presence of the complainant and he ought to have given an opportunity to the complainant to adduce evidence in support of his allegations. Further, the version of these officers contained in the order of the District Magistrate did not at all justify the inference that they assaulted and abused the complainant in the purported discharge of their official duties. It is remarkable that, even in the version of the accused mentioned in the order dated the 6th April, 1962, these officers have not denied the allegations made by the complainant regarding assault, abuses, insults and injuries, nor have they spoken of any resistance, obstruction or angry protests by the complainant. The tact that there was tension at Pota polling booth on the date of poll might have justified the arrest of the complainant and others; but there was no justification for assaulting or abusing the complainant in the absence of any statement that there was any protest or resistance by or on behalf of the complainant.
The mere fact that the accused officers arrested the complainant and others in order to prevent a breach of the peace does not justify the conclusion drawn by the District Magistrate "that the offences alleged to have been committed related to the discharge of official duty. Another observation of the District Magistrate Is that the complainant was admittedly an outsider, who was neither an election agent nor a polling agent, nor a voter in the constituency and that he had also taken a few persons with him, who were also outsiders. But In law even a resident of another district or another State is entitled to go to a particular constituency or a particular booth and canvass for a particular candidate so long as he does not infringe the election law or create any disorder. There is nothing in that law to support this observation of the District Magistrate nor to prevent such outsiders from issuing slips to the voters on behalf of a particular candidate. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the complainant was inside the polling booth or so near it as to violate election rules. After the District Magistrate had examined the complainant on solemn affirmation under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and fixed a date for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, there was no justification for his making a private inquiry from the accused officers for the purpose of a decision regarding sanction; and without a proper inquiry in respect of the allegations made by the complainant, he could not, under the law, come to a decision regarding sanction.
Then, I fail to comprehend the underlined (here in ') observations of the District Magistrate in the last but one sentence of his order dated the 6th April, 1962, reproduced earlier. it is obviously impossible to infer from the contents of the complaint petition and the statement on solemn affirmation only that the "use of criminal force etc. alleged against the accused are definitely related to the performance of their official duties.
In my opinion, the materials on the record in the present case do not in any way show any reasonable connection between the official duties of the accused officers and the acts of assaulting and abusing the complainant; and the claim of the officers made in private before the District Magistrate that they did these acts in the course of performance of their official duties cannot be countenanced.
10. In this connection, I should refer to some other decisions cited at the bar. In Mahadeb Muhherjee v. Jagannath Prasad Sinha , Das, J. (as he then was) took the view that Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not attracted on the facts stated hereinafter. One Satya Kinker Banerjee filed a petition in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Purulia. Satya Kinker said in his application that he was in great difficulties and the paddy crops would be destroyed if he were not allowed to take water from certain tanks in the village. One of the tanks in question was called Bhubirsair. At the time when the aforesaid application of Satya Kinker was moved, the complainant was present in Court. He was a co-sharer owner of the said tank. The Subdivisional Magistrate asked the compliant to allow Satya Kinker to irrigate his paddy crop from the said tank and give his permission in writing so that Satya Kinker might irrigate his paddy crop from the tank in question. The complainant said that he could not do so without consulting his co-sharers. The Sub divisional Magistrate became furious, and in the presence of several persons threatened the complainant in the following words:
I shall give orders for shooting if you do not allow water. You are taking a dog-in-the-manger policy. I shall not give you a single grain at the time of Government help, and I Know that you Win be in need of food grains surely. I shall send armed force; I shall ruin your family, though I know my order is illegal.
His Lordship held that it was not a part of the official duty of the Subdivisional Magistrate to pass an order for irrigation of the paddy crop of a private person from a tank which belonged to another private person; and consequently even if the Subdivisional Magistrate had authority to pass such an order, it was no part of his official duty to use the words which he used against the complainant.
In Beharl Rai v. The State , the complaint against a Deputy Superintendent of Police was that when he and other Police Officers had gone to the place of a dacoity to investigate into the case, the cone plainant, who along with them was also making a search for the dacoits, was called by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and on his arrival abused and slapped, and, upon his protest, beaten by a lathi. Reuben, J. (as he then was) held that, taking the complaint as it stood there was nothing to indicate that the accused was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. In Ganga Prasad Sinha v. Brindaban Chandra Das AIR 1935 Cal 176, a Subdivisional Officer of the public Works Department went to supervise the work which was done by the complainant, who was a Road Muharrir of that department. On seeing the Subdivisional Officer, the complainant was proceeding from one bank to the other by a boat. When the boat reached the bank, the Subdivisional Officer got into the boat and finding that the western bank had collapsed in spite of its having been repaired, he became enraged and without seeking any explanation from the complainant, he remarked "Can't you maintain the dhip of the western bank" and then he gave to the complainant two blows on the left knee causing injury to the knee. Consequently, the complainant filed a complaint against the Subdivisional Officer who was summoned under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court held that, although the Subdivisional Officer had gone to discharge some official duty in connection with earth work, he could not be said to be purporting to act in discharge of that duty when he lost his temper and assaulted the complainant. These decisions support the view that I have taken in-the present case. The observation of Wallace, J. in AIR 1932 Mad 214, approved by Varadachariar, J., also supports this view.
Learned Standing Counsel, however, relied on the decision of Agarwala, J. (of this Court as he then was) in Nagwant Sahay v. D. W. If, 48 Cri. LJ 217 : AIR 1946 Pat 432; but this decision also supports my view in that case, the petitioners, who were students, had agreed to chastisements by their school authorities for having taken part in a fracas. The physical instructor of the school, however, took them to the bungalow of the Deputy Commissioner where the Superintendent of Police chastised the-students. Students filed a complaint under Section 323 of the Indian .Penal Code against the Deputy Commissioner, the Superintendent of Police and the physical instructor. But the Magistrate dismissed the complaint for want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, It was found 'by the High Court that the accused did not act or purport to act in discharge of their official duty and the sanction was not necessary. But while considering the question of further enquiry, it was held' that, although the public officers had acted illegally and not only irregularly, they had, however, acted from the best of motives. The students did not suffer much harm in getting the chastisement at the hands of the Superintendent of Police, instead of the school authorities. They had also escaped the ignominy and risk of prosecution. In these circumstances, further enquiry into the complaint was not desirable.
11. It must, therefore, be held that sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not required in respect of the allegations of assault and abuse which constituted offences under Secs, 323, 500 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. The impugned order, so tar as it requires sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the offences under Sections 342 of the Indian Penal Code and 129 of the Representation of the People act, 1951, shall, however, stand, as the acts constituting these two offences may be reasonably connected with the discharge of the official duties of the accused officers; and action in respect of these offences can be taken only after sanction is obtained.
12. In the result, the application is allowed in part and the order of the learned District Magistrate requiring sanction in respect of the offences under Sections 323, 500 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside, and the complaint case will proceed in accordance with law in respect of these three sections. The order of the learned District Magistrate requiring sanction in respect of the offences under Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 129 of the Representation o1 the People Act, 1951 is, however, maintained.
13. As the District Magistrate of Muzaffarpur has definitely shown bias in favour of the accused officers, it is not desirable to allow the case to continue in his file; and as this case must have created sensation by this time in Muzaffarpur district, it is also not desirable that it should be enquired into or tried in that district. In this view of the matter, I direct that the case shall be withdrawn from the file of the District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur and transferred to the District Magistrate of Monghy for being dealt with in accordance with law. that District Magistrate shall now make an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and take further action in accordance with law.