Orissa High Court
Chittaranjan Behera vs State Of Orissa And Others on 25 January, 2018
Author: B.R. Sarangi
Bench: B.R. Sarangi
HIGH COURT OF ORISSA : CUTTACK
W.P.(CRL.) NO.385 OF 2009
In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India.
AFR -----------
Chittaranjan Behera ......... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Orissa & others ......... Opp. Parties
For Petitioner : M/s. Ajit Kumar Choudhury
and K.K. Das, Advocates
For Opp. Parties : Miss. Savitri Ratho,
Addl. Government Advocate
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P R E S E N T:
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE B.R. SARANGI
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Date of hearing : 19.01.2018 : Date of judgment : 25.01.2018
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DR. B.R. SARANGI, J. The petitioner, having been allegedly subjected
to harassment, torture and humiliation by the Officer-in-Charge,
Mahakalpada Police Station in connection with Mahakalpada P.S. Case
No.57 of 1992 corresponding to G.R. Case No.558 of 1992 pending in the
Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Kendrapara, even though his name was
neither found placed in the FIR nor in the charge sheet, has approached
this Court by filing the present application claiming for compensation.
2
2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that on
03.06.1992, the then Presiding Officer of Ward No.11 and 12 (Bankichhanda) of Deulapara Gram Panchayat, who was on election duty, submitted a written information to the Election Officer, Mahakalapada stating inter alia that some people came inside the booth and forcibly took away the ballot papers etc., while the election was going on. Due to the said act, the election was affected and the same was postponed. On the basis of the said information, the Addl. Tahasildar, Marshaghai-cum-Election Officer, vide letter no.1668 dated 03.06.1992, lodged a written report before the OIC, Mahakalpada P.S. requesting to take necessary steps against the mischievous persons as per law. The said written report was treated as FIR and registered as Mahakalpada P.S. Case No.57 of 1992 under Sections 448/171-F/34, IPC. Accordingly, the prosecuting agency, after completion of investigation, submitted charge sheet on 30.06.1992, from which it reveals that Ranjit Samal, son of Raju Samal; Kumar Behera, son of Krutibash Behera; and Tukuna Behera son of Ekadasi Behera were involved in the said activities. On receipt of the charge-sheet, which was filed on 16.07.1992, the learned SDJM issued summons to the accused persons named in the charge sheet on 22.09.1992.
2.1 The OIC, Mahakalpada P.S. on four occasions called the petitioner to the police station and threatened to arrest him in connection 3 with the aforesaid case disclosing that NBW has been issued against him. The petitioner tried to convince the OIC, Mahakalpada P.S. that he was no way connected with the case, as he is not Tukuna Behera son of Ekadasi Behera against whom the charge sheet has been submitted. On being threatened and as advised/suggested by the local police, the petitioner surrendered before the SDJM, Kendrapara in connection with the aforesaid case on 04.10.1997 and moved for bail. The learned SDJM, on perusal of the case record, came to the finding that the name of the petitioner did not find place in the charge sheet and his application seeking bail bears no consideration. Despite the order passed by learned SDJM on 04.10.1997 holding that the petitioner was no way connected in the aforesaid G.R. case, the local police arrested the petitioner in connection with the very same case and produced him before the learned SDJM on 16.12.1998 by showing him as Tukuna Behera. The learned SDJM, on perusal of the photo identity card, school leaving certificate and the admit card of Board of Secondary Education, Odisha, came to the conclusion that the name of the petitioner was Chittaranjan Behera, son of Niranjan Behera, but the local police failed to file any document to show that the petitioner is Tukuna Behera, and, accordingly, discharged the petitioner from the case directing the police to arrest the proper accused Tukuna Behera.
42.2 From order dated 10.08.2000 of the learned SDJM it reveals that the local police had clearly admitted before the court that no such accused Tukuna Behera, as per the charge sheet, was available and the said case was adjourned from time to time. When the matter stood thus, the local police, on the basis of the NBW issued by the learned SDJM, Kendrapara in the aforesaid case, again called the petitioner to the police station and threatened him to surrender before the learned SDJM by posing/identifying himself as Tukuna Behera keeping, in view the last Legislative Assembly Election which was scheduled to be held in the month of April, 2009, as the Investigating Officer failed to apprehend accused Tukuna Behera as per the direction of the learned SDJM and other authorities. It is contended that by this process the local police has harassed the petitioner by causing custodial torture mentally, physically and psychologically, which violates the fundamental right to live with dignity, which is a valuable right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Since the petitioner was neither an accused nor his name was found placed in the charge sheet, nor was he connected with the aforesaid case in any manner, but the police authorities were harassing and torturing him in connection with Mahakalpada P.S. Case No.57 of 1992 corresponding to G.R. Case No.558 of 1992 pending in the court of the learned SDJM, Kendrapada. Therefore, the petitioner has filed this application claiming for adequate compensation, as the police 5 authorities have violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
3. Mr. A.K. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged before this Court that such callous action of the police authorities against the petitioner time and again has affected the fundamental rights of the petitioner with regard to his right to live with dignity as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as neither the petitioner was an accused nor was he in any way connected with the aforementioned case. More particularly, on the basis of the documents placed before the learned S.D.J.M., Kendrapara, namely, photo identity card, school leaving certificate and admit card issued by the Board of Secondary Education, Odisha, although it was clearly revealed that the petitioner is Chitta Ranjan Behera, son of Niranjan Behera, but the police all the times has harassed the petitioner by impersonating him as Tukuna Behera, son of Ekadasi Behera, even though actually he was not an accused in the charge-sheet submitted by the police during investigation. It is further contended that the mental agony and the torture, which the petitioner sustained, cannot be compensated in any manner. Furthermore, the reputation of the petitioner in the public, which has been tarnished for callous and irrational action of the police authority, amounts to violation of the fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution of India, for which the petitioner 6 has to be compensated for the harassment, custodial torture and humiliation done to him by the local police. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chattisgarh, 2012 (5) SUPREME 370 and of this Court in Manibhadra Biswal v. State of Orissa and others, 2003(II) OLR 151.
4. Miss. Savitri Ratho, learned Additional Government Advocate argued with vehemence justifying the action taken by the police and she has relied upon the affidavit filed by opposite party no.3, especially paragraphs 6 and 7 thereof, which read thus:
"6. However, there is no cases nor NBWs are pending at P.S. against the petitioner and there is no chance to harass him. It is humbly submitted that Chitaranjan Behera @ Tukuna Behera, S/o-Niranjan Behera @ Ekadasi Behera is are(sic one) person i.e. the petitioner. The then I.O. executed the NBW and produced the petitioner before the learned court below. Unfortunately, the learned court below without verifying the proper identification of the petitioner was pleased to pass an order on 16.12.1998. Since the present petitioner is an accused in Mahakalapada P.S. No.57 of 1992, he was produced by the then I.O. before the court below. As such the plea of petitioner is quite false and hereby strictly denied by the deponent.
7. That on verified locally the petitioner is the actual accused of the case and he is involved in Mahakalapada P.S. Case No.57 of 1992. The fact of the case is the petitioner along with Ranjit Samal and Kumar Behera are involved in booth snatching case in 1992 Election. But the then I.O. did not mention the actual name and address of the petitioner. The actual name of the petitioner is Chittaranjan @ Tukuna Behera, S/o- Niranjan @ Ekadasi Behera of village Amirabad, PS- Mahakalapada, Dist-Kendrapara, but the name of the 7 petitioner in all the record is Chittaranjan Behera, S/o- Niranjan Behera. However, there is no cases nor NBWs are pending at P.S. against the petitioner and he is not call to P.S. neither for harassing nor threatening to him".
It is thus contended that the petitioner is not entitled to get any compensation, in view of the contentions raised in paragraphs-6 and 7 mentioned above and, as such, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
5. This Court heard Mr. A.K. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner and Miss. Savitri Ratho, learned Additional Government Advocate. Since pleadings have been exchanged and this is an old case of the year 2009, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is being disposed of at the stage of admission.
6. The undisputed fact being that the charge-sheet was submitted by the police on 30.06.1992 in connection with Mahakalapada P.S. Case No.57 of 1992 corresponding to G.R. Case No.558 of 1992 pending in the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Kendrapara naming three persons, such as, Ranjit Samal, son of Raju Samal; Kumar Behera, son of Krutibash Behera; and Tukuna Behera, son of Ekadesi Behera, as accused persons. The O.I.C. Mahakalapada Police Station called the petitioner to the Police Station on four occasions and threatened him to arrest in connection with the said case disclosing that NBW was issued against him. Not only that, the petitioner was also taken to custody, tortured and forwarded to the court of learned S.D.J.M., Kendrapara, even though he 8 was not involved in the alleged crime mentioned in the F.I.R. itself. When the petitioner was produced before the learned S.D.J.M., he moved an application for bail on 04.10.1997, but the learned SDJM, on perusal of the case record, came to the finding that the name of the petitioner did not find place in the charge sheet and his application seeking bail bears no consideration. Subsequently on 16.12.1998, the petitioner was again produced before the learned S.D.J.M., Kendrapara showing him as Tukuna Behera, although actually he is Chittaranjan Behera. To substantiate the same, the petitioner produced his photo identity card, school leaving certificate and admit card of Board Of Secondary Education, Odisha by which learned S.D.J.M., Kendrapara came to a conclusion that the name of the petitioner is Chittaranjan Behera, son of Niranjan Behera, and that the police authority has not been able to prove, by producing any cogent document, that the petitioner is Tukuna Behera, named in the charge-sheet. In this factual backdrop of the case, if the petitioner is not an accused in the aforesaid case, he could not have been harassed by the local police, by impersonating him as Tukuna Behera, and subjected to mental and physical torture, which violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
7. In Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chattisgarh, 2012 (5) SUPREME 370, the Hon'ble Dipak Misra, J. (as His 9 Lordship then was), in the opening paragraph-2 of the judgment has observed as follows:-
"2. Albert Schweitzer, highlighting on Glory of Life, pronounced with conviction and humility, "the reverence of life offers me my fundamental principle on morality". The aforesaid expression may appear to be an individualistic expression of a great personality, but, when it is understood in the complete sense, it really denotes, in its conceptual essentiality, and connotes, in its macrocosm, the fundamental perception of a thinker about the respect that life commands. The reverence of life is insegragably associated with the dignity of a human being who is basically divine, not servile. A human personality is endowed with potential infinity and it blossoms when dignity is sustained. The sustenance of such dignity has to be the superlative concern of every sensitive soul. The essence of dignity can never be treated as a momentary spark of light or, for that matter, 'a brief candle', or 'a hollow bubble'. The spark of life gets more resplendent when man is treated with dignity sans humiliation, for every man is expected to lead an honourable life which is a splendid gift of "creative intelligence". When a dent is created in the reputation, humanism is paralysed. There are some megalomaniac officers who conceive the perverse notion that they are the `Law' forgetting that law is the science of what is good and just and, in very nature of things, protective of a civilized society. Reverence for the nobility of a human being has to be the corner stone of a body polity that believes in orderly progress. But, some, the incurable ones, become totally oblivious of the fact that living with dignity has been enshrined in our Constitutional philosophy and it has its ubiquitous presence, and the majesty and sacrosanctity dignity cannot be allowed to be crucified in the name of some kind of police action."
8. The very expression in paragraph-2 of the aforesaid judgment persuaded this Court to examine the factual matrix of the 10 present case vis-à-vis the law laid down by the apex Court and, as such, the factual matrix clearly indicates that there was deliberate and willful violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
9. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 provides that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The apex Court, while construing Article 21 of the Constitution of India which guarantees "life or personal liberty", held that it includes right to live with human dignity and it also includes within itself a guarantee against torture and assault by the State or its functionaries. Similarly, Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India postulates that a person accused of an offence shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. It is profitable to refer the judgment of the apex Court in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610, in paragraphs-10, 11 and 12 whereof, it has been held thus:
"10. "Torture" has not been defined in the Constitution or in other penal laws. "Torture" of a human being by another human being is essentially an instrument to impose the will of the "strong" over the "weak" by suffering. The word torture today has become synonymous with the darker side of human civilization.
"Torture is a wound in the soul so painful that sometimes you can almost touch it, but it is also so intangible that there is no way to heal it. Torture is anguish squeezing in your chest, cold as ice and heavy as a stone, paralyzing as sleep and dark as the abyss. Torture is despair and fear and rage and hate. It is a desire to kill and destroy including yourself."11
- Adriana P. Bartow
11. No violation of any one of the human rights has been the subject of so many Conventions and Declarations as "torture" - all aiming at total banning of it in all forms, but in spite of the commitments made to eliminate torture, the fact remains that torture is more widespread now than ever before. "Custodial torture" is a naked violation of human dignity and degradation which destroys, to a very large extent, the individual personality. It is a calculated assault on human dignity and whenever human dignity is wounded, civilization takes a step backward - flag of humanity must on each such occasion fly half- mast.
12. In all custodial crimes what is of real concern is not only infliction of body pain but the mental agony which a person undergoes within the four walls of police station or lock-up. Whether it is physical assault or rape in police custody, the extent of trauma, a person experiences is beyond the purview of law."
Similarly, in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260, the apex Court held as follows:
"The horizon of human rights is expanding. At the same time, the crime rate is also increasing. Of late, this Court has been receiving complaints about violations of human rights because of indiscriminate arrests. How are we to strike a balance between the two?
A realistic approach should be made in this direction. The law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights, liberties and privileges, on the one hand, and individual duties, obligations and responsibilities on the other; of weighing and balancing the rights, liberties and privileges of the single individual and those of individuals collectively; of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the weight and the emphasis; of deciding which comes first - the criminal or society, the law violator or the law abider..."12
While dealing with various facets of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Joginder Kumar (supra), it has been held that any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution, whether it occurs during investigation, interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the government become law breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to anarchy. No civilized nation can permit that to happen, for a citizen does not shed off his fundamental right to life, the moment a policeman arrests him. The right to life of a citizen cannot put in abeyance on his arrest. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in custody, except according to the procedure established by law by placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law.
10. The factual backdrop of the case in hand is that the petitioner was called upon to the police station time and against even though he was not involved in any of the allegations made in the FIR and his name was not found placed in the charge sheet.
11. In D.K. Basu supra, the apex Court held that custodial torture is a naked violation of human dignity and degradation which destroys, to a very large extent, the individual personality. It is a 13 calculated assault on human dignity. In all custodial crimes what is of real concern is not only infliction of body pain but the mental agony which a person undergoes within the four walls of police station or lock up. Whether it is physical assault or rape in police custody, the extent of trauma, a person experiences is beyond the purview of law. The fact that custodial violence occurs and this is not peculiar, it was precisely for this reason, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was quoted. Article 5 of the said declaration makes mention of the fact that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
12. The very action of the police authority is to harass the petitioner. Meaning of "harass" has been explained in Fourth Edition of P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, which reads as follows:-
"Injure and injury are words having numerous and comprehensive popular meanings, as well as having a legal import. A line may be drawn between these words and the word "harass" excluding the latter from being comprehended within the word "injure" or "injury". The synonyms of "harass" are: To weary, tire, perplex, distress tease, vex, molest, trouble, disturb. They all have relation to mental annoyance."
In Oxford Dictionary of New Words, the meaning of word "harassment" has been explained, which reads as follows:
"The subjection of a person to aggressive pressure or intimidation through unwanted sexual advances.14
In Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th Edition, 1998, it states as follows:-
"There is no definition of "harassment" but the concept would seem to involve tormenting or intolerably troubling a person by continuing attacks or accusations or by intrusions such as following him about or "watching and besetting" his home.
"Harassment" should be interpreted as potentially producing some unreasonably adverse impact on the victim. The conduct should produce more than "worry", "trouble", "discomfort" or "unease", unless perhaps these are experienced to an extreme degree."
13. Similarly, the meaning of torture has been explained in Black Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p-1498 that the infliction of intense pain to body or mind to punish; to extract a confession or information, or to obtain sadistic pleasure.
In Arvind v. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2124, the apex Court held that under British rule torture is universally acknowledged to have been a most unsatisfactory mode or getting the truth, often leading the innocent through weakness to plead guilty to crime they had not committed.
Similarly, in D.K. Basu supra, the apex Court held that 'torture' is essentially an instrument to impose the will of the 'strong' over the 'weak' by suffering.
15
14. The cumulative meaning of the word 'torture' and 'harassment' as mentioned supra clearly indicates that it brings down the reputation of a man, who actually not involved in any of the allegations of crime so made. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others, (1983) 1 SCC 124, it has been held that right to reputation is a facet of right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution.
15. Torture in custody flouts the basic rights of the citizens recognized by the Constitution and is an affront to human dignity. In State of M.P. v. Shyam Sunder Trivedi, (1995) 4 SCC 262 and D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416, the apex Court held that compensation could be awarded under public law, adjustable against damages awarded in civil suit.
In Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam (supra), the apex Court held that it is the sacrosanct duty of the police authorities to remember that a citizen while in custody is not denuded of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The restrictions imposed have the sanction of law by which his enjoyment of fundamental right is curtailed but his basic human rights are not crippled so that the police officers can treat him in an inhuman manner. On the contrary, they are under obligation to protect his human rights and prevent all forms of atrocities.
16
16. The apex Court time and again cautioned the police authorities to follow the guidelines in case of arrest and retention in its catena of judgments. In Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P., AIR 2005 SC 402, the apex Court held that powers of the police do not include torturing a person to extract information, be he an accused or a witness. Law enforcers cannot take law into their hands in the name of collecting evidence. It is further held that dehumanizing torture, assault and death in custody which have assumed alarming proportions, raised serious questions about the credibility of the rule of law and administrator of criminal justice system. The diabolic recurrence of police torture results in terrible scare in the minds of common citizens and their lives and liberty are under a new and unwarranted peril because the guardians of law destroy the human rights by custodian violence and torture invariably resulting in death. The vulnerability of human right assumes a traumatic torture when functionaries of the state, whose paramount duty is to protect the citizens and not to commit gruesome offences against them in reality perpetrate them.
17. In Ranjitsing Brahmajeeting Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 2277, the apex Court held that presumption of innocence in a human right. The same view has also been taken by the apex Court in Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 2004 SC 3249. 17
18. In Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 406 while dealing with the role of police, the apex Court condemned the excessive use of force by the police and observed as follows:
"The main objectives of police is to apprehend offenders, to investigate crimes and to prosecute them before the courts and also to prevent commission of crime and above all to ensure law and order to protect citizens' life and property. The law enjoins the police to be scrupulously fair to the offender and the Magistracy is to ensure fair investigation and fair trial to an offender. The purpose and object of Magistracy and police are complementary to each other. It is unfortunate that these objectives have remained unfulfilled even after 40 years of our Constitution. Aberrations of police officers and police excesses in dealing with the law and order situation have been subject of adverse comments from this Court as well as from other courts but it has failed to have any corrective effect on it. The police has power to arrest a person even without obtaining a warrant of arrest from a court. The amplitude of this power casts an obligation on the police and it must bear in mind, as held by this Court that if a person is arrested for a crime, his constitutional and fundamental rights must not be violated."
19. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1086, the apex Court in paragraph-6 of the judgment held as follows:
"..............The petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial, in the sense that a Civil Court may or may not have upheld his claim. But we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover damages for his illegal detention, a decree for damages would have to be passed in that suit, though it is not possible to predicate in the absence of evidence, the precise amount which would be decreed in his favour. In these circumstances, the 18 refusal of this Court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lip- service to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated. Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders of release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violaters in the payment of the monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield..........."
Similarly, following Rudul Sah (supra) in Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of J & K and others, AIR 1986 SC 499, the apex Court held as follows:
"................We can only say that the Police Officers acted in a most highhanded way. We do not wish to use stronger words to condemn the authoritarian acts of the police. If the personal liberty of a Member of the Legislative Assembly is to be played with in this fashion, one can only wonder what may happen to lesser mortals; Pollice Officers who are the custodians lf law and order should have the greatest respect for the personal liberty of citizens and should not flout the laws by stooping to such bizarre acts of lawlessness. Custodians of law and order should not become depredators of civil liberties. Their duty is to protect and not to abduct."
"...............We have no doubt that the constitutional rights of Shri Bhim Singh were violated with impunity. Since he is now not in detention, there is no need to make any order to set him at liberty, but suitably and adequately compensated, he must be. That we have the right to award monetary compensation by way of 19 exemplary costs or otherwise is now established by the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 3 SCR 508: (AIR 1983 SC 1086) and Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1026. When a person comes to us with the complaint that he has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal rights were invaded, the mischief or malice and the invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his being set free. In appropriate cases we have the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation.........."
20. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the apex Court, it is to be considered whether the petitioner is entitled to get any compensation for violation of his fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Keeping in view the law laid down by the apex Court in Rudul Sah and Bhim Singh (supra), this Court awarded compensation in Manibhadra Biswal (supra) to the tune of Rs.10,000/-. The apex Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of M.P., (2012) 1 SCC 748 awarded compensation of Rs.2,00,000/-, whereas in the case of Dr.Mehmood Nayyar Azam (supra), the apex Court awarded a compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-.
21. Applying the law laid down by the apex Court to the present case, there is no iota of doubt that the petitioner had undergone mental torture at the hands of insensible police officer. The very conduct of the police authority has destroyed the brightness and willpower of the petitioner. The inhuman treatment can be well visualized when the 20 petitioner was scot free by the order passed by learned S.D.J.M., Kendrapara, but the mental torture harassment, humiliation and as such the mental agony already suffered by the petitioner cannot be determined in terms of money. In order to restore the human dignity of the petitioner, this Court is of the considered view that a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (two lakhs) should be granted towards compensation to be paid by the State within a period of three months, which will be realized from the erring officers in equal proportion from their salary as thought appropriate by the competent authority of the State.
22. In the result, the writ petition (criminal) is allowed, but there shall be no order as to cost.
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( DR. B.R. SARANGI ) JUDGE The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Dated the 25th January, 2018/Alok/Ashok/GDS