Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad
All India Pensioner And Senior Citizen ... vs D/O Personnel And Training on 9 April, 2026
Reserved on 02.04.2026
Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad
This the 09th day of April, 2026
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A)
Original Application No. 413 of 2013
1. All India Pensioners & Sr. Citizens Forum through Secretary
General (R.N. Shukla) R/o 125/1 Om Gayatri Nagar, Allahabad.
2. R.N. Shukla S/o Late B.P. Shukla R/o 125/1 Om Gayatri Nagar,
Allahabad.
3. Devi Prasad Pathak S/o Late R.D. Pathak R/o 87/9, Moti Lal
Nehru Road, Prayag Station Allahabad.
........... APPLICANTS
By Advocate: Shri S.J. Ishtiaque
Versus
1. Union of India, through Secretary, Department of Personnel and
Training and Public Griveances & Pension, New Delhi.
2. Director (PP), Department of Pension and Pensioners Welfare,
Lok Nayak Bhawan Khan Market, New Delhi.
3. Pay & Accounts Officer, Central Pension Accounting Office,
Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure Block no II,
Trikoot Complex, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi.
4. Pay & Accounts Officer, O/o Pay & Accounts Office, A.G.
(A&E) - I U.P. Allahabad.
..........RESPONDENTS
By Advocate: Shri Pankaj Srivastava
ORDER
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (J) Shri S J Ishtiaque, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Pankaj Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents, were present at the time of hearing.
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2. The instant original application has been filed seeking following relief:
"(i) To issue a writ / directions / orders in the nature of certiorari quashing the provisions of Rule 1 and 10(A) of CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules 198 as amended on 08.06.12 including notification dated 09.11.10 especially the new table applicable after 02.09.08 and restoration of full pension after 15 years impugned orders (A-1).
(ii) To issue a writ / directions / orders in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to consider for notifying commutation table as applicable before 02.09.08 and also to make provisions in the Rules for restoration of full pension after 10 years for those retried before 02.09.08 or for 09 years for those retired after 02.09.08, or to give the benefit by removing cut-off date on the basis of commutation table applicable before 02.09.08 (A-1 & A-2)
(iii) To consider any other relief which this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(iv) To award the cost of the application throughout."
3. The instant original application has been filed against the restoration of commuted portion of pension after 15 years of retirement. The application seeks restoration of full pension after 10 years for those retired before September 2008 and after 9 years for those retired after September 2008, claiming that the lump-sum amount of commuted pension is adjusted and fully recovered by that period. By way of the OA, the applicants also intend to challenge the legality and rationale of the provisions of CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules 1981 amended on 08.06.2012 including the notification dated 09.11.2010 and the GI decisions regarding restoration of full pension after 15 years of commutation alleging that the commutation tables applicable for and on the age of retirements varying and being discriminatory.
The brief facts of the OA are that it has been claimed that the respondent no 4 issued a PPO commencing from 01.04.2003 in the case of applicant no 3 (who is a member of applicant no 1) who has paid commuted value of Rs. 292535/- on 01.04.2003 which has been fully recovered by and before 31.03.2013 (within ten years), with 4 RITU RAJ SINGH
2|Page installments extra. Contention is also that the excess recovery against lump-sum payments made is continuing and the full pension has not been restored. Similarly, further contention is that the applicant no 2 who retired on 31.01.2009 will repay the commuted value of Rs. 568139/- within 9 years of retirement but ordered for restoration of full pension after 15 years by amending the rules on 09.11.2010 and notification dated 08.06.2012. Contention with regard to the union represented as applicant no 1 is that the applicant no 1 has submitted representations dated 11.11.11 before respondent no 1 & 2 for considering restoration of full pension after 10 years in case of commutation of pension to Central Government employees retiring on superannuation. Justifying with illustration indicating that commuted value paid to a pensioner in lump-sum is fully recovered in 9 years and 8 months in the case of employees who retired before 02.09.08 and in 8 years 2 months in case of employees retired after 02.09.08. Accordingly, it has been claimed that the restoration of full pension must be restored with the outer limit of 10 years as the value of commuted pension paid as advance is fully recovered and adjusted. The applicant no 1 also requested to consider the alleged arbitrary change in commutation tables from 02.09.08, which it claims to be discriminating to retired employees. By way of the OA, the applicants have prayed to quash the provision of Rule 1 and 10(A) of CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules 1981 as amended on 08.06.2012 including notification dated 09.11.2010 especially the new table applicable after 02.09.08 and restoration of full pension after 15 years impugned orders. Further prayer has been made to consider for notifying commutation table as applicable before 02.09.08 and also to make provisions in the Rules for restoration of full pension after 10 years for those retired before 02.09.08 and for 9 years for those retired after 02.09.08, or to give benefit by removing the cut-off date on the basis of commutation table applicable before 02.09.08.
Counter has been filed by the respondents wherein it has been stated that the applicants had opted commutation of pension as per RITU RAJ SINGH
3|Page Rule 13 of CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981, and as per Rule 8 of CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981. The calculation of commuted value of pension was made in accordance with the table of the value prescribed on the date on which the commutation becomes absolute. Now the pensioners are stopped from challenging the said provisions after accepting the provisions / rules applicable at that time and they cannot challenge once they are aware that the commuted value of pension will be restored after 15 years. Counter further states that the plea taken by the applicants pertain to the policy matter and the Tribunal has got not jurisdiction to pass orders on the policy matters.
Rejoinder has also been filed on behalf of the applicants rebutting the averments of the respondents expressed through the Counter Affidavit.
Additionally, applicants have also filed MA No 2527 of 2025 on 12.05.2025 for submission of certain documents which they claim to be signifying the latest and updated administrative and legal position with regard to the controversy prevailing in the instant case. Rebutting the contents of the instant MA, respondents have also filed a Supplementary Counter Affidavit dated 03.08.2025.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records.
5. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that applicants were retired on different dates. Commutation was also required by them and it was allowed and commutation was also made. Since deduction against the commutation amount is decided by the respondents for 15 years. Referring to the facts disclosed in the OA, it was also argued that deduction of the commutation amount is completed before the expiry of 15 years.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents referring to the counter affidavit argued that no decision yet has been taken at the end of the Government and no direction can be issued to the Government to RITU RAJ SINGH
4|Page allow deduction of the commuted amount before the expiry of the 15 years' period. It is a policy decision and thus argued that the similar issued was raised before the Hon'ble High Court and was dismissed. Till date, there is no direction passed by any Court to reduce the period of deduction. It is further argued that OA be dismissed.
7. Rejoinder has also been filed by the applicants rebutting the averments of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. A perusal of the rejoinder reveals that the pleadings contained in the counter have been denied in an identical way as per the pleadings recorded in the OA. Learned counsel for the applicants, by way of MA No. 2527 of 2025 has pleaded to bring on record certain case laws and letters issued by different governments across the country. Thus, all the case laws and such letters are quoted herein below along with the respective pleadings taken by the applicant's counsel with regard to them:
i. Learned counsel for the applicants have claimed that Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High court in CPW-2490 of 2024 vide Order dated 14-03-2024 (Yashpal Rai & Ors State of Punjab) had stayed the recovery pension against the Commutated Value of Pension till further Orders. A step further vide Order dated 29-08-2024, Government of Punjab, Department of Finance (Finance Pension Policy) addressed to All Pension Disbursing Banks in State of Punjab, in order to avoid further litigation in the matter, after considering on the issue has decided to stop the recovery of Commuted value of Pension till the vacation of stay orders, from all pensioners (including Petitioners) of the State Government who have completed 10 years of retirement or above.
ii. Learned counsel for the applicants has further stated that Hon'ble Haryana High court in CPW-12858 of 2024 vide RITU RAJ SINGH
5|Page Order dated 28-05-2024 had stayed the recovery pension against the Commutated Value of Pension till further Orders.
iii. Applicants' counsel has further stressed that the Principal Accountant General (A&E) Haryana vide its letter dated 19-07-2024 addressed to All Accountant General in India and all Treasury Officers in the State on the direction of State Government has directed to stop the recovery of commutated value of pension till the vocation of stay orders from all pensioners (including Petitioners) of the State Government who has completed 10 years of retirement or above.
iv. Applicants' counsel has also placed reliance upon the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana Judgment Dated 27-11-2024 in CWP No.9426/2024 (the lead case) in which it has disposed all the 808 Writ Petitions after clubbing them and vacated all the stays by a single Order/Judgment as stated above. Reliance has also been placed upon the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment dated 07-04-2025, arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 04- 12-2024 in CWP No.22606/2024 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, wherein the Apex Court opined that they are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court. The Special leave petitiones are, accordingly, dismissed. Further contention of the applicants' counsel is that a catena of other interim orders passed by various Hon'ble High Courts as well as Tribunals are in the process of being closing down at the drop of the hat after the pronouncement of Order/Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court dated 07-04-2025 and will remain as a Legal history unless some other and new aspects are produced before the Hon'ble Courts.
v. Learned counsel for the applicants has also claimed that the issue before Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana and RITU RAJ SINGH
6|Page thereafter Hon'ble Apex Court pertains to the Pension Commutation Rules as framed by the Government of Punjab & Haryana and similarly all States in the Country had framed their respective Rules where as the employees serving under Central Government governed by are CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules 1981. Also, some States such as Kerala and Gujarat has already reduced the period of recovery of commutation value from 15 years. Applicants' counsel has further stated that prior to 01-12-1981, an employee was permitted to commute pension to 1/3rd of pension and the said portion was not liable to be restored at any later date and deduction from monthly pension on account of commutation continued throughout the life of the employee and this fact was very much in the knowledge of the employee and they used to opt the such Commutation of Pension with the condition of recovery throughout life. However the Government decided vide its OM dated 05-03-1987 that recovery of Commuted Value will be restored after 15 years w.e.f. 01-04-1986 during the pendency of the case of Common Cause (A Registered Society) and Ors. Vr. Union of India, 1987 (1) SCC 142 and Hon'ble Supreme Court in WP Nos. 3958-61 of 1983 (Decided on 09-12- 1986). This decision of the Respondent (Government) was communicated to the learned Attorney General by a letter dated 20-03-1986. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment dated 09-12-1986 had opined (Para-9):-"In dealing with a matter of this nature, it is not appropriate to be guided by the example of Life Insurance; equally unjust it would be to adopt the interest basis. On the other hand, the conclusion should be evolved by relating it to the years of purchase' basis. An addition of two years to the period necessary for recovery on the basis of years of purchase justifies the adoption of the 15 year rule...." The basis of years of purchase' method requires the amendments in the table value of purchase as prescribed from time to time as provided RITU RAJ SINGH
7|Page in Rule 8 of CCS (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 as this table was last updated on 01-01-2006. While concluding its Judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed on record its appreciation of consideration shown by the Union of India to ameliorate the hardship of the pensioners.
vi. Applicants' counsel further submitted that the Judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana did not reject the demand of lowering the recovery period of Commutated value of pension out rightly.
vii. Applicants' counsel further stated that Hon'ble Supreme Court while adjudicating the SLP No. 8845/25 arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 04-12-2024 in CWP No. 22606/2024 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh opined as below:- "After considering various aspects of the matters, we not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court. The special leave petitions are, accordingly, dismissed."
8. Denying the aforesaid pleadings taken by the applicants' counsel, learned counsel for the respondents has filed a supplementary counter dated 03.08.2025 wherein it has been stated that the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana has dismissed all the 808 writ petitions demanding the stopping of recovery beyond 10 years after retirement along with those of interim orders regarding recovery of commuted pension vide order dated 27.11.2024 and therefore the said order dated 29.08.2024 from the Gov of Punjab has become infructuous and will not be applicable to the subject matter. Instead the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana vide its order dated 27.11.2024 has directed to recover the portion of recovery from the pension which was stayed through the interim order of the Court. It has also been argued that the Apex Court vide order dated 07.04.2025 has dismissed various SLPs and opined that they are not RITU RAJ SINGH
8|Page inclined to interfere with the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court regarding recovery of commutation amount of pension and therefore, there is no such ground exists to reduce the period of recovery of commutation value from 15 years.
9. We have considered the rival contentions and carefully gone through the documents on record including the short counters and rejoinders filed in the case and also have perused the case laws relied upon by the contesting parties.
10. By way of the instant original application, the applicants are seeking quashing of the provisions of Rule 1 and 10(A) of CCS (Commutation of pension) Rules 1981 as amended on 08.06.2012 including notification dated 09.11.2010 especially the new table applicable after 02.09.08 and restoration of full pension after 15 years. Having gone through the facts of the case in detail and also carefully perused the case laws relied upon by the contesting parties to ascertain the current position with regard to the controversy involved in the matter, it is pertinent to record that the scheme of commutation of pension is completely voluntary in nature and the applicants themselves have applied for commutation of pension. All the applicants herein have retired from government service after completing long service and were well aware of the rules and regulations. Despite having complete knowledge of the recoveries, they applied for commutation of pension. The period of recovery of 15 years has been fixed by the Central Government after the order of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India passed in the year 1986 in the case of Common Cause a registered society and others Vs UOI (reported in (1987) I Supreme Court Cases, 142) and implemented by the Government of India vide OM dated 05.03.1987. Here, it is also pertinent to refer to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in Writ A No 17819 of 2024 titled Ashok Kumar Agarwal and 48 Others Vs Union of India and Another wherein dealing with the similar controversy, the High Court held as under:
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9|Page "The provisions contained in the Regulations would clearly indicate that the retiring employee shall indicate a fraction of pension, which he desires to commute, and may indicate its maximum limit, which shall not be more than 1/3rd of the pension. In case, the fraction amount is in part of the rupee, such fraction of a rupee is to be ignored for the purposes of commutation. Note (2) is categorical and provides in specific terms that employees who have commuted the admissible portion of pension, is entitled to have the commuted portion of the pension restored after the expiry of 15 years from the date of commutation. The statutory scheme is, therefore, abundantly clear that an option is extended to the retiring employee concern to avail of the benefit of computation and such computation is on specific terms that on expiry of 15 years of such commutation, the original pension is to be restored.
The petitioners' contention that period for resumption of full pension be reduced from 15 years to 10 years only because the bank actually recovers the lumpsum amount paid on expiry of 10 years, is a misconceived argument. The Policy contained in the Regulations of 1995 extends an offer to the retiring employee to avail the benefit of commutation on specific terms. These terms clearly provide for restoration of pension only on expiry of 15 years. The petitioners otherwise do not say that the terms of the policy is unconstitutional or unconscionable.
Having accepted such offer, a binding contract comes into existence between the employee and the employer as per which the original pension is to be restored after 15 years. Having acquiesced to the commutation policy with open eyes, it is not open for the retiring employee to contend later that the period of restoration of full pension be reduced from 15 years to 10 years. Whether or not the lumpsum amount gets equalised on expiry of 10 years or 11 year is not decisive or material. What is material is the nature of obligation which enures upon the parties when the retiring employee accepts the provision of commutation of pension. The employee with his open eyes having availed the policy, cannot subsequently turn around or seek modification in its terms. The argument that the table or the figures were not adequately disclosed, is also not acceptable, inasmuch as the chart specifies the manner in which the commutation is to be fixed and the period after which the original pension is to be restored. In case, the employees had any misgivings about it, they could have sought appropriate clarification before accepting the offer. Once, the petitioners have acquiesced to the policy and accepted the offer, their subsequent attempt to resile or seek change in its computation would clearly be impermissible.
The writ petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
The view taken by us clearly finds support from the adjudication made by the Supreme Court in "Common Cause", A Registered Society And Others Vs. Union of India, (1987) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 142, R. Gandhi Vs. Union of India And Others, (1999) 8 SCC 106 as well the judgment of Delhi High Court in Forum Retired IPS Officers (FORIPSO) Vs. Union of India & Another, 2019 SCC Online Del 6610 and Punjab & RITU RAJ SINGH 10 | P a g e Haryana High Court in Shila Devi Vs. State of Punjab in CWP No. 9426 of 2023."
11. Furthermore, since the controversy prevailing in the instant case and relief sought by the applicants pertains to a policy decision and there has not been any decision passed by any Court to reduce the period of commutation before the expiry of 15 years, no any direction as prayed for in the OA can be issued to the respondents. It is needless to reiterate that the Tribunals have not got any jurisdiction to interfere in a policy matter nor it can direct the Government to frame a particular policy. In this regard, it would be in the fitness of things to refer to the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its judgment dated 14.12.2023 in the case of Union of India & Ors Vs Air Commodore N K Sharma (17038) ADM/LGC reported in 2023 INSC 1074 wherein dealing with the issue as to whether the Tribunals can direct the Government to frame a policy or not, following ratio was laid down:
"16. It is in consideration of this statutory scheme that we must look for an answer to the question as to whether the Tribunal could have directed the formation of a policy, albeit in regard to a matter affecting the service of armed forces personnel, to adjudicate which, it otherwise possesses the jurisdiction?
17. Making policy, as is well recognised, is not in the domain of the Judiciary. The Tribunal is also a quasi-judicial body, functioning within the parameters set out in the governing legislation. Although, it cannot be questioned that disputes in respect of promotions and/or filling up of vacancies is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it cannot direct those responsible for making policy, to make a policy in a particular manner.
18. It has been observed time and again that a court cannot direct for a legislation or a policy to be made. Reference may be made to a recent judgement of this Court in Union of India v. K. Pushpavanam where while adjudicating a challenge to an Order passed by a High Court directing the State to decide the status of the Law Commission as a Statutory or Constitutional body and also to consider the introduction of a bill in respect of torts and State liability, observed as under: -
"..As far as the law of torts and liability thereunder of the State is concerned, the law regarding the liability of the State and individuals has been gradually evolved by Courts. Some aspects of it find place in statutes already in force. It is a debatable issue whether the law of torts and especially liabilities under the law of torts should be codified by a legislation. A writ court cannot direct the Government to consider introducing a particular bill before the House of Legislature within a time frame. Therefore, RITU RAJ SINGH 11 | P a g e the first direction issued under the impugned judgment was unwarranted."
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20. The above being the settled position of law, it only stands to reason that a Tribunal functioning within the strict boundaries of the governing legislation, would not have the power to direct the formation of a policy. After all, a court in Writ jurisdiction is often faced with situations that allegedly fly in the face of fundamental rights, and yet, has not been entrusted with the power to direct such formation of policy.
21. Not only that, it stands clarified by a bench of no less than 7 Judges of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors15 as reiterated by a Bench of 5 judges in Rojer Matthew v. South Indian Bank Ltd & Ors16 that a Tribunal would be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in Article 226, in the following terms as recorded by Gogoi, CJ, writing for the majority-
"215. It is hence clear post L. Chandra Kumar [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 does not limit the powers of High Courts expressly or by implication against military or armed forces disputes. The limited ouster made by Article 227(4) only operates qua administrative supervision by the High Court and not judicial review. Article 136(2) prohibits direct appeals before the Supreme Court from an order of Armed Forces Tribunals, but would not prohibit an appeal to the Supreme Court against the judicial review exercised by the High Court under Article 226.
217. The jurisdiction under Article 226, being part of the basic structure, can neither be tampered with nor diluted. Instead, it has to be zealously protected and cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of any enactment, even if it be formulated for expeditious disposal and early finality of disputes. Further, High Courts are conscious enough to understand that such power must be exercised sparingly by them to ensure that they do not become alternate forums of appeal. A five-Judge Bench in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal [Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, (1955) 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1955 SC 425] whilst reiterating that jurisdiction under Article 226 could not be ousted, laid down certain guidelines for exercise of such power : (AIR pp. 428-29, para 13) "13. The jurisdiction which Articles 226 and 136 confer entitles the High Courts and this Court to examine the decisions of all tribunals to see whether they have acted illegally. That jurisdiction cannot be taken away by a legislative device that purports to confer power on a tribunal to act illegally by enacting a statute that its illegal acts shall become legal the moment the tribunal chooses to say they are legal. The legality of an act or conclusion is something that exists outside and apart from the decision of an inferior tribunal.
It is a part of the law of the land which cannot be finally determined or altered by any tribunal of limited jurisdiction. The RITU RAJ SINGH 12 | P a g e High Courts and the Supreme Court alone can determine what the law of the land is "vis-àvis" all other courts and tribunals and they alone can pronounce with authority and finality on what is legal and what is not. All that an inferior tribunal can do is to reach a tentative conclusion which is subject to review under Articles 226 and 136. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 with that of the Supreme Court above them remains to its fullest extent despite Section 105."
This position stood restated, recently, in Union of India v Parashotam Dass "26. On the legislature introducing the concept of "Tribunalisation" (one may say that this concept has seen many question marks vis-a-vis different tribunals, though it has also produced some successes), the same was tested in L. Chandra Kumar18 case before a Bench of seven Judges of this Court. Thus, while upholding the principles of "Tribunalisation" under Article 323A or Article 323B, the Bench was unequivocally of the view that decisions of Tribunals would be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and would not be restricted by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment which introduced the aforesaid two Articles. In our view, this should have put the matter to rest, and no Bench of less than seven Judges could have doubted the proposition... Thus, it is, reiterated and clarified that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not inhibited, and superintendence and control under Article 227 of the Constitution are somewhat distinct from the powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution."
22. Thus, it only stands to reason then, that, a Tribunal subject to the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot be permitted by law, to direct the framing of policy by the Government."
12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussions and analysis, it is explicitly held that no relief as prayed for by the applicants can be granted to them. Further, in case they deem fit, the applicants will be at liberty to move representation before the competent authority of the department to agitate this issue. Accordingly, the instant original application is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed and the same is dismissed.
13. All associated MAs stand disposed of. No costs.
(Mohan Pyare) (Justice Om Prakash VII)
Member (Administrative) Member (Judicial)
RITU RAJ (Ritu Raj)
SINGH
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