National Consumer Disputes Redressal
M/S. Hubtown Ltd. & Anr. vs Vimal Bhannudas Varak on 21 June, 2022
Author: R.K. Agrawal
Bench: R.K. Agrawal
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 46 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1001/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. VIMAL BHANNUDAS VARAK AKRUTI NIRMAN CAMP NO. 7, ROOM NO. 44, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 47 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1002/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. SHANTARAM SITARAM JOSHI AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 20, TRANSIT CAMP-3, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 48 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1003/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. VINAYAK DHONDU RANE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 119, TRANSIT CAMP-7, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 49 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1004/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. ANAND RAGHOBA PATIL AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 57, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 50 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1005/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. KASHINATH HARHARI KALE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 51, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 51 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1006/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. CHANDRAKANT AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 119, TRANSIT CAMP-7, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 52 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1007/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. PANDURANG SANTU GITE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 119, TRANSIT CAMP-7, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 53 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1008/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. VIJAY KASHINATH KULKARNI AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 5, TRANSIT CAMP-7, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 54 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1009/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. DHANAJI RAMCHANDRA MORE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 4, TRANSIT CAMP-7, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 55 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1010/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. ASHOK MADAN GAWADE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 67, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 56 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1011/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. JANARDHAN VISHNU MUDUGAL AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 61, TRANSIT CAMP-7, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 57 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1012/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. KASHINATH SITARAM MORE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 43, TRANSIT CAMP-7, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 58 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1013/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. USHA GOPICHAND MOHITE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 64, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 59 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1014/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. YASHODA YASHWANT MOHITE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 119, TRANSIT CAMP-7, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 60 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1001/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. ANANDIBAI LAXMAN GHODE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 10, TRANSIT CAMP-3, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 61 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1016/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. VIMAL BHANNUDAS VARAK AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 61, TRANSIT CAMP-4, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 62 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1017/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. BHAGIRATHI HARI LAD AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 70, TRANSIT CAMP-4, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 63 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1018/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. MANGALA SHANTARAM LINGAYAT AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 60, TRANSIT CAMP-4, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 64 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1019/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. VASAMT BHIKU PATIL AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 54, TRANSIT CAMP-8, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 65 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1020/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. NARAYAN BHIKAJI BALGUDE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 61, TRANSIT CAMP-4, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 66 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1021/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. KRISHAN CHINTU GHRAT AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 8, TRANSIT CAMP-1, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 67 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1022/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. SAHADEV MUKUND BANE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 6, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 68 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1023/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. SALVADOR D'SOUZA AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 69, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 69 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1024/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. KALPANA YOGESH BHOGE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 70, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 70 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1025/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. VANITA VITTHAL BALGUDE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 71, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 71 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1026/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. BHARATI SAHADEV BANE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 2, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 72 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1027/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. BHARATI BHARKAR BHOIR AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 50, TRANSIT CAMP-8, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 73 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1028/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. JAYRAM KUKUND GAWAD AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 73, TRANSIT CAMP-4, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 74 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1029/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. SHARAD MADAN GAWADE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 72, TRANSIT CAMP-4, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 75 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1030/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. JAYESH KHIMAJI SALAVE AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 50, TRANSIT CAMP-4, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s) REVISION PETITION NO. 76 OF 2019 (Against the Order dated 12/10/2018 in Appeal No. 1031/2015 of the State Commission Maharashtra) 1. M/S. HUBTOWN LTD. & ANR. AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA 2. MR. VIMAL SHAH, DIRECTOR HUBTOWN LTD.,AKRUTI TRADE CENTRE, ROAD NO. 7, MAROL M.I.D.C, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400093 MAHARASHTRA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus 1. GAJANAN SHANKAR JADHAV AKRUTI NIRMAN ROOM NO. 41, TRANSIT CAMP-2, TELLI GALLY, N.S.PHADKE ROAD, SAIWADI, TELIGALLI, ANDHERI(E) MUMBAI-400069 MAHARASHTRA ...........Respondent(s)
BEFORE: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL,PRESIDENT HON'BLE DR. S.M. KANTIKAR,MEMBER For the Petitioner : For the Petitioner : Mr. Ali Murtaza and Mr. Bhaskar Nayak Advocates For the Respondent :
Dated : 21 Jun 2022 ORDER
1. The present batch of the Revision Petitions under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short "the Act"), has been filed by the Petitioners/Opposite Parties in the Complaint before the District Forum, assailing the Common Order dated 12.10.2018, passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra, Mumbai (for short "the State Commission") in First Appeal Nos. A/15/1001 to A/15/1031. By the impugned Order, the State Commission has dismissed all the First Appeals preferred by the Petitioners/Opposite Parties against the Common Order dated 30.04.2015 passed by the Consumer Grievances Redressal Forum, Mumbai Sub-Urban District (for short, "the District Forum") in Complaint Nos. 08/2009 to 38/2009 and upheld Order of the District Forum. By the said Order, the District Forum while partly allowing the Complaints filed by the Complainants, has directed the Petitioners/Opposite Parties to pay a compensation of ₹3,00,000/- to each of the Complainants for mental torture and harassment within a period of 30 days from the receipt of the copy of the Order failing which the amount was to carry interest @18% p.a. from 07.01.2007 till actual payment. Besides, Petitioners were also directed to pay a sum of ₹10,000/- to each of the Complainants for cost of litigation.
02. Since all the Revision Petitions have arisen from a Common Order passed by the State Commission, we dispose of the same with this Common Order.
03. Succinctly put, the material facts giving rise to the present Revision Petitions are that the Complainants were residing at Rukminibai Chawl, Room No. 60, Saiwadi, Teligalli, Andheri (East), Mumbai situated on the land City Survey No. 428, 429 and 430, Revenue Gundavali, Tehsil Andhri, Mumbai Suburban District. Under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, the Government of Maharashtra has declared the said land as Slum and gave a right to the Hut Holders/Slum Dwellers to appoint the Developer for development of the said Slum. The Petitioners/Opposite Parties promised to the Respondents/Complainants and other Hut Holders to give a permanent accommodation in lieu of their premises in Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and the Respondents/Complainants accordingly accepted the said offer. Necessary approval in this regard was obtained from Saiwadi Slum Rehabilitation Authority by the Petitioners. An Agreement dated 26.12.1994 (for short, the "Agreement") was executed between the parties, according to which the Petitioners were allowed to construct Free Sale Buildings along with the Rehabilitation Buildings for rehabilitation of the Slum Dwellers including Complainants. In terms of the Agreement and the guidelines of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, the Petitioners were under an obligation to give permanent alternative Flats to the Complainants and other Hut Holders within a period of 18 to 24 months from the date of execution of the Agreement. On 19.05.2005, the Respondents/ Complainants and other Hut Holders received a notice from the Petitioners to vacate their huts and hence they vacated the land in the month of May, 2005 and shifted to a Transit Camp. However, since possession could not be handed over within the stipulated time, after protests from the Respondents, the Petitioners in writing on 02.04.2007, promised to the Complainants to hand over the possession within next 15 months. But still the Petitioners failed to keep their promise and possession could not be handed over to the Respondents. A notice dated 22.08.2008 was also served upon the Petitioners asking them to hand over the possession of the alternative Flats. Vide reply dated 16.09.2008, the Petitioners denied to having committed to give the possession within 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement. It was alleged by the Complainants in the Complaints that although the Hut Holders were promised to be given Permanent Alternative Flats admeasuring 225 sq. ft. free of costs in exchange of their residing house under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, the Petitioners were getting the Floor Space Index (FSI) and Transferable Development Right (TDR) free of costs having area of 225 Sq. Ft. from the Government of Maharashtra in lieu of flats free of costs. It is further alleged that the Petitioners had given first priority for construction of the Sale Building and sold the flats and had avoided to construct rehabilitation building for accommodating the Slum Dwellers. Feeling aggrieved the Complainants filed the various complaints before the District Forum.
04. The Opposite Parties by filing their joint Written Version resisted the complaints filed by the Complainants on the grounds that; as there was no privity of contract between the Complainants and the Opposite Party No.2, the Director of the Opposite Party No.1, the Complaints were liable to be dismissed against him; the Complainants had preferred Writ Petition No. 472/2008 before the Hon'ble Bombay High Court for same cause of action and vide Order dated 29.02.2008, they were directed to file appropriate representation before the High Power Committee constituted by the State Government; Complaints could not be entertained in view of the principle of Res-judicata and Estoppels.
05. On merits, it was the contention of the Petitioners that they were developing a larger piece of land of 52508.sq. mts., the Hut Dwellers were shifted to the Transit Camp after vacation of land; 15 Buildings for the rehabilitation of the Hut Holders were to be constructed by the Petitioners and 4 Buildings for free Sale. Out of 15, 12 Buildings for Hut Holders were completed; 2 buildings were under construction and 1 building was yet to be started for construction; similarly, 2 Buildings out of the 4, were constructed by the Petitioners for free sale; there were about 2145 slum dwellers under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and out of them 1321 slum dwellers had already been allotted Permanent Alternative Accommodation; there was some dispute with some of the Slum Dwellers who had not vacated their premises and went for legal proceedings resulting in delay of rehabilitating the Complainants; some of the Hut Holders would be given the Permanent Alternative Accommodation within a period of 6 to 8 months on completion of the under-construction buildings; the Petitioners were making all the efforts to provide Permanent Alternative Accommodation to the remaining Hut Holders in accordance with the Seniority List maintained by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority;
06. After a careful consideration of all the facts and material available on the record, the District Forum rejected all the contentions raised by the Petitioners in support of their defence for delay in handing over the Alternative Flat to the Slum Dwellers in terms of the Agreement dated 26.12.1994.
07. With regard to the preliminary objections raised by the Petitioners that the Complainants are not the "Consumers" in the absence of any payment as consideration, Complaint is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and the Consumer Forum has no jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint in terms of bar created by Section 42 of Maharashtra Slum Act, the District Forum held as under:-
" It will be proper to consider the points raised by the advocate of the opponent. Though the place of Saiwadi Slum is owned by Government where the Complainant is residing, still the Government has regularized the slum by planning the policy to give houses to the hut holders under Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and taken in hand the development work of slum through Slum Rehabilitation Authority. The hut holders gave the possession of their places under this Scheme to the Opponent for development i.e. the Complainant in it gave his place and the opponent agreed that they will give the permanent alternative accommodation to the complainant in lieu of it and executed the agreement as per that, it means though the Complainant has not paid the price in the form of money to the Opponent but still the Complainant gave the possession of his place to the Opponent and they only the Opponent took in hand the above work of Slum Development. As per that the Complainant is to be decided as the customer of the Defendant and as is the opinion of this Forum. Hence, the objection raised by the Advocate of the Defendant for this is not having any meaning.
The Opponent also has argued that as Govt. of Maharashtra and Slum Rehabilitation Authority were not included as the necessary parties, hence the complaint is being affected by the principal of "non-joinder of necessary parties". But there is not any meaning as per reason mentioned below because originally the Complainant and Opponent executed an agreement dated 26.12.1994 and the Defendant has agreed to give some particular services to the Complainant and though it was the case the Complainant has charged that the Opponent has violated the terms and conditions of the Agreement and has given the defective services to the Complainant. As per that it was cleared that the main dispute is in between the Complainant and the Opponent. In this situation, it cannot be decided to include Government of Maharashtra and S.R.A. as parties because the Complainant does not demand any reliefs from them.
The other objection raised by the Opponent is that the complaint is being affected by the principle of res-judicata and estoppels and in this objection also the Forum found no meaning because the Writ Petition No.472/2008 filed in the Hon'ble High Court before and as per the Order issued in it, the dispute subject in case filed before the High Power Committee and the dispute subject in this complaint are different and it was seen clearly by the documents filed by the Defendant. Hence, the principles of Res-Judictata and Estoppels are not applicable here.
The Lawyer of the Opponent referred the Section 42 of Maharashtra Slum Act and argued as above. It is necessary to mention that provisions of Section 42 here. This is the following provision in Section 42:-
"Bar of Jurisdiction"
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Appellate Authority, Competent Authority, Grievance Redressal Committee or Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act, to determine; and no injunction shall be granted by my court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of the any power conferred by or under this Act.
After reading the above said provision, it was clearly seen that the Section 42 does not applicable to this case. "
08. On the merit of the case, the District Forum has observed as under:-
" Considering the available documents and evidences in this case, it was proved that the Defendant has given the defective services to the Complainant because the Complainant and other hut holders gave their place in the possession of the Opponent in May 2005 and though it was the case still the Defendant has not given the permanent flats to some out of the Complainants upto year 2010 and the Defendant avoided to give the flat to the Complainant by saying the different excuses. At last it was seen as per the additional reply filed by the Opponent at Exh-A that they gave the flats to 13 hut holders out of the total complainants. But to the other complainants they have not given the permanent flats upto now. As per Opponent he was ready to give the flats to the other Complainants also in year 2010. But the complainants themselves did not come ahead by themselves to take possession. Though the opponent would have tried to show like this but they have not filed any evidences to support their this statement on the record. It was not seen that the Defendant had sent any letter or notice to the other complainants in year 2010 for to take possession and in this situation it is not possible to accept the statement of the Opponent. Due to the mistake and negligence of the Opponent the complainant has to reside in the transit camp upto 2010 and some complainants have to reside upto now and in this situation it is quite natural that they would have been tortured mentally, physically and financially and it is the opinion of the Forum that only the Opponent is responsible for it. Hence considering all these points and situation the Forum has come to the conclusion that the complaint is liable to obtain the compensation from the Opponent."
09. Dis - satisfied with the Common Order passed by the District Forum, the Petitioners preferred aforesaid First Appeals before the State Commission. However, after reappraisal of facts of the case and the evidence adduced by the parties, the State Commission confirmed the finding returned by the District Forum to the effect that the Petitioner were deficient in service on account of not handing over the Permanent Alternative Flats to the Hut Holders in terms of the Agreement in question. The State Commission observed as under:-
" In our view, under Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 there is additional and supplemental remedy available to a person who falls within definition of 'Consumer' within meaning of section 2(1) (d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each of the Complainants as consumer had vacated the premises in their occupation in favour of the Builder developer for consideration that they will get permanent alternate accommodation of 225 sq. ft. to each of them. The Builder/Developer had under the contract made promises in consideration of vacating slum area by each of the complainant and enabled themselves to construct the building project including presale area and rehab area. Thus builder/developer become service provider within the meaning of the Act and was under obligation under the contract to construct the building in accordance with sanctioned plan and to provide residential accommodation to each of the complainants as promised. There is no question of transgression of limits by the learned Forum below so as to pass any order contrary to the slum Redevelopment Act. The power was exercised in the facts and circumstances of the case in view of the independent and supplemental remedy available under section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. When consumer dispute was raised by the complainants against the service provider in their capacity as consumer within the definition of section 2(1) (d) of the Act, nothing prevented the learned Forum below to pass appropriate Award by entertaining and deciding the complaint. We therefore find that when there was delay to deliver possession to each of the Complainants and there was avoidance on the part of the builder/developer to take steps to form registered co-operative Housing Society of the flat occupants in the building project as contemplated under the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963 the builder/developer indulged into deficiency in service as contemplated under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Therefore, learned Forum below rightly passed impugned Judgment and Award.
10. Feeling aggrieved, Petitioners have filed the present Revision Petitions questioning the legality of the Orders passed by the Fora below.
11. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners at some length and also perused the material available on the record.
12. The main thrust of the arguments advanced by the learning Counsel appearing for the Petitioners is that the Consumer Fora has no jurisdiction to entertain the present complaints inasmuch as the Slum Dwellers in an Slum Rehabilitation Scheme do not fall within the definition of "Consumer" as defined u/s 2(1)(d) of the Act.; the Complainants are not Consumers as no consideration was paid; vacation of Slum Area is not a consideration as paid by the Complainants and consideration has to be in monies worth; as per clause 8 of the Agreement, the entire cost of the construction was to be borne by the Petitioners and Respondents were to pay a meagre sum of ₹15,000/- in exchange of taking possession of their permanent alternate accommodation admeasuring 225 sq. ft..
13. He further strenuously urged that only a few Respondents/ Complainants out of 2145 Slum Dwellers had filed the Consumer Complaints before the District Forum with ulterior motives; the Slum Rehabilitation Authority was the appropriate Authority which could had adjudicated upon the disputes; the very purpose to constitute Slum Tribunals and Grievance Redressal Commission is to resolve the issues pertaining to Slum Rehabilitation Schemes and thereby ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts; the Complaint is barred by Res-judicata since the Complainants had raised the same issues before the High Power Committee; the Petitioners are not Service Providers and are only responsible for implementing a Government Scheme; the Petitioners have not violated the terms of the Agreement dated 26.12.1994; there is a clear Statutory Bar under Section 42 of the Maharashtra Slum Act, 1970 with regard to the jurisdiction of any other Forum/Tribunal to entertain the Complaint, the District Forum being a Civil Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in terms of Section 42 of the Slum Act, 1971; the Order passed by the District Forum is ex-facie illegal, bad in law and contrary to the provisions of the Consumer Protect Act; the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1326 of 2007, namely, Tulsiwadi Navnirman Cooperative Housing Society Limited vs. State of Maharashtra & ors. - , decided on 01.11.2007, had directed the parties to address their grievances before the High Powered Committee; decision delivered in the case of Tukaram Dhondi Sutar (Since Deceased) Through Legal Heirs vs. Nana Bhau Tibile & Ors is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case; delay, if any, in offering the Permanent Alternative flats to the Slum Dwellers cannot be attributed to the Petitioners since some of the Hut Holders did not vacate their premises in time and non-action on the part of the Dy Collector, SRA.
14. Having heard patiently the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, we are of the considered view that there is no substance in any of the Preliminary Objections raised by him. The Consumer Fora below has dealt with all the Preliminary Objections in detail and in our considered view, has rightly rejected the same holding concurrently that the Complainants are the Consumers as defined u/s 2 (1)(d) of the Act and the remedy available in the Consumer Fora is an additional remedy and is not in derogation of the provisions of any other law or statute.
15. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has fervently submitted that Complainants, the Slum Dwellers, are not the Consumers inasmuch as the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme does not fall under the purview of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. He further contended that the Slum Rehabilitation Authority is appropriate Authority to adjudicate upon the issues involved between the parties and Section 42 of the Maharashtra Slum Act bar the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora.
16. We find it a fit case to place reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Union of India - (2019) 8 SCC 416 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court referring to the various provisions contained in Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (for short "the Code"), Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (for short, the "RERA") and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as well as its earlier decisions, has held as under:-
"RERA is to be read harmoniously with the Code, as amended by the Amendment Act. It is only in the event of conflict that the Code will prevail over RERA. Remedies that are given to allottees of Flats/Apartments are therefore concurrent remedies, such allottees of Flats/Apartments being in a position to avail of remedies under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, RERA as well as triggering of the Code"
17. Further, in the case of Imperia Structures Ltd. Vs. Anil Patani - (2020) 10 SCC 783, while disussing the various provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the RERA 2016 especially the Section 79 of RERA imposing a bar on the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter which the Authority or the Adjudicating Officer or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the RERA Act to determine, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Doctrine of Election is applicable and it is always open to a person either to approach the fora under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986/2019 or to approach any other Authority under Real Estate Regulatory Authority Act, 2016 or NCLT under the provisions of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 for redressal of his grievance. The person who has approached to any of the Authorities referred to above, at the first instance, is estopped from approaching other two Authorities as Doctrine of Election applies. The aforesaid Section 79 of the RERA is similar to Section 42 of the Maharashtra Slum Act 1971 which provides that "no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Administrator, Competent Authority or Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act, to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other Authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. With respect to the effect and applicability of Section 79 of RERA, the Apex Court has held as under:-
" It is, therefore, required to be considered whether the remedy so provided under the RERA Act to an allottee is the only and exclusive modality to raise a grievance and whether the provisions of the RERA Act bar consideration of the grievance of an allottee by other fora.
Section 79 of the RERA Act bars jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Authority or the adjudicating officer or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the RERA Act to determine. Section 88 specifies that the provisions of the RERA Act would be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, while in terms of Section 89, the provisions of the RERA Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force.
On plain reading of Section 79 of the RERA Act, an allottee described in category (B) stated in paragraph 22 hereinabove, would stand barred from invoking the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. However, as regards the allottees who can be called "consumers" within the meaning of the CP Act, two questions would arise; a) whether the bar specified Under Section 79 of the RERA Act would apply to proceedings initiated under the provisions of the CP Act; and b) whether there is anything inconsistent in the provisions of the CP Act with that of the RERA Act.
In Malay Kumar Ganguli v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee : (2009) 9 SCC 221, it was held by this Court:
" The proceedings before the National Commission are although judicial proceedings, but at the same time it is not a civil court within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may have all the trappings of the civil court but yet it cannot be called a civil court. (See Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees: AIR 1950 SC 188 and Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 635."
On the strength of the law so declared, Section 79 of the RERA Act does not in any way bar the Commission or Forum under the provisions of the CP Act to entertain any complaint."
As such, the Section 42 of the Maharashtra Slum Act, 1971 does not bar the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora to entertain any Complaint. It is an additional remedy available to the Consumers.
18. Similarly, in the case of the Joint Labour Commissioner and Registering Officer & Anr. Vs. Kesar Lal - II (2020) CPJ 32 (SC) while dealing with the question whether a construction worker who is registered under the Building and other Construction Workers' (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 and is a beneficiary of the Scheme made under the Rules framed pursuant to the enactment, is a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Act, the Apex Court has held as under:-
" As a matter of interpretation, the provisions contained in the Consumer Protection Act 1986 must be construed in a purposive manner. Parliament has provided a salutary remedy to consumers of both goods and services. Public authorities such as the Appellants who have been constituted under an enactment of Parliament are entrusted with a solemn duty of providing welfare services to registered workers. The workers who are registered with the Board make contributions on the basis of which they are entitled to avail of the services provided in terms of the schemes notified by the Board. Public accountability is a significant consideration which underlies the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. The evolution of jurisprudence in relation to the enactment reflects the need to ensure a sense of public accountability by allowing consumers a redressal in the context of the discharge of non-sovereign functions which are not rendered free of charge. This test is duly met in the present case."
19. Recently, in the case of Vodafone Idea Cellular Ltd. Vs. Ajay Kumar Agrawal - Civil Appeal No.923 of 2017 - decided on 16.02.2022, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue, as to whether Section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 ousts the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum in deciding a dispute between a Telecom Company and a Consumer, has held as under"-
" The judgment of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in M Krishnan (supra) arose from a decision of the Kerala High Court. The dispute, in that case, arose from the disconnection of a telephone connection for the non-payment of the bill. The District Forum allowed the complaint. The writ petition was dismissed. The proceedings resulted in a reference to a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, which dismissed the writ appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge. Before this Court, the jurisdiction of the consumer forum was in issue. In that context, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus:-
"5. In our opinion when there is a special remedy provided in Section 7-B of the Telegraph Act regarding disputes in respect of telephone bills, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred."
The Court also relied on Rule 413 of the Telegraph Rules in terms of which all services relating to telephones are subject to the Telegraph Rules. The Court held that the special law would override the general law and concluded that the High Court was not correct in upholding the jurisdiction of the consumer forum.
We are unable to subscribe to the view which has been adopted in the above decision in M Krishnan (supra). The decision is incorrect on two grounds. First, it failed to recognize that the Act of 1986 is not a general law but a special law that has been enacted by Parliament specifically to protect the interest of consumers. Second, even if it is assumed that the Act of 1986 is a general law, it is a settled position of law that if there is any inconsistency between two legislations, the later law, even if general in nature, would override an earlier special law. In Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India - (1984) 3 SCC 127 , a three-judge Bench of this Court observed:
"38...As mentioned hereinbefore if the Scheme was held to be valid, then the question what is the general law and what is the special law and which law in case of conflict would prevail would have arisen and that would have necessitated the application of the principle Generalia specialibus non derogant. The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later general law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied:
"(i) The two are inconsistent with each other. (ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment."
If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law, even though general, would prevail.
39. From the text and the decisions, four tests are deducible and these are: (i) The legislature has the undoubted right to alter a law already promulgated through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law may be altered, abrogated or repealed by a later general law by an express provisions, (iii) A later general law will override a prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each other that they cannot co-exist even though no express provision in that behalf is found in the general law, and (iv) It is only in the absence of a provision to the contrary and of a clear inconsistency that a special law will remain wholly unaffected by a later general law. See in this connection, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edn., pp. 196-198."
19. In any event, the decision in M Krishnan (supra) also fails to note that the Act of 1986 is a special law providing protection to consumers. Crucially, M Krishnan (supra) fails to notice that Section 3 of the Act of 1986 clearly provides that the remedies available under the Act are in addition to the remedies available in other statutes and the availability of additional remedies would not bar a consumer from filing a complaint under the Act of 1986. Section 100 of the Act of 2019 corresponds to Section 3 of the Act of 1986. In Emaar MGF Land Ltd. (supra), this Court held that the complaint under the Act of 1986 is a special remedy provided to a consumer in addition to the remedies that can be availed of by them, including arbitration. In Imperia Structures Ltd. v Anil Patni (2020) 10 SCC 783 , this Court held that the remedies available under the Act of 1986 are in addition to the remedies available under other statutes, including special statutes like the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 2016. This Court reiterated the settled position of law in the following terms:
"23. It has consistently been held by this Court that the remedies available under the provisions of the CP Act are additional remedies over and above the other remedies including those made available under any special statutes; and that the availability of an alternate remedy is no bar in entertaining a complaint under the CP Act."
20. The above position was reiterated in IREO Grace Realtech (P) Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna - 2021 SCC ONLINE SC 277 by a three-judge Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part. Justice Indu Malhotra, speaking for the Bench invoked the doctrine of election, which provides that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the party at whose disposal such remedies are available, can make the choice to elect either of the remedies as long as the ambit and scope of the two remedies is not essentially different. These observations were made in the context of an allottee of an apartment having the choice of initiating proceedings under the Act of 1986 or the RERA. In the present case, the existence of an arbitral remedy will not, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum. It would be open to a consumer to opt for the remedy of arbitration, but there is no compulsion in law to do so and it would be open to a consumer to seek recourse to the remedies which are provided under the Act of 1986, now replaced by the Act of 2019. The insertion of the expression 'telecom services' in the definition which is contained in Section 2(42) of the Act of 2019 cannot, for the reasons which we have indicated be construed to mean that telecom services were excluded from the jurisdiction of the consumer forum under the Act of 1986. On the contrary, the definition of the expression 'service' in Section 2(o) of the Act of 1986 was wide enough to comprehend services of every description including telecom services.
21. For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the NCDRC which came to the conclusion that the District Forum has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint."
20. A bare perusal of the afore-extracted judgements would reveal that an option was available to the Hut Holders either to approach the Consumer Forum or the Slum Rehabilitation Authority for redressal of the their grievance against the Developer on account of delay in handing the possession of permanent alternative Flat. Hence, the said contention of the Opposite Party is rejected.
21. Another contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the Hut Holders/Slum Dwellers are the not the "Consumers" as they did not pay any consideration to the Petitioners, also does not hold any water. It is undisputed that the Complainants were residing in a Chawl situated on the land City Survey No.428, 429 and 430, Revenue Gundavali, Tehsil Andhari, Mumbai Suburban District. The Government of Maharashtra declared the land as Slum under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme and gave a power to the Hut Holders to appoint the Developer for development of the said land. The Slum Dwellers entered into an Agreement/contract dated 26.12.1994 with the Petitioners Developer. As per the Agreement, the Petitioners were under an obligation to give a Permanent Alternative Flat admeasuring 225 sq. ft. to all the Hut Holders on vacation of their land premises and the Developer was entitled to use the excess FSI, construct the Free Sale Building and to sell the Flats of the Free Sale Building. As admitted in the Written Version, the Developer was to construct 15 Buildings for the rehabilitation of the Hut Holders and 4 Buildings for free sale of Flats by them. Therefore, the Developer became the Service Provider within the meaning of the Act and was under obligation under the Contract dated 26.12.1994 to construct the Rehabilitation Building in accordance with the sanctioned plan and to provide Residential Accommodation to each of the Complainants as promised. In fact, though the Complainants have not paid the price in the form of money to the Developer but still the Complainants gave the possession of their land premises to the Developer for construction of Rehabilitation Building and Free Sale Building any by selling the Flats in the Free Sale Building, the Petitioner has got the sale proceed as consideration. It will also be pertinent to reproduced here the Clause 8 of the Agreement dated 26.12.1994 which is as under:-
" The entire cost of development of the said property including the cost of construction of the new building or buildings in respect of the said property is to be borne and paid by the Developers alone, save and except for the same of Rs.15,000/- per non-commercial tenement and sum calculated at the rate of Rs.550/- sq. ft. for the commercial tenement which shall be paid by each of the tenants/members/ occupants to the Developers, i.e. by party of the Third part for the tenement allotted to them, on signing of this Agreement."
22. Be that as it may, recently, the Hon'ble Supreme in the case of "Laureate Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. vs. Charanjeet Singh" [2021 SCC OnLine SC 479], has laid down the principal that the absence of privity of contract is not a bar for maintaining a Complaint against a Service Provider. It was observed as under:-
"25. In another decision, Canara Bank v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2020) 3 SCC 455, the issue which this court had to consider was whether the insurer could repudiate liability in respect of a fire which destroyed farm produce kept in a cold storage, when the farmers had no privity with the insurer, but with the cold storage, and who availed credit on the security of the crop. The court held as follows:
"28. Taking the issue of privity of contract, we are of the considered view that as far as the Act is concerned, it is not necessary that there should be privity of contract between the Insurance Company and the claimants. The definition of "consumer" under Section 2(d) quoted hereinabove is in two parts. Sub-clause (i) of Section 2(1)(d) deals with a person who buys any goods and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods as long as the use is made with the approval of such person. Therefore, the definition of consumer even in the first part not only includes the person who has purchased but includes any user of the goods so long as such user is made with the approval of the person who has purchased the goods. As far as the definition of "consumer" in relation to hiring or availing of services is concerned, the definition, in our view, is much wider. In this part of the section, consumer includes not only the person who has hired or availed of the services but also includes any beneficiary of such services. Therefore, an insured could be a person who hires or avails of the services of the Insurance Company but there could be many other persons who could be the beneficiaries of the services. It is not necessary that those beneficiaries should be parties to the contract of insurance. They are the consumers not because they are parties to the contract of insurance but because they are the beneficiaries of the policy taken out by the insured."
XXXXX It is therefore evident that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was conceived as a legislation to address complaints of consumers (an expression defined and interpreted widely) and provide a forum for their quick redressal, and, furthermore, wherever third parties have claimed relief, technicalities have been brushed aside consistently, by this court. Thus, even after an original consumer is indemnified for a fire accident, the insurer can maintain a complaint against the carrier/service provider, and claim damages (of course along with the insured party). Likewise, absence of privity of contract is not a bar for maintaining a complaint against a service provider, by a third party who suffers an incident, which is otherwise covered by an agreement......"
23. Applying the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laureate Buildwell's case (supra), we are of the view that the Complainants being the beneficiary or user of the Rehabilitation Builders to be constructed by the Developers in lieu of vacation of their land, are Consumers and accordingly this contention is also rejected.
24. Now, coming to the question of the delay in handing over the possession of the Permanent Alternative Flats to the Hut Holders/Slum Dwellers, there is a concurrent finding of facts returned by the Consumer Fora below that the Petitioners have completely failed to deliver the possession of the Permanent Alternative Flats to the Slum Dwellers as promised within a period of 18 months from the date of vacation of the Slum Area on 19.05.2005. It is an admitted fact that the Petitioners had agreed to offer a Flat admeasuring 225 sq. ft. to the Slum Dwellers in lieu of vacation of their hut, in the Rehabilitation Building to be constructed by them, in terms of Agreement dated 26.12.1994. A notice dated 15.04.2005 was sent to the Slum Dwellers to vacate their huts in Slum Area and accordingly they vacated the Slum Area on 19.05.2005. All the Slum Dwellers except 11 were shifted to the Transit Camps. As promised, the Petitioners were to construct the Rehabilitation Houses and to give the possession of Flats to the Slum Dwellers within a period of 18 months from the date of vacation of land. However, the Petitioners had miserably failed to hand over the possession of the Flats in Rehabilitation Building to the Hut Holders upto the year 2010 and the Hut Holders were completed to reside in the Transit Camp to bear the mental torture. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners argued that they offered possession to the Complainants in the year 2010 itself but they did not come forward. But, no cogent and valid documentary evidence has been adduced by the Petitioners to substantiate the veracity of the said contention. The only defence taken by the Petitioners for delay in handing over the possession of the Flats to the Complainants was that 11 Slum Dwellers did not vacate their Hut in the year 2005 and some of the Slum Dwellers filed the Writ Petitions before the Hon'ble High Court which had ultimately resulted in delay of the completion of the Rehabilitation Buildings. However, we do not agree with the said contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners inasmuch it it has been categorically upheld by the District Forum in its Order dated 30.04.2015 that the Complainants were still residing in the Transit Camp waiting and hoping for their dream of a house to become true and the said fact has been affirmed by the State Commission in the Appeals preferred by the Petitioners. Hence, there is a concurrent finding of deficient service on the part of the Petitioners by the Fora Below which does not warrant any interference from us in Revisional Jurisdiction. The Revisional Jurisdiction of this Commission is extremely limited as has been recently held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 'Sunil Kumar Maity vs. State Bank of India & Anr.' [Civil Appeal No. 432 / 2022 Order dated 21.01.2022] by observing as under:-
"9. It is needless to say that the revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the said Act is extremely limited. It should be exercised only in case as contemplated within the parameters specified in the said provision, namely when it appears to the National Commission that the State Commission had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In the instant case, the National Commission itself had exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by calling for the report from the respondent-bank and solely relying upon such report, had come to the conclusion that the two fora below had erred in not undertaking the requisite in-depth appraisal of the case that was required. ....."
25. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the Orders passed by the Fora below. Consequently, the Revision Petitions are dismissed devoid of any merit in limini.
......................J R.K. AGRAWAL PRESIDENT ...................... DR. S.M. KANTIKAR MEMBER